Augusto César Sandino has given American historians, as he once gave the Marines, a very difficult time. A close reading of the standard accounts reveals more confusion than understanding. Interpretations of him range through a broad spectrum from bandit to patriot, and Latin American writers outside of Nicaragua regard him as an Ariel. Neill W. Macaulay of the University of Florida has written an important book which answers many questions concerning the enfant terrible of Nicaragua. Little changed in its present form, The Sandino Affair is based on an exceptional Ph.D. dissertation. It is a well-researched and forcefully written study which deserves serious attention.
Although the current vogue for guerrilla warfare fascinates Macaulay, his work is more than an operational case study. Limiting his direct references to Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Vietnam to the Preface and Postscript, he shows admirable restraint in his analysis. He clearly demonstrates that the creed of Latin American nationalism sustained the indomitable guerrillero of the Segovias in his ruthless and protracted campaign against interventionism. This nationalism had mystical Indo-Hispanic implications which, however, were never clearly articulated. Sandino’s basic nationalism emerged intuitively after his experience in revolutionary Mexico, where intense ideological ferment aroused his latent abilities. Macaulay also clarifies Sandino’s flirtation with the Communists. Accepting their sympathy, he never submitted to their direction. Consequently Party interest waned until after his death, when he was proclaimed a martyr.
It was Sandino’s success as a charismatic guerrilla leader which first brought him fame. Here Macaulay excels in his analysis, for his experiences with the July 26 movement in Pinar del Río have given him valuable insights. He convincingly argues that it is a fatal error to employ conventional warfare in a revolutionary guerrilla situation, noting that the United States has failed to learn this basic lesson. Linking the late Ernesto Guevara to Sandinismo is significant and raises many questions about current explanations for the origins of Fidelista guerrilla warfare. Since the geographical setting of northern Nicaragua is intimately related to Sandino’s insurgency, the author’s familiarity with the area enhances his analysis and leads to some vivid descriptive passages.
Some qualifications should be considered. It is apparent that Macaulay writes with special reference to current Castroite techniques and to Vietnam, thereby introducing a measure of relativity into his account. He also pushes his identification of Cold War guerrillas with Sandino too far. After all, Sandino was a nationalist. Also Macaulay has not explored some important areas, notably Sandino’s cultural legacy and his influence on American diplomacy and politics.
While we still lack an over-all assessment of Sandino’s place in history, this book is based on the major sources in English and Spanish, and the author’s use of Marine Corps records breaks new ground. Interested scholars should study his comments on them in HAHR (May 1966, 179-181). Elting E. Morison’s interpretation of Henry L. Stimson and L. Ethan Ellis’ study of Frank B. Kellogg are also worth examining. Every Latin Americanist should consider the implications of The Sandino Affair, and it should be required reading for high Washington officialdom. The inability of Americans to understand Sandino may symbolize the failure of the United States in Latin America.
