This small book attempts to construct a behavioralist case study using the various efforts to bring peace between Paraguay and Bolivia during the era of the Chaco War. The author focuses on the diplomatic rivalry between the United States and Argentina, the extent and seriousness of which he exaggerates. He loses his perspective, too, when he discusses bipolarization of prestige power, asserting that as “the largest national power on the continent” (p. 136) and a “South American giant” (p. 68), Argentina sought “hemispheric dominance” (p. 70).
This reviewer does not presume to appraise the book from the theoretical viewpoint of the behavioralist school of political science, but it is obvious that if a model is constructed out of inaccurate facts, it will have little value. The quality of Garner’s scholarship is suggested by the following errors selected from a long list. After 1717 Peru was a part of the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata (p. 41). Bolivia became independent in 1813 (p. 42). Daniel Salamanca attained the presidency of Bolivia by revolution in June 1930 (p. 62). Bolivia and Paraguay exchanged declarations of war in May 1933 (p. 82). Garner insists on regarding isolated clashes of December 1928 as the beginning of a “permanent state of war” (p. 50) in the Chaco, despite the three and one-half years of peace which followed. Part of his analytical framework rests upon the erroneous belief that as early as 1928 Argentine foreign policy was guided by Carlos Saavedra Lamas (p. 55).
Garner’s clumsy paraphrasing without attribution sometimes seems to border on plagiarism. His footnotes violate accepted style; the proofreading was careless; and the publisher’s claim that this monograph contains “penetrating analysis” cannot be taken seriously. The author, ignoring studies by Bryce Wood and the undersigned, asserts that this is the only diplomatic history of the Chaco War in English. Garner is correct in saying that much remains to be done on this subject, but his book does little to meet the need.
