Making considerable but by no means exhaustive use of archival material, Carlos Mery Squella of the Catholic University of Chile has written a brief summary of early Chilean-United States relations. Frequently he stresses the lack of preparation of United States representatives to Chile and also concedes the inadequate background of Chilean diplomats serving in the United States. He leaves the impression, though, that he regards the inadequacies of Chileans as quite natural, while those of United States diplomats are judged to be inexcusable and an affront to the southern republic. In general, Mery’s work is diplomatic history on the most superficial level, for he has made little attempt to explain the attitudes and background conditions that influenced Chilean-United States relations. A cursory introduction by historian-polemicist Jaime Eyzaguirre adds nothing of value to the meager work.

Mery deals in some detail with the treaty of peace, amity, commerce, and navigation signed in 1832 by the United States and Chile. The United States wanted the treaty to contain a conventional most-favored-nation clause, while Chile desired the right to grant sister Latin American republics concessions which would not have to be extended to the United States. The Chilean point of view prevailed, and subsequent attempts of the United States to prevent diplomats of Santiago from granting more favorable terms to Peru than those extended the United States resulted in discord and friction. Mery contends that the willingness of Andrés Santa Cruz, leader of the Peru-Bolivia Confederation (1835-1839), to subscribe to the United States position on tariff matters was in part responsible for Washington’s favorable attitude toward the Confederation in its struggle with Chile.

In effect, the main purpose of the Mery book is to justify Chile’s war against the Confederation while at the same time censuring various United States diplomats for their sympathy with the Santa Cruz cause. He pictures Yankee representatives as motivated solely by selfish economic considerations, whereas high-minded Chileans who grasped the true needs and destiny of the southern continent showed selfless statesmanship and international wisdom. Mery has totally ignored the research of Robert N. Burr and others in writing a chauvinistic history of Chile’s crusade against the nefarious Santa Cruz Confederation and its United States sympathizers.

Not long ago in a Lima newspaper the Chilean historian, Guillermo Feliú Cruz, praised Félix Denigri Luna’s unique qualifications to write a balanced history of the Peru-Bolivia Confederation and its diplomatic relations. He expressed the hope that this Peruvian historian would soon dedicate himself to that task. The inadequacies of the present book make one all the more anxious for the speedy fulfillment of Feliú’s hope.