Colombia’s economic troubles constitute the subject of these books. The smaller of the two offers a panacea, while the larger deals not only with contemporary problems but with broad philosophical and historical factors. Both authors are strong advocates of economic and social planning, and each makes a plea to Colombians to think in “modern” terms.
Carlos Sanz de Santamaría has served his country in several capacities, most notably as minister of finance and as ambassador to the United States. He explains the purpose of his very long introduction in particular and the book in general as his effort to enlighten the Colombian public about “the difficult epoch” of 1961-1962, but he does not confine himself to that brief period. An optimist, he is trying to convince the people that their fears are only more likely to bring on the financial crises which they dread.
He discusses problems of monoculture, lack of diversification of exports, deficits in the balance of payments, and the need for a more equitable tax structure, and tells how various economic plans of the 1940s and 1950s were never really followed. The crisis of 1961 specifically involved a drop in coffee prices, followed by a serious balance of payments situation because the export of coffee to the United States at U.S. $0.52 per pound was insufficient to pay for imports and, at the same time, to service the debt. The Colombian congress never wholly accepted the tax proposals of Sanz and preceding finance ministers, although government expenses were constantly increasing. In November the government resorted to devaluation, and the peso, which had gradually been dropping over the years, was pegged at nine per U.S. dollar, as against 1.80 to 1 in 1948, when the reviewer was in Bogotá. Stating that “planning is indispensable,” the author concludes with a discussion of optimism itself, saying that modern optimism is based on the progress of science and technology.
Lauchlin Currie, New Deal planner and controversial figure during the McCarthy era, headed the World Bank mission which made an economic study of Colombia in 1949 (HAHR, XXXI, 463-66). The five-year development plan proposed by this study was never really followed. Currie remained in Colombia, became a Colombian citizen in 1958, and produced his Operación Colombia as a personal report to the Colombian government in 1960. It conflicted with the government’s development programs; President Lleras Camargo publicly opposed it; and it was not adopted. The present book is the plan now issued to the public, for Currie still feels that it holds the answers to such Colombian problems as a large but nonproductive rural population, inadequate industrial production, and the increasing external debt accompanied by the flight of capital. Natural economic forces and the government’s programs may be moving in the right direction, writes Currie, but they are moving too slowly. Operación Colombia “presents a possible solution and can give dramatic results in a short time” (p. 21).
His detailed plan cannot be covered here, but the immediate action he calls for is to move a half million (eventually one and a half million) rural workers to the major urban centers within two years. Taking these semiemployed people from inefficient minifundios will lead to solutions for many problems. Initially the government will have to find them low-cost housing and jobs in industry. The farmers left behind on the land, given mechanization and newly opened fertile areas, and now having less competition, will produce much more. As a result, agriculture will become diversified. Meanwhile the increase in the domestic market will give a boost to industrialization; the great national investment in transportation and the steel industry will begin to pay off; loans will be facilitated; foreign investment encouraged; and the flagging faith in the vitality of the system will be restored. “It is concluded that the program here enunciated is economically good, logically consistent, administratively possible, and that it is the only one which, preserving free institutions, promises the rapid solution to our most pressing problems” (p. 69).
Both books include many charts and graphs. Both may be too difficult for the general public for which they are supposedly written, but may afford interesting if controversial reading for those who are in a position to follow the suggestions.
