El fin de la División del Norte is the third volume of Alberto Calzadíaz Barrera’s study of General Francisco Villa and his part in the Mexican Revolution, the first two volumes of which were reviewed in HAHR, February 1963. The preceding volumes traced Villa’s career from his semilegendary boyhood to his defeat by Obregón in the battles of Celaya and Trinidad during the summer of 1915. The author advanced the thesis that Villa was a dedicated revolutionary from early in life, rather than a bandit who turned revolutionist. The present volume covers the relatively short period between Villa’s defeat by Obregón and the dissolution of his forces after the ill-starred campaign in Sonora.
As in the first two, volumes, the author has drawn heavily for his source material upon the memories of aging men who were active participants in the crucial events of 1915. In addition he has been able to obtain documentary material, such as copies of orders, not previously available. Since he has made use of both Villistas and Carrancistas, the author has been able to achieve a remarkable degree of objectivity, despite the fact that he is admittedly an admirer of Villa.
Very few of the numerous studies of the Mexican Revolution by either Mexican or American writers have given attention to Villa’s last major campaign, when he attempted to revive his fortunes by the conquest of Sonora. It was a decisive campaign which, had Villa succeeded, would have given a totally different direction to the Mexican Revolution. The present work covers this important but almost forgotten phase of the Mexican Revolution in detail.
An American reader cannot help being somewhat disappointed that the work stops short with the end of the Sonora campaign and hence sheds no light upon the Columbus raid, the American punitive expedition, or Villa’s later efforts to rebuild his forces and stage a “comeback.” The work is also marred in a minor degree by repetition of disproved myths that have been repeated so often by otherwise responsible American writers that they are accepted without proof. The legend, for example, that President Wilson recognized Carranza because Villa had turned down propositions carried by Judge DuVal West, offering recognition in exchange for a concession at Magdalena Bay, is not supported by one iota of evidence. The myth that the searchlights causing the failure of Villa’s night attack at Agua Prieta were located on the United States side of the boundary and were manned by American soldiers is utterly untrue.
There are a number of errors in the transcription of English quotations, and the author would do well to acknowledge the sources from which he took such quotations. These minor shortcomings, however, do not detract materially from the value of the work, which is an important contribution to the literature on the Mexican Revolution.
