In November 1894, five years after the Brazilian armed forces had overthrown the empire and seized control of the government, a leading civilian and Paulista assumed the presidency. His coming to power ended a period of military incidents and uprisings and initiated one of freedom from overt military interference which would extend far into the twentieth century. The conditions on which the success of São Paulo was based deserve careful attention, for they have not often been repeated in Latin America. Utilizing the divisions within the armed forces and refusing to resort to armed revolt, the Paulistas illustrated one way by which a determined group of civilians might peacefully ease the armed forces out of direct political control.
While numerous civilians in Brazil demonstrated dissatisfaction with military involvement in political affairs, only one group, composed primarily of large landowners from the economically powerful coffee-exporting state of São Paulo, succeeded in removing the officers from the government. The Paulistas had long favored the creation of a federal, republican regime in their own best interests. They now saw that a strong military government posed a threat to local autonomy and to their prosperity. During the first years of the republic, established through a military uprising on November 15, 1889, they strengthened their power base in São Paulo, built up their own local military force, and generally opposed the revolts and political disturbances which damaged the Brazilian government’s credit abroad and hindered economic progress. When the fleet rebelled against the army-dominated government in September 1893, the civilians were able to take advantage of the divisions within the armed forces, ally themselves with Vice-President Marshal Floriano Peixoto, who needed their state militia, and then gain eventual control over the central government.
The large landholders of São Paulo took an active interest in the politics and government of their nation. Unlike the oligarchies of some other Latin American countries, they did not remain apart from the actual scene of political battle to rule by military proxy. Instead, they entered the political arena to defend their economic interests. They retained firm control over their state government and protected it against any encroachments by the federal government, in part by building up a strong military force; the prosperous coffee planters controlled the men and funds needed for the maintenance of a well trained and equipped “police force.”
By the latter part of the nineteenth century the divergences between the northern and southern parts of Brazil had increased, and the south, including São Paulo, had become dominant. After the mining prosperity of the eighteenth century ended, the nation’s economy had remained stagnant until the rise of a new export product —coffee. Social organization in the south underwent rapid changes, as wage-earning laborers increased, both on the coffee plantations and in the cities, European immigration grew, and small farm agriculture developed in the southernmost states. São Paulo, in particular, had become prosperous and its landed class wealthy.
Under the empire the plantation owners did not exercise political power commensurate with their economic importance. São Paulo naturally became the major center of the republican movement. The imperial government—largely influenced by former slave owners, some of them from the long-decadent sugar economy—often showed little sympathy with administrative and other reforms required by the transformations in the south. For many Paulistas and other southerners a federal regime with great local autonomy promised to meet their needs.
The Republican Party of São Paulo, the best organized republican grouping under the empire, advocated a federal regime. Alberto Sales, their chief theoretician, was the brother of Manuel Ferraz de Campos Sales, leading Paulista statesman and coffee planter. In his writings he extolled the benefits of this form of government almost to the point of separatism. Under a federal regime, each local center would “employ its own resources as best it thought,” and “the elements of wealth which exist in the different localities, instead of all being drained off to the general treasury” of the imperial government, would remain to benefit each locality.1 Moreover, São Paulo was “incontestably the only one giving to the imperial government without receiving.”2 Even under the “regime of the despotic centralization of the empire,”3 São Paulo had advanced to the forefront of the nation, and Sales predicted a vast increase in its agriculture, commerce, railroads, immigration, industry, and general prosperity when the overwhelming proportion of its revenues ceased to enter the imperial treasury. He advocated a form of separatism “as a means of arriving at federation,” which would especially include the southern part of Brazil.4 The coffee planters had learned the importance of government as an instrument of economic action, and they agreed that with state autonomy São Paulo would progress more rapidly, and less of its wealth would flow into the coffers of the central government.
Even before the founding of the republic in 1889, the Paulistas were intent on keeping control over their state government away from the army officers. The civilians had been aware of plans for the revolution of November 15, 1889, and they were prepared to take action in São Paulo once the republic had been declared. According to Campos Sales, one of their principal leaders, “the Paulista republicans closely followed the revolutionary movement and were informed of the details of occurring events” through means of letters, personal envoys, and telegraphic codes.5 On the night of November 15, 1889, “the people of the capital (of São Paulo), gathered in a compact body in front of the Republican Club, [and] acclaimed the provisional government of São Paulo,” a three-member junta, “without encountering the slightest resistance.”6 This junta, composed of two strong civilians and a compliant officer absent from the Paulista capital at the time, was recognized by the provisional republican regime of Marshal Manoel Deodoro da Fonseca. São Paulo had set up its own republican regime under civilian control, unlike many other states surprised by the overthrow of the empire and forced to submit to military governors chosen by the army-dominated central government.
During the early days of the republic the Paulistas remained most anxious to preserve local autonomy. Their views were reflected in newspapers like the Diário Popular, which continued to proclaim the benefits of federalism and the “great principle of autonomy,” railing against the “dangers of parliamentarism” and a centralized government.7 According to another local paper, São Paulo’s government was perhaps “that with the greatest importance in all the vast territory of the Brazilian republic,” and the state itself was one “most distinguished for its orderly and progressive spirit” and its steady, fruitful economic labors.8 Prudente José de Morais Barros, the first republican governor of São Paulo, clearly expressed this desire for autonomy and the intention to work for it in a letter to the finance minister of the provisional government. In this letter he declared that if the minister contributed “rapidly toward the decentralization of revenues—corresponding to the decentralization of services,” he would be “rendering the best and most important service to São Paulo, which, achieving this, will be able to live and develop itself with its own resources, without disturbing the central government—this is the supreme aspiration of this state.”9
But economic development would not be possible without political stability. Influential Paulistas like Campos Sales feared the “anarchy” which might arise out of the political violence of the times and the “discredit” into which Brazil was falling abroad.10 As he later recalled, the “long series of grievous events and armed movements … disturbed the normal functioning of national life, causing the destruction of our credit abroad.”11 During peaceful times São Paulo would attract more European immigrants, enriching its agriculture and thereby the whole economy of the state.12 The São Paulo government had become even more responsive to the interests of the coffee farmers under the federal republic, and it now took much more determined measures to promote the immigration of European laborers than had the imperial government. Such immigrants, however, might be less inclined to come to an unstable country, they felt.
Great concern was expressed for the nation’s finances, so seriously weakened by the military governments. The officers, unaccustomed to ruling a nation, did not always make the best administrators, and their shortcomings contributed to civilian dissatisfaction. As one friend of Prudente de Morais related, many were deeply worried about “the credit of the Republic, so seriously jeopardized by the incapacity of the officers who have been governing us.”13 These economic considerations seem to have been of greater interest to the Paulistas than any abstract principle of civil liberties or civilian rule.
In Minas Gerais, another economically powerful state interested in coffee export, governmental leaders expressed similar concern for state autonomy and opposed the revolutions and military disturbances which damaged the economy. As in the case of São Paulo the wealth of Minas Gerais was primarily agricultural. The mining region, once a great source of riches, was in decline, and the southern coffee area, a center of republicanism under the empire, was now ascendant. Since the establishment of the republic in 1889 the state government had remained in civilian hands, and local leaders expressed their belief in a large measure of state autonomy and political and economic stability. Residents of Minas Gerais like Américo Werneck could write that the officers’ “intentions are disruptive and their pronouncements, rebounding in society, disturb families, promote the depression of the exchange rate, and cause losses of thousands of contos to frightened commerce, which sees in their acts a symptom of bad times or the latent prelude of revolt.”14 Like his Paulista colleagues, Governor Afonso A. Moreira Pena of Minas Gerais had long been concerned with safeguarding state autonomy and maintaining stability. And he opposed revolutionary movements, those “most grievous political disturbances which weaken our institutions and compromise our credit.”15
To help protect their own autonomy and to fortify their position vis-à-vis the central government, the Paulistas concentrated on building up their own local military force. During the last years of the empire governors and police chiefs urged the drastic increase in the number of police troops, arguing that “the development of industries and the expansion of the railroads” had led to population growth requiring “a numerous police force” and that the existing force was grossly inadequate “for the most indispensable needs of policing the province.”16 But their incessant pleas went unheeded by the imperial government. With the republican federal regime, the governors of São Paulo gained the power to increase their forces. Prudente de Morais, the first republican governor, could justify such expansion by the need properly to “guarantee order and public tranquility” in this “revolutionary period.”17 As Campos Sales wrote Bernardino de Campos, the second governor of São Paulo, “our police force should be very well organized and disciplined, and the command given to men of confidence,” for “these men, under rigorous military discipline, will be a powerful safeguard in whatever eventuality.”18 Prudente later also advocated the formation of armed municipal forces of “good republicans” as further protection.19
While all the states had police forces, these had had no military potential under the empire. But after the federal republic was established, states like Minas Gerais, Rio Grande do Sul, Bahia, and especially São Paulo increased the number of men under arms. In 1888, the permanent police force of São Paulo numbered less than five hundred men. The first republican governor, Prudente de Morais, raised the number of troops to seventeen hundred. By the time of the outbreak of the naval revolt in 1893, the Paulista forces totaled approximately three thousand, organized into three infantry battalions equipped with machine guns and other modern equipment, one cavalry regiment, and a battalion of armed “firemen.” Following the conclusion of this revolt São Paulo maintained its expanded, efficient military force, and even secured a foreign training mission for its “police” long before the federal army received one. The Paulistas were aware that a powerful militia would give them increased leverage on the national scene, while at the same time serving to protect their local interests. Though some state governments such as that of Rio de Janeiro had to permit their police force to be commanded by officers of the regular army, the Paulistas jealously guarded the independence of their large state army.20
The Paulistas’ concern in this regard was evident in their relations with the central government. Among the many incidents between the two governments, one specifically involved the São Paulo police. The war minister had recommended the nomination of an army captain, Tomás Alves, as commander of this state force. The captain, sure that he would be given the post, left for São Paulo. While Campos Sales, the minister of justice in the provisional regime, publicly approved of the war minister’s recommendation in order not to offend the government, he privately advised Prudente against it.21 Because of the Paulistas’ vigorous defense of the independence of their state force, the captain was obliged to return to Rio.
A few months later, this same army officer secured a nomination from the war ministry to command the 10th Cavalry Regiment in São Paulo. It seems that the appointment came from Marshal Floriano Peixoto, the acting war minister, for the matter was decided during the absence of War Minister General Benjamin Constant de Magalhães. Also Alves was Floriano’s man, for whom he had secured the important position of commander of the civic guard during the last year of the empire.22 Perhaps Floriano was seeking to extend his influence to São Paulo, and Prudente’s hostile reaction to this move may have been one of the factors behind their continually cool relations. Protesting vigorously, Prudente threatened to resign as governor of São Paulo if this nomination were not rescinded.23 Campos Sales and Francisco Glicério, two Paulista leaders and members of Marshal Deodoro da Fonseca’s ministry, tried to assure Prudente that the nomination was made simply for service reasons, and that “absolutely no one thought of causing you any displeasure.” Another friend added that “São Paulo never will be deprived of its authority.” But Prudente continued adamant until the Paulistas forced the central government to revoke this nomination and send someone acceptable to them.24
Relations between the Paulistas and the Rio government were sometimes uneasy, for Deodoro did not always respect the boundaries of their state autonomy. A small but illustrative incident concerned the granting of a concession to construct a second railroad linking the port of Santos with the interior of São Paulo. When Deodoro recommended that the concession be given to a certain not very promising company whose head was related to him by marriage, Prudente de Morais did not oblige. As governor of São Paulo he argued that the matter was so important and difficult that he would prefer nominating a commission of experts and then holding an open competition to decide the matter. Deodoro never secured his request.25
The Paulistas knew that Deodoro could threaten their position, and shortly before the opening of the Constituent Congress in November 1890 Campos Sales wrote Prudente concerning the political action that they should take. If they all worked together, they could secure their “predominance in the state,” and once a state constitution was approved and elections held, their rights would be protected. But the Paulistas, fully aware of Deodoro’s political and military power, handled such matters with care and attempted to win his favor. In the same letter, Campos Sales spoke of a projected visit by Deodoro to São Paulo and urged Prudente to give him a “good reception,” for he believed “that he will come away from there dazzled, and, like the man of emotions he is, he will devote all his affection to the Paulistas, giving us, consequently, a preponderant place in public affairs.”26
With the end of the provisional government, relations between the Paulistas and the Deodoro government deteriorated rapidly. Prudente’s candidacy for the presidency and the support given it by the Paulistas angered Deodoro, and his chief minister, the Barão de Lucena, attempted to dislodge the São Paulo Republican Party from its position of prominence. For years the party had worked for the creation of a federal republic, and now, as Campos Sales later recalled, the “autonomous life of the state” was being menaced by Deodoro, and their long-held desire “to destroy the oppressive apparatus of the centralized monarchy” was still unfulfilled.27 They felt their state threatened by the central government, which went so far as to remove their governor a month after Deodoro’s election as first constitutional president.
A manifesto signed by Prudente de Morais, Campos Sales, Francisco Glicério, Bernardino de Campos, other important Paulista leaders, and most of the Paulista delegation in congress charged that the Deodoro government had deliberately entered upon a policy of interference in the local affairs of São Paulo. Their governor had been dismissed without cause, and confidential agents had been appointed to all important posts in order to control the state. This, they said, was done because the Paulista delegation had voted against Deodoro in the 1891 election for the first constitutional president of the Brazilian republic.28
According to Prudente de Morais much of the “explosion of hatred against São Paulo and especially against the Paulista republicans” was the result of his “being a Paulista considered and supported for President of the Republic.” This was the cause of “the sudden, spiteful removal” of their governor and “the organization of the reactionary government” in São Paulo. Thus attacked, they must fight back, they insisted, for their “cause” was that of the “autonomy and honor of São Paulo.”29
While some Paulistas remained open to the possibility of a reconciliation with the Lucena government in return for various concessions, no such accord was achieved.30 Tensions increased between Deodoro and his congressional opponents, and finally he unconstitutionally dissolved congress on November 3, 1891. Furthermore, it seems that Deodoro intended to institute some constitutional reforms which would have strengthened the central government and weakened São Paulo’s internal position and its influence within the union. These changes would have included the allotting of an equal number of seats in the chamber to all states, as was the case with the senate, a measure which would also serve to benefit the northern states at the expense of the south.31
Although the Paulistas had become some of his most outspoken opponents, and Deodoro held Prudente largely responsible for the crisis, they were still powerless to act at this time. Instead they could only wait until dissident military elements grouped themselves and overthrew Deodoro on November 23, 1891. Even then they lacked sufficient military force to oust their state governor, appointed by Deodoro earlier that year, and were forced to request and await military assistance from the central government, now controlled by Marshal Floriano Peixoto.32 The federal forces that Deodoro had stationed in their state were more powerful than their own, and the Paulistas were dependent on Floriano’s commands to the federal troops to regain control over their government.
Under the more competent Floriano regime, which generally respected the state’s autonomy, many Paulistas cooperated with the marshal against armed threats to his government and to general political stability. They supported him when congressional opposition forces wished a new presidential election following Deodoro’s ouster. Francisco Glicério, who even served as government leader in the Chamber of Deputies, defended the regime against charges by dissident military leaders concerning the government’s policy in Rio Grande do Sul, and so did Campos Sales.
Paulistas like Campos Sales wished to fortify the government against military disturbances and the danger of anarchy. But he ceased his support when Floriano’s intervention in the states went too far. If the central government persisted in interfering with state affairs, São Paulo itself might eventually be menaced. This was of greater concern to Campos Sales than Floriano’s infringements on civil liberties. Moreover, the marshal’s lack of moderation in dealing with his enemies seemed to encourage resistance and threaten political anarchy.33 Two important Paulista desiderata appeared to be in danger—local autonomy and political stability. Even after his split with Floriano, however, Campos Sales exemplified the cautious, non-violent Paulista political procedure. Instead of joining the ranks of the marshal’s bitter critics, which would only “create new complications” and “assist or animate the pernicious elements of turmoil,” Campos Sales took an extended trip to Europe, not to return until the outbreak of the naval revolt in September 1893.34
During this insurrection, the most dangerous during the early life of the Brazilian republic, the Paulista leaders came to the aid of the Floriano government. Old grievances and disagreements were put aside in the face of such a serious military threat to the general peace of the nation and to São Paulo itself, since the insurgents even attempted to attack the coffee port of Santos. The Paulistas could see that a military revolt was not the best way to achieve civilian government, especially when a Paulista was running for president. If the insurgents won, they would be unlikely to let him assume power. On the other hand, Floriano might do so in exchange for Paulista military and political support. Protesting “against this insane revolt, without a noble ideal that might justify it,” Campos Sales returned from Europe to occupy his “post among those combating the revolt.”35 Fellow Paulistas like Prudente de Morais also abhorred this revolution and “the accursed Custódio de Melo,” leader of the rebellious fleet.36 In congress, Prudente read a message of support for the government, arguing from the evidence of history that “the pronouncements and the revolts by armed troops against the authorities constituted by the national sovereignty … infallibly produce anarchy, and anarchy is the unfailing precursor of despotism.”37 Francisco Glicério continued to support Floriano in congress, and Rangel Pestana edited O Tempo, a strongly pro-government newspaper, during the revolt.
The governor of Minas Gerais, Afonso Pena, expressed the fears of civilians that should this military uprising succeed, others would follow, preventing civilian rule. He publicly opposed the naval revolt as a struggle “to secure decisively for the heads of the army and navy the power to appoint themselves the supreme arbiters of the nation.” According to Pena, military despotism was “mainly due to the competition and rivalry of army and navy officers for the possession of power, each one controlling an armed force and striving to raise himself to the position of supreme arbiter of the established government and claiming to act under the constitution.” And he declared that those “who hope for the abolition of military despotism by military revolts” would be greatly deceived. Moreover and most important, “revolutions, even when successful, are the cause of incalculable evil to the economic life of a nation.” Continued revolts would mean “the complete destruction of public and private wealth and the ruin of the producing and laboring classes.” If such a revolt, coming at the end of Floriano’s term of office and just before a presidential election, were allowed to succeed, future presidents would never be able to govern securely.38
At the same time that the naval insurgents were menacing Rio de Janeiro and threatening both future civilian rule and the Floriano government, the Federalists from the south were moving northward. The smoldering political passions in Rio Grande do Sul had erupted into a sustained rebellion against the state government early in 1893, and the Federalist rebels continued to press on. They had left Rio Grande do Sul, invaded Santa Catarina and Paraná, and were fast approaching the southern boundary of São Paulo. “As the barbarians of a former age threw themselves, ravenous, upon the delights of Rome, so did the Federalist troops hasten toward the wealth of São Paulo,” according to one long-time resident.39 This state, situated between these two movements against the central government, held the balance of power.
The Paulistas were in a position to lend decisive aid to the Floriano regime. São Paulo’s economic power had now been translated into a capacity to employ armed force through its army, and it could decide the conflict between the federal government and the insurgents. The Paulistas decided to throw their support to Floriano. With the state treasury in good shape the state could and did lend large sums to the federal government. Before the termination of the naval revolt and the presidential election, Governor Bernardino de Campos reminded Floriano of the sum owed the state and of all the other war expenses which São Paulo was assuming. He called for an early payment. But Bernardino did not hesitate to cooperate fully with the central government. He purchased some arms from commercial establishments in São Paulo, inquired of Floriano concerning purchases abroad, and actively sought additional arms from Floriano to equip more Paulista troops.40
The Paulistas already had a large number of men under arms, and Bernardino de Campos raised additional troops through the landowners of São Paulo, who had numerous workers at their disposal. With the cooperation of Paulista leaders like Prudente de Morais he asked “the local chiefs” to “send, with all possible brevity, the contingents they could obtain to the state capital, where they will be uniformed, armed, and instructed, to defend our state against the invasion of barbarians with which it is menaced.”41 These troops proved to be not only crucial in deciding the conflict, but also valuable in enforcing São Paulo’s will later on.
Even while the naval revolt was still raging, the governor of the other economically powerful coffee state, Afonso Pena of Minas Gerais, attempted to convince Floriano that it would be wise to hold the presidential elections of March 1, 1894. In late January 1894 he called Floriano’s attention to this “matter of the greatest political importance,” and requested him to limit the extent and duration of the state of siege, so that it would “not impede the holding of elections,” or give any pretext to those who supposed the presidential election would be prevented. Otherwise, he said, the people would view “your government as aspiring to a dictatorship.” People “in revolutionary epochs” carry out “generally unreasonable action” and tend to believe any charges of usurpation which are leveled against those heading the government.42 In this way, Afonso Pena was warning Floriano of a possible reaction if the election were not held and Prudente elected.
At this crucial juncture, with the naval insurgents still threatening the capital and the Federalists rapidly approaching the southern borders of São Paulo, the presidential election of March 1, 1894, took place and Prudente de Morais was chosen. Since much of the country was under a state of siege and the southern part of the nation in insurgent hands, a civilian who had long opposed military control in government would not have won so easily if Floriano had actively opposed his candidacy. But in February and March 1894, the Federalist threat was at its peak, and the marshal was dependent on Paulista aid.
The candidacy of Prudente de Morais requires some explanation. A diverse group of civilians had long wished to secure nonmilitary rule through the election of a civilian as chief magistrate. In July 1893, before the outbreak of the naval revolt, a large group of senators and deputies led by Francisco Glicério of São Paulo met to organize an all-inclusive political party, the Federal Republican Party, and to prepare for the presidential elections. The party embraced all major state groupings. Its program was not merely to defend the constitution and constitutional liberties, but also to “secure the authority of the states, scrupulously maintaining their rights, which are as sacred as those of the union,” and “to increase public credit.”43 On September 25, 1893, during the naval revolt, the party convention unanimously chose Prudente de Morais as its presidential candidate. Another civilian, Manoel Vitorino Pereira of Bahia, was selected for the vice-presidency. Manoel Vitorino was no friend of military rule, for in 1890, Deodoro had forced him to resign as governor of his state, after he had forbidden a demonstration in honor of one of Deodoro’s officer-brothers, soon to be governor.
Floriano had never evinced any fondness for Prudente, even when both had received support from elements opposing Deodoro’s election as first constitutional president of Brazil in 1891. Since the constitution prevented Floriano from running for the presidency, some of his friends attempted a constitutional revision, but they could not obtain the necessary congressional approval and had to resort to another candidate. It has been said that beginning in April 1893 Floriano had constantly attempted to learn who would be the civilians’ candidate. When it seemed likely that Prudente would be chosen, Floriano objected and offered to support Rangel Pestana, another Paulista. He approached other civilians, including Gabriel de Toledo Piza e Almeida, a Paulista serving as Brazil’s representative in Paris. But the Paulistas remained united and loyal to Prudente.44 While Floriano did not overtly oppose him, Colonel Manuel Presciliano de Oliveira Valadão, Floriano’s political confidant and former secretary, who was then chief of the Rio de Janeiro police, sent telegrams to the state governors and district military commanders suggesting the candidacy of another officer, Lauro Sodré. The officers were not united, however, and Sodré declined to run.45 Despite his refusal, Sodré received a number of votes when the presidential election took place as scheduled on March 1, 1894. Nevertheless Prudente de Morais was elected the first nonmilitary president of Brazil, in order, as he termed it, to “initiate the civilian, or truly republican, government.”46
Although Floriano had not prevented Prudente’s election, many civilians were fearful that military elements might keep him from occupying the presidency once the naval revolt had ended, and the Federalist insurgents were on the defensive. For months newspapers throughout the country reported military plots and rumors that Floriano would retain control of the government and proclaim a dictatorship. So persistent were these rumors that they were even repeated in foreign newspapers, and Prudente received anonymous warnings that Floriano would not permit him to take office.
Floriano did seem to be attempting to fortify his position, for when the naval revolt collapsed, he did not end the state of siege but kept some opponents in jail for many more months. His government purchased additional arms in Europe, forcibly recruited troops, and made numerous military appointments. In August, Campos Sales, concerned by Floriano’s course of action, wrote Bernardino de Campos that “the political situation is not very good; for the present, it continues very bad.”47
Some of Prudente’s friends urged him to make his peace with those military elements supporting Floriano and to ally himself with others. From Paris Gabriel Piza stressed the need to compromise and come to terms with the officers if necessary to stay in office. Only with a strong, stable, economically sound government could Brazil deal effectively with the European powers. “If, for whatever irregular motive, your administration does not arrive at its normal termination (revolt, resignation, assassination), we will be giving testament declaring Brazil bankrupt and the republic destroyed and lost.” Since “politics, being full of relativity, do not admit perfection,” it would be “perfectly licit to compromise a little with such elements, which, poorly directed, can pervert the republic and disrupt the country.” In this connection, Piza cited the example of the Cotegipe ministry which “had prolonged the life of the monarchy” when menaced by military conflicts, and the French government’s skill in handling the Boulanger affair to insure a republican, loyal, and disciplined army.48
Prudente did compromise. In choosing his ministry he was careful not to antagonize Floriano. Besides being “competent,” he wrote, the new ministers could “not signify hostility toward the marshal, who continues irascible,” and Prudente appointed a finance minister who was “highly esteemed” by Floriano besides inspiring general confidence. But Prudente could still write that “the situation continues fraught with apprehension, and the murmurs of our pessimistic friends are great.”49
The president-elect was also well aware of the divisions within the armed forces which had facilitated his rise to power. While some army officers had apparently plotted to keep Floriano in office, others had refused to cooperate, and the weakened navy would naturally oppose such a plan. Still, some officers favorable to Prudente were being transferred from Rio de Janeiro. Although some of his correspondents in Rio wrote that Floriano “was backing down before the opinion and resistance, especially of Barbosa Lima,” the officer-governor of Bahia, Prudente continued to be most anxious.50
A few years later, after his split with Prudente, Vice-President Manoel Vitorino recalled that “it was very late” for Floriano to “realize his political plans,” for he lacked sufficient “capable personnel for the attainment of his ends.”51 While Floriano was still extremely popular among certain army sectors, he could not command a sufficiently strong section of the armed forces to prevent Prudente illegally from occupying the presidency. Furthermore, Floriano was infirm and lacked sufficient energy to attempt such a move. Perhaps this illness explained why Floriano did not attend Prudente’s inauguration, although Prudente’s supporters construed his absence as further evidence of his hostility. If the armed forces had remained united, another officer, less popular than Floriano, might have been able to lead them against Prudente. But they were divided.
Despite last-minute rumors of a military movement Prudente was inaugurated on November 15, 1894, without incident. A few days later he could write Bernardino that “the new situation is being inaugurated under good auspices; I received congratulations and adherence from everywhere and from all groups, including officers here and in the states. The clouds are disappearing, and the horizon is becoming clear,” although up to the “last minute,” Floriano and his people had been active and intriguing.52 While Prudente’s presidency would be far from free from clashes with military elements, the government was now basically in civilian hands.
One group of civilians, composed principally of representatives from the economically powerful state of São Paulo, had profited from the divisions among the armed forces to take direct political control out of the hands of the officers. The Paulistas opposed military predominance, for resultant instability endangered economic growth, prosperity, and state autonomy. These men could see that a successful military uprising would only encourage future revolts, leaving the government in military hands. Instead of directly attacking the officers in the Floriano government, they tended to cooperate and compromise when necessary. During the naval revolt they gave decisive aid to the Floriano regime, mainly through their state militia, and managed to secure the election of one of their most antimilitary colleagues, Prudente de Morais, as president. In this way, the Paulistas succeeded where many civilian groups in other Latin American countries had failed.
Alberto Sales, “Catecismo Republicano,” in Luis Washington Vita, Alberto Sales. Ideólogo da república (São Paulo, 1965), 193.
“Alberto Sales, A pátria paulista (Campinas, 1887), 184.
Ibid., 149.
Ibid., 294; see also Vita, Alberto Sales.
Manuel Ferraz Campos Sales, Da propaganda à presidência (São Paulo 1908), 45.
Relatório of Prudente José de Morais Barros, in O novo govârno da república (Rio de Janeiro, 1894), 122-123.
Diário Popular, November 23, 1889, 1; December 2, 1889, 1; December 5, 1889, 1.
Correio Paulistano, June 4, 1890, 1.
Prudente to Rui Barbosa, September 29, 1890, copy in Prudente’s handwriting, Prudente de Morais Papers, in possession of Odálio Amorim, Rio de Janeiro (cited as Prudente Papers).
Manuel Ferraz Campos Sales, Cartas da Europa (Rio de Janeiro, 1894), 10. Campos Sales, speech, June 1, 1892, in Antônio Joaquim Ribas, Perfil biográphico do dr. Manuel Ferraz de Campos Salles, ministro do justiça do govêrno provisório, senador federal pelo estado de São Paulo (Rio de Janeiro, 1896), 462.
Campos Sales, Da propaganda à presidência, 52-53.
Manuel Ferraz Campos Sales, Manifesto ao estado de São Paulo (São Paulo, 1896), 13-15; Campos Sales, Cartas da Europa, 84, 93.
Guimarães Natal to Prudente, June 20, 1894, Prudente Papers.
Américo Werneck, Erros e vícios da organisação republicana (Petrópolis, 1893), 73.
Afonso A. Moreira Pena to Fernando Lobo, May 1, 1893, in Hélio Lobo, Um varão da república. Fernando Lobo. A proclamação do regime em Minas, sua consolidação no Rio de Janeiro (São Paulo, 1937), 183.
Antônio de Queiroz Telles, Visconde de Parnahyba, Exposição com que … Visconde de Parnahyba passou a administração ... de São Paulo ao … Francisco de Paula Rodrigues Alves … (São Paulo, 1888), 38; Salvador Antônio Moniz Barreto de Aragão, Relatório apresentado ao … Francisco de P. Rodrigues Alves … pelo chefe de polícia interino … (São Paulo, 1888), 25; Francisco de Paula Rodrigues Alves, Relatório com que … Francisco de Paula Rodrigues Alves passou a administração ... de São Paulo oa … Francisco Antônio Dutra Rodrigues … (São Paulo, 1888), Anexos, 14; Francisco Antônio Dutra Rodrigues, Exposição com que ao … Pedro Vicente de Azevedo passou a administração … de São Paulo … Francisco Antônio Dutra Rodrigues … (São Paulo, 1888), 15.
Prudente José de Morais Barros, Exposição apresentada ao dr. Jorge Tibiriçá pelo dr. Prudente J. de Moraes Barros … (São Paulo, 1890), 31.
Campos Sales to Bernardino de Campos, September 2, 1892, in Cândido Mota Filho, Uma grande vida. Biografia de Bernardino de Campos (São Paulo, 1941), 273.
Prudente to José Gabriel de Oliveira, April 21, 1893, Prudente Papers.
Visconde de Parnahyba, Exposição, 37-39; Moniz Barreto de Aragão, Relatório, 25-29; Prudente de Morais, Exposição, 31-35; Ernani Silva Bruno, História e tradições da cidade de São Paulo (Rio de Janeiro, 1954), III, 1203; Pedro Dias de Campos, A revolta de seis de setembro. (A acção de São Paulo). Esbôço histórico (Paris and Lisbon, 1913), 32; O. H. Dockery, “Police Force of Rio de Janeiro.” January 18, 1892, in Reports from the Consuls of the United States (Washington, 1892), XXXIX, No. 142, 444; T. Oscar Marcondes de Sousa, O estado de São Paulo. Phýsico, político, econômico e administrativo (São Paulo, 1915), 218-219; Rio News, June 18, 1895, 6; June 23, 1896, 7; July 2, 1896, 6; July 30, 1896, 5; August 17, 1897, 4.
Benjamin Constant de Botelho Magalhães to Campos Sales, December 11, 1889; Campos Sales to Prudente, December 12, 1889 and December 13, 1889, Prudente Papers.
Campos Sales and Francisco Glicério to Prudente, March 25, 1890, Prudente Papers; Floriano Peixoto to José Basson de Miranda Osório, August 5, 1889, August 8, 1889, November 15, 1889, and José Basson to Afonso Celso de Assís Figueiredo, Visconde de Ouro Prêto, December 15, 1889, Arquivo do Museu Histórico National, Rio de Janeiro, p. 28, No. 13.
Prudente to Glicério, March 23, 1890, Prudente Papers.
Campos Sales and Glicério to Prudente, March 25, 1890; Cesário Alvim to Prudente, March 26, 1890; Campos Sales to Prudente, March 27, 1890, Prudente Papers.
Glicério to Prudente, May 20, 1890; Manoel Deodoro da Fonseca to Prudente, May 21, 1890 and May 31, 1890; Prudente to Deodoro, June 8, 1890; Deodoro to Prudente, June 10, 1890, Prudente Papers.
Campos Sales to Prudente, October 12, 1890, Prudente Papers.
Campos Sales, Da propaganda à presidência, 52, 78.
Rio News, March 17, 1891, 3.
Prudente to Amador Simões, April 10, 1891, in José Benedicto Silveira Peixoto, A tormenta que Prudente de Morais venceu! (2nd ed., Curitiba, 1942), 71.
Cf. unsigned article by Prudente de Morais, Correio Paulistano, May 18, 1902, 2, with article in O Tempo, June 3, 1902, 1; Campos Sales, Da propaganda á presidência, 60-61, 83-91; Barão de Lucena to Cesário Alvim, November 4, 1891, in Tobias Monteiro, Pesquisas e depoimentos para a história (Rio de Janeiro, 1913), 346-348.
Monteiro, Pesquisas e depoimentos, 258; João Dunshee de Abranehes Moura (ed.), O golpe de estado. Atas e atos do govêrno Lucena. (Obra póstuma). (Rio de Janeiro, 1954), 113.
Campos Sales to Floriano, November 23, 1891; General Carlos Machado de Bittencourt to Floriano, November 23, 1891, November 24, 1891; Glicério, Campos Sales, Prudente, Bernardino to Floriano, November 30, 1891, Arquivo Nacional, Rio de Janeiro (cited as AN), Cx 1206.
Campos Sales, Da propaganda à presidência, 12-30, 98-99; Campos Sales, Cartas da Europa, 28-31; Ribas, Perfil biográphico, 451-452, 496.
Campos Sales to Coelho Rodrigues, June 6, 1893, in Campos Sales, Cartas da Europa, 30-31.
Campos Sales to Jorge Miranda, September 22, 1893, in Campos Sales, Cartas da Europa, 280; Introduction to Cartas da Europa, 33.
Prudente to Maria Amélia de Morais Silveira, September 10, 1893, in Silveira Peixoto, A tomenta, 97.
País, September 27, 1893, 1.
Manifesto of Afonso Pena, País, December 15, 1893, 1.
Ribas, Perfil biográphico, 527.
Bernardino to Floriano, January 10, 1894, January 12, 1894, January 18, 1894, January 23, 1894, January 25, 1894, January 27, 1894, February 3, 1894, February 4, 1894, February 23, 1894, AN, Cx 1195; Bernardino to Floriano, January 23, 1894, AN, Cx 1209; Bernardino to General Bibiano Sérgio Macedo da Fontoura Constallat, February 7, 1894, February 16, 1894, March 3, 1894, AN, Cx 1195; Bernardino to Constallat, February 8, 1894, AN, Cx 1209; Colonel J. J. Jardim to Floriano, January 10, 1894, January 11, 1894, January 12, 1894, January 15, 1894, March 3, 1894, April 10, 1894, AN, Cx 1195; Captain Lauro Müller to Constallat, March 3, 1894, March 4, 1894, March 9, 1894, AN, Cx 1195; Müller to Floriano, February 13, 1894, AN, Cx 1209; Custódio José de Melo, O govêrno provisório e a revolução de 1893 (São Paulo, 1938), II, 39; see also Dias de Campos, A revolta de seis de setembro.
Prudente to José Gabriel, January 28, 1894, in Gastão Pereira da Silva, Prudente de Moraes. O pacificador (Rio de Janeiro, [1937]), 197.
Afonso Pena to Floriano, January 23, 1894, AN, Cx 1209.
O novo govêrno da república (Rio de Janeiro, 1894), 227.
See Silveira Peixoto, A tormenta, 101; Pereira da Silva, Prudente de Moraes, 39-41; José Maria dos Santos, A política geral do Brasil (São Paulo, 1930), 334-335.
Tobias Monteiro, O presidente Campos Salles na Europa. Com uma introducção e cinco retratos (Rio de Janeiro, 1928), LII; interview with Lauro Sodré, Jornal do Comércio, January 31, 1895, 1.
Prudente to Antônio Mercado, March 7, 1894, Prudente Papers.
Campos Sales to Bernardino, August 26, 1894, in Mota Filho, Bernardino de Campos, 268.
Gabriel Piza to Prudente, September 24, 1894, Prudente Papers.
Prudente to Bernardino, November 11, 1894, in Silveira Peixoto, A tormenta, 129.
Prudente to Bernardino, October 22, 1894, in Silveira Peixoto, A tormenta, 123-124; cf. Tobias Monteiro, O presidente Campos Salles na Europa, LVI-LVII; José Joaquim de Medeiros e Albuquerque, Minha vida. Memórias (2nd. ed., Rio de Janeiro, 1933-1934), I, 228-229.
Manoel Vitorino Pereira, Manifesto político (São Paulo, 1898), 26.
Prudente to Bernardino, November 18, 1894, in Silveira Peixoto, A tormenta, 135.
Author notes
The author is Assistant Professor of History at Texas Technological College. Research for this article was made possible by a grant from the Foreign Area Fellowship Program.
