It is always welcome news when a standard reference on a given topic is reissued, especially if it has been out of print for years. Winner of the coveted Justin Winsor Prize (1914) and originally presented as a doctoral dissertation at Stanford University, this honored work was published under the auspices of the American Historical Association in 1916. By utilizing the extensive documentation of the Public Record Office in London and by employing a more critical historical approach, Miss Williams improved upon the pioneer studies of Ira D. Travis. Her objective exposition of the controversial 1850 treaty and its hectic aftermath caught the attention of reviewers from the beginning; indeed, a half century later, that section remains the most vital contribution of her book. Less definitive, because of the lack of documentation available to her, the last two chapters treat Anglo-American negotiations from 1860 to 1914 in just fifty pages.
Miss Williams painted the same uncomplimentary picture of British activities in Central America that Travis had sketched, charging the Foreign Office with a deliberate plan of territorial acquisition and extension of English influence throughout the area. British agents, for example, were responsible for the dissolution of the Central American Republic (1823-1839); and they consistently fought the liberal-unionist movement in subsequent years, siding with the Serviles, or Conservatives, of Central America. Though the controversy over the nature of Britain’s role in Central America is still alive today, we can safely say that Miss Williams’ interpretation is now outdated. Reviewing British policy in its European context from 1846 to 1860, Professor Richard Van Alstyne convincingly refuted or qualified the former imputations of British imperialism in a trio of articles published in the late 1930s. Others have done the same for the Central American context. In the HAHR (August 1960), Professor Robert A. Naylor argued that the commercial interests of Englishmen in the area, not political or strategic factors, guided British policy in Central America. Professor Thomas Karnes in The Failure of Union: Central America, 1824-1960 (Chapel Hill, 1961) sharply attacked the Williams interpretation, denying that Frederick Chatfield had anything to do with the dissolution of the Republic or with the anti-unionist movement in subsequent years. My own study, A Palmerstonian Diplomat in Central America: Frederick Chatfield, Esq. (Tucson, 1964), supports Karnes’ assertion with regard to the Republic. With these qualifications in mind, Miss Williams’ book is still useful.
