The Mexican Church and the Rebellion of the Polkos Open Access

On January 11, 1847, Valentín Gómez Farías, vice president of Mexico, signed a law which authorized the government to appropriate ecclesiastical property and goods to the maximum value of fifteen million pesos.¹ One third of this sum was to be taken from the regular and secular clergy within the archbishopric. The purpose of this radical measure was to obtain the funds which General Antonio López de Santa Anna had insisted were necessary if he was to continue to prosecute the war against the invading United States army. In spite of the military danger, both public and clerical reaction to the law was immediately hostile, and within four days rumors of imminent armed rebellion to force repeal of the law were reported in the press.² Faced with this threat, Gómez Farías moved a regiment and a battalion of the National Guard, suspected of revolutionary intentions, to barracks located at some distance from the National Palace.³ Then on January 16 the clergy, who had been openly condemning this latest assault on the wealth of the Church, were forbidden by the government to make political speeches. Still the bishops and their chapters in every Mexican diocese continued to denounce the law in numerous representations hurriedly dispatched to the central government and to the Congress.⁴ Furthermore, the proclerical press lost no time in rousing public opinion against the proposal; frequent warnings were issued that any attempt to implement the law would certainly lead to revolution. Revolt was in fact openly encouraged. One newspaper declared that the publication of the law was like a bugle call summoning the faithful to battle.⁵

Gómez Farías, while well aware of the dangers of the situation, was determined to proceed, for the national treasury was empty, and new revenues had to be raised immediately. On February 4 he established a committee with special responsibility for implementing the complicated provisions of the law, and on the same day Congress empowered the government to collect a further sum of five million pesos, but without specifying where this amount was to be found.⁶ Throughout the following three weeks the clergy continued to campaign openly for repeal of the law, and rumors of rebellion persisted. Hence it came as no surprise when at eleven o’clock on the night of February 26, the regiment Independencia, and the battalions Victoria, Hidalgo, Mina, Zapadores, and other groups of soldiers under the leadership of General Matías Peña y Barragán, revolted against the government.⁷ The aristocratic rebels, who became known popularly as the Polkos, issued a plan consisting of thirteen articles, in which they demanded the removal from office of the two chief executives, Santa Anna and Gómez Farías, the dissolution of Congress, and new federal and state elections.⁸ But these political demands were of secondary importance to that of article twelve which declared that the law of the previous January relative to the occupation of the properties of the Church was annulled. The object of the revolt was clearly to defend these properties and to prevent their seizure by the defeat of Gómez Farías.

The next day, February 27, Congress assembled to discuss the revolt and resolved to offer an amnesty to the rebels on condition that they should submit to the authority of the government within half an hour.⁹ Valentín Canalizo, commander of the troops loyal to Gómez Farías, informed the rebels of this proposal, which they of course rejected, and by eight fifteen in the evening intermittent artillery fire had begun. Both sides began to fortify strategic points in the city, the government forces holding the National Palace, the cathedral, the university building, and several convents, and the rebels various other convents, including La Concepción and the hospital of Terceros.¹⁰ The firing continued from scattered points in the city. A meeting on March 1 between the two generals, Canalizo and Peña, failed to produce a settlement. Over the next few days further meetings took place and brief armistices were arranged.¹¹

Then on March 8, a significant event occurred. The rebels withdrew their original plan and replaced it with one of a single article calling for the removal from office of Gómez Farías.¹² The new demand, therefore, made no reference to the repeal of the anticlerical law of January 11. Public opinion, which had previously supported the viewpoint of the Church, now turned against the clergy and the rebels, for the revolt had taken place at a time when the nation was at war and desperately needed unity.

The change in plan failed however to bring a settlement; fighting between the two sides continued in the streets of the city. On March 10 a group of deputies decided to urge President Santa Anna to return from the north to put down the revolt and to restore order. The following day, news reached the city that the United States forces had begun to disembark in the region of Veracruz, and it was learned that Santa Anna had denounced the rebellion and was sending four thousand troops to help the government.¹³ On March 13 both sides received word from Santa Anna that he was on his way back to the capital. He ordered that hostilities cease. The rebels immediately sent four representatives to put their ease to Santa Anna, who eventually arrived at the town of Guadalupe, on the outskirts of Mexico City, on March 21. The two sides now realized that a settlement must be reached. On March 23 Canalizo and Peña agreed to end hostilities, and prisoners were exchanged. The military aspect of the Polkos rebellion, therefore, ended without any apparent gain to the Church. The law of January 11 had not been repealed, and Gómez Farías was still in office. The political maneuvering of the clergy and their supporters, however, continued after Santa Anna’s arrival.

Eventually, a compromise was reached whereby the ecclesiastical corporations agreed to lend the government one and a half million pesos on condition that the previous laws concerning the confiscation of clerical goods be annulled.¹⁴ Santa Anna agreed to this arrangement and also decided, probably at the insistence of the Church negotiators, that it was politically unwise to continue supporting Gómez Farías, who was subsequently removed from office. As in 1834, the attempt by Gómez Farías and the liberals to reduce the size of ecclesiastical wealth, despite their highly patriotic purpose, had failed because of the mercurial attitude and action of Santa Anna. Though he had at first supported the law of January 11 he now abandoned it and Gómez Farías, both because of political expediency and to some extent because of his government’s desperate need for money to prosecute the war.

Once again the clergy had successfully resisted the liberal attack on the possessions of the Church, even though the military action of the Polkos had failed. The causes and instigators of the rebellion have long been the subject of discussion and argument. Certain circumstances make it obvious that the revolt was not simply the attempt of an ambitious general to gain power. In the first place, it occurred at a time when the Mexican nation was fighting a crucial defensive action against the overwhelming strength of the United States forces, and those responsible for a military revolt in such a situation could expect little public sympathy or support. Secondly, it was widely known that the clergy and the clerical press were openly encouraging rebellion in defense of the Church wealth. Both contemporary and recent historians have in fact laid full responsibility for the revolt at the doors of the Church, and a number of accusations have been made. It has been stated, for example, that the plan issued by the rebels was drawn up by the cathedral chapter and proclerical politicians. When the original plan was altered and the question of ecclesiastical property omitted, the clergy are said to have threatened to withdraw their financial support from the rebels.¹⁵ Guillermo Prieto bitterly condemned their betrayal by the capitular vicar, Juan Manuel Irisarri, then head of the archepiscopal see, who refused to supply General Peña with the funds which he had promised.¹⁶

More recent historians have condemned the alleged participation of the Church in the revolt, and in particular, have denounced the clergy for financing the revolution while claiming at the same time that they could not afford to lend or give money to the government.¹⁷ Such statements, however, have so far been made without concrete evidence to support them, and in defense of the Church Father Mariano Cuevas has rightly asked for proof. He wrote:

Until now Father Cuevas’ questions have not been answered, and the allegations that the Church actually organized and financed the Polkos rebellion have remained neither proved nor disproved. The answers to the above points, however, are to be found within a secret memorandum drawn up by an ecclesiastical committee and presented to the head of the see in 1851.¹⁹ This committee, known as the Junta de Préstamos, was established in May 1847 for the purpose of raising the funds needed to meet the loans which the regular and secular clergy of the archdiocese had contracted to make to the government. The report covers the complicated fiscal negotiations and dealings of the Church during the years 1847 to 1851. Within this memorandum there is a section entitled Cuenta secreta which reveals the following facts: Two convent administrators, Jorge Madrigal and Vicente Pozo, lent almost 90,000 pesos to General Matías de la Peña y Barragán with the specific purpose of aiding a revolution against the government. The two men approached the capitular vicar some weeks after the revolt had ended and asked to be reimbursed for the amount which they claimed to have supplied to the general. They had used the money, they said, “in order to help General D. Matías Peña in the pronunciamiento which he made in this city shortly after the publication of the law of January 11, under which ecclesiastical goods were to be confiscated.”²⁰

They tried to justify their actions on the grounds that it had been a question of religion, maintaining that the see had authorized them to lend the money. The vicar referred the matter to the Junta de Préstamos. The three senior members of the clergy within the diocese, Irisarri, Patiño, and Osores, each signed a statement in which they denied having authorized either Pozo or Madrigal to give Church funds to the rebels.²¹ Armed with this denial, the Junta first decided not to repay any of the money. Hints from Sr. Irisarri, and the absolute necessity of keeping the whole matter in the strictest secrecy changed its mind, inasmuch as any public disclosure of the transactions would be harmful to the Church. For these reasons and in order to save the two administrators from financial ruin the junta resolved to pay those amounts which it could be proved that General Peña had actually received. A special subcommittee was set up to audit all the accounts presented by Pozo and Madrigal.²² The fact that the prelates agreed to accept responsibility for the money owed was in no way to imply that they were condoning the action of the administrators, nor that the clergy had taken any part either directly or indirectly in the revolt.

The above summary of the facts as reported in 1851 in the secret memorandum suggests that the Church did not directly finance the revolt, because it cannot be held accountable for the deeds of every one of its many officials. The personal accounts of Pozo and Madrigal, however, reveal more detailed information about what actually did happen in February and March 1847.²³ The following table shows that the two men began to supply the rebels with funds on February 25, that is, the day before the beginning of the revolt, and that they continued to do so almost daily throughout the month of March. In addition it reveals that a number of convents and ecclesiastical corporations also helped finance the rebels :

Razón de las cantidades entregadas en numerario y por libranzas aceptadas a los Sres. General D. Matías Peña y Barragán, Comisario D. Miguel Arroyo, y otros varios, para las atenciones del Ejército Salvador, de las que son responsables los que subscriben. . .. A saber:

Valor de las letras entregadas al Sr. Lic.

Razón de las corporaciones que entregaron directamente.

This table was drawn up by Pozo and Madrigal and submitted to the special committee considering their claim. They had raised this money by borrowing from a number of persons small sums of about 1,000 pesos, which they had agreed to repay within two to three months.²⁵ It is significant to find that the capitular vicar, Juan Manuel Irisarri, was among the lenders. On February 12, 1847, he handed over 1,000 pesos to Andrés Pizarro, who later took part in the revolt, and this loan was repaid by Pozo on June 5, 1847.²⁶ Ten days later, Irisarri gave another 1,000 pesos to Madrigal, which was also repaid by Pozo on June 10, 1847.²⁷ Although Irisarri had denied giving any official authorization to Madrigal or Pozo to use clerical funds for the revolt, he himself lent them two thousand pesos only a few days prior to the outbreak of hostilities. It would seem highly improbable that he was ignorant of what the money was to be used for, and it must also be remembered that it was at his insistence that the Junta de Préstamos eventually repaid all the money supplied to General Peña. Hence it can be concluded that although he probably did not give official approval on behalf of the Church, he certainly acquiesced in and supported the actions of the administrators. Furthermore, the two men insisted that authorization had been given, and it is unlikely that they would have incurred debts to such an extent without some form of approval from a higher authority.²⁸

The two administrators, Pozo and Madrigal, several ecclesiastical corporations, and the head of the secular Church in the person of Irisarri, therefore, were directly responsible for financing at least in part the Polkos rebellion. In view of the testimony of active participants there remains little doubt that the clergy were in fact the main planners and financial power behind the rebels.²⁹ This knowledge raises other questions concerning the activities of the clergy during Mexico’s first forty years of independence. Was this, for example, the first and only occasion on which ecclesiastical wealth was used to encourage and sustain a revolution against the civil government? The events of 1847 were in many respects similar to those of 1833-34, when the liberals led by Gómez Farías made their first attempt to dispossess the Church of its riches. The eventual result was also revolution and the defeat and exile of the liberal leaders. Whether clerical funds were used at that time or at any other remains unknown, but in view of the events of 1847 it is clearly possible.

Author notes