A revolution occurred in Brazil in 1930 which marked the first time in the history of the forty-one-year-old republic that a constitutionally elected government was overthrown by force. It has been called a turning point in Brazilian history as dramatic as the change from empire to republic.1 It was to a great extent a war of states against political hegemony, and it had far-reaching effects—as far-reaching as the year 1964. The spark that lighted the fire of that important revolt, however, had little to do with the revolutionary movement itself. The spark was the assassination of the governor of the state of Paraíba.
The revolution had been brewing for some time in 1930. Definite plans for a revolt got under way in Rio Grande do Sul after the election of March 1, 1930. Oswaldo Aranha, Secretary of the Interior of Rio Grande de Sul, was coordinator.2 Antônio Carlos Ribeiro de Andrada, governor of Minas Gerais and disappointed contender for official support as a candidate for the presidency in the election of 1930, had allied his state with Rio Grande do Sul. He had also strongly supported the creation of a new political party which spread rapidly in Minas Gerais, Rio Grande do Sul, and Paraíba. It was called the Aliança. Liberal, and into it was gathered the discontented of Brazil, a heterogeneous group.3
The revolutionaries intended to precipitate the movement at the end of June, 1930. Preparations went more slowly than anticipated, however, and Oswaldo Aranha moved the date to July 16. Then early in June the governor of Minas Gerais announced that Minas did not find itself in a position to participate further in the movement. Antônio Carlos had, in fact, lost confidence in the military preparations of Rio Grande do Sul. He was not impressed with the ability of the gaúcho leaders, and he had grave doubts about the success of the revolution. He had begun to think in terms of a strong Aliança Liberal and political action in Congress rather than armed revolt.4
Oswaldo Aranha, discouraged at the withdrawal of Minas Gerais and feeling that it was impossible to set the revolution in motion at that time, resigned from his state position of Secretary of the Interior on June 26, 1930, and withdrew from active participation in the plans. Instructions were given the revolutionary officers to disperse and await another opportunity.5
Top-level planning had broken down, and the revolutionary movement seemed in danger of dwindling into inactivity. Then on July 26, João Pessoa, governor of Paraíba, was assassinated by a local political enemy over a partially personal matter, and the revolutionaries snapped into action.
The Aliança Liberal took advantage of every political opportunity to discredit the national government, headed by Washington Luis Pereira de Sousa, and to incite revolutionary feelings toward it. The political situation in Paraíba presented just such an opportunity.
An internal struggle over commercial policies developed between the governor of the state on one side and the political chefes of cities in the interior on the other. When the governor was assassinated in July, 1930, Paraíbans and members of the Aliança Liberal throughout the country blamed the Washington Luis government.
João Pessoa succeeded João Suassuna as governor of Paraíba in 1928. Suassuna, a member of a prominent family in the interior of the state, had been primarily interested in the prosperity of the sertão. His policies brought influence to the dominant families of that region and favored the towns of the interior. João Pessoa had something quite different in mind for his state.
The towns of the Paraíban sertão, during the administration of Suassuna, had prospered as commercial centers of connection between Recife, the capital of the neighboring state of Pernambuco, and the Paraíban consumers. Imported goods bound for Paraíba came through the port of Recife. From there they were shipped to the interior towns of Paraíba and then distributed to Paraíban consumers. Recife was one of the most important ports in the northeast, and the Paraíban trade was no small factor. Since Paraíba did not have a well-developed port of its own, it was dependent on Recife. The governmental policies of Suassuna had made the state also commercially dependent on the towns of the interior.6
João Pessoa did not wish Paraíba to be subordinated to that situation. The state should have its own ports, he believed. When it did, then the logical points of distribution of goods would be towns near the coast. The new governor, therefore, sought and received permission from the federal government to develop the port of Cabedello. Construction began in 1929. Pessoa was convinced that it was in the best interests of his state to bring commercial activity to the coast, and he set about doing so by means of a severe tariff policy. A very low tariff was levied on goods imported through the Paraíban port. Those that came into the state by land from neighboring states carried a prohibitive tariff. Sertanejo commerce with neighboring states became impossible.7
Protests came from the chefes of the towns in the sertão and from merchants in Recife. Two cousins of João Pessoa, the brothers Pessoa de Queiroz, who had commercial interests in Recife, led the protests in the daily paper, O Jornal do Comercio. Other Pernambucan newspapers joined in the censure of João Pessoa and his attempt to cut old and established commercial ties between the two states.8
The popular reaction in Paraíba to the program of the governor to do away with the state’s commercial dependence on Pernambuco was decidedly favorable. Pessoa explained to the Commercial Association of Paraíba that in addition to making it possible for Paraíba to stand on its own commercial feet, the new policy was sure to bring more prosperity to the state. Even the rank and file of the sertão favored his program because it had the effect of opposing their local chefes who maintained a feudalistic system of government. The chefes and the members of the dominant families of the sertão stood to lose much, however, and they were united in bitter opposition to João Pessoa and his commercial plans.9
July, 1929, found João Pessoa embarked on a reorganization program for Paraíban commerce in the midst of some serious opposition. Meanwhile the national political scene became more and more complicated. Paraíba had not yet taken a stand so far as the national presidential campaign controversy was concerned. João Pessoa received a telegram on July 22 from Carlos Pessoa, a member of the Paraíban representation in the national Congress, informing him that the majority leader in Congress had inquired about Paraíba’s position on the question of the president’s choice of the official candidate. There were rumors, said Carlos Pessoa, of a Minas Gerais-Rio Grande do Sul alliance in opposition to the president’s choice. The Paraíba bancada requested instructions.10
João Pessoa was well aware of the Minas Gerais-Rio Grande do Sul agitation. His uncle, Epitácio Pessoa, a former president of Brazil and the senior Paraíban statesman, had informed him of it. Epitácio Pessoa, furthermore, had reported that Antônio Carlos had suggested to him the possibility of João Pessoa as the vice-presidential candidate on the slate of the Aliança Liberal. The governor of Paraíba had been awaiting developments. In his reply to Carlos Pessoa he imparted the information his uncle had given him and asked that the bancada sound out the situation.11
After an exchange of telegrams and a meeting with the leaders of the major party in Paraíba, the governor instructed the bancada on July 29, 1929, to oppose the candidacy of Júlio Prestes, the choice of the president. A few hours after he sent the telegram of instructions, he received an official invitation from the Aliança Liberal to be the running mate of Getúlio Vargas. João Pessoa accepted immediately. Paraíba thus officially joined Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul in the Aliança Liberal.12
The election in March, 1930, was a congressional as well as a presidential election. When the time arrived to prepare the Paraíban slate of congressional candidates, João Pessoa insisted on a policy of no reelections. Such a policy would eliminate João Suassuna from the slate since he had been serving as a congressional representative. Pessoa intended to remove from political influence that source of opposition to his state commercial policy. The slate, without the name of Suassuna, was announced on February 18, 1930.13
João Suassuna had represented the oligarchy of the sertão in Congress. José Pereira, chefe of the interior town of Princesa, was a friend and colleague of Suassuna. Pereira and the other chefes were far from pleased with the exclusion of Suassuna’s name from the congressional slate. Pereira began planning an armed revolt against the governor. Late in February he notified President Washington Luis and Júlio Prestes that they had his and his colleagues’ solid support in the coming election. He then began mobilizing forces.14
João Pessoa withdrew from Princesa all the state personnel including the police force, the tax collector, and the school teachers. Early in March a civil war, known as the Revolution of Princesa, was in progress between the governor and the prominent families of the sertão who wished to preserve their feudal dominion.15 The forces of José Pereira attacked and occupied the towns of Teixeira, Sant-Anna dos Garrotes, Pianco, and Princesa. João Pessoa created a provisional battalion by decree and proceeded against the rebellious sertanejo faction.16 The governor of Pernambuco became concerned that the fighting might extend over into his territory, and he sent forces to the Pernambuco-Paraíba border.17 Baek in Rio in the Chamber of Deputies, legislators discussed the political problems of Paraíba and watched the developments with great interest.18
The forces of João Pessoa were seriously hampered by a scarcity of munitions. Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul promised to supply some, but their promises, according to Alvaro de Carvalho, Vice-President of Paraíba, “remained in telegrams.” Throughout Brazil, popular sympathy seemed to be with João Pessoa.19
It is not known where José Pereira obtained his arms. There were speculations that the government of Pernambuco was a source.20 Suassuna charged in a telegram to Estácio Coímbra, governor of Pernambuco, that João Pessoa was making war on him and his faction in order to remove their support of the official presidential slate for the coming election.21 João Pessoa declared that he must take measures to suppress the revolt “in order to reestablish peace and tranquility in the state.”22
João Pessoa wrote President Washington Luis early in March informing him of the state of affairs in Paraíba. He received no reply.23
In the presidential election, two-thirds of Paraíba’s votes went to Getúlio Vargas and João Pessoa. The minister of justice, Vianna do Castello, charged that in Paraíba the election had been held under conditions of fraud and violence. João Pessoa challenged him to produce proof. The governor of Paraíba wrote again to Washington Luis giving him all the details of conditions in Paraíba. No answer came from the Catete.24 The civil war continued inside Paraíba, and the federal government took no official notice of it.
The Paraíban legislators who had been elected March 1, 1930, went to Rio to present their credentials and take their seats in Congress. Their credentials were not accepted, and Paraíba had no representation in the new session of Congress.25
Feeling ran high in Paraíba and throughout Brazil against Washington Luis and his government. Paraíba, cried the Aliança Liberal, had been unjustly and unlawfully deprived of its constitutional right! João Pessoa left no doubt in anyone’s mind that his loyalties and his duty were to his state. “I will defend it,” he exclaimed, “cost what it may cost, without consideration of the sacrifices; I will fight with the federal government or against the federal government, with neighboring state governments or against neighboring state governments, aided or not, for Paraíba’s tranquility, its greatness and its autonomy.”26 To those who opposed the Washington Luis government for whatever reason, João Pessoa became a symbol of resistance to the tyranny of that government.
By early July, 1930, the Paraíban state treasury was almost empty, and supplies and ammunition depleted. The state was virtually blockaded. Neighboring states would not sell arms to the Pessoa government, and they protested the transportation of shipments from other areas of Brazil through their territory to the Pessoa forces.27 The Pessoa government believed the federal government to be responsible for the blockade. The difficulty of obtaining arms and ammunition grew to enormous proportions.28
In an attempt to arrange for a shipment of arms, João Pessoa went to Recife on July 26, 1930. His advisors warned him of the personal danger of such a trip, but he took no heed.29 Late in the afternoon of that same day, he went with friends to the Confeitaria Glória in Recife for refreshments. One João Dantas entered the confeitaria and shot the governor of Paraíba as he sat talking to his friends.30
João Dantas belonged to one of the prominent sertanejo families of Paraíba, and he sided politically with José Pereira and João Suassuna. Some time before João Pessoa’s trip to Recife, state authorities had searched the house of João Dantas for arms and ammunition as a result of a tip that Dantas was in possession of military supplies for the rebels. They found and took possession of Dantas’ arsenal as well as papers and documents in the house. Among the papers were personal love letters, some of which got into the hands of a newspaper and were published. João Dantas blamed the governor of Paraíba for the publication of the letters. His lack of political sympathy with João Pessoa turned to a smouldering personal hate, and he took the opportunity of the governor’s visit to Recife to gain revenge.31
In Paraíba, grief at the death of João Pessoa reached hysterical proportions. Public demonstrations of huge crowds of people in the capital city and throughout the state went on day after day. The state assembly changed the name of the capital city from Paraíba to João Pessoa. The design of the state flag was also changed to pay homage to the dead governor.32
At that point Washington Luis sent federal troops into Paraíba to settle the Princesa revolt. Alvaro de Carvalho, who had succeeded João Pessoa as governor, protested the federal intervention. The minister of justice replied that a virtual state of anarchy had existed in Paraíba since the death of the governor, and it was the duty of the federal government to restore order. Alvaro de Carvalho refused to accept the allegation that anarchy existed. Of the thirty municipalities in the state, he pointed out, only eight were involved in the partisan revolt, and federal troops occupied many peaceful towns. The government troops remained.33
Words of sympathy and support came from Getúlio Vargas and Antônio Carlos to Alvaro de Carvalho. Vargas telegraphed somewhat cautiously that if the federal troops did not respect Paraíba’s state autonomy, he could count on Rio Grande do Sul’s support. Antônio Carlos was less cautious. He wired that he joined Paraíba in violent protest against the intervention of the president of the Republic in the state’s affairs.34
In the national Congress, reaction to the assassination of João Pessoa reached fever pitch among representatives of the Aliança Liberal. Lindolfo Cólor of the Rio Grande do Sul bancada accused the president of the Republic of responsibility for the “crime of Recife.” In a dramatic speech Cólor cried, “Cain, what did you do to your brother? President of the Republic, what did you do to the President of Paraíba?”35
Aliança Liberal newspapers joined the outcry. João Pessoa was dead virtually by the treacherous hands of the president of the Republic, the Aliança charged. In addition, the president had violated the sovereignty of Paraíba by sending troops to occupy the state. What more proof did the country need of the wickedness and oppression of the existing government!36
Once more passions were aroused and preparations were resumed with great intensity. Oswaldo Aranha again took the helm, and the other leaders took up their tasks where they had left off.37 The revolutionary planners in Rio Grande do Sul now decided that if worst came to worst, the state would undertake the revolution alone.38
The expansion of the rebel military organization in the northeast was in the hands of Juarez Távora. After the assassination of João Pessoa and the occupation of Paraíba by federal troops, there was danger that that state would not wait for the completion of Rio Grande do Sul plans.39 “For the love of God, hurry!” Távora telegraphed Oswaldo Aranha on September 30, 1930. “It is impossible to avoid for long an isolated revolt here.”40
Oswaldo Aranha and other conspirators in Rio Grande do Sul, however, were already working at top speed. They set October 3, 1930, as the date to launch action, and the revolution began on schedule.41
The details of the events in Paraíba mattered little to the revolutionary elements in Brazil, but the propaganda power of the situation was invaluable. Plans for an armed revolt against the federal government had gone forward after the March 1 election, but they had been postponed twice, the second time indefinitely. The revolutionaries had not been able to muster enough force then, but developments in Paraíba brought new vigor to the lagging plans. The distinction of providing the final impetus for setting the revolution in motion belonged to João Dantas, a Paraíban who did not have a national revolution in mind at all.
Donald E. Worcester and Wendell G. Schaeffer, The Growth and Culture of Latin America (New York, 1956), p. 858.
João Alberto, Memórias de um revolucionário (Rio de Janeiro, 1954), pp. 221-223.
Alexandre José Barbosa Lima Sobrinho, A verdade sôbre a Revolução de Outubro (São Paulo, 1933), pp. 100-103.
Virgílio A. de Mello Franco, Outubro, 1930 (Rio de Janeiro, 1930), pp. 302-308.
General Góes Monteiro, A Revolução de 30 (Rio de Janeiro, 1934), p. 34.
Barbosa Lima Sobrinho, A verdade sôbre a Revolução de Outubro, p. 169.
Ibid., p. 170.
Ibid., p. 171.
Ibid., p. 172.
Adhemar Vidal, 1930, História de João Pessoa e da revolução na Paraíba (São Paulo, 1933), p. 40.
Ibid., p. 41.
Ibid., pp. 41-45.
Barbosa Lima Sobrinho, A verdade sôbre a Revolução de Outubro, p. 173.
Vidal, 1930, pp. 98-99.
José Maria Bello, História da república, 1889-1954, 4 ed. (São Paulo, 1959), p. 323.
Vidal, 1930, p. 112.
Ibid., p. 159.
Barbosa Lima Sobrinho, A verdade sôbre a Revolução de Outubro, p. 174.
Ibid., p. 178.
Ibid., p. 179.
Vidal, 1930, p. 121.
Ibid., p. 112.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 133. Catete is the name of the presidential palace in Rio de Janeiro.
Ibid., pp. 223-230.
Ibid., p. 231.
Ibid., p. 288.
Ibid., p. 366.
Ibid., pp. 329-330.
Vidal, 1930, pp. 390-394.
Barbosa Lima Sobrinho, A verdade sôbre a Revolução de Outubro, pp. 184-185.
Ibid., p. 200.
Ibid., pp. 195-196.
Vidal, 1930, pp. 371-372.
Barbosa Lima Sobrinho, A verdade sôbre a Revolução de Outubro, p. 190. It was customary to call the head of a state “president.”
Ibid., pp. 201-202.
“Como se Organisou a Revolução,” by Assis Chateaubriand, A revolução nacional, documentos para a história, a special edition of O Cruzeiro (November, 1930), p. 16.
Góes Monteiro, A Revolução de 30, p. 69.
Personal conversation with Marshal Távora, August 17, 1962. Marshal Távora was one of the Tenentes of the famous Prestes Column, and he became the commander of the northern revolutionary army during the Revolution of 1930. He is the Minister of Transportation and Public Works in the cabinet of the Castelo Branco government.
Vidal, 1930, p. 442.
General Gil de Almeida, Homens e factos de uma revolução (Rio de Janeiro, n.d.), pp. 300-303.
Author notes
The author is a member of the History Department of Alvin Junior College, Alvin, Texas.