This well-documented monograph goes far to prove the existence of a system of power politics in South America by the 1880’s. Based upon manuscript sources in the Chilean and Colombian foreign office archives, after a brief introductory chapter it carefully and lucidly narrates (in chapter II) the South American diplomatic scene from independence to the outbreak of the War of the Pacific, in 1879. From that point, the increasingly complex inter-relationship of Chilean, Ecuadorean, Peruvian, Bolivian, Argentinian, and Brazilian diplomatic interests is explained (in Chapter III) with a clarity that does the author much credit. The international problems confronting Colombia in 1879 are discussed in chapter IV, and the worsening relations between her and Chile from 1879 to 1880, in chapter V. In this chapter, the tension arose between the two states over the neutrality of the Panama Isthmus as regards the war Chile was waging against Peru and Bolivia.
The next chapter (VI) discusses the increasingly uneasy and potentially explosive boundary disputes with Colombia’s neighbors, Costa Rica and Venezuela, which, by mid-1880 had reached serious proportions. Potential Chilean diplomatic collusion with the latter states brought a temporary rapprochment between Chile and Colombia late in 1880. Both nations agreed to submit their differences to peaceful arbitration. In chapter VII, Professor Burr neatly relates the inter-action between President Rafael Núñez’ foreign policy—one which would bring diplomatic peace and international prestige for Colombia—and his domestic policy of channeling his country’s energies toward the reconstruction of the State. The means he proposed was the calling of a congress of the Spanish American nations to meet in Panama, late in 1881. The assemblage of states would, Núñez hoped, ratify the principle of compulsory arbitration. By the spring of 1881, however, the Colombians had actively begun to contemplate a broader agenda for the Panama Congress.
The increasingly stronger Chilean ascendency over Bolivia and Peru, thanks to her military successes in the War, plus the dangers her statesmen viewed as threatening the hard-won fruits of that victory, had, by September, 1881, convinced them that serious compromises—if not losses—might result to Chile were she to attend Núñez’ projected congress at Panama. This forms the substance of chapter VIII.
By the fall of 1881, the Chileans had concluded that the incipient Panama Congress boded them no good, and that furthermore, it would be to their advantage to sabotage it. Chapter IX is devoted to the maneuvers of Chilean diplomats in Mexico, Central, and South America charged with that purpose. The ability of the Chilean diplomats, added to the self-interest of various of the larger nations such as Mexico, Argentina, and Venezuela, brought them resounding success.
As the final narrative chapter (X) shows, only the Costa Rican, Guatemalan, and Salvadoran delegates and their Colombian host were in Panama by early January, 1882. A few days later, the representatives of the three visiting states voted to disband. The Congress had ended before it could begin.
The value of this study lies in its perceptive mastery of the diplomatic history of South America, and in its abundant proof that, by the eighth decade of the nineteenth century, the South American states had, out of interlocking interest, developed a system of power polities. For this achievement, for his solid research, for his clear presentation of a complicated series of events, and, above all, for making a significant contribution to South American history in the National Period, Professor Burr deserves the plaudits of the field.
In the main, therefore, this reviewer can find little substantive fault with the work. The main theme is well-handled. The author is clearly more than conversant with both Chilean and Colombian internal developments in the period under discussion. He is, however, not on quite as firm ground in discussing Venezuelan affairs. I find it hard to concur with his statement (p. 107) that Antonio Leocadio Guzmán was “distinguished. . .” or that the Venezuelan Congress in 1881 had much influence upon the nation’s foreign policy, as Burr seems to imply. Nor can the several errors in spelling which appear in the scholarly apparatus be glossed over; even worse, neither can footnotes 15 and 20 of chapter IV, which—through a doubtless oversight—do not concur either in substance or subject with the source cited.
Leaving these objections aside, Professor Burr has given us a valuable insight into a much-neglected area of Latin American history.
