Military Aspects of the 1930 Brazilian Revolution Open Access

Any understanding of contemporary Brazil pivots on the 1930 revolution, which resulted in a new political and social course of development. The final form of this development is yet to be seen, for it is still in a state of redefinition.

The role of the army in Brazilian political affairs has always been subtle but crucial. The military brought about the collapse of the Empire of Dom Pedro II in 1889, and it remained behind the scenes when civilians took over the chief executive’s office in 1894. Civilian presidents usually could depend on the support and assistance of the professional army corps throughout the period 1894-1930.

Younger elements in the army, notably lieutenants, organized unsuccessful revolts throughout the period but the majority of higher ranking officers did not join nor sympathize with these rebels. The older professional army officers generally closed ranks against these extralegal attempts to bring about political change.

A key to understanding why the 1930 revolution succeeded is found in the basically conservative nature of the military leaders of the revolt. Those in command of the 1930 revolution were not the lieutenants of 1922 and 1924. The commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the 1930 revolution was Lieutenant Colonel Góes Monteiro. The famous “tenentes” took their orders from him and coordinated their plans under his direction. Góes Monteiro was an extremely shrewd political opportunist rather than a revolutionary. He had served the government of President Washington Luis (1926-1930) loyally and faithfully and was partially responsible for the defeat and final retreat of the Prestes Column.

The lieutenants were used in coordinating certain phases of the 1930 military operations, but they did not make policy. The most prominent of the revolutionary lieutenants of the 1920’s, Luis Carlos Prestes, did not participate in the 1930 revolution, and he condemned it as a bourgeois revolt. The lieutenants were more important in preparing the psychological climate of opinion in the country than in the military planning and the little fighting which actually occurred.

Before, during, and after the revolution Góes Monteiro made sure that there were no massive purges of the Brazilian general staff as the young rebels desired. The professional army structure remained intact. There were no executions and no dismissals of top ranking generals. There was a simple accommodation within the professional army of a small group of younger men who moved up several ranks within the military hierarchy and who also obtained political power.

The implications for the future of the professional army were clear. The success of Lieutenant Colonel Góes Monteiro could encourage other of the high-ranking officers to take similar action during later periods in Brazilian affairs. The door was now open for wider participation of the military in the political life of the country. One of the fascinating points of Brazilian political development since the 1930 revolution has been the fact that the events of 1930 have not been repeated. Every military move in the political arena has been carried out by the highest ranking army officers, and there has been no repetition of younger officers challenging, winning control of, and then being incorporated into the military establishment. This is amply illustrated by the coup d’ état of 1937, the 1945 move of the army against Vargas, and the November, 1955, operations of General Texeira Lott. In August, 1962, when Jânio Quadros resigned, the highest ranking army officers again boldly entered the political arena. It remains to be seen whether the military leaders have been able to keep abreast the new generation of army officers who were trained and developed during the Vargas and post-Vargas periods.

By focusing on the military events of the October revolution, much is revealed concerning the overall political and social milieu of Brazil in 1930. Events in the state of Rio Grande do Sul will be used as a framework, since this state played the most important role in the revolution and the planning that preceded it. The role of the military in Brazil, both on a state and federal level, had to be clearly defined before any successful extralegal change of government could take place. The success of any positive political rebellion depended upon the willingness and the ability of the protesting party to field a military force. This military unit would have to be equal to São Paulo and federal troops, which remained temporarily loyal to the government. Brazil, up to 1930, had no tradition of successful military revolts. With the exception of the two small uprisings in 1922 and 1924, the Republic had never faced a serious armed revolution.

Shortly after the March, 1930, elections, General Gil de Almeida, federal commander of the Rio Grande do Sul military zone, stated: “The elections which were held March, 1930, resulted in an exceptional resurrection of the dead, who turned up to vote for the candidates of the Liberal Alliance.”¹ By March 8, 1930, General Gil de Almeida had obtained detailed information concerning the arrival in Porto Alegre, capital of Rio Grande do Sul, of some of the 1924 fugitive army officers. This information, together with previous advice, led the general to believe that these rebels had returned to Brazil to aid in planning a revolution.² He reported to Rio Grande do Sul officials that the disappearance of federal rifles and munitions had increased.³

Despite knowledge of anti-federalist activity, it seemed as though Getúlio Vargas and Borges de Medeiros, the leading political figures of Rio Grande do Sul, were prepared to accept the election results. In an interview on March 19, 1930, Borges de Medeiros declared that he was convinced

The views of Borges de Medeiros, however, were not shared by the more ardent and militant members of the Liberal Alliance. On April 11 Oswaldo Aranha met with anti-government political leaders from the states of Minas Gerais, Rio Grande do Sul, and Paraiba to prepare a military revolution.⁵ A tentative military organization was planned. The revolution was to break out simultaneously in Minas Gerais, Paraíba, and Rio Grande do Sul. Aranha agreed to coordinate the movement in the south of Brazil, and plans were made to contact the 1924 rebel army officers, Luis Carlos Prestes and João Alberto Lins de Barros. In northeastern Brazil the plans were to be carried out by the governor of Paraíba, João Pessôa, who had been the vice presidential candidate of the Liberal Alliance. Juarez Távora, another 1924 rebel, was to command the military organization in the northeast. In São Paulo efforts would be made to win over a machine gun squadron to the revolution.⁶ In Minas Gerais the state government would also participate under the direction of Governor Antônio Carlos.

On April 2 Batista Lusardo cabled Aranha to send to Rio de Janeiro 100,000 Mauser bullets, four machine guns, and two instructors. Lusardo said he would pay for these expenses personally.⁷ On April 12 Aranha placed an order for more than 800,000 dollars worth of arms and equipment with a Czechoslovak munitions factory.⁸

As a result of the campaign promises of the Liberal Alliance, organization of the rebel military forces was made easier. The federal military had been offered a program of army expansion, new equipment, and a better system of promotions.⁹ These promises induced many officers to become partisans of the revolution.

In the month of May Aranha decided that the revolution could begin July 16, 1930.¹⁰ Contact had been made with all the army officers in exile. The details for the military preparations in the state of Minas Gerais had been perfected. The cooperation of certain São Paulo federal military garrisons had been arranged.¹¹ But there ensued a series of events which nearly forced the revolutionists to discard their plans. Siqueira Campos, one of the exiled army officers contacted, died in an airplane crash in the middle of the month. He was to have provided the contacts in the state of São Paulo.¹² In June the governor of Minas Gerais lost confidence in the military-preparations of the state of Rio Grande do Sul, and the July date for the revolution was given up.¹³

An exchange of letters during the month of June between Aranha and Antônio Carlos merely increased the distrust between the two officials. Aranha wanted unconditional support from the state of Minas Gerais, but Antônio Carlos, a cautious politician, refused to permit the state to become involved in the revolution until military preparations were perfected.¹⁴ The cumulative effect of these events produced a crisis in the revolutionary plans. Aranha resigned his post as Secretary of the Interior of Rio Grande do Sul, and João Alberto, Aranha’s chief military aide, returned to Buenos Aires.¹⁵ At the end of June most of the dissatisfied elements felt that the opportunity for a successful revolution had been lost.

Early in July Vargas told General Gil de Almeida:

A political assassination revived the plans of the Liberal Alliance. On July 26 João Pessôa, vice presidential candidate, with Vargas and a Liberal Alliance leader in northeastern Brazil, was shot and killed by a political opponent who allegedly had the support of the federal government.¹⁷ Once again the revolutionaries had a cause and a rallying point, and they took heart. Aranha immediately declared:

The rebel military plans were reorganized. Lieutenant Colonel Góes Monteiro, serving in the Rio Grande do Sul military region under General Gil de Almeida, who had secretly accepted the position of chief of staff for the rebels as early as April, 1930, reactivated his plans.¹⁹ Meanwhile, João Alberto had returned from Argentina to work with the newly appointed rebel chief of staff. Furthermore, additional support came from Minas Gerais as the death of João Pessôa had moved Antônio Carlos to abandon his cautious role.

At the same time loyal federal troops prepared to defend themselves. Intense military and political agitation in August forced General Gil de Almeida to distribute federal forces in the strategic railroad cities of Santa Barbara and Passo Fundo. As added defense against a possible revolution, he reinforced the military garrison at Pôrto Alegre.²⁰

João Alberto and others of the rebel army staff believed that their military preparations would be ready by the end of August. Plans were made for simultaneous attacks all over the country.²¹ A few days before the date set for the revolution Aranha was once again forced to change plans.²² The principal reason the revolution did not take place in August was the decision by Vargas that someone must go to Rio de Janeiro to contact federal military officials known to be well disposed toward the Liberal Alliance program.²³ Vargas wanted these officials informed of the revolutionary plans, and, in case of success before rebel troops reached Rio de Janeiro, these military officials were to take over the government temporarily until the Rio Grande military forces arrived.

Simultaneously, the revolutionists began a propaganda campaign against loyal federal troops stationed in the state of Rio Grande do Sul. The theme was that brothers should not fight brothers. The campaign was effective, for the majority of the federal troops there were natives of Rio Grande do Sul.²⁴

While news from Rio de Janeiro was awaited, great quantities of military supplies were unloaded in the town of Passo Fundo on the Rio Grande do Sul-Paraná border.²⁵ Despite the concentration of rebel military supplies, it was feared that the federal commander of the garrison would not join the revolution.

Passo Fundo was strategically located, and its occupation would enable rebel troops to cross immediately into the state of Santa Catarina to carry the revolution northward to the crucial state of São Paulo. Vargas dispatched a letter to the federal commander in Passo Fundo and invited him to join the rebels, but no definite commitments were made by the commander.²⁶ Early in September word finally arrived from Rio de Janeiro that the high ranking military officers contacted would not be able to aid the revolution, but they promised to take over the government and keep order until the rebel forces arrived in the national capital, should the revolution succeed.²⁷

General Gil de Almeida kept pleading with federal authorities in Rio de Janeiro to take action against the revolutionary preparations. On September 3, 1930, he radioed to the Ministry of War, “Intolerable situation as state authorities are protecting military deserters and openly inviting all to join the rebellion. I ask permission to concentrate troops in various parts of the state.”²⁸

On September 15, General Gil de Almeida wired in code to General Nestor Passos, Minister of War, in the federal capital that he was certain that Getúlio Vargas was disloyal and was participating in the revolution. The general also said he had seen through the device of Vargas which was to have the general contact his personal secretary, who honestly knew nothing about the revolution.²⁹

On September 25, at a meeting at rebel headquarters in Pôrto Alegre, the revolution was definitely scheduled for October 3. The revolt would take place at five thirty in the afternoon in Rio Grande do Sul, Paraíba, and Minas Gerais. This hour had been picked because government offices closed at 5 p.m. and military headquarters would be deserted. Under these conditions it would be a simple matter to take the federal commander of Rio Grande do Sul, General Gil de Almeida, prisoner. In Pôrto Alegre the barracks of the state guard were in front of the federal army headquarters. For months the civil guard had lined up there when changing guard. This had been planned to avoid arousing suspicion on the day of the revolution, when, instead of changing guard, they would simply march into the army headquarters and take over.³⁰ The attack against General Gil de Almeida’s headquarters was to occur five minutes earlier, so that when the major attack commenced in other parts of the state, the general would be a prisoner and unable to coordinate any defense.³¹

On September 28, six days before the revolution, General Gil de Almeida received secret information that the revolution was imminent. He demanded an interview with Vargas, but was informed by the latter’s secretary that “The state is in peace—a revolution is no longer possible.”³² September 30 found Rio Grande do Sul state forces ready for battle. Effective mobilization had been accomplished by the municipal authorities in coordination with the rebel military staff.³³ The occasion of border incidents was used as an excuse to increase the state troops’ concentration there.³⁴ Three days later, October 3, the revolution started.

Throughout the whole period of preparation for revolution the figure of Luis Carlos Prestes appears. His reputation as a military genius and his great popularity in the rural areas of Brazil made him a natural choice to lead the Liberal Alliance army.

As early as September, 1929, Prestes was reported to have been approached by Aranha to lead rebel military forces. A group of Liberal Alliance leaders went to Buenos Aires, where Prestes was living in exile, in an effort to win him over to the party. Although Prestes refused to join the movement, the majority of the lieutenants, including João Alberto, joined the rebels.³⁸ The link with the revolutionaries was maintained by Colonel Nelson Etchegoyen. João Alberto was made sub-chief of the general staff by Góes Monteiro, and Newton Estillac Leal was made the assistant to João Alberto. Both João Alberto and Estillac Leal were commissioned as colonels by Góes Monteiro.³⁶

Prestes refused to join the revolution because the platform of the Liberal Alliance failed to strike at the basic economic problems of Brazil.³⁷ On the other hand, the Liberal Alliance military leaders had obtained the support of most of the former Prestes Column lieutenants.

The role of Minas Gerais had been determined at the Pôrto Alegre meeting of April 18, 1930. It had been arranged that the Minas government would join the revolution simultaneously with Rio Grande do Sul and Paraíba. In view of the weakness of the military forces of Minas Gerais, their role would be to distract federal troops in Minas when the revolt started.³⁸ The Minas Gerais soldiers were also to close the frontiers and thus draw federal troops which normally would have gone to fight the Rio Grande do Sul forces. Aside from military aid, Minas Gerais was pledged to contribute more than 30,000 dollars for the purchase of arms and munitions.³⁹

The manufacture of war materials for the revolution was started in various factories in Minas Gerais. The Belgo-Mineira steel mill began to make hand grenades.⁴⁰ Also being made in a factory in Belo Horizonte were 75 millimeter artillery.⁴¹ The biggest problem faced by the Minas Gerais rebels was that the majority of the federal forces were not mineiros and would probably remain loyal to the government.⁴² Nevertheless, by June 13 three rebel military battalions were secretly organized.⁴³

The military preparations in the Northeast of Brazil were on a smaller scale. As early as March, 1930, both military and civilian elements had arrived to help organize the coming revolution.⁴⁴ On April 14 Juarez Távora, one of the 1924 military heroes and a native of the Northeast, arrived in Paraíba to help plan the revolt.⁴⁵ Progress was uncertain until the assassination of João Pessôa on July 26 created chaotic conditions in the state.⁴⁶ Federal troops were prepared to occupy the state completely to restore order in the event of riots and bloodshed resulting from the assassination.⁴⁷ Shortly before the death of João Pessôa some federal troops had been transferred to the state to combat a local uprising and had remained on the alert to prevent any rebellion from elements of the Liberal Alliance. The rebel military organization, nevertheless, was constantly expanded under Juarez Távora, and federal units were also contacted in different sections of the state. Many promised to join the rebels on the day of the revolution.⁴⁸ Using the same tactics which were employed in Rio Grande do Sul, the rebels chose the federal military headquarters as the first target of attack on October 3.

In Rio de Janeiro it was evident throughout this whole preparatory period that a revolution was imminent. To all appearances Washington Luis was powerless to halt the military developments. On August 29 the federal government allowed newspapermen to file dispatches to foreign countries which declared that rumors of revolutionary unrest in the southern part of Brazil were untrue.⁴⁹ On September 6 the government issued a press release which stated that there were no indications of disorder in any part of Brazil.⁵⁰ From the amount of newspaper publicity which was given to the coming revolution it seems impossible that the Washington Luis government was not aware of events. On September 12 a New York Times dispatch from Montevideo, Uruguay, declared:

At first the Washington Luis government believed that the date set for the revolution would be September 7, Brazil’s Independence Day. On that day Rio de Janeiro was the scene of a military review in which more than 15,000 troops participated.⁵¹ As October 3 drew closer, it was apparent that the government, pre-occupied with the economic crisis, could do nothing to stop the coming revolution.

October 3, 1930

With weeks of advance notice, the revolution began in Rio Grande do Sul, Minas Gerais, and Paraíba. At three o’clock in the morning of October 3 Oswaldo Aranha and Lieutenant Colonel Góes Monteiro went to the government palace, where Vargas was awaiting information. In the governor’s office Aranha informed Vargas that the revolution was to start that day at 5:30 p.m.⁵² As the day progressed, rumors and warnings began to spread throughout the city. General Gil de Almeida was informed by enemies of the Liberal Alliance at one o’clock that the revolution was about to begin. Another message arrived at federal headquarters declaring that Aranha had issued a revolutionary manifesto. Shortly after two o’clock in the afternoon more telephone calls came to General Gil de Almeida’s office warning that the revolution would start that day.⁵³

The general alerted the federal garrison of Pôrto Alegre. Later in the afternoon reports from all the major cities of Rio Grande do Sul carried information of irregularities.⁵⁴ General Gil de Almeida sent a lieutenant to inform Vargas of disturbances and Vargas declared: “Tell the general measures will be taken.”⁵⁵ Although federal officers generally left the military headquarters at 4:30 p.m., General Gil de Almeida ordered that no one was to leave that afternoon.⁵⁶ Despite this advance preparation, shortly after five o’clock the attack on the army headquarters began. Within twenty minutes the federal military headquarters was in the hands of the revolutionists.⁵⁷ General Gil de Almeida refused to surrender until Vargas wrote him a letter requesting his surrender. Vargas guaranteed that the general would be treated with respect.⁵⁸

By eleven o’clock that night most of the federal troops of Pôrto Alegre had gone over to the rebels. The one exception was the Seventh Battalion, which held out until the next day.⁵⁹ On October 4 Vargas issued a proclamation. It declared that the reasons for the revolution were the fraudulent presidential elections of March and the interference of the federal government in Paraíba. Events had made the revolution essential. He concluded:

The rebel military general staff, composed of Lieutenant Colonel Góes Monteiro, as chief of staff, and his principal aides, João Alberto and General Miguel Costa, were occupied October 4 with plans for the invasion of Santa Catarina.⁶¹ The rebellion moved at a fast pace in southern Brazil. The majority of the cities in Rio Grande do Sul went over to the revolutionists without fighting, and by the evening of October 4 few cities remained in the hands of federal troops.⁶² On October 5 the majority of the federal troops in the neighboring state of Santa Catarina joined the rebel forces, and it was only the capital of the state, Florianópolis, located on an island off the coast of Brazil, which offered any resistance. Paraná, the next state north of Santa Catarina, capitulated to the rebels on October 6, three days after the revolution started.⁶³ The number of rebel troops in the field were estimated at from twenty to thirty thousand.⁶⁴

By October 10 most of the Rio Grande do Sul troops had moved across Santa Catarina and Paraná and were taking up positions on the Paraná-São Paulo border.⁶⁵ From October 12 to October 20 there was a military stalemate near the São Paulo-Paraná border town of Itararé.⁶⁶ The battle fought was supposedly modern warfare, with trenches running along the whole front, barbed wire, machine gun nests, and artillery.⁶⁷ Both sides gave conflicting reports, but when it appeared that the front had been stabilized, the government troops began to retreat.⁶⁸ The battle of Itararé was crucial because the city was situated on the central north-south railroad line of Brazil. If the rebel military forces captured it, the road to São Paulo would be open.⁶⁹ The United States consul general in the city of São Paulo reported by telegram to the United State Secretary of State on October 18:

One of the results of the stalemate in the battle at Itararé was the request by the rebel military headquarters for the Minas Gerais rebel forces to continue their military offensive for another five days, although they had been asked for only ten days of military action.⁷¹ While fighting was suspended at Itararé due to bad weather conditions, events in other parts of the country had developed favorably for the rebels. The rebel troop action in Minas Gerais followed the same pattern as that in Rio Grande do Sul. The revolutionists occupied the federal headquarters in Belo Horizonte, capital of Minas Gerais, shortly before five o’clock, and captured the commander of the federal troops.⁷² The state troops acquired control of most of the federal garrisons. One federal unit, the Twelfth Infantry Division, refused to surrender until October 8.⁷³ Although the state government had carefully planned the military phase of the revolt, the majority of the federal troops did not join the rebels until the revolution started.⁷⁴

Federal troops surrounding the state of Minas Gerais were at a disadvantage, as their lines were too extended. Their job was to protect the Rio de Janeiro-Minas Gerais frontier as well as the São Paulo-Minas Gerais border. Taking advantage of the long line of communications of the federal troops, rebel soldiers from Minas Gerais invaded the states of Espírito Santo, Bahia and Goiás.

The governor of Espírito Santo, on learning of the invasion, boarded a ship for Europe and left the state to a provisional government which joined the rebels.⁷⁵ The Minas Gerais attack upon Bahia was an attempt to meet Liberal Alliance forces advancing south from Paraíba.⁷⁶

Northeastern operations were controlled by Juarez Távora. Though the federal government had issued standing orders for his arrest, he had been moving about freely in the Northeast for over six months.⁷⁷ By October 5, following the strategy set up in other rebel sections, the revolutionists occupied the federal headquarters. Approximately five thousand federal soldiers began to move south to the state of Pernambuco, while other troops went north to Rio Grande do Norte.⁷⁸ The rebels triumphed without difficulty in both states. By October 7 Natal, capital of Rio Grande do Norte, and Recife, capital of Pernambuco, joined the rebel forces, and provisional governments were set up.⁷⁹ In Pernambuco the rebel activity consisted of attacks by civilian reservists who had been called to service. They had armed themselves without contacting the Liberal Alliance military leaders and had captured the federal garrison.⁸⁰

In a New York Times report from Pernambuco on October 13, Juarez Távora stated:

The United States government entered the military scene late in the campaign as a result of a State Department decision on October 22 to place an embargo on the sale of arms and munitions to rebel forces.⁸² In view of the general information sent to the State Department by the various consular officials in Brazil, it is surprising that this action was taken. It was naturally interpreted by the rebels as an unfriendly act, and it was also attacked in the United States press.⁸³ As a result of these attacks, and as this was the first time an arms embargo had been placed on a South American country, Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson issued press releases justifying his action.⁸⁴

From the onset of the revolution, Rio de Janeiro had been the scene of conflicting information, mostly as the result of government censorship of the press. According to the government-controlled press federal troops were winning all the battles and the rebels were routed on all fronts.⁸⁵ Washington Luis had declared a state of siege of Rio Grande do Sul, Paraná, Minas Gerais, and Rio de Janeiro. He also issued an order calling up all civilian reservists. When the government tried to enforce this order and demanded that reservists, regardless of their social, economic, or political connections, report for active service, there was violent protest in Rio de Janeiro.⁸⁶ The Liberal Alliance gained adherents in the capital of the country by this action of Washington Luis.⁸⁷ As early as October 12, 1930, Excelsior, a Mexico City newspaper, carried stories that President Washington Luis had lost the support of the army, but it was not until the last days of the revolution that rumors began to circulate in Rio de Janeiro that the government was about to be overthrown.⁸⁸

In southern Brazil inclement weather between October 20 and 24 delayed a general rebel offensive along the Paraná-São Paulo border. But on October 24 Lieutenant Colonel Góes Monteiro ordered a general offensive in the area.⁸⁹ On the same day word reached rebel headquarters that a revolution had broken out in Rio de Janeiro.⁹⁰ The rebel general staff called off the attack and made efforts to reach the headquarters of a military junta that had been set up in Rio de Janeiro.⁹¹

A junta composed of Generals João de Deus Menna Barreto, Firmino Antônio Borba, Pantaleão Teles Ferreira, and José Fernandes Leite de Castro had in fact overthrown the federal government. Without consulting the rebel forces, they had sent a proclamation to President Washington Luis demanding his capitulation. The generals stated that they felt the best interests of the country lay in accepting the revolution and in preventing more bloodshed. Also on October 24 the federal troops stationed in the capital joined the rebel cause. The junta of military officials appointed General Leite de Castro as Minister of War and Colonel Bertoldo Klinger as Chief of Police of the Federal District. The appointment of General Hastimphlio de Mouro, who had been in command of federal forces opposing the rebels on the São Paulo-Paraná front, as military governor of São Paulo brought a storm of protest.⁹² Rebel commanders were surprised, as these decisions had all been made without previous communication with the rebels. Messages of protest began to pour in from the members of the Liberal Alliance party in São Paulo. Vargas and Lieutenant Colonel Góes Monteiro demanded clarification, and dispatched telegrams to the military junta in Rio de Janeiro. Vargas telegraphed on October 24:

Lieutenant Colonel Góes Monteiro, representing the military element of the Liberal Alliance, demanded:

1. The provisional government must have as its chief Dr. Getúlio Vargas, president of the state of Rio Grande do Sul, whom the revolution considers as the president-elect of Brazil, refusing to recognize frauds practiced by the executive and the legislative branches of the national government.

2. The position is not only justified by the fact that Dr. Vargas was elected by the popular will, but also by his position as commander-in-chief of the revolutionary forces directed against the regime which has just been overthrown. The opinion is definitely established among the leaders of the three states which led the revolt, Minas Gerais, Paraíba, and Rio Grande do Sul, in agreement with the military and political elements of the entire nation.

3. A government headed by Getúlio Vargas will govern the nation without any previously assumed obligations except those principles set forth in the program of the Liberal Alliance, which headed the revolution.⁹⁴

It was not until three days later, on October 27, that the junta in Rio de Janeiro answered the telegrams of Vargas and Lieutenant Colonel Góes Monteiro. That day the junta declared, in a circular to the people, that it had finally made contact with the rebel forces and awaited the arrival of Getúlio Vargas before taking any further steps in organizing the government.⁹⁵ On October 27 Oswaldo Aranha arrived in Rio de Janeiro. Getúlio Vargas would not enter the capital until it had been occupied by Rio Grande do Sul troops. Between October 27 and October 31 nearly three thousand gaúcho troops arrived in the capital.⁹⁶ When these troops had made Rio de Janeiro secure, Vargas entered the city and the junta of military officials turned the government over to him.

Author notes