The controversial figure of the Mecklenberg mercenary, General Hans Kundt, loomed large in Bolivia for a quarter-century. The conclusion of his career as a military mission chief, naturalized Bolivian field officer, and a figure of political eminence came with his removal from the supreme command of the army in the Chaco after the disastrous Battle of Campo Via. Since then, Kundt has been much maligned by Bolivian historians and charged with major responsibility for their country’s ultimate defeat. Although the General prepared several important reports, they have been suppressed since 1935.

Retired General Tovar Villa presents to the public two of Kundt’s reports to the government on his conduct in the Chaco. Although Tovar’s introduction is useful, his primary contribution lies in publishing these documents. In them, Kundt emerges in a new light. That he has been a convenient whipping boy for the Bolivian officers’ accounts is now confirmed; the manifestly incompetent jefes seem less able to share with the German the blame for the loss of the Chaco War. Far from meddling in minute tactical matters, Kundt employed the traditional German general directive and left details to his subordinates. Furthermore, he charged them with the unsuccessful strategic conceptions for which he himself has usually been held accountable. The ineptitude of Bolivian commanders apparently was more significant than Kundt’s shortcomings. Finally, Kundt demonstrated a sincere respect for constitutional authority, and a concern for the welfare of the nation unmatched by his successors.

Tovar Villa has performed a valuable service for students of Bolivia. His book makes clear the need for a reevaluation of Kundt to determine his true role in Bolivia history.