In a rather brief monograph Mr. Goldwert presented a basically solid account of the constabulary in both the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua; however, extreme condensation has lessened the value of the work. Too many generalizations were drawn, and conclusions were reached which could be misleading to anyone not familiar with the history of the countries. For example, it was not pointed out that the government of the United States was not a party to the General Treaty of Peace and Amity of 1923, yet it is implied that this Treaty was the basis for later intervention in Nicaragua by the United States. Also the author overlooked the fact that the election of A. Díaz as provisional president was a violation of said Treaty, a fact completely ignored by the Department of State which resulted in much opposition in Nicaragua and Central America. The Sacasa-Moncada and Sandino revolts were the strongest opposing forces, both of which received foreign support.

One major weakness is evident though. Mr. Goldwert made the assumption repeatedly that the intervention by the United States began in Nicaragua in 1927, thereby ignoring the important fact that a large portion of the difficulties after that date were instigated by earlier activity. With the exception of a few months, troops were maintained by the United States Government from the first decade of the century when José Santos Zelaya was in power.

For the beginning student in Latin-American studies, this monograph should be an excellent aid. The bibliography is annotated and covers most of the sources in libraries in the United States. However, much additional primary and secondary material may be found in the National Archives, the files of the Department of State, the United States Marine Corps Library, and private, public, and governmental libraries in the Dominican Republic and Central America.