This short work by a veteran Latin American hand and widely respected statesman, businessman, and economist, should be quickly translated into Spanish and Portuguese and widely distributed in Latin America. Readers there will be annoyed by much of what is stated in the book. But the time has come, as Berle argues, to ask the Latin Americans to face up to reality, no matter how unpleasant this may be.

That Latin America has a vast potential, Berle is at considerable pains to point out. At the same time, he indicates that there is no inevitable tide working toward realization of this potential. If Latin American countries are to begin adequately to utilize resources, they must commence to cooperate with each other, and also with the United States. Berle maintains that economically the United States is not dependent upon Latin America. It could, with only a short-term dislocation, establish its economy almost exclusively on an East-West axis. Latin America, on the other hand, depends almost inescapably upon cooperation with the United States for its economic development.

Should Latin American nations insist upon obtaining “independence” from the United States, they must realize that this country is free to assert its independence from them. The United States can do this by eliminating aid programs and also by closing its markets for Latin American goods. Where then could Latin America turn? Probably not to Europe, as the common market there may become increasingly difficult for Latin America to penetrate. Recent Cuban experiences do not suggest that turning to Iron Curtain countries holds the way out for Latin America.

Berle does not expect Latin American countries going through a period of social upheaval to emulate United States models. So long as a country fulfills three basic requirements, by protecting human rights, by not becoming a base for aggression against the United States, and by not intervening in the affairs of other American republics, Berle feels that it has a right to anticipate cooperation from the United States—even if it resorts to socialism and shows little interest in two-party democracy.

A number of parallels between Latin American development and historical precedents are drawn by Berle. He feels that the present stage of the Latin American economy is in some ways similar to that of Europe a century or so ago; and he sees a similarity in the social tensions of mid-nineteenth century Europe and those now evident in Latin America. He feels also that just as Europe was given its choice of cooperating with the United States or going its independent way at the time the Marshall Plan was formulated, so now Latin America has reached the point of decision: either it can cooperate with the Alliance for Progress or, in the name of independence, go its separate way.

Readers may find the least interesting that rather lengthy and highly legalistic portion of the book which deals with the rights of an American state to defend itself or to act under any arrangement for collective defense. This section may have been included because of Berle’s desire to justify his well-known early advocacy of a tough policy toward Cuba. A real dilemma is involved here, one which I think Berle ignores in the present book. If a country does not fulfill the three requirements for United States cooperation, should it be allowed to go its independent way, or should it be subjected to intervention that extends even to military invasion?

Among readers in this country, Diplomacy and Reality will offend both “conservatives” who think only free-enterprise capitalism can solve Latin America’s problems, and “liberals” whose stock in trade has been to endorse uncritically every leftist group that attacked the United States and spoke loftily of social reform while at the same time ignoring economic realities. This is only one of the many virtues of a book that contains what is among the best and most succinct formulations of a realistic Latin American policy to appear since the end of the Second World War.