On October 27, 1795, at the summer residence of the Spanish court in the village of San Lorenzo del Escorial, near the Sierra de Guadarrama range, one of the most widely discussed events in history took place—the signing of the Treaty of San Lorenzo.1 It was an event the importance of which can only be compared with that of 1783 in the history of the United States, that recognized it before the world as a nation free, independent, and sovereign. After fifteen years of continued diplomatic overtures and controversy between Spain and the United States over the southern boundary and the navigation of the Mississippi River, Spain’s acquiescence to the United States opened the greatest of possibilities for her future development, and marked the beginning of the end of Spain’s expansion. The importance of the treaty and the astounding fact of its realization have brought into being many critical and historical works, but only a few of these writers have had direct access to original sources.2 Accordingly, with the perspective that time affords, and basing my observations principally on original documents conserved in the National Historical Archives, Madrid, I should like to present yet another interpretation of the conditions which preceded the signing of the Treaty of San Lorenzo. A detailed background of the question can be found in my: “Los Antecedentes Políticos y Diplomáticos del Tratado de Pinckney.”3
The powers of Thomas Pinckney4 that designated him as “envoy extraordinary and only commissioned plenipotentiary” authorized him to negotiate and sign, subject to the ratification of the President and the consent of the Senate, a treaty or treaties “concerning the navigation of the Mississippi River and other matters such as the confines and territories of the United States and His Catholic Majesty”; he also was empowered to conclude, in the same way, an agreement “of general commerce between the United States and the kingdoms and dominions of His Catholic Majesty.”5
Fortunately for Pinckney and the United States, he arrived in Madrid at a relatively favorable time, on June 28, 1795, although it was not the psychological moment as Whitaker points out.6 The prevailing situation in European politics appeared to have been in his favor. Prussia and Holland already had abandoned the anti-French coalition. France began to fortify her armies that now advanced victoriously into Spain. Don Manuel de Godoy,7 director of the King’s policy and the Queen’s sentiments, was not long in finding a way to realize his cherished desires, and by so doing, to enter the field of reality and history. On June 22, 1795, in Switzerland, Spain and France signed in secret the peace treaty that is known as the Peace of Basilea. By signing this treaty, Spain deserted the Anglo-Spanish alliance and remained exposed to the indignation and revenge of England, who was soon to learn of her ally’s disloyalty, united as England and Spain were in a truly artificial alliance which did not correspond either to their reciprocal interests or their feelings, since they were traditional enemies.
In the opinion of Arthur Preston Whitaker in “New Light on the Treaty of San Lorenzo,” it was the Peace of Basilea, and not Jay’s Treaty, which made possible Pinckney’s triumph at San Lorenzo.8 The violation of the alliance and the fear of a vengeful England made Godoy increasingly apprehensive. Nevertheless, it would seem more likely to suppose that the combined weight of these treaties taken together was what so decidedly influenced Godoy’s attitude, and thus impelled him to conclude an agreement with the Americans with so little delay. By virtue of Jay’s Treaty, the fear that England and the United States had offered one another mutual support was added to the fear of British revenge once Spain’s disloyalty was known. These facts were so inter-related in Godoy’s mind that he was unable to consider them as separate entities. The fundamental danger was compounded of a furious England determined to punish Spain and united by common consent with the American states. Such being the case nothing could save the Spanish possessions in North America— and possibly some of the Spanish dominions of the Southern hemisphere—from falling into the hands of allied American and English forces.
What is certain is that the content of Jay’s Treaty, although inoffensive in all its aspects for Spain, was thought to be a great danger because of its secret nature—a threat, which could be averted only by the signing of a treaty of friendship with the United States.9
Pinckney, unaware of the easy course that events would take for him, arrived in Madrid only to find that the Spanish court, which was residing in Aranjuez, appeared not to be seriously affected either by political preoccupations or foreign military invasions. The Envoy went to Aranjuez only to discover that the court was about to leave for Madrid. He managed, however, to be introduced to Godoy and to exchange impressions with Short.10 Desirous of beginning conversations, Pinckney, accompanied by Short, proceeded to Madrid. The court remained in the capital city only ten days, sufficient time to make preparations to depart for the summer residence in San Ildefonso. Nevertheless, in Madrid, Pinckney had arranged to be introduced to the King and, accompanied by Short, had had two personal interviews with Godoy. The Peace of Basilea still had not been signed. Godoy had not yet reached a maximum point of fear. In an interview with Pinckney, Godoy revealed his interest by expressing the desire that at the time Spain signed the projected separate peace with France, a triple alliance could be signed simultaneously with Spain, France and the United States—thus creating a powerful alliance opposed to Great Britain and one that would demand respect. But Godoy added that he could not reach any definite agreement until he had received a reply from President Washington concerning the proposals he had made a year ago. It was then that Pinckney learned through Short, from the reports of Secretary of State Randolph,11 about the suspicious nature of Jáudenes’ delay in delivering the proposals, and the vague way in which he had made them; he had presented as proposals what were in reality resolutions already adopted by Spain. Pinckney informed Godoy of this fact. Godoy could hardly believe what he heard, assuring Pinckney that he had been awaiting the American reply with much interest.
At Randolph’s request Pinckney sent Godoy, in support of this information, a copy of the proposals delivered to Jáudenes, April 4, 1795.12 The conversations were interrupted at that moment, when the court moved to San Ildefonso.13
On July 22 the secret Peace of Basilea was signed. Seven days later it was ratified in Paris. A special mail carrying the treaty arrived at Madrid on August 3. The treaty was immediately ratified by the Court and returned to Paris. On August 7, 1795, it was announced in Madrid that the war with France had ended.
The jubilation of the people in the streets knew no bounds and Godoy had his apotheosis. For having achieved the termination of hostilities “alone and unaided” grateful Charles IV conferred on him the sonorous title of the Prince of the Peace. But the Duke of Alcudia, now also the Prince of the Peace, could not rest on his laurels. England’s reaction on learning the news remained to be seen!
As mentioned earlier, Godoy in his interview with Pinckney had expressed the desire for a triple alliance to be concluded simultaneously with the agreement of peace with France. The United States did not want an alliance of this nature. She wanted to remain free, at all costs, from the compromises that such an agreement would imply. Pinckney declared to Godoy in San Ildefonso that “it was not found authorized to include in a treaty a guaranty of the Spanish possessions in America.” Godoy, having in mind his project of simultaneous agreements, listened with displeasure to Pinckney’s declarations. Added to his discontent was the fear that the proposals that he had forwarded to President Washington, although facts, had been studied informally and thrown out by the American government as a result of Pinckney’s attitude and declarations concerning the proposed alliance.14
Inasmuch as the Treaty of Basilea had been concluded, the alliance as Godoy desired it had not been effected. The following day, after having made public in Madrid the announcement of peace, Godoy informed Pinckney that His Majesty “in order to give testimony to his good will toward the United States” was disposed to sacrifice some of his rights to the end that an understanding might soon be reached between the two nations. They were not empty words. Godoy was really expressing his fears, his anxiety, and his ardent desire to win American support and thus prevent the United States, England’s ally, from undermining the Spanish possessions in American territory.
The Spanish Council of State met August 14, 1795.15 It did not waver with regard to the attitude which it would adopt towards the Americans. If, instead of Godoy, Floridablanca or Aranda had been present as top representative of Spanish policy at that moment, it is most unlikely that a decision of such a nature would have been taken so easily and so conclusively. But Godoy did not vacillate a moment when, in order to satisfy him, the Council decided to proceed with negotiations with the Americans on the basis of conceding to them the rights of navigation of the Mississippi and the limit of 31 degrees in accordance with the claims of the United States. But if this fact in itself is surprising, it must be considered all the more so if it is taken into account that to make these concessions, Spain did not demand an alliance or a reciprocal guarantee of territories.16 It only requested, and tacitly, a sincere friendship—a friendship capable of compensation for what could have been consolidated in Jay’s mysterious treaty—and a sufficiently solid friendship so as to restrict the Americans from uniting with the British in an attack against the Spanish possessions in America.
The daring Prince of the Peace who “alone and without aid from anyone” effected the enactment of the Peace of the Basilea, was prepared to seek passage of the Treaty of San Lorenzo—one of the most precipitate and irresponsible acts of his career. Neither boards nor consultive bodies” would mediate in the negotiations. Godoy and Pinckney would resolve all the differences in a rather cordial diplomatic “tête-à-tête.” Conrotte states that the plan of the treaty was delivered in confidence to don Diego de Gardoqui, Secretary of the Treasury, for study, with his vast knowledge of the points to be settled. It is affirmed that Gardoqui formulated a confidential report, “throwing out that which would signify authorization to do business with the Spanish colonies,” and made some interesting observations over rights of capture of ships whose cargoes “would be harmful to the mercantile interests of Spain.”17 But although Gardoqui offered his opinion, it was obvious that Godoy would be the one who alone and without the aid of anyone would decide the question. It would seem likely that the very conscientious Gardoqui was perplexed by the concessions that Spain was disposed to make. He had remained almost five years in the United States without yielding to the same demands that Spain now seemed so ready to accept.18
The Spanish Ambassador in London notified Godoy of England’s reactions on learning of the Peace of Basilea and of the prodigious preparations of that nation to undertake a campaign in America: “We must fear the worst.” Such a warning only added to the desperation of the Prince of the Peace. Pinckney, for his part, had noted Godoy’s situation, and wrote Randolph concerning it: “My opinion in the present state of affairs is that the new position of Spain with respect to England will induce them to reach a decision with us.”19
He was not mistaken. Godoy began negotiations energetically—one could say almost sportingly. Naturally, those differences that they had to resolve were of little importance in comparison with those that had at first been arranged: the questions of the limits and navigation of the Mississippi. Pinckney tried to get Godoy to accede to a commercial treaty with reciprocal rights in all the dominions. But to open the doors of her colonies to the Americans, in virtue of Spain’s treaties with other nations, would mean having to open the doors to all the European nations with which Spain had compromises. Godoy manifested that he would not make concessions on this point. Pinckney wished to leave as established the contents of the article relating to the navigation of the Mississippi. He desired to avoid being obliged to accept said navigation as a ‘concession’ on the part of Spain, but on the contrary, he wanted Spain to admit that it treated of the public recognition of a ‘right’ of the Americans. Moreover, he wanted a free port, or at least a place on Spanish territory, near the mouth of the river, where American ships could unload their merchandise.20 Accordingly, in a plan of the treaty that Pinckney presented on August 15, the article referring to the question of the Mississippi was prepared in such a way that it implied the concession of a landing place. The article in question said: “that the navigation of the Mississippi be recognized as free for both nations and all the facilities for its use be mutually accorded.”21 Godoy asked for a complete plan of the treaty for study. On August 20 Pinckney presented it to him. The latter consisted of thirty-two articles which referred to diverse points, such as those of navigation, commerce with the American possessions, declaration of free zones on the islands and terra firma of the said continent, the Canaries and the Philippines; and others, concerning the extradition of offenders, etc.22 But for several weeks and in spite of Godoy’s frank decision and great interest in concluding an agreement, Pinckney was still obliged to listen to some negative arguments.
Godoy’s most categorical refusal had to do with the pretentions of the American envoy to ensure a landing place at the mouth of the Mississippi. In the counter-plan that Godoy submitted to Pinckney on September 18, Godoy not only left out the proposed articles of commerce but omitted the mention of a place of deposit, and he threw out the terms with which Pinckney had prepared the article on navigation. The American insisted on a place of deposit and Godoy again rejected the claim. Pinckney argued that without a place of disembarkation at the mouth of the river, the recognition of the right of navigation would be “illusory, without utility and without effect. Pinckney was absolutely right, but Godoy answered by requesting that they sign the treaty as he had proposed it. As a result of the renewed insistence of Pinckney, who called the right to disembark merchandise “one of the principal purposes of his mission,” Godoy replied again by refusing to yield in this matter and by expressing his desire that this matter be not mentioned in the body of the treaty.23
As a consequence of the intransigence of both parties, negotiations on this issue were delayed, and the Spanish court moved to its autumn residence at San Lorenzo. Pinckney had not dared to predict a decision. The conclusion of the famous treaty of San Lorenzo was a question of days. Still Pinckney on entering the village of San Lorenzo, and without suspecting it, was given the final step to fame. After exchanging impressions with Short, Pinckney decided to take the advice of the latter and put “the good will” of Spain to a test in negotiations. He decided to make the right to deposit merchandise at a point near the mouth of the Mississippi a condition fundamental to the conclusion of the treaty. It was then that he took a step so daring that if he were not to be admired for his triumph, he would have to be admired for his courage. Whether such a step was wise or not, it would be difficult to decide, but judging by the results of his action it would seem to have been an intelligent maneuver.
On seeing that Godoy would not yield to his claims, he gave up his efforts as a failure; having now assured the right of navigation and the limit of 31 degrees, to which the United States had so long aspired, he demanded his passports on October 24, 1795.24
In the face of such a daring attitude, the Prince of the Peace felt obliged to capitulate. His concession consisted in “permitting the privilege” of deposit, for three years at the port of New Orleans, capable of being prolonged at the termination of such period if before then a similar place was not conceded to them to effect their landings.25
Three days later, October 27, 1795, the Treaty of San Lorenzo was signed, which was also the Treaty of Pinckney, and, in good measure, the prize for the will of a people who would be called upon to serve a historical mission for the nations of the world.26
Needless to say, when the news of the Treaty reached the United States, it caused “great joy to all the people.”27 In Spain, on the contrary, a century and a half later there were still historians who mourned the outcome of the negotiations in the name of those who fought to conserve for Spain what Godoy ceded to the United States:
What think those who lived amongst Aranda, Floridablanca, Campo, Otamendi, Llaguno, the Count of Gálvez, Casas, Sormeruelos, Miralles, Rendon, Gardoqui, Miró, Carondelet, Gayoso, Céspedes, Queseda and more than a hundred Spaniards of lesser destinies, who during so many years, fought, worked, depleted themselves, and went their ways, on seeing how their efforts in serving Spain, on occasions without concrete orders and means, remained annuled and sterile by a pen of the resplendent and sagacious diplomat, the Prince of the Peace?28
But this was to be no more than Godoy’s first great error. The following year would reveal, in San Ildefonso, how he reinitiated the lamentable alliance with France, which would be truly the beginning of the end of Spain’s greatness.
In the United States, on the contrary, with the concessions obtained by the Treaty of San Lorenzo, the possibility of its total development as a power and a nation was afforded her. The much-discussed point of “a place of deposit” at the mouth of the river, on being assured was several years later to play an important role in the Louisiana Purchase. The agreement of control that both nations, the United States and Spain, exercised over the Indian tribes in their respective territories, brought as a consequence a period of tranquility and in its wake a great growth in population and expansion in farming productivity. The importance of the treaty was also to extend to the later negotiations over Florida. As a consequence of the free navigation of the Mississippi, the conspiracies and the separatist movements in Kentucky ceased; the nation, which before was divided into “easterners” and “westerners,” was more strongly unified, and the development of commerce and the American west reached astonishing proportions. Now that the limits were defined, the nation was preoccupied not only with conserving them but of extending them with the course of the years, in such a way that the subsequent century would witness the spectacle of the nation whose borders would stretch from the Atlantic to the Pacific.
In English, Pinckney’s Treaty.
According to Arthur Preston Whitaker in “New Light on the Treaty of San Lorenzo: an essay in Historical Criticism,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XV (March, 1929), 435-454, the following writers all wrote “without benefit of access to the Spanish Historical Archives”: B. W. Bond, The Monroe Mission in France, 1794-1796 (Baltimore, 1907), p. 40; Edward Channing, History of the United States (New York, 1917), IV, 146; F. L. Paxson, History of the American Frontier (Boston, 1924), p. 85; G. L. Rivas, “Spain and the United States in 1795,” American Historical Review, IV, 76-79; F. J. Turner, “The Policy of France,” American Historical Review, X, 266-67.
My doctoral thesis, successfully defended at the University of Madrid, in 1958. The thesis is divided into two parts: the first, referring to the period which ends in 1783, with the recognition by England of the independence of the colonies; the second, covering the period from 1783 until the date itself on which the treaty was subscribed.
Jáudenes’ despatch of July 2, 1795 is in the Archivo Histórico Nacional (Madrid) (hereinafter cited as AHN). Sección de Estado; leg. 3894. Jáudenes and Viar to Floridablanca, March 26, 1792, Est. No. 74. According to the description which the Spanish agents themselves sent, when Thomas Pinckney was appointed minister to England, he was a “wise, kind and dependable” man.
Samuel F. Bemis, Pinckney’s Treaty, a Study of America’s Advantage from Europe’s Distress, 1783-1800 (Baltimore, 1926), p. 290.
Professor Whitaker in his essay argues that he believes it was not “the psychological moment” (Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XV, 451). “Pinckney did not, as some writers say, arrive in Spain ‘at the psychological moment.’ That moment occurred earlier in the year, when the impression of Jay’s mysterious negotiations was still fresh, and when Godoy, already fearful of British treachery, had not yet freed himself of his French adversary. When at last Pinckney arrived in Spain, the situation was on the whole very favorable to his negotiation, but, as Short complained and as Pinckney himself would doubtless have admitted, a still more favorable moment had already passed; and the treaty was not so satisfactory to the United States as it might have been had Pinckney proceeded to Spain immediately upon the receipt of his commission.”
The innumerable titles of Godoy comprise almost half a page in the introduction to the text of the Treaty of San Lorenzo. “With this intention His Catholic Majesty has appointed the most excellent Lord Don Manuel de Godoy and Álvarez de Faria, Ríos, Sánchez Zarzosa, Prince de la Paz, Duke de la Alcudia, Lord of the Soto de Roma and of the State of Albalá: Grandee of Spain of the first class, etc., etc., etc.. . . and the President of the United States with the advice and consent of their Senate, has appointed Thomas Pinckney a Citizen of the United States and their Envoy Extraordinary to His Catholic Majesty.
Whitaker, p. 436.
AHN, Leg. 3896, No. 291 and No. 309.
Short, “first American career diplomat,” is vindicated by the American historian, Samuel F. Bemis, in his Pinckney’s Treaty, and thanks to said historian, he passes to the diplomatic history of the United States as an example of a man of vision, loyalty, and professional dedication to the interests of his nation. When, after Pinckney’s arrival at Madrid, Short learned that the mission would not be assigned to him, that the name of Pinckney would pass to history and not his, and that the change was owing to the malintentions and unjust complaints of Godoy, he addressed the latter indignantly, demanding an explanation. Godoy lied, telling Short that he had been always persona grata to His Majesty and that the complaints referred only to Carmichael. Later, in a note, he made known his pleasure with Short’s person and attitude. But the harm was done. Wounded and disillusioned, Short renounced his diplomatic career, and his name remained practically forgotten in the annals of American diplomacy. Bemis, pp. 186-272.
Jáudenes to Godoy, July 29, 1795, AHN, leg. 3896, No. 310. Correspondence with Randolph over the navigation of the Mississippi.
Jáudenes to Godoy, April 4, 1795, AHN, leg. 3896, No. 286. Jáudenes’ reply to Randolph’s letter desiring to know Spain’s proposals.
Bemis, pp. 308-310.
Pinckney to Monroe, August 28, 1795. Pinckney Papers, p. 127. Cit. by Bemis, p. 312.
The report of the meeting of the Council of State is in the bound volume, Actas del Consejo de Estado, AHN, Est.
Actas del Supremo Consejo de Estado, August 14, 1795.
Manuel Conrotte, La Intervención de España en la Independencia de los Estados Unidos de la América del Norte (Madrid, 1920).
Godoy to Jáudenes, AHN, leg. 3896 (not numbered). “Estímesele su celo, pero ya sabrá que be firmado el tratado.”
Bemis, p. 316.
Ibid., p. 317.
Ibid., p. 318.
Conrotte, p. 195.
Bemis, p. 320.
Pinckney to the Prince of the Peace, Oct. 24, 1795. AHN, Est., Leg. 3384, Original in French. Pinckney’s note demanding passports.
Article 22, “and in consequence of the stipulations contained in the IV. Article His Catholic Majesty will permit the Citizens of the United States for the space of three years from this time to deposit their merchandise and effects in the Port of New Orleans and to export them from thence without paying any other duty than a fair price for the hire of the stores, and His Majesty promises either to continue this permission if he finds during that time that it is not prejudicial to the interests of Spain, or if he should not agree to continue in there, he will assign to them on another part of the banks of the Mississippi an equivalent establishment.”
AHN, Leg. 3896 (not numbered), “duplicate of the Treaty signed October 27, between Spain and the United States for her ratification, is remitted to Jáudenes. ”
Jáudenes to Alcudia, January 26, 1795, AHN, No. 326, “News has arrived of the signing of the Treaty with Spain, which has caused great joy to all the people.”
Miquel Gómez del Campillo, Relaciones diplomáticas entre España y los Estados Unidos (Madrid, 1944), p. CII.
Author notes
The author is Professor of Spanish at Western Washington State College, Bellingham, Washington.