The Latin people of America are condemned to be absorbed in the twentieth century by a colossal egotist—an exceedingly sad future for our grandchildren! In half a century more the United States will triple in population and then the barbarian invasion will be repeated in human history. I hate the Yankees more for tomorrow than for today.1
So wrote the foremost literary figure of Peru, Ricardo Palma, to Pedro Santacilia, Cuban patriot and son-in-law of Benito Juárez, just prior to the outbreak of the Spanish-American War. The sentiment was echoed by the dean of the Latin American diplomats in Washington, Matías Romero, Mexican Minister to the United States, who expected the United States to annex Cuba.2
Fear of the Yankee menace was also reflected in the works of the Latin American poet Rubén Darío and increased by the ever-quickening Pan-Hispanism movement.3 As the war approached, Spain let loose a barrage of propaganda aimed at making herself “the polar star of a Latin American confederation.”4 Pan-Hispanism, which was strongly cultural in its emphasis, has been defined as “a Spanish-led movement that aims at achieving solidarity among the Hispanic nations” and as a “conscious expression of the persistence of the idea of empire.”5 It was quite clear that the achievement of solidarity was in part “to be forged upon the anvil of Yankeephobia.”6 Few Latin American countries felt the Yankee menace as keenly as did Mexico. No Latin American country was as close to the United States as Mexico. The outbreak of the Spanish-American War revealed in Mexico a variety of conflicting movements: anti-Americanism, Pan-Hispanism, pro-Cubanism, some pro-Americanism, and even a little anti-Spanish sentiment. The result was an interesting neutrality.
Mexico was enjoying the much disputed benefits of the Pax Porfiriana. Don Porfirio had ruled for over two decades with an iron hand in the name of progress. Díaz had made Mexico solvent and had been showered with praise and medals. Foreign capital poured into Mexico with the encouragement or the connivance of people in high places and Mexico could indeed be called “the mother of foreigners and the stepmother of Mexicans.” But Díaz was sincere in his belief that foreign capital was necessary for the development of Mexico. American capital was an important source of this development.
Díaz considered that relations with his northern neighbor ought to be good and he directed his policies toward that end. Consequently, when Díaz surveyed the scene in 1897 he found relations “with contiguous countries, the most delicate and difficult to establish and preserve . . . as solid and agreeable as could be desired.”7
Mexican-United States relations had indeed improved since the crisis over border troubles and the recognition of the Díaz regime in the period 1877-1879.8 Problems concerning the international boundary, water rights, the Free Zone (a strip of territory about eight miles wide along the border free of custom duties), extradition, and the usual individual claims were discussed in a friendly atmosphere and many of them settled. In 1897 the new United States Minister to Mexico, General Powell Clayton, placed wreaths on the graves of the Mexican cadets who had fallen in the Battle of Chapúltepec in 1847. Mexican cadets honored the graves of American soldiers killed in the Mexican war.9 Díaz was pleased. The Secretary of Foreign Relations, Ignacio Mariscal, was pleased. One of Mexico City’s American newspapers, The Mexican Herald, said the Mexicans were pleased.10 Díaz had already indicated the government’s position when he told Clayton on the occasion of the latter’s diplomatic reception,
Great is the admiration that your country inspires among the Mexican people who have taken it as a model for their political institutions and who are attempting to imitate it in the intelligent development of their natural resources.11
How close this friendship was has yet to be determined, but one of the charges leveled by Mexican critics against the Díaz administration was that Díaz gave permission to
Mr. Powell Clayton to appear every afternoon at the National Palace with a list of recommendations for private American affairs, in order that they might be approved immediately by the administrative and judicial authorities in favor of the interested parties.. . .12
When the Maine exploded, Mexico, along with many other countries, promptly sent an expression of sympathy to the Department of State.13 As war approached, the American, Cuban, and Spanish colonies in Mexico became more and more articulate. The Mexican government, however, was extremely careful in its action. On April 25, 1898, Secretary of State John Sherman instructed Clayton that
a state of war exists between the two countries [Spain and the United States] since and including April 21. You will inform the government to which you are accredited so that its neutrality may be assured in the existing war.14
The Mexican reply was not unexpected.
The Mexican President had already ordered his Secretary of the Interior, González Cosío, to instruct the governors of the states to preserve the strictest neutrality in case of war between Spain and the United States. The order was dated April 22, 1898.15 On April 26 Foreign Secretary Mariscal officially replied to the note of the United States, assuring that country of the neutrality of the Mexican government, indicating its regrets over the conflict between two such good friends, and hoping for a quick termination of hostilities.16 The British declared their neutrality the same day and instructed consuls in Mexican ports to watch the movements of belligerent vessels.17 So concerned were the British about neutrality that later in the war they refused to allow a message from the Governor General of Cuba to the Spanish minister in Mexico to be transmitted through British channels.18
Following Mexico’s declaration of neutrality, all of its government departments issued circulars to everyone under their jurisdiction requiring strict enforcement of neutrality and warning that drastic steps would be taken if the orders were violated.19 A further order from the Mexican War Department on May 4 decreed “that no vessel carrying provisions or money for either of the belligerent powers be under any circumstances, dispatched.. . .,”20 But this order went too far and had to be modified in a short time. One result of this order was to prevent United States ships from obtaining supplies on the Mexican west coast without clearance from the capital. The United States had in March foreseen this difficulty and expected that the Pacific Mail Steamship Company, an American firm, would furnish coal and other materials for its warships. Clayton had indicated that the Mexican government would cooperate.21 But on May 5, a Mexican national holiday, the United States warship Alert put in at Acapulco and found it could not obtain supplies. The coal merchants, who were Spanish, refused to sell any coal and the port commander referred the matter to the capital.22 Clayton went to the president, the matter was adjusted, and the United States got its coal.23 Mexico’s zealous enforcement of neutrality regulations caused a certain amount of inconvenience to business firms on the west coast and at Veracruz. Mining supplies such as powder and dynamite were under continuous restrictions.24
More serious, however, was the problem of the “Free Zone” and border war jitters. From early April through June the United States was concerned about the possibility of hostile outbreaks on the Mexican border. Part of this was due to rumors played up in the press of both countries and part to the apprehension of border residents, who feared a repetition of the border raids of the past. It was also due to a real fear that the “Free Zone” would become the “rendezvous of smugglers and dealers in contraband of war,” which to some extent it did.25The San Antonio Express reported on April 2 that a plot to invade the United States in case of war had been broken up by the Mexican authorities. The incident was widely publicized and Clayton asked Mariscal to investigate.26 Mariscal replied that there had been an attempt to organize Spanish sympathizers at the ranch of Las Tortillas in Tamaulipas by Joaquín Martí, but that the commandant of the military zone had arrested the men and destroyed their force.27 On May 3 Clayton had an interview with Mariscal in which he quoted from an earlier report of Special Treasury Agent George A. Benham that there were numerous Spanish sympathizers along the border, that it was an area well suited for smuggling, and that, in case of war, there might be serious trouble. Clayton had been instructed to bring the matter to the attention of the Mexican government so that it might take precautions. Clayton was assured that the Mexican government would be especially vigilant but the Foreign Secretary did not think Clayton’s fears well grounded.28
The new United States Secretary of State, William R. Day, late in May instructed Clayton to ask the Mexican government once again not to relax its vigilance in the border area because of reports from Lieutenant Edward Lloyd that Americans along the border expected hostile raids.29 This time it was Clayton who did not share his chief’s concern over the border. When on May 28, at the request of the Spanish minister in Mexico, the Mexican consuls in border cities from Laredo west, took over Spanish interests, subject to instructions from the French ambassador in Washington, the United States made no objection, and no further difficulties of this kind developed.30
On September 16, 1898, President Díaz, reviewing Mexico’s official attitude toward the war on the opening of the Mexican Congress, said that the Mexican government was pleased that hostilities had terminated. He indicated that the government had taken measures to preserve a strict neutrality and said it was indeed due to these measures that, in spite of some more or less serious incidents, there had been no controversy or difficulty with the belligerent nations.31 The Mexican government did remain officially neutral. But neutrality applies to more than the government, and it also depends upon interpretation. It was here that the United States encountered its most serious problems.
Americans in Mexico found themselves in a difficult position with the outbreak of the war. It was not a question of action but rather of attitude. A British observer noted that
Mexico is Spain in many respects.. . . There is no expression of dislike or animosity but the sentiment is there, veiled. . . . It is evident that their sympathy is generally with the cause of Spain.32
In Mazatlán United States Consul Louis Kaiser wrote in June, 1898, that “the sympathy of a large majority of the people of all classes are with the Spaniards.”33 In Monterrey an American citizen wrote to the consul, “There is no mystery about the fact that the neutrality of Mexico is on the surface and that the sympathy is on the side of Spain.”34 From Michoacán Joseph Bird complained to Clayton of mistreatment, saying,
ever since the Maine was blowed up there has been a change of sentiment against all Americans, although seldom expressed straight out, because there are circulars warning everyone against expressions pro or con, still sometimes they do it.35
Travellers after the war found that
pulling a feather out of the eagle’s tail is held as profitable in politics in Mexico as twisting the lion’s tail once was in the states.. . . Americanophobia is not limited to the crowd alone. It permeates every class of Mexican society.36
Fifty years later a historian contended “that Americans generally [outside of Mexico] were unaware of the hostility manifested in Mexico toward the United States.”37 There is no doubt that the Americans in Mexico felt the hostility. Intellectually Mexico looked to France and Spain. France, in spite of neutrality, was wholly on the side of Spain and viewed the contest “as frankly one between the Latin and the Anglo-Saxon.”38
American conduct in Mexico in the face of this hostility was circumspect. The loss of the Maine had evoked a strong patriotic statement to the American minister in Mexico.39 But aside from keeping a close watch on Spanish sympathizers and Spaniards, most Americans pursued their businesses or retired to the American casino and let the American colony’s press in the capital express their opinions. Between 1895 and 1900 there was a substantial increase in the number of foreigners in Mexico. Americans were numerous and their numbers were increasing, but Spaniards still predominated, especially in Veracruz and Mexico City. Part of the foreign influx was, of course, due to the Cuban insurrection. What these immigrants were was more a matter of politics than of birth.40 From Cuba came refugees supporting the Cuban cause and inclined to be sympathetic to the United States. But from Cuba also came a host of Spaniards who energetically joined the activities of the Spanish colony in Mexico. The combination of the activities of the Spanish colony, Mexican sympathy toward Spain, and the weakness of the American blockade turned Mexico into a Spanish supply base for Cuba and presented the American minister with his greatest challenge.
The Spanish colony in Mexico was not only numerous but articulate, powerful, and rich. Much of Mexico’s commercial life was in its hands. Retail trade was dominated by Spaniards, and much wholesale traffic was controlled by them. They were industrious, ambitious, and particularly loyal to the mother country. Many had married into prominent Mexican families, and a number of the bankers and mill owners in Mexico were Spanish.41
Spanish headquarters in Mexico City was the Spanish Casino, and here gathered all the prominent Spaniards both for social and business reasons. Even before the outbreak of the war, the Spanish colony had held a patriotic meeting and raised $200,000 for aid to Spain.42 Spanish sympathizers throughout Mexico organized juntas patrióticas designed to aid Spain with money, supplies, and propaganda. Clayton had protested the Spanish subscriptions on the ground that the money was being used to send supplies to Cuba. He objected to open announcements in the newspapers of meetings to find “means to cooperate in defraying the expenses incurred in our war with the United States.”43 Especially irritating was the fact that a number of subscribers to these funds were Mexicans. The Mexican government issued orders that the meetings were to be stopped and that Mexicans should refrain from lending their names to the Spanish cause.44 The United States consul at Veracruz, William W. Canada, reported a bitter feeling among the Spaniards at that port as well as at Coatzocoalcos and Frontera. The Spanish colony in Veracruz sent Canada a communication informing him that the United States had provoked a war with Spain and had interfered in a strictly internal situation. Therefore the colony organized a Spanish subscription at Veracruz to aid the victims. Here also a number of Mexican names appeared prominently. Canada reported that the Spaniards were issuing circulars against the Americans and continually trying to influence the Mexican people against the United States. He recommended that masters of United States vessels clearing for Mexican ports be warned of this feeling.45 The recommendation was carried out by Assistant Secretary of the Treasury W. B. Howell and publicized by the New York Times on June 5, 1898.
In Mexico City Clayton called the attention of Mariscal to the activities of Delfín Sánchez, a prominent and wealthy Spaniard, who, in answer to the Spanish Foreign Minister’s recommendation that supplies be sent to Cuba, answered, “Everything needed has gone, is going, and will go.”46 The Spaniards continued their activities and attacks on Americans in spite of continual warnings from the Mexican government that the strictest neutrality must be observed. Part of the campaign was aimed at the Mexicans in the hope that if the war was prolonged, Mexico would finally side with Spain against the United States.47 Supplying provisions to Cuba would materially aid this cause and it was here that the Spaniards were most effective. Actually, the United States’ position on neutral rights and the weakness of the American blockade contributed almost as much towards making Mexico a supply base as did the activities of the Spaniards.
On April 22 the Secretary of State had instructed Clayton by telegram that in the event of hostilities the following principles would be recognized:
First, the neutral flag covers enemy’s goods with the exception of contraband of war; second, neutral goods with the exception of contraband of war are not liable to capture under an enemy’s flag; third, blockades in order to be binding must be effective.48
The first blockade included only a small portion of the north Cuban coast from Cárdenas to Bahía Hondo and the southern port of Cienfuegos.49 The naval blockade was very weak through early July. Throughout the Southwest, papers reported this weakness. The Arizona Daily Citizen, Tucson, complained on June 20 that the
blockade is a failure and a constant stream of provisions comes from Yucatan to the Isle of Pines regularly landed by schooners, steamers, and other vessels. U. S. rarely if ever patrols these waters.
On June 27 the blockade was extended to the south coast of Cuba from Cape Francés to Cape Cruz and San Juan de Puerto Rico. The main Spanish ports of supply were Nuevitas, Caibarién, and Sagua la Grande on the north coast and Batabanó and Casilda on the south. Santiago de Cuba was never officially blockaded.50 Since the blockade was not effective and the United States observed neutral rights, supplies flowed in from Mexico, Jamaica, and Europe. When neutral vessels called at Veracruz they could take on cargoes of provisions without violating any Mexican law. They could clear for any port not officially blockaded and even make for those that were when the blockade was not effective. These were the conditions that faced the American minister in his efforts against the Spanish colony in Mexico.
Before war was declared the United States consul at Veracruz, feeling that war was inevitable, had informed the State Department that his consular district was dominated by Spaniards, that they controlled almost all business, and that through their hands passed the major portion of Mexican commerce at Mexico’s largest port.51 Furthermore, the few American ranchers and businessmen in the district were forced to sell through Spaniards or not sell at all. It was by these means that the Spanish juntas patrióticas were able to send a constant stream of supplies to Cuba. The juntas collected money and also acted as agents for the shipment of various commodities throughout Mexico. At almost the precise moment that war was declared, the Spanish had forty carloads of provisions in transit for Cuba via Veracruz.52 Spanish merchants in Veracruz easily transferred them to vessels under contract to their firms. Almost everything that entered the port of Veracruz would sooner or later fall under the Spanish colony’s control. They had at their disposal Mexican ships which they owned and foreign ships carrying their cargoes. American ships brought material to Veracruz where even their agents were of necessity Spanish.
Clayton had been instructed to watch the movement of ships, but this task was actually carried out by consular agents and secret service personnel. Canada asked for and received a special fund to hire an assistant for this work. He reported that the Spanish steamer Villaverde was being loaded with supplies obtained by the juntas.53 Two other Spanish steamers, the Pío IX and María Herrera, were in the port of Veracruz throughout the war. Spanish officers, Cuban refugees, gold, and intelligence reports continually entered the port. Wealthy Cubans deposited their money and other valuables in the Banco Mercantil of Veracruz.54
Norwegian, British, and French vessels left Veracruz for Cuba with cargoes of coal and corn and other provisions. British dealers in coal agreed to supply Cuba. Agents in Veracruz, after assuring Canada that coal shipments from the United States would be used in Mexico for legitimate purposes, turned around and gave it to the Spanish agents.55 A cargo of coal consigned to L. Joublanc in Veracruz was transferred to the Spanish steamer María Herrera.56 The United States State Department became concerned over such activities, but there was no legal remedy.
Just as Canada had anticipated, vessels left from smaller ports along the Mexican coast and headed for the south coast of Cuba. Small coasting vessels thus carried a great amount of material the short distance to the Cuban ports. For some time Clayton had been urging greater patrolling of these waters and had informed the State Department of the best points to stop this traffic. But it could only be stopped if there were contraband aboard or if the vessels were Spanish. By July the blockade had tightened and the American Navy was free to act on Clayton’s information. The Spanish steamers were more closely watched and the Santo Domingo was destroyed by the American warships after having tried to run the blockade at Havana.57
Clayton had consistently tried to get the Mexican government to detain the Spanish steamers. He was able to delay their sailing temporarily but the Mexican government decided that the steamers were within their rights. Clayton then switched the grounds and declared that they were taking munitions from Mexico, that they were armed and that in reality they were part of the Spanish Navy. He convinced the State Department that he should formally request the Mexican government to investigate the character of these vessels. It took the Mexican government a long time to investigate but Mariscal finally notified Clayton on July 31, 1898 that the Montevideo and the Villaverde were considered Spanish auxiliary naval vessels and would be given only enough provisions to reach Cádiz.58
When early in August United States naval forces captured the Mexican steamer Tabasqueño in the waters off Sagua la Grande, the Mexican minister Romero immediately protested that the port was not blockaded and that the vessel had a perfect right to be there. The American Attorney General agreed and the vessel was released.59 Supplies for Cuba continued as usual. Although the three largest Spanish vessels were in one way or another prevented from rendering much effective aid to the Spaniards in Cuba and many of Spain’s smaller vessels never cleared Veracruz until the end of the war, supplies for the Spanish forces on Cuba were continually being carried on a variety of Mexican, Norwegian, British, and other foreign vessels of every description from Caribbean ports as well as from more distant harbors.
The Cuban colony in Mexico was not large, but ever since the insurrection broke out in 1895 its numbers had been increasing. The attitude of many Latin American nations toward the conflict was not clear, or rather was not clearly expressed. Bolivia’s recognition of Cuban belligerency in 1896 provoked some comment on the possibility of Latin American aid, but the New York press did not think anything would come of this.60 Throughout the period 1896-1898 there arose various proposals involving Mexico as an arbiter in the Cuban crisis. It was suggested that Cuba be ceded to Mexico, that the whole question be submitted to a world congress, or that the United States, Mexico, and Spain come to a tripartite settlement. But these suggestions came from newspapers and private individuals and were not taken seriously.61
One of the most acute of the private observers in Mexico was the Cuban, Pedro Santacilia. His correspondence with Romero, the Mexican minister in Washington, reflects both men’s most interesting views. When the Maine blew up, Santacilia, who was close to several government sources, was convinced that war was inevitable. He reported the visit of a Spanish naval officer to Díaz, and wondered if Spain wanted to see where Díaz stood on the Cuban question. He noted that a Madrid newspaper was predicting that Mexico would side with Spain in order to regain lost national territory. The Cuban patriot and man of letters did not agree with Romero’s fear of annexation of the island to the United States because he felt the Americans would be happy exploiting an exclusive market, exercising a certain moral tutelage to prevent Cuba from falling into European hands, and enjoying the generous concessions that the Cuban government would make. Santacilia, in spite of his age, was still a force among the Cubans and was certainly in constant contact with Cuba during the war. In Mexico he continued to stimulate the Cuban colony to work against Spain and to aid the United States.62
The American minister found that the Cubans were eager to aid the United States and received numerous offers of services from Cubans in Mexico. Members of the local Cuban juntas would volunteer for the United States Army. Others offered intelligence reports on Spanish activity in Cuba and Mexico.63 Cuban passengers arriving in Veracruz often reported the presence of Spanish agents and pilots sent to take Spanish ships to Cuban ports.64 Information on the mines in Havana harbor was transmitted to Clayton by Cuban agents and forwarded to Washington when they found it impossible to get to Key West.65 Clayton and Canada used Cubans as secret service employees in Mexico. While Americans were powerless to stop the Spanish activities in Veracruz, they maintained an effective intelligence center and certainly were able to transmit to Washington and to the Navy information of considerable importance.
Cuban immigration to Mexico was heavy, according to the British consul in Veracruz. Some five to six thousand Cubans came to Veracruz alone. Fifty per cent of them were said to be businessmen and planters who were easily absorbed into the population. As a result there was a noticeable improvement in the Mexican tobacco industry. Some brought capital and contributed in other ways to the Mexican economy.66 What sympathy there was for the Cuban cause in Mexico could never be made effective after the United States was involved. As the Spanish historian, Rafael Altamira, has pointed out, Latin American democrats separated specific political questions from the interests of race and civilization because of the Yankee menace.67
The Mexican press at the time of the Spanish-American War was undergoing a change. Modern journalism was developing in Mexico but so was modern censorship under Díaz. In spite of Díaz’ control there were a number of distinctly different periodicals. All of those which wished to avoid persecution wisely supported Don Porfirio, but they were divided politically and by national groups. Since Díaz exercised iron control it is interesting to observe how much anti-American feeling was expressed. The Spanish colony was represented in Mexico City by El Correo Español, El Universal, La Rara de Covadonga, and El Popular, described by Santacilia as “hydraphobic Spanish vomiting abuses against the Yankees.” Even the Arizona Daily Citizen was upset by these papers and expressed the wish that they be removed from the United States mails. The so-called liberal papers included El Imparcial, El Mundo, El Diario del Hogar, La Patria, El Combate, El Continente Americano, El Hijo del Ahuizote. The word liberal must be qualified because El Impartial was the semi-official paper subsidized by the government. El Mundo vias, the afternoon edition. Both refrained from anti-American comments and were relatively impartial. La Voz de México, El Tiempo, and El National were conservative, and they were “more or less traitors,” said Santacilia. El Tiempo was the leading Catholic paper and violently anti-American. Equally vehement against the Yankees was the French journal, Courier du Mexique. The American colony fought back as best it could through The Mexican Herald, The Two Republics, The Evening Telegram, and the Mexican Financier. Debates on the Cuban question and the war raged in the pages of all of the leading papers and reflected the feelings of the conflicting groups. Each of these groups used its journals to uphold its cause in the face of official neutrality.68
News of the peace protocol produced a reaction that might have been expected in the Spanish colony, but it also split the colony for a time and produced a protracted debate. Part of the colony protested to the Queen Regent on August 29, 1898, condemning the Spanish government for having signed the peace, for the loss of honor, and the uselessness of the sacrifices made. The document was signed by over 600 members of the colony in the capital, including the president of the Junta Patriótica Española. El Correo Español charged that this represented only a fraction of the colony and condemned the protest. Other journals took up the debate, all lamenting Spain’s loss but praising the Spanish character—although they tended to agree that the Spanish government was inefficient. Even Madrid newspapers reacted to the protests and commented that the same sentiments condemning Spain’s actions were to be heard throughout Latin America.69 This reaction was reflected in other Spanish colonies in Mexico. Protests were signed in Laguna del Carmen, Orizaba, Tuxpan, Veracruz, Matehuala, San Luis Potosí, and all used intemperate language.70
The effect of the Spanish-American War on the commerce of Mexico seems to have been negligible. Most of the variations in trade stemmed from apparently normal causes. The Cuban revolution had opened a new market for Mexican foodstuffs and cattle. The outbreak of the war somewhat disrupted this pattern but the market remained. Veracruz traffic was also temporarily deranged when the American Ward line, which sent four steamers a month to the port, discontinued shipments and chartered British vessels. Spanish steamers also discontinued their commerce and it took a while to transfer the Spanish products to French and British bottoms. Sea rates on British shipping rose twenty-five per cent as a result of the war and the scarcity of cargo vessels. On the whole, however, barring the months of May and June, trade at Veracruz increased, with the United States and Germany benefiting to the detriment of the British.71
While the full story of Mexico and the Spanish-American War requires access to the Mexican and Spanish diplomatic correspondence as well as private papers of government officials, there are conclusions about Mexico’s position in the war which seem clearly warranted from the evidence examined. First, Mexican neutrality was dictated by the government’s recognition that Mexican interests, both economic and strategic, would best be served by this policy. It is equally clear that while the official position was neutral, the sympathy of large numbers of people was with Spain. This fact in turn made effective the efforts of the Spanish colony in Mexico to help the mother country with money and material and to incite ill feeling against the Americans. Mexican neutrality appears also to have damaged American war interests although Mexico served as a valuable intelligence base during the war. More significant perhaps were the impetus that the outcome of the war gave to Pan-Hispanism and the augmented anti-American bitterness which developed in an important element of Mexican society. It was abundantly clear to many Mexicans and probably to many Latin Americans that the little war was not at all splendid.
Ricardo Palma, quoted in Pedro Santacilia to Matías Romero, April 7, 1898. Banco de México, Archivo Histórico, Archivo Particular de Matías Romero (cited hereinafter as APR), No. 48514.
Ibid.
Rafael Altamira y Crevea has dealt with many of the aspects of Pan-Hispanism in various works. An introductory sketch may be found in William B. Bristol, “Hispanidad in South America, 1936-1945” (unpubl. Ph.D. diss., Dept. of Hist., Univ. of Pennsylvania, 1947), pp. 72-73.
José F. Gómez, quoted in J. Fred Rippy, “Pan-Hispanism Propaganda in Hispanic America,” Political Science Quarterly, XXXVII, 394.
Mark J. Van Aken, Pan-Hispanism, Its Origin and Development to 1866, Univ. of California Publs. in Hist., Vol. 63 (Berkeley, 1959), vii.
Rippy, “Pan-Hispanism,” p. 394.
The Two Republics, México, Jan. 13, 1897.
For the period up to 1898, see the standard accounts of Mexican-United States relations: J. Fred Rippy, The United States and Mexico (New York, 1931), and James M. Callahan, American Foreign Policy in Mexican Relations (New York, 1932).
Clayton to Sherman, June 2, 1897. United States Department of State. Dispatches from United States Ministers to Mexico. National Archives (hereinafter cited as DM Mex.), No. 14.
The Mexican Herald, May 30, 1897.
Clayton to Sherman, May 13, 1897. DM Mex., No. 3.
Francisco Bulnes, The Whole Truth about Mexico (New York, 1916), p. 123.
Clayton to Mariscal, March 17, 1898. DM Mex., No. 332.
Sherman to Clayton, April 25, 1898. DM Mex., No. 390, Enel. 1.
Secretaría de Estado y del Despacho de Gobernación, Sección 2a, Circular Núm. 1233, México, April 22, 1898. México. Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. Boletín Oficial de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (hereinafter cited as Bol. Rel. Ext.), VI, 10-11.
Mariscal to Clayton, April 26, 1898. Bol. Rel. Ext., VI, 6.
Stronge to Carden, April 26, 1898. Great Britain. Public Record Office. Foreign Office. Series 203, Vol. 126 (hereinafter cited as FO/series/vol.).
Foreign Office to Stronge, June 9, 1898. FO/50/513.
The dates of the circulars are as follows: Hacienda, April 27; Justicia, April 27; Guerra y Marina, April 29. Bol. Eel. Ext., VI, 11-12.
Clayton to Day, May 7, 1898. DM Mex., No. 420, Encl. 2.
Clayton to Sherman, March 12, 1898. DM Mex., No. 320.
Stoll to Ministro de Guerra y Marina, May 5, 1898. Bol. Eel. Ext., VI, 132-134.
Clayton to Sherman, May 6, 1898. DM Mex., No. 412.
See, for example, the correspondence between Mariscal and the Giant Powder Co. on this point. Bol. Rel. Ext., VI, 129-131.
Clayton to Mariscal, May 3, 1898. DM Mex., No. 407.
Clayton to Mariscal, April 5, 1898. DM Mex., No. 361.
Mariscal to Clayton, April 10, 1898. DM Mex., No. 372, Encl.
Mariscal to Clayton, May 16, 1898. DM Mex., No. 436, Encl.
Day to Clayton, May 25, 1898. DM Mex., No. 439; Clayton to Day, June 3, 1898. DM Mex., No. 452. Immediately after the declaration of war, William Day, who had been Assistant Secretary of State, was appointed to replace John Sherman as Secretary of State.
Day to Romero, May 28, 1898. United States. Department of State. Notes to Foreign Legations in Washington, D.C. Mexico. National Archives (hereinafter cited as Notes FL Mex.), No. 339.
Un Siglo de Relaciones Internacionales de México. Archivo Histórico Diplomático Mexicano, Núm. 39 (México, 1935), 199.
Laniger D. Kocen, “Mexico and the Hispano-American Conflict,” Westminster Review, CL, 13-16.
Kaiser to Secretary of State, June 24, 1898. United States. Despatches from United States Consuls in Mexico. National Archives (hereinafter cited as DC Mex.), Mazatlán, No. 11.
Pollard to Moore, June 29, 1898. DC Mex., Monterrey, No. 29.
Clayton to Day, July 6, 1898. DM Mex., No. 507.
Frederick Palmer, Central America and Its Problems (New York, 1910), pp. 25-26.
Charmion C. Shelby, “Mexico and the Spanish American War: Some Contemporary Expressions of Opinion,” Essays in Mexican History, ed. by Thomas E. Cotner (Austin, 1958), p. 213.
Louis Martin Sears, “French Opinion of the Spanish American War,” HAHR, VII (February, 1927), 34.
Clayton to Sherman, March 11, 1898. DM Mex., No. 316, Enel.
México. Dirección General de Estadística. Estadísticas Sociales del Porfiriato, 1877-1910 (México, 1956), pp. 7, 33, 34, and 184.
Accurate population statistics, particularly with respect to foreigners, are almost impossible to obtain. For example, the number of Spanish residents in Mexico in 1887 was 9,553, of whom 2,139 lived in the capital and 2,628 in Veracruz. The American population of these cities at the time is unknown. By 1910 there was a total of 116,527 foreigners in Mexico.
Matías Romero, Mexico and the United States (New York and London, 1898), I, 78-79.
The Mexcian Herald, March 28, 1898.
Ibid., May 2, 1898.
Clayton to Sherman, May 3, 1898. DM Mex., No. 406. The New York Times on May 5, 1898 ran a brief article which said that Mexican police, upon governmental orders, had prevented a meeting of Spanish clerks to raise money and volunteers for Spain.
Canada to Moore, May 16, 1898. DC Mex., Veracruz.
Clayton to Day, May 27, 1898. DM Mex., No. 441.
Santacilia to Romero, June 5, 1898. APR, No. 48681.
Sherman to Clayton, April 22, 1898. DM Mex., No. 381, Encl. This information was communicated to Mariscal on April 23.
Sherman to Clayton, April 22, 1898. DM Mex., No. 380, Encl.
French Ensor Chadwick, The Relations of the United States with Spain, The Spanish American War (New York, 1911), II, 322-323.
Canada to Day, April 17, 1898. DC Mex., Veracruz.
Clayton to Sherman, April 22, 1898. DM Mex., No. 379.
Canada to Clayton, April 22, 1898. DC Mex., Veracruz.
Canada to Clayton, April 26, 1898. DC Mex., Veracruz.
Clayton to Day, May 21, 1898. DM Mex.; Canada to Moore, May 14, 1898. DC Mex., Veracruz; Canada to Moore, May 23, 1898. DC Mex., Veracruz.
Canada to Moore, June 14, 1898. DC Mex., Veracruz.
Day to Clayton, July 12, 1898. DM Mex., No. 520. Clayton to Secretary of State, July 14, 1898. DM Mex.
Clayton to Day, July 31, 1898. DM Mex., No. 562.
Day to Romero, August 8, 1898. Notes FL, Mex., No. 359. Moore to Clayton, August 19, 1898. United States. Department of State. Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State. Mexico. National Archives. The delays resulted in the detention of both the Montevideo and the Villaverde at Veracruz until the end of the war. Since the Santo Domingo was sunk by the United States Navy, and these three were the largest of the Spanish provision ships, the delays benefited the United States.
Joseph E. Wisan, The Cuban Crisis as Reflected in the New York Press, 1895-1898 (New York, 1934), pp. 176-177.
See for example, the New York Herald, Oct. 19, 1896; The Globe Democrat (St. Louis), May 12, 1898; I. Wertheimer to Romero, March 31, 1898. APR, No. 48481; Clinton Furbish to Romero, April 5, 1898. APR, No. 48509.
Santacilia to Romero, March 6, 1898. APR, No. 48366; March 14, 1898. APR, No. 48404; March 21, 1898. APR, No. 48427; April 27, 1898. APR, No. 48575; July 28, 1898. APR, No. 48836.
Canada to Day, April 26, 1898. DC Mex., Veracruz.
Canada to Moore, June 22, 1898. DC Mex., Veracruz.
Clayton to Sherman, April 28, 1898. DM Mex., Telegram following No. 396.
Chapman to Foreign Office, June 16, 1898. FO/50/515.
Rafael Altamira, Cuestiones Hispano Americanos (Madrid, 1900), pp. 50-51.
There is some confusion about the exact names of some of the Mexican newspapers because of frequent changes. The Mexican Herald, for example, supposedly superseded The Two Republics, yet Santacilia mentioned them both in May of 1898. Santacilia to Romero, May 23, 1898. APR, No. 48637. See also Henry Lepidus, The History of Mexican Journalism (Columbia, Missouri, 1928), pp. 57-68; R. García Granados, Historia de México . . . (México, 1956), III, 13-15; Shelby, “Mexico and the Spanish-American War,” pp. 216 ff.
Exposición que la Colonia Española . . . (México, 1898).
Enrique Mendoza y Vizcaino, Historia de la Guerra Hispano-Americana (México, 1902), pp. 234-239.
Chapman to Foreign Office, June 16, 1898. FO/50/515. Mexico, Supplementary Report for the Year 1897-1898, on the Trade and Commerce of Veracruz, No. 2194. Great Britain. Foreign Office. Diplomatic and Consular Reports, Annual Series, Nos. 2182-2240, 1898-1899, pp. 2-15.
Author notes
The author is Associate Professor of History at Monterey Peninsula College.