This booklet is primarily devoted to a critical examination of the abortive invasion of Cuba of April, 1961. Two chapters are reserved for vigorous attacks on the CIA, Allen Dulles, and United States’ foreign policy in general.
The chapters dealing with the invasion are composed of general information gathered from various news media. The most original chapter presents the thesis that the basic plan of Operation Pluto “almost succeeded.” According to the authors, the exile invasion was designed only to secure and hold a beachhead. When this had been accomplished the Revolutionary Council would have been flown in to establish a provisional government and to call for military help. During the next phase the U. S. Marínes and troops from three Latin American countries would have launched a major invasion. Thus, the authors write that the failure of the exile phase of the operation was not due to CIA bungling or errors of intelligence, but to the effectiveness of Castro’s forces in eliminating the beachhead.
The recent book by Nicholás Rivero lends some support to this thesis, but it cannot be verified or rejected until more information is made available.
This publication is a polemic tract with little value for the historian except as an indication of the point-of-view of that segment of the American Left represented by Light and Marzani.
