The Origins and Passage of Lord Aberdeen’s Act

Most historians would agree that the 4th Earl of Aberdeen was one of the most peace-loving statesmen of nineteenth-century Europe. Yet, as Prime Minister, he involved his country in the futile Crimean War, and in Latin American history he gave his name to a statute generally regarded as arbitrary at best, and, at worst, illegal, coercive, and bullying.¹ Leaving Aberdeen’s connection with the Crimean War for treatment elsewhere, this paper is concerned with the latter incident, and will seek to show why and how Aberdeen’s Act came into existence, and to clarify how a gentleman of his high character and conciliatory disposition came to be associated with it.

While the Aberdeen Act dealt solely with the suppression of the Brazilian slave trade, it was closely related to two other contemporary problems—the Anglo-French intervention in the Plata region in 1845, and the Anglo-Brazilian trade negotiations of 1841-1846. Despite the interrelationship of these three themes, this presentation might be clearer if each is taken up in turn.

The facts of the Plata intervention have been fairly well established.² Brazil viewed with alarm the growth of Juan Manuel de Rosas’ influence in present-day Uruguay, while Britain and France desired, in the interest of trade, to end the civil strife there. All three nations wanted to create a stable political regime in that area.

The tensions between Brazil and Buenos Aires became so menacing in the summer of 1844 that Brazil decided to seek aid from Britain and France.³ In October Viscount Abrantes conferred with Aberdeen in London, and received the impression that Brazil might be included in a tripartite intervention in La Plata along with France. When Britain and France intervened in 1845, however, Brazil was excluded from the project.

Various explanations have been offered why Aberdeen decided to exclude Brazil. One historian strongly insisted that this should not be traced to Aberdeen’s distrust of Brazil, but rather to his dissatisfaction over Brazil’s failure to sign an anti-slave trade pact.⁴ Such dissatisfaction was certainly present, but a certain amount of distrust was there also.⁵ A broader interpretation must include the possibility that Aberdeen excluded Brazil because he thereby secured a bargaining weapon which he could use in both the slave trade and commercial negotiations. Once in control of La Plata, Aberdeen might expect Brazil to make concessions in these fields in order to secure her interests there.⁶ As it turned out, Aberdeen was able to make some use of this weapon.⁷ The immediate result of this sequence of events was to wound Brazilian sensibilities at the moment when she was to make her decision on the slave trade treaty, which made it more unlikely than ever that she would placate Britain by renewing it.⁸

Going on to the story of the commercial negotiations between Britain and Brazil during this period, we come to another rich source of ill-feeling between the two countries. During a period of weakness following independence, Brazil had made in 1827 a commercial agreement which was weighted heavily in Britain’s favor. While British manufactured goods were admitted into Brazil under it at a 15% maximum ad valorem rate, Britain was left free to lay duties on Brazilian goods ad libitum. Britain was naturally anxious to maintain this favorable arrangement as long as possible, and this led in 1842 to another irritating disagreement with Brazil over the expiration date of the treaty.⁹

To secure the renewal of some of the privileges of the treaty of 1827, Britain had to open her home market to Brazilian coffee and sugar, the exports in which that country had a vital interest. “If we are to make a concession in favour of Brazilian Sugar & Coffee,” Lord Ripon wrote Gladstone in 1841, “it must be in return for some stringent & really effective regulation on their part in respect to Slave Trading, & even Slavery.”¹⁰ Most British contemporaries believed, not without reason, that increased imports of Brazilian slave-grown products would encourage the spread of the slave trade and slavery, and in this manner the commercial question became inextricably mixed with the slave trade problem. So, in effect, Britain sought two concessions in return for opening her market to Brazil— stronger anti-slave trade legislation, and favorable Brazilian tariffs on British manufactured goods.

In 1842 Britain first undertook unsuccessful negotiations with Brazil through her minister at Rio, C. J. Hamilton, then later sent an experienced diplomat, Henry Ellis, on a special mission to that country. Ellis likewise failed, but Brazil declared her willingness to discuss a commercial treaty in London in the near future. Lord Ripon regarded this change of location for the talks as a clever move by Brazil to enlist the aid of her friends in the House of Commons.¹¹ As it turned out, Brazil’s supporters brought up the matter in April, 1843, before José de Araujo Ribeiro came to London, and again in March, 1844, following the failure of his mission.¹²

Ribeiro offered Britain a most-favored nation type commercial treaty in exchange for the admission of Brazilian sugar and coffee into the British market. Aberdeen objected on the ground that his proposition would be harmful to the British West Indian colonies, which could not compete with the slave labor of Brazil, and also because the plan would strengthen and spread slavery in Brazil.¹³ So Ribeiro joined Hamilton and Ripon on the list of negotiators who failed to arrive at a solution of the problem.

The private correspondence at this time, however, shows clearly that both Aberdeen and Peel were prepared in early 1844 to permit the competition of Brazilian slave-grown sugar with British West Indian sugar provided that the arrangement did not result in the further spread of slavery in Brazil. Aberdeen wrote in January, 1844:¹⁴

Peel was inclined to agree with Aberdeen, “but experience has shewn that we must not be too sanguine as to the result of our efforts for the repression of the Slave Trade,” he warned. “I fear we cannot without experiment assume success to be certain.”¹⁵ Obviously, any satisfactory commercial treaty had to await the negotiation of an efficient anti-slave trade arrangement.

By this time the deadline for the expiration of the treaty, November, 1844, was coming uncomfortably close, so Aberdeen sent Hamilton new instructions that April to negotiate an “innocuous” treaty af amity with Brazil, which would guarantee British merchants the rights and privileges Brazil had recently given the French. This time Hamilton was told by the Brazilian Government that the election atmosphere of that year prevented the conclusion of a treaty.¹⁶ Meanwhile Brazil had prepared her new tariff schedule and British authorities therefore knew what might be expected before the treaty formally expired. Aberdeen regarded the schedule as “by no means unfavourable to us.”¹⁷

But, without a formal treaty, British commerce was more or less at the mercy of the Brazilian Government, which might adjust tariffs as it saw fit. Aberdeen therefore brought up the treaty question when Abrantes visited him that autumn, and he was pleased to learn that Brazil would accept the British propositions very shortly.¹⁸ Aberdeen was so convinced of his success that he let it be known in some circles that the conclusion of an Anglo-Brazilian commercial agreement was imminent.¹⁹ But as it turned out this was no more imminent than was Brazil’s participation in the Plata intervention.

So in early 1845 the honors, such as they were, were even. Brazil had promised a commercial treaty, but had failed to perform. Aberdeen had alternately raised and dashed Brazilian hopes on the Plata question. In effect, each of the countries had forged a weapon which might be used to coerce the other. It was at this point that the slave trade issue reached a crisis and complicated further the uneasy relations between Britain and Brazil.

The history of the British anti-slave trade movement can be found elsewhere.²⁰ Suffice it to say that in this story the roles of Brazil and Portugal are so closely interrelated that it is impossible to describe one without discussing the other. This interrelationship long survived the severance of the political connection between the two countries.

The arrangement made by Britain with Portugal for the suppression of the slave trade consisted of three major agreements; viz., the Treaty of 1815, which made the slave trade illegal, save between Portugal and her colonies in America; the Convention of 1817 under which Britain and Portugal might visit each others’ ships, and in certain cases, seize them; and an additional article to the 1817 convention under which Portugal promised, once the slave trade were entirely abolished, to adapt the convention of that year to the new circumstance. In exchange for these promises Britain remitted the balance of a fairly large debt owed to her by Portugal, and arranged to compensate owners of Portuguese slave ships who would suffer financial loss as a result of these agreements. There was thus a meeting of minds between the two nations on this subject, a valuable consideration was exchanged for the concessions, and a binding bargain was concluded.

Despite these agreements Portuguese ships continued to ply the slave trade after Portugal had lost Brazil, and with it her right to traffic in slaves. In 1835 Lord Palmerston, then Foreign Secretary, opened negotiations with Portugal in an effort to cause her to live up to her agreements, but after about four years of futile bargaining he decided to employ coercion. How could Britain force Portugal to live up to her treaty obligations? Palmerston decided to revise unilaterally the terms of the agreements to permit British cruisers to seize Portuguese ships equipped to ply the slave trade (whether slaves were present or not) and to bring them to British courts for adjudication. Such a revision necessitated an act of Parliament. Otherwise the commanders of cruisers seizing such ships might be exposed to vexatious law suits.

Bi-partisan support permitted Palmerston’s bill to pass through the House of Commons without debate, but in the Lords Wellington raised some serious objections to it.²¹ He contended that the enforcement of treaties was an executive, not a legislative function; and, secondly, that this bill would permit British ships to carry on war against Portugal without such a declaration on the part of the Sovereign. Wellington’s opposition delayed the measure, but it was finally passed over the protests of the Duke and some other lords.²²

Despite Wellington’s condemnation of “Palmerston’s Act,” it accomplished its purpose. In July, 1842, Portugal signed what Aberdeen later called “the best, as it is the most recent, of our Slave Trade Treaties.”²³ This sequence of events is of the utmost importance in tracing the origins of the Aberdeen Act. Had Palmerston’s Act failed in its purpose, there is little likelihood that Aberdeen would ever have proposed his own, but its success hallowed the means, and made their application again practically inevitable.

All of this provides the background for the anti-slave trade negotiations between Britain and Brazil which culminated in the passage of the Aberdeen Act. The story of these negotiations is lengthy and complex, and begins in 1822, when Brazil declared her independence from Portugal. During 1822-1826 Brazil permitted the British cruisers to continue their operations just as if she were still part of the Portuguese empire. Under strong pressure from Britain, however, she signed the treaty of November 23, 1826, with Britain and thereby provided a legal basis for their anti-slave trade activities.

There were three main parts to the treaty of 1826. Brazil promised to abolish the slave trade completely no later than three years after the treaty was ratified, and to acknowledge “the carrying on of such trade after that period, by any person, subject of His Imperial Majesty, shall be deemed and treated as piracy.” Secondly, she promised to cooperate with Britain in regulating the trade until it was finally abolished, and thirdly, she assumed the obligations outlined in the Anglo-Portuguese treaties of 1815 and 1817, and the additional protocol of September 11, 1817, as well. Ratifications were exchanged on March 13, 1827, and mixed courts were established at Rio and in Sierra Leone to try cases arising under it.

As Brazil interpreted her obligations under this treaty, she was no longer obliged to cooperate with Britain in the suppression of the slave trade on and after March 13, 1830, for the special arrangement under which her subjects participated in the trade expired on March 12 of that year. So, on March 4, 1830, she formally notified Britain of her views, and declared that after March 12 all cases arising under the treaty would be tried “by the ordinary Tribunals of the contracting parties.”

But her acceptance of the protocol of September 11, 1817, had pledged her to “adapt” the convention of 1817 to the new situation created by the abolition of the slave trade, or, as an alternative, pledged that the convention would remain in force for fifteen years after the slave trade was formally abolished. Because Brazil had failed to “adapt” the convention to the new situation, Britain insisted that it would remain in force for another fifteen years—that is, until March 13, 1845. After an exchange of notes, Brazil accepted the British interpretation of her obligations.²⁴

When Aberdeen took office in 1841 the terminal date of the convention was approaching, and, as has been noted above, he tried to link anti-slave trade legislation to the plan to admit Brazilian sugar and coffee into the British market. Following the failure of his negotiations, Henry Ellis wrote Aberdeen privately in 1843:²⁵

Ellis’ report differed from those submitted by Hamilton, who contended that the Brazilian Government actually wanted to suppress the slave trade.²⁶ While Aberdeen probably attached some weight to Ellis’ opinion, he was more influenced by the forthcoming Ribeiro mission when he instructed Hamilton on July 5, 1843:²⁷

to declare to the Govt. of Brazil that if that Govt. still declined to enter with Great Britain, into formal arrangements calculated to give effect to the Intentions of the Parties to the Convention of 1826, for the total and final abolition of the Trade, it would remain for Her Majesty to take alone, and by Her own means, steps for carrying into full effect the obligations imposed upon Her by the First Article of that Convention.

If this threat of coercion were designed to force the Brazilian Government to provide Ribeiro with instructions for an anti-slave trade agreement, it did not accomplish its purpose. When Ribeiro presented his proposals in November, 1843, they did not include such a convention.

Neither the Ellis mission nor the Ribeiro mission thus made any progress toward the solution of the slave trade question. The next opportunity for such negotiations arose in October, 1844, when Abrantes visited London. Just before seeing him, Aberdeen wrote Peel:²⁸

The Slave Trade will be a matter of fresh difficulty with Brazil. In March 1845 the Convention will expire then we will be placed under the operation of the engagements entered into with Portugal in 1815 and 1817. The consequence of Portugal having so long delayed to fulfill the Stipulations entered into at that time, we passed an Act of Parliament of 1838 [sic] by which we took the matter into our own hands. Since that time, in 1842, Portugal has made a Treaty with us for the abolition of the Slave Trade, which is in every respect satisfactory, & I am sincerely happy to say that they are carrying it into effect fairly & honestly. They have captured several Slavers on the coast of Africa & really appear disposed to act with us at last cordially & zealously. I should propose to offer to Brazil, the Portuguese Treaty of 1842, or something like it; & to follow it up with an intimation that if they refuse to concur in effectual measures for the abolition of the Trade, they will be treated in the same manner as Portugal. The law was certainly a great stretch of power, & open to many objections in principle; but having been once sanctioned by Parliament, the difficulty of applying it in a similar case is in great measure removed.

We are terribly hampered by this Slave Trade, the questions about which meet us in every quarter & estrange us from our best friends. France, the U. States, Spain, Portugal, Brazil all furnish matter for angry discussions every day. Never [have] a people made such a sacrifice as we have done to attain our object, & the payment of the money is the least part of it. We must not relax; but our progress has not been hitherto very encouraging. In his interview with Abrantes, Aberdeen tried to use the Plata situation to force an anti-slave trade agreement on Brazil, but he was unsuccessful.

The final attempt prior to the Aberdeen Act to persuade Brazil to sign an agreement on the slave trade was entrusted to Hamilton in Rio. Aberdeen’s proposals were embodied in instructions of December 4, 1844, and read as follows:²⁹

Probably Aberdeen preferred to continue under the treaty, rather than to renew it formally, as the latter course might call its “permanent” character into question.

Hamilton received these instructions in plenty of time to negotiate with Brazil before the deadline of March 12, 1845. In his private letter of January 31, 1845, however, he mentioned the slave trade issue only briefly as follows:³⁰

It is rather extraordinary that Hamilton’s sense of delicacy should have prevented his presenting Aberdeen’s alternative to the Brazilian Government immediately, when one considers that the deadline was now fast approaching. The final sentences of his letter seem to indicate that he regarded coercion as inevitable.³¹

In March Hamilton was under the impression that the Brazilian Government was constructing measures of its own for the suppression of the slave trade. So, when the Brazilian Government handed him a note on March 12 declaring that as of March 13 the British cruisers had lost their right to visit and search Brazilian ships, he seems to have delayed in transmitting this vital decision to Aberdeen.³² The British Government thus does not seem to have learned of it until early in May.

Aberdeen and Peel meanwhile had been considering the possibility of a joint remonstrance by Britain and the United States to Brazil and Spain on the subject of the slave trade.³³ On learning of Brazil’s action, Peel wrote Aberdeen: “The Brazil affair is a most Complicated and Embarrassing one.”³⁴ Aberdeen, in his reply, used the same phrase as Peel:³⁵

The Brazilian affair is certainly complicated and embarrassing; but I hope we shall be able to steer our course satisfactorily. We have been preparing for the Law Officers, a very full and detailed statement of the Case, which will be submitted to them tomorrow, and I hope will produce such an opinion as we desire. When you see it, I think this statement will make you understand our present position without difficulty, which otherwise appears rather involved and obscure.

Thus, it is clear that the Law Officers ultimately determined whether or not the Aberdeen Act would be offered to Parliament.

After more than two weeks of study, the Law Officers rendered their opinion on May 30. They noted that three main questions were involved: 1) Had the Convention of 1817 and its additional article come to an end on March 13, 1845? 2) What rights did Britain still possess under Article I of the Treaty of 1826? 3) How might these rights be exercised? After reviewing the history of the case, they reported:³⁶

The Treaty of 1817 was adopted by the Brazilian Government by the Treaty of 1826, and they now contend that having absolutely abolished the Slave Trade from the 13th of March 1830, the Fifteen years has now expired, and that consequently all the stipulations of the Treaty of 1817 are at an end. It does not appear, however, that there is any Decree, or Law of the Brazils abolishing the Slave Trade generally from the 13th of March 1830; the first law on the subject is on the 7th of November 1831, and the next is April, 1832, and in neither of which is any reference made to that of the 13th of March 1830. The Brazilian Government therefore must rest entirely on the First Article of the Convention of 1826, ratified on the 13th March 1827 and contend that inasmuch as between Them and the British Government the Slave Trade by their Subjects has been Piracy since the 13th March 1830, the Stipulations of 1817 are no longer applicable, and on the whole We are disposed to think that this is the correct view as between the Two Countries, and we should therefore come to the conclusion that Her Majesty’s Government are bound to admit to the Brazilian Government that the Convention of 1817 (except the article relating to Piracy) with all its annexes are to be considered as at an end from the 13th of March 1845, and we think that under the First Article of the Convention of the 23rd November 1826 Her Majesty has acquired the right to order the Seizure of all Brazilian Subjects found upon the High Seas engaged in the Slave Trade, or punishing them as Pirates, and in disposing of their vessels on which they may be captured together with the goods on board belonging to them as Bona Piratoram.

The document was signed by Sir John Dodson, Judge of the Prerogative Court, Sir William Webb Follett, the Attorney General, and Sir Frederick Thesiger, the Solicitor General.³⁷

Peel, who feared the measure might be contested,³⁸ was for immediate action once the opinion of the Law Officers had come in,³⁹ but Aberdeen, no doubt hoping for a more favorable report from Hamilton, delayed. However, he prepared a memorandum for presentation to the Brazilian Government, which reviewed the situation and concluded: “This being the case, the Undersigned is directed to observe, that Her Majesty’s Government have no longer any course open to them.. . . than that of giving full effect to the stipulations of the First Article of that 1826 Convention. . .,”⁴⁰ In the original form, he announced that Britain would proceed against both Brazilian citizens and Brazilian ships, but the threat was later softened to include ships only.⁴¹

Along with this memorandum Aberdeen sent a letter in which he tried to justify the course he had adopted:⁴²

Despite the urgings of Peel for action,⁴³ Aberdeen waited another month before he presented his bill to the House of Lords.

Following instructions from Peel, Aberdeen conferred with Wellington and procured his consent before introducing the measure. He also drew up a Cabinet Memorandum which was circulated among the other members of the Government late in June, and he evidently secured their unanimous consent to go ahead with it.⁴⁴ Regarding the drawing up of the actual measure, this was apparently left to the Judge of the High Court of Admiralty, Stephen Lushington. Despite these conferences and preparations, it was obvious later that neither Peel nor Aberdeen was certain of the legal grounds upon which they were proceeding.

The bill passed through the House of Lords without debate between July 3-10, and the silence continued until the Commons went into committee on it on July 24. At that time Sir Thomas Wilde pointed out that Brazil had never passed a municipal statute making the slave trade piracy. He insisted that the treaty of 1826, concluded by the executive branch of the Brazilian Government, could not make criminal law, which came under the power of the legislature. This being so, by what authority did the British Government propose to subject Brazilians to British law ? Wilde concluded :⁴⁵

The state of unpreparedness on the part of the Government to answer Wilde strongly indicates that they had left the details of the measure completely to their legal advisers. Peel wrote Aberdeen immediately that “formidable difficulties” had been thrown in the path of the bill, and concluded his letter with the question: “Can you constitute Slave Trading by Brazil Piracy?”⁴⁶ Aberdeen referred the matter to Lushington,⁴⁷ and also sought the advice of Dodson concerning the “innocent cargo” taken on slavers.⁴⁸ At this point, the confusion was profound.

Lushington’s reply could not be located among Aberdeen’s papers, but undoubtedly it formed the basis of Peel’s defense of the measure in the Commons on July 31, 1845. Peel insisted that Brazil did not have to pass a municipal statute to make the slave trade piracy, as this had been done by the treaty of 1826, and Brazil had admitted as much in her Proclamation of November 4, 1829, and her note to Britain of March 4, 1830. Piracy, he pointed out, was an international crime punishable by all nations. Hence, because Brazil had agreed that the trade was piracy, Britain had the right to proceed against her slavers.⁴⁹ While not all of the House was convinced, the bill nevertheless passed, and finally received the Royal Assent on August 8.

The day after the enactment of the measure, Aberdeen sent new instructions to Hamilton to conclude an anti-slave trade treaty with Brazil.⁵⁰ All to be done now was to await the reaction of that nation to his act. Hamilton meanwhile had presented Aberdeen’s memorandum of June 4 to the Brazilian Government on July 23. “The nature of the note . . . has not yet transpired,” Hamilton wrote, “& curiosity is the predominant feeling.. . .”⁵¹ Thereafter Hamilton tried to negotiate a new treaty with Brazil. On October 11 he apologized for not sending either a new slave trade convention, which the Brazilian Government had promised him, or their reaction to the Aberdeen Act. “I am sorry to say,” he added, “nothing is forthcoming on either of these points at present.. . .”⁵²

On the basis of these reports, Aberdeen concluded that the reaction of the Brazilians was unexpectedly mild. “I am much relieved by the last news from Brazil,” he wrote Peel. “They take our Act of Parliament very quietly, and appear disposed to enter into a new treaty.”⁵³ This interpretation was obviously inspired by Hamilton’s letter of October 11, which raised hopes that Brazil would follow Portugal’s example and sign a new and satisfactory convention.

Early in 1846 the Brazilian Government instructed its minister in London to take up the slave trade question with Aberdeen. Just what was said on both sides is not clear, but the Brazilian sent Aberdeen’s views home, and Hamilton reported to Aberdeen how those views were received by the Brazilian Government. This report was made on April 15, 1846:⁵⁴

The “pending S.T. negotiations,” however, continued in that suspended state for the balance of Aberdeen’s term at the Foreign Office.

Despite the mild and hopeful official reaction of the Brazilian Government, Aberdeen had sources of information which provided a deeper insight into its feelings and intentions. Someone furnished him with extracts from the dispatches of the Brazilian Ministry to its envoy in London dated February 20 and February 21, 1846, and perhaps others also.⁵⁵ An even better source of secret information were the reports of an unidentified Brazilian “Counr. of State,” who submitted at least seven reports to Aberdeen through one John George Young, a British citizen who had financial claims against the Brazilian Government. For his services Aberdeen paid this “Counr.,” through Young, the sum of £200 in December, 1845, and another £100 in July, 1846.⁵⁶

Unfortunately, only two of these reports, numbers 5 and 7, are available. Number 5, which accompanied Young’s letter of April 16, 1846, stated bluntly that Brazil would not negotiate a new anti-slave trade treaty so long as “Lord Aberdeen’s Bill” was on the statute books, and the same applied to an Anglo-Brazilian commercial treaty.⁵⁷ Number 7, enclosed with Young’s letter of June 10, took up all three issues outstanding between Britain and Brazil.

British acceptance of the commercial treaty offered by Ribeiro in 1843 was the suggested means of disposing of that question. Concerning the slave trade issue, Aberdeen should instruct Hamilton not to press the British proposals, but to ask for negotiations. “It would then of course be proposed,” the report continued, “as a preliminary condition to any negotiation of this kind to repeal the ‘Bill’ whose existence, in the general opinion of the Brazilians, does not allow the Imperial Govt. to commence any negotiations on the subject.”⁵⁸ Under certain conditions, Brazil might even accede to the Anglo-Portuguese treaty. These observations were followed by another which was probably of considerable significance. After a few remarks regarding the possibility of establishing peace in La Plata, and “upholding” Paraguay, the writer concluded: “In the meantime Brazil continues to be a looker on in a struggle which it is extremely interested in putting a stop to, and to the cessation of which it might greatly contribute by uniting its forces and means to those of the Anglo-French intervention.. . .”⁵⁹ The hope (which Aberdeen by no means dispelled) that Brazil might yet secure a voice in the Plata settlement probably helps explain the mild official reaction of the Brazilian Government to the Aberdeen Act.

The latter history of the Aberdeen Act is told in some detail elsewhere.⁶⁰ At this point, an evaluation of the measure might be in order. Was it a success or failure? Certainly during its first five years it was a failure. It failed in its immediate objective of forcing Brazil to sign an anti-slave trade treaty, and in its major purpose of cutting down the slave trade, which actually increased after its passage. But in 1850 Lord Palmerston decided to enforce the act with exceptional vigor,⁶¹ and his decision to do so stimulated Brazil to take effective action against the slave trade. So much progress was made thereafter in halting that trade that the pacific Derby Government suspended operation of the Aberdeen Act in 1852, but it was not actually repealed until 1869.

To what extent did Aberdeen step out of his usually-conciliatory character in sponsoring this act? One can hardly doubt that he exhausted all possibilities for negotiation with Brazil on the issue before resorting to it, or that he projected the act with great reluctance. He called it a “great stretch of power,” and one which he did not want to become permanent. Some might insist, however, that his sin was the greater because he was more keenly appreciative of the rights of other nations than was Palmerston.

Yet, in fairness to Aberdeen, one must consider whether or not, given the situation of that moment, he actually had an alternative. The precedent set by Palmerston and the upholding of the legality of the act by the Law Officers to a large extent determined Aberdeen’s course, and his decision was made the more inevitable by the fact that Portugal had bent to Palmerston’s act of 1839 and had signed the much-desired anti-slave trade treaty. No doubt the qualms Aberdeen felt about applying this method were balanced by the feeling, shared by the overwhelming majority of his countrymen, that the cause involved would to some extent justify the stretch of power.

Author notes