This is the forty-ninth volume published in the United States Army in World War II series. It is the first of two volumes in a sub-series devoted to the Western Hemisphere.
As the title indicates, this is essentially a story of defensive war, of the plans made and measures taken by the United States Army to protect the hemisphere against military attack by the Axis powers before and during World War II. It is a story exceptionally well told by two highly competent “official” historians who have had access to such a variety and quantity of primary source materials as will likely whet the appetite and rouse the envy of the academically employed historian.
Focus is upon the 1938-1942 period. The first seven chapters treat the pre-Pearl Harbor evolution of hemisphere defense policy. These are followed by three general chapters on over-all military relations, arms supply, and air defense preparations in Latin America, and by five chapters dealing specifically with Brazil, Mexico, and Canada.
The commitment to defend the entire hemisphere in 1938 was an entirely new departure in United States’ military policy. After the smashing German victories of early 1940, the United States, in anticipation of a possible German assault on the Western Hemisphere, for the first time in history sought closer military relations with the Latin American nations. Latin American cooperation, it was found, was closely related to the quantity of arms the United States was willing to supply, and since Brazil was the chief point of vulnerability to enemy invasion, she was also the recipient of the bulk of the Lend Lease aid. After 1942, when the invasion threat declined, hemisphere defense rapidly became secondary to offensive operations outside the hemisphere.
Those interested in understanding Pan American Airways’ dominant position in Latin America today will find a most illuminating historical explanation in Chapter X (Air Defense Preparations). Also revealing is the evolution of the collective defense concept in Chapter VIII (General Military Relations With Latin America). For example, the Inter-American Defense Board was launched by the State Department over the strenuous objections of the War Department, and the Army deliberately bypassed the IADB during World War II in favor of bilateral negotiations whenever possible.
This is by no means history in a vacuum. Not only do the authors present the Western Hemisphere problem in the context of the global problem, but also they analyze the Army’s role in balanced relation to that of the Navy, the State Department, and the President. Drs. Conn and Fairchild are to be commended for an outstanding professional job. In this reviewer’s opinion, this volume comes very close to rating as definitive history. Readers of this important book will eagerly await the same team’s forthcoming second volume in the Western Hemisphere subseries.
