The Significance of the September Revolution

On February 19, 1852, Justo José de Urquiza, governor of Entre Ríos, made a triumphal entry into the city of Buenos Aires.¹ On July 13, 1853, he had to flee from that city under the escort of a foreign diplomatic representative. Much more was compressed between these dates, however, than the ups and downs of another Argentine caudillo. The traditional economic struggle between the port of Buenos Aires and the inland river ports along the Paraná and Uruguay, the rivalry of provincianos and porteños, the supremacy of a central authority versus a loose confederation of provinces, immediately arose in their many guises to haunt the military victory which Urquiza had won over Juan Manuel de Rosas, governor of Buenos Aires and for almost two decades the de facto ruler of Argentina.

Argentines have long judged their leaders in personalist terms. Detractors and supporters of the Rosas regime or of the Urquiza reorganization have often forgotten that behind those leaders lay economic factors and traditional sentiments far more important than the character of a provincial governor or a national leader. It was true that porteño support for Rosas had faded to the extent that Robert Gore, the British chargé in Buenos Aires, wrote a month before the battle of Caseros:

This only signified, however, that Rosas had failed to win the unquestioning loyalty of any important group in Buenos Aires, such as the landowners, the military, the clergy, the merchants, or the sizable foreign element comprising 45 per cent of the city’s population, and not that he had aroused any effective porteño opposition. As a consequence, Rosas was removed from power by an invading army made up of men and leaders from the rival littoral provinces and heavily supported by Brazilian gold and naval strength. The aftermath of Caseros, the September Revolution of 1852, and the tenacious resistance of the porteños to any national government which did not safeguard their predominance and interests soon demonstrated that Rosas had founded his regime on the stable principle of porteño selfinterest. Indeed so sound was that principle that a national government was not achieved in Argentina until another porteño governor, Bartolomé Mitre, reached the presidency after defeating Urquiza at Pavón in 1861.

It is not the purpose of the present article to narrate the events of these eighteen months following the battle of Caseros but rather to provide further documentation of that keystone to Argentine history, the porteño efforts to dominate the provinces, as compressed into the events of 1852-1853.

The campaign against Rosas had not developed as a barracks mutiny. Political and commercial interests in the littoral provinces had risen against an informal yet dictatorial control which Rosas and the provincial government of Buenos Aires exercised over all Argentina. Free and unrestricted trade for the Paraná and Uruguay river ports, a share in customs revenue which was concentrated in the port of Buenos Aires, desires for local autonomy, were consequently blended by Urquiza’s advisers into a program to provide Argentina with a national government, “representative, republican and federal” as subsequently stated in the 1853 Constitution, and an economic structure which if not destined to create equality between the provinces would at least force Buenos Aires to share its monopoly with other river ports. The Rosas regime having vanished overnight, Urquiza and his followers were faced with two immediate problems of government: the formation of a temporary provincial authority in Buenos Aires; and the creation of a national authority which would operate until a constitution and the resultant branches of government could be brought into existence.

While no powerful faction in Buenos Aires mourned the passing of the Rosas regime, it was equally true that no effective resistance had emerged from Buenos Aires against Rosas. Urquiza could not, therefore, turn over control of the province to the guidance of any particular group or interest made popular or supreme by Rosas’ overthrow. The early hours of February 4, the day following the battle of. Caseros, witnessed the arrival at Urquiza’s headquarters in Palermo, four miles from the heart of Buenos Aires, of a “ commission of surrender” for the city. It was to a member of that commission that Urquiza turned for the needed local leadership. The venerable jurist, Vicente López y Planes, famed as the composer of Argentina’s national anthem, a man of excellent intellectual merits but just as certainly lacking the youth and energy to face and dominate the dubious political scene in Buenos Aires, returned to the city at noon with the title of Provisional Governor. As his minister of government, Vicente López chose a violent anti-rosista, Valentín Alsina, nominal leader of the returning group of exiled intellectuals.

Chaos rather than organized government resulted on the porteño scene. Urquiza’s own presence and personality provided a hindrance; his statesmenlike acts and proclamations were interspersed with ill-considered, spur-of-the-moment decisions. His often uncontrollable temper, his expectance of absolute loyalty and even fawning obedience from all around him, his frequent reliance on brute strength, his suspicion of all that he did not understand, had been reinforced during the past ten years when he had been the caudillo of Entre Ríos and the virtual field commander of Rosas’ army. It was not only logical that he would make mistakes but that Buenos Aires would interpret these mistakes as endangering the city’s role of predominance in Argentina. The execution of Colonel Chilavert, one of the few who had fought at Caseros with some sense of loyalty to the fallen governor, the mass execution of an entire porteño regiment which had mutinied when forced to fight against Rosas, Urquiza’s intransigent demand that porteños display the federalist badge of a red hatband, waistcoat, or boutonniere, symbols incidentally of the former Rosas regime which the populace had discarded after Caseros, were only the most publicized of those mistakes. At the same time the absolute controls of the Rosas regime which had virtually prevented any form of political activity were suddenly lifted. Freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of assembly, although they might not mean much to the mass of the population, were seized upon by politicians, altruistic and selfish alike, for their own advancement. Literally dozens of political groups and parties appeared on the porteño scene during the months after Caseros. In the last analysis, each group was a lever in the hands of the politicians and responded to their personalized leadership rather than to principles. While as a result of Caseros no group in Buenos Aires could assert effective control over the province, the conditions which ensued generated an excess of political fragmentation and energy.

Opposition to López’ provisional governorship, still under the tutelage of Urquiza’s headquarters in Palermo, found ready grist in natural porteño suspicions of any caudillo from the provinces. Although Valentín Alsina was a minister of that government he soon became the leader of anti-Urquiza sentiment. On April 11 elections for the provincial legislature of Buenos Aires were held. Despite the lack of secret ballot or universal suffrage, this was the first expression of public opinion since the advent of the Rosas regime. The provisional government entered the names of its candidates, known to be supported by Urquiza, on a white list, while the opposition printed its candidates ’ names on yellow lists. Election day was clear and sunny, and in spite of the importance of this election, no violence was reported at the voting tables where the yellow and white ballots were cast. The various reports agreed that Urquiza not only influenced the choice of government candidates, but to a greater or lesser degree attempted to use his armed forces at Palermo to intervene in the elections.³ It was, therefore, all the more notable that the yellow or opposition list was permitted to triumph over the interests and efforts of Urquiza and the provisional government.

The newly elected legislature was to convene in May to select a governor to replace the provisional administration; in this question Urquiza intervened more effectively than he had in the elections. Two days after the April 11 elections he invited the principal political leaders of the moment to visit the battlefield of Caseros with him. A friendly luncheon, followed by the inevitable and interminable toasts, provided Urquiza with the opportunity to voice his political dictates: “That venerable patriot, Vicente López, has demonstrated by his many virtues his right to occupy the governorship of this province, and he can rely on the sympathies of the Liberating Army as I am sure he can on the gratitude of the citizens.”⁴ The significance of this toast was only too clear, and it was made clearer during the ensuing weeks in El Progreso, the official government newspaper. Although the opposition elements controlled the legislature it would have been foolhardy to oppose Urquiza’s will at this stage. The leading opposition candidate, Alsina, withdrew from the race, and on May 13 Vicente López was elected governor by an overwhelming majority.

The first of the political problems arising from Caseros appeared to have been solved. Governing authority had been constituted by provincial action, and Buenos Aires was once more controlling its destinies only three months after the overthrow of Rosas. The administration of López, however, was an imposed government. After the May election, Valentín Alsina refused to continue in the ministry and he was accompanied in his resignation by the Minister of War. López accepted these resignations with great reluctance, since, particularly in the case of Alsina, it meant the clear definition of a hostile opposition. For two days López was unable to form a ministry and in despair even wrote out his own resignation of the governorship.⁵ Finally on May 20, the ministry was formed with Juan María Gutiérrez, another intellectual émigré from Rosas’ persecution, as minister of government. Stormy days lay ahead.

At the same time that provisions had to be made to replace Rosas, governor of Buenos Aires, it was also necessary to replace Rosas, ruler of the Argentine Confederation. Rosas had exercised his de facto control over the country through authority he derived from the Federal Pact of 1831 to represent the four provinces of Buenos Aires, Santa Fé, Corrientes and Entre Ríos, and by implication or extension, the rest of the provinces, in financial matters and foreign relations. Urquiza used this same pact as a departure point in his effort to organize a constitutional national authority. On April 6 representatives of the four littoral provinces concluded a protocol at Palermo authorizing Urquiza to represent the Argentine provinces in foreign affairs. As a result, the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the province of Buenos Aires was abolished and its occupant, Luis José de la Peña, was named foreign minister of the Confederation. A further provision gave Urquiza power to draw on the customhouse of Buenos Aires for necessary funds.

Meanwhile, Bernardo de Irigoyen, a former private secretary to Rosas, had been dispatched to the interior to secure the loyal adhesion of rosista caudillos and governors for the new state of affairs on the coast. The success of that mission permitted Urquiza on April 8 to direct an invitation to all provincial governors to attend “a National Convention at which the provincial executives of the republic could unify their political thought and efforts in order to achieve the great object of the epoch—the unity of their governments and their peoples.”⁶ The governors were advised to secure sufficient powers from their respective legislatures to enable them not only to discuss but also to take positive action. As yet, however, the exact direction which this “National Convention” would take was uncertain in the minds of Urquiza and his advisers. Suggestions had ranged from action on purely temporary measures preceding convocation of a constitutional convention to efforts toward establishment of an immediately permanent government.

In early May Urquiza called together several of the outstanding porteño politicians at Palermo to discuss one project which had been suggested for action by the “National Convention.” Argentine historians have subjected this meeting to extreme scrutiny since it represented the very clear resistance of Buenos Aires to a government controlled by the provinces.⁷ The secrecy of that meeting was ended six years later in a public polemic carried on in the newspapers; but exactly what transpired can only be deduced from various letters, since an uncontested version of the facts never emerged from the polemic. Among Urquiza’s counselors in Palermo had been two, Juan Pujol from Corrientes and Santiago Derqui from Córdoba, who typified a prevalent fear in the provinces, namely, that Buenos Aires would once more dominate Argentina. Since March they had supported and argued in favor of a project to federalize the city of Buenos Aires and to divide the remainder of the province into two new provinces. This was no new idea. Rivadavia had conceived it in 1826 as a project to guarantee centralized government under the control of the city of Buenos Aires. The warmed-over version of such a unitarist idea was seized upon by anti-porteños like Derqui and Pujol because, in 1852, it appeared evident that Urquiza, a caudillo of the provinces, would be the next national leader of Argentina. Therefore, if the city of Buenos Aires could be subtracted from the province and made into a federal district, hence subservient to a national government, the danger of porteño domination would be removed. This was the idea which Urquiza wanted to submit to the porteño politicians.

Present at that historic meeting were Tomás Guido, Dalmacio Vélez Sársfield, Valentín Alsina, Vicente Fidel López (interim minister of foreign affairs of the Confederation and son of the governor), Francisco Pico, José Gorostiaga, and Juan Pujol. To the assembled politicians Pico read a project, written by Pujol, which contained three principal ideas: convocation of a constituent congress; the organization of a provisional national government to rule until the congress could organize federal authorities; and the federalization of the city of Buenos Aires as residence of the national authorities and the subdivision of the province along the lines of the 1826 project. Horrified silence met this proposal, and then one by one all present signified their strong opposition to such a program. Only the idea of immediate convocation of a congress met with any favor, while the other two parts of the program were roundly denounced as unacceptable to Buenos Aires. Urquiza, after listening to the discussion, requested that these individuals present another suggestion which could be introduced at the “National Convention.” By common consent, Pico and Vélez Sársfield were chosen to draw up such a plan. Pico composed a draft, subsequently accepted by Vélez Sársfield, which limited itself to the matter of a constituent congress.⁸ A contemporary letter written by Pujol to Derqui, then on a diplomatic mission to Paraguay, demonstrated that Urquiza figuratively if not literally tore this plan to shreds—hizo pedazos.⁹

The drama of plans and counterplans then moved to San Nicolás where the “National Convention” would meet. The meeting of the governors had been called for May 20, but the two steamers carrying Urquiza and his party, including the governors of Buenos Aires and Corrientes, did not even leave Buenos Aires until that morning, and subsequently got stuck on the mudbanks in the Paraná River for four days.¹⁰ Significantly López was the only provincial governor who had not asked his legislature for powers to negotiate or to conclude any arrangements at San Nicolás, action which would have been incomprehensible if the Pico-Vélez Sársfield draft had been slated for acceptance. He realized that Urquiza had swung back toward an anti-porteño stance and that the projects to be discussed at San Nicolás would arouse the resistance of the Buenos Aires legislature. Significant also was the resignation of Alsina effective a few days before a trip on which he, as minister of government, would have logically accompanied the governor. Finally there was the absence of Vélez Sársfield from San Nicolás, despite his prior plans to accompany Urquiza’s party.¹¹ All these indications pointed to a resolution at San Nicolás which would be anything but favorable to the porteño position.

When the first official session of the governors opened on May 29, Urquiza disclaimed any intention of introducing a pre-arranged program. The vacuum was quickly filled, however, with the formation of an ad hoc committee comprised of the ministers of government from various provinces. Obviously a plan, or plans, had been brought by Urquiza to San Nicolás, and the rapid conclusion of the Acuerdo de San Nicolás, ready for the governors ’ approbation and signatures two days later, indicated that the preconceived program had not changed too much since the consultation in Palermo three weeks earlier.

On the ad hoc committee were several of those who had participated in the Palermo meeting: Vicente Fidel López, Juan Pujol, and Francisco Pico. Pujol’s version was the decisive one in the drafting sessions for it was not difficult to convince those from the interior provinces of the dangers of porteño domination. At the same time it was recognized that an element of compromise was necessary and that to insist on the federalization of Buenos Aires at this time might jeopardize the effort of national organization. When the final project emerged from a special commission formed by López, Pujol, and Pico, and modified by the addition of Manuel Leiva from Santa Fé, it was reduced to two essential points: the convocation of a constituent congress and the formation of a provisional national government to rule until a constitution had been written and put into execution. In essence, this was the Pujol project minus the issue of the federalization of Buenos Aires. A letter from López to Urquiza in November 1852 demonstrated that Pico was forced to depart from the draft which he and Vélez Sársfield had submitted to Urquiza after the Palermo meeting and had to yield to pressures of the anti-porteño element even at the risk of alienating Buenos Aires.¹²

The Acuerdo was Urquiza’s method of solving the second political problem raised by the battle of Caseros—the formation of a national authority. It went far beyond the rather simple provisions of the Federal Pact of 1831. Legislative and executive functions were combined in the person of a “Provisional Director of the Argentine Confederation,” namely, Urquiza. The command of all provincial armies was centralized in his hands. He was authorized not only to establish the Federal Pact of 1831 as the basic law of the land but also to intervene in the provinces to maintain in power the constituted authorities. Internal tariffs were abolished, and navigation of the rivers was to be controlled by Urquiza. The provinces were to contribute to the expenses of the national government in proportion to their tariff receipts, which meant that Buenos Aires would financially underwrite this authority. A council, appointed by Urquiza, could be consulted on matters of grave importance, but in no way did this council exercise any control over the unlimited powers granted Urquiza by the Acuerdo. Even in the matter of a constituent congress, the latent fears of Buenos Aires were aroused. Each province was to send two representatives to such an assembly. Thus, despite the wealth and population of Buenos Aires, it would be definitely inferior in voting power to any unified sentiment expressed by the other provinces, and the constitutional form of government would be one over which the porteños would have little control.

The June debates set the tone of the porteño politicians’ response to the Acuerdo. The legislature immediately took steps to insure that the Acuerdo would be submitted to its scrutiny. Less publicized was the formation of an emergency committee on June 10 to collect funds and munitions for a military force to displace Urquiza. A commission was sent to Montevideo to request General José María Paz’s return to command porteño forces in event of open conflict.¹³ Governor López consequently arrived in Buenos Aires on June 12 to face the immediate problem of a hostile legislature and a populace already aroused by violent press discussion of the Acuerdo.

The debates themselves lasted only two days, June 21 and 22. The feeble defense of the Acuerdo made by the government ministers was promptly drowned out by the oratory of Mitre and Vélez Sársfield which played on the fears of Buenos Aires toward an irresponsible government dominated by a caudillo from the provinces. The city populace took a holiday, enthusiastically crowded the Chamber and adjoining streets, cheered their new-found heroes, repeatedly interrupted the debates, and on the evening of June 22 caused the government ministers to withdraw prudently from the Chamber in the carriage of the Chief of Police. Those two days made it evident, however, that the legislature would never give its approval to the Acuerdo. The ministers submitted their resignations, and when the legislature met on June 23 it received a message from Governor López stating that since free discussion of the Acuerdo no longer appeared possible, he also must resign his post. His resignation was accepted, and the legislature voted to install its president, General Manuel Pinto, as provisional governor on the following day.

The course which the legislature now proposed to follow must inevitably clash with the national authority represented by Urquiza, located a few miles away at Palermo. Rejection of the Acuerdo by Buenos Aires meant that the richest of the Argentine provinces would not assent to Urquiza’s provisional mandate. Unless Urquiza would call another meeting of the provinces and give up his pretension to the provisional executive authority, the problem would not be resolved to the satisfaction of the legislature or Buenos Aires. Urquiza, however, was convinced that the resistance of Buenos Aires was only the work of an obstinate minority, “the decided effort of a few discontented individuals to defeat the will of the majority.”¹⁴ His troops at Palermo gave him the upper hand, and he saw no reason to revise or abandon his plans for national organization.¹⁵ Temporary military occupation, although it had not occurred after Caseros, now took place as a result of the June debates. The legislature was dissolved, military patrols entered the city to maintain order, opposition newspapers were closed and several politicians exiled, and Governor López and his cabinet were reinstated in power. Within a month a minor cabinet crisis provided López with the chance to escape from his untenable position. His resignation was accepted, and Urquiza himself assumed executive responsibility over the province.

Superficially, calm reigned in Buenos Aires. Below the surface, however, there was active planning throughout the winter months of 1852 to prepare a revolution against the “foreign” domination of the province. Urquiza’s aggressive measures to control the situation in June overlooked a potentially dangerous source of opposition, the minor caudillos and military officers within the province of Buenos Aires. Thus conspiratorial meetings not only involved the leader of the anti-Urquiza party, Valentín Alsina, and members of the dissolved provincial legislature, but such divergent military figures as Colonels Emilio Conesa, Manuel Hornos, Hilario Lagos and Pedro Rosas y Belgrano. The British chargé continued to send pessimistic reports to the Foreign Office concerning the deteriorating political situation in Buenos Aires; on September 1, he concluded: “The Unitarian Party are endeavouring to get up a movement against General Urquiza during his absence …”¹⁸ Urquiza, however, was ignorant of or chose to ignore the signs of intrigue. On September 8, with much fanfare, he left Buenos Aires to open the sessions of the Constituent Congress in Santa Fé and named his Minister of War, General Galán, as interim governor during his absence.

The departure of Urquiza and the undiplomatic selection of Galán provided the conspirators with the formula of success. The nomination of Galán aroused the jealousies of General Juan Madariaga and José María Pirán, commanders of the Corrientes detachments outside the city, and they offered their services to the conspiracy. The time for revolt was set for early Saturday morning, September 11. A final meeting of the military collaborators at ten o’clock the preceding evening selected the senior officer, General Pirán, as military commander of the revolution. Well before sunrise, regular troops had occupied the main plaza of Buenos Aires and detachments were patrolling the city. The ringing bell in the colonial Cabildo called out waiting elements of the National Guard of the province. Two generals of the forces at Palermo, Urdinarrain and Virasoro, were taken into custody at their homes in the city; Galán escaped by virtue of being at the army headquarters outside Buenos Aires.¹⁷ Not a shot had been fired and the revolution had been skillfully executed by purely military units. Most of the Entre Ríos battalions stationed at Palermo did not join the revolution, but their relative inferiority to the forces which had joined the movement and their demoralized state caused Galán to withdraw immediately to Santos Lugares, ten miles west of the city.

According to prior arrangement with Alsina and other politicians, the revolution which had been carried out by the military was now turned over to civilian elements. A note which had already been drawn up was sent by Pirán to Pinto, president of the dissolved legislature, advising him that it was “the strong desire of the people and the army that the President immediately convoke the Honorable Deputies of the province, who were so violently dispersed on June 24, in order that this essential organ of legal government may assume control over all our constitutional processes.”¹⁸ At ten o’clock that morning thirty members of the legislature met and, in repetition of the June 23 session, granted their president powers as provisional governor of the province. A cabinet with Alsina as minister of government and Pirán as minister of war was immediately named. Popular acceptance of this revolution appeared inevitable, since it marked a reassertion of provincial autonomy and the removal of “foreign” domination. John Pendleton, the United States chargé who had just returned from Montevideo, wrote:

For a week or more the outcome of the September Revolution hung in the balance. The forces under Galán had left their observation point at Santos Lugares and were marching north toward the Santa Fé border, their fighting potential reduced by desertion and low morale. More crucial was the attitude which the undecided rural caudillos of the province would assume and the action which Urquiza would take. When news of the revolution reached Urquiza at Santa Fé he moved with the same aggressiveness and decision which had characterized him during the June crisis. His evaluation of the situation, however, was radically altered when he arrived at San Nicolás in northern Buenos Aires on September 17. Galán was in full retreat with a disorganized and dispirited contingent of 2,500 men. The vast majority of the local provincial authorities had pledged their support to the revolution, and most decisive, key rural caudillos, José María Flores in the north and Colonels Eugenio Bustos and Juan Francisco Olmos in the south, had promised their adherence to the revolution. Consequently Urquiza embarked with his forces for Entre Ríos and sent a personal emissary to General Pinto announcing his decision to leave the province “to the full enjoyment of its rights.”²⁰

The porteño city had been vastly assisted in its revolution by rural caudillos. Once the unifying influence of opposition to Urquiza was removed, however, this political marriage began to show signs of strain. The symbolic embrace of Alsina with Lorenzo Torres, a figurehead of the Rosas regime, at a political banquet on September 18, and the financial rewards to the officers of the revolution voted by the legislature deceived few. As early as September 24, the chief of police gave ten prominent civil and military figures twenty-four hours to leave the province; at least two of these, Colonels Lagos and Bustos, had been key figures in the September Revolution.²¹ Meanwhile, Mitre, the hero of the June debates, was assigned the task of activating and commanding the provincial National Guard as a counter-balance to the unstable loyalty of the military units.

Dominant in the minds of the porteño politicians was the longstanding ambition of the city of Buenos Aires to direct Argentine destinies. The “Manifesto of the Legislature” of September 19, addressed to all provincial governments, clearly defined the policy of Pinto’s provisional government. After defending the basis of the September Revolution and summarizing complaints against Urquiza, it closed with a ringing appeal for porteño leadership in organizing a national government: “With its provincial sovereignty restored and its laws vindicated, the Province of Buenos Aires has risen to its feet with a sword in its hand, ready to repel all aggression, to support any movement toward liberty, to fight tyranny, to accept any co-operation, and, after victory, to aid with all its power the noble aim of National Organization.”²² Legislative action immediately followed to nullify Urquiza’s authority as exercised under the Acuerdo de San Nicolás. The legislature announced it would not recognize any act of the Constituent Congress in Santa Fé and ordered its representatives to withdraw immediately from that assembly. Authority granted Urquiza to represent the province in foreign affairs was revoked, and the provincial government was empowered to handle its own relations with foreign powers.

If, however, Buenos Aires were “to support any movement toward liberty,” or to promote understanding with the provinces, it was necessary to erase some of the distrust felt toward Buenos Aires. In particular, it became essential to dispel the conviction that Buenos Aires wanted to monopolize all trade in Argentina. Motivated by such considerations, the legislature promptly accepted a government-sponsored measure to declare the Paraná River free to navigation by vessels of all nations. More discussion was occasioned by a law to provide free transit and free deposit of goods in Buenos Aires, for by such a measure the porteño stranglehold on national revenues appeared to be threatened. Only the economic liberalism of men such as Mitre, Vélez Sársfield, and Alsina, and the need for a dramatic surrender of the privileged porteño position, finally brought passage of the measure in mid-November. Subsequent developments, however, virtually canceled out the effect of these liberal measures. Certainly the porteño domination of Argentine commerce and the monopoly of customs revenues were little endangered by such projects. Many years would pass before commercial houses would be built elsewhere than in Buenos Aires and make meaningful the free navigation of interior rivers and the free transit or deposit of goods.

In order to carry out their legislative pronouncement, the porteño politicians undertook a two-pronged assault upon Urquiza’s efforts at national organization. One was an overt mission to secure the alliance and sympathy of the provinces of the interior and the other was a secret mission to raise rebellion in Corrientes and Entre Ríos. José María Paz, veteran commander of movements against Rosas in the 1830s and 1840s, was sent to the Santa Fé border “to harmonize the political and mercantile interests and views of all the provinces of the Republic.”²³ He was also to influence the provinces to withdraw their deputies from the Constituent Congress and to cancel the authorization permitting Urquiza to act as director of foreign affairs. He was further directed to reassure the provinces of Buenos Aires’ interest in a program of national organization: that a new congress should be convened on terms arranged between Buenos Aires and the provinces; that Buenos Aires would support any effort to prevent civil war or re-establish peace in the interior; that Buenos Aires would guarantee free transit of goods to the interior and free navigation of the Paraná River.

The September Revolution received little acclaim in the interior. Although there were a few individuals in every province who believed that a civilized, stable nation could only be achieved through porteño leadership or who were resentful or fearful of Urquiza and sought his defeat by means of an alliance with Buenos Aires, they were submerged by the jealousy and hatred of Buenos Aires so prevalent in the interior. A letter addressed Alsina by one of his followers in Mendoza accurately evaluated these sentiments: “Provincialism, a niggardly passion, disgracefully predominant in these parts, outdoes itself and defends Urquiza for the sole reason that he is a provincial, raising its frenzy to the pretension of accusing us (the porteños) of the perversity of Don Juan M. de Rosas.”²⁴ The governments of Santa Fé and Cordoba, echoing such sentiment, issued strict orders to prevent the passage of Paz to the interior and thus brought his mission to a standstill.

Simultaneously with the Paz mission, the porteño authorities sought to create a diversion in the province of Corrientes lying on the northern border of Entre Rios. During the previous decade, Urquiza had invaded that province on several occasions to suppress revolutions against Rosas and had consequently aroused the enmity of certain elements of the population. Significantly in late August, provincial Minister of Government Juan Pujol had seized the governorship of Corrientes, replacing Governor Virasoro, who was still absent in Buenos Aires as Urquiza’s chief of staff. Although Pujol was no friend of the porteños as was amply shown in the formulation of the Acuerdo de San Nicolás, the hope was that practical considerations might draw him to the Buenos Aires side. Also, the Corrientes commanders and detachments in Buenos Aires had played an important role in the September Revolution. In an effort to capitalize on possible sympathies, the official communication which announced the success of the September Revolution to the Corrientes government differed from that addressed to the other provinces and actually suggested cooperation between the two provinces. Juan José Méndez was promptly dispatched by the porteño government to consult with Pujol and was received by that governor.²⁵

By November the time had come for the porteño leaders to make their daring bid to upset Urquiza’s effort at national organization and to assume command of the nation themselves. Paz wrote from his post on the northern Buenos Aires frontier that his present mission was a failure and that he needed new instructions. The election of Valentín Alsina at the end of October to replace the provisional authority of General Pinto was decisive. A secret plan of action was agreed upon by the new governor and his cabinet the day after their inauguration:

On November 3 a letter marked VERY CONFIDENTIAL from Governor Alsina to General Paz revealed some aspects of how this cabinet agreement would be executed:

Alsina briefly sketched the plan. Forces from Corrientes would invade Entre Ríos on November 15. At the same time, the Corrientes battalions and a few units from Entre Ríos which had supported the September Revolution would join in the attack under the pretext of returning peaceably to their provinces. Some artillery and considerable funds would be provided by Buenos Aires. “You will understand that this creates a new situation. For whatever may happen we should be militarily prepared in the north, yet without arousing alarm.” The transfer of supporting military units toward the north was outlined. General Flores and Colonels Lagos and Bustos, the latter two recently returned to favor after their abrupt September 24 expulsion, were to be the key officers in these movements.

The two prongs of the porteño strategy were checked almost before they could be launched. Two landing parties attacked the eastern coast of Entre Ríos bordering the Uruguay River. The first group under General Hornos landed near Gualeguaychú but could stir up no local support for the movement. They consequently withdrew toward the province of Corrientes, only to find that Pujol, after a month of wavering indecision, had finally given his support to Urquiza, for reasons explained in his own words: “It is clear that Buenos Aires sought little else than to sacrifice those poor peasants by launching them into the heart of Entre Ríos without support, protection or assistance in the hope that we would undertake to protect them and involve ourselves in war with Entre Ríos, thus pulling their chestnuts out of the fire—llamarse ellos el Juan de afuera.”²⁸ The second group proceeded farther up the river toward Concepción del Uruguay. The commander of this force, General Madariaga, never got ashore, and his forces were promptly driven back into their boats. Meanwhile, Alsina urged Paz to find some excuse to invade Santa Fé, and National Guard units, “mostly of youths, the sons of respectable persons and shopkeepers of this City, unaccustomed to any hardship and entirely unexperienced as soldiers,”²⁰ were sent northward as reinforcements. Before any decisive action could be taken on that front, the countryside and the rural caudillos of Buenos Aires rose against the policy of porteño aggression. An active participant in the counterrevolt, provincial Minister of War José María Flores, wrote Paz on December 2:

The city of Buenos Aires was immediately surrounded by the counterrevolutionaries led by Colonel Hilario Lagos, and as the penalty for having failed in his ambitious plans, Valentín Alsina resigned the governorship to the perennially available General Pinto. But if the city of Buenos Aires had lacked sufficient strength and enthusiasm to extend its influence to the provinces at this historical moment, the ensuing events demonstrated the power which that city possessed to defend its interests. Characteristic was the attitude of Lorenzo Torres, one of the leading rosista politicians who had participated in the early stages of the counterrevolt; once Alsina was removed, he and his followers came staunchly to the defense of the city. The initial Lagos attack on the city failed and by mid-December both sides settled down to siege conditions, interrupted by sporadic armistices and the mediation efforts of the foreign representatives of France, England, and the United States.

It soon became evident that two factors would be crucial in this siege: the financial position of each side and the attitude adopted by Urquiza. Certainly few financial resources existed in the countryside save for the cattle roaming the Pampas. Lagos ’ forces made confiscations, and hides were shipped to Montevideo for sale, but this was hardly a satisfactory economic basis for an army operating within its own territory. The commercial wealth of the city of Buenos Aires, on the other hand, provided inherent strength to the porteño resistance. Most important, since this siege had reduced customhouse revenues, was the accepted operation by the provincial bank in issuing paper notes. These issues, authorized by the legislature, were readily accepted in commerce at a gold value determined daily by the purchase and sale of this money in an exchange market. Naturally these bank notes depreciated as issues increased, but not so rapidly as to rob the government of a flexible source of funds in any emergency. In the last analysis, the reliance placed on these paper notes came not only from their long usage and general acceptance in the city but also from the assumption that Buenos Aires would remain the principal port of Argentina and the customhouse of the nation. Therefore, it would always possess funds to underwrite this paper currency and maintain foreign confidence in Argentine credit.

Urquiza’s agents had been in contact with the besieging forces from the start of the Lagos counterrevolt, not only to offer assistance but also to assure themselves that the movement would guide Buenos Aires into Urquiza’s concept of national organization.³¹ At first, outright aid was limited to small shipments of men and supplies; finally in January it was extended to include the loan of the Confederation naval force, a vital key to the blockade of the port of Buenos Aires. But Urquiza, with the experience of the September Revolution behind him, was in no rush to endanger the structure of national organization being elaborated by the Constituent Congress in Santa Fé by plunging into the internal conflicts of the province of Buenos Aires. Although he had been authorized by that Constituent Congress “to use all methods which his prudence and unblemished patriotism may counsel to end the civil war in the Province of Buenos Aires and obtain the free acceptance of this Province of the National Pact of the 31st of May 1852 [Acuerdo de San Nicolás],”³² he did not send a mediating commission to Buenos Aires until late February.

This mediating commission under the Confederation’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Luis José de la Peña, did achieve a temporary armistice between Lagos and the city. The resultant Treaty of March 9, however, was strongly opposed by Lagos since it could hardly be expected to curb porteño aspirations and it provided few guarantees for the besiegers. The authority and position of the government brought to power by the September Revolution remained unchanged. Only half the legislature was to be renewed and in turn to elect a new governor. Military forces were to be demobilized, while ranks held prior to December 1 were to be respected. But nowhere in the treaty were there any definite provisions to safeguard those who had participated in the December counterrevolt. The relation of Buenos Aires to the provisional national government was even less satisfactory, for the Acuerdo de San Nicolás was drastically amended. Representation in the Constituent Congress would be allotted according to population and Buenos Aires could send as many as ten deputies instead of the two called for by the Acuerdo. Urquiza’s powers were limited to authority to handle matters of foreign affairs.

Urquiza exploded at the news of this treaty: “I do not believe it, it cannot be. I would sooner lose my left hand than ratify a Treaty which would betray my friends.”³³ In late March Urquiza, accompanied by 1,500 troops, arrived at San José de Flores, Lagos’ headquarters just north of the city of Buenos Aires, ready to press the negotiations personally or, failing that, to enter the campaign on the side of Lagos. Negotiations dragged on for several weeks, and finally in mid-April the Buenos Aires government denounced the existing armistice.

Urquiza’s entry into the civil war in Buenos Aires caused some dismay both in the city and outside. While the besiegers were glad to receive military and above all financial aid, they were not overjoyed to have the other provinces of the Confederation or the personality of Urquiza interjected into the conflict. In the estuary of the Río de la Plata, the Confederation flotilla under the command of John Halsted Coe, a Yankee adventurer and a river captain during the Rosas regime, established a formal blockade of the port and sharply reduced the overseas and coasting trade of the city.³⁴ On May 1 the United States chargé, John Pendleton, reported:

The financial strength of each side now became the determining factor of success. Expenses for the defense of the city averaged between four and five million paper pesos per month.³⁶ The legislature authorized, and the provincial bank issued, nearly fifty million paper pesos between March and July, 1853.³⁷ Commerce and business continued to accept the paper money although it lost about one-third of its value during this period. The important fact was that the government of Buenos Aires was able to obtain such a forced loan from the public without causing a major economic upset. Financial aid from the Confederation only slightly improved Lagos’ desperate situation. The Constituent Congress in Santa Fé had authorized a loan of 500,000 silver pesos (equivalent to ten million paper pesos); yet it was only with the greatest difficulty and at an exorbitant interest of 16 per cent that the sum of 225,000 pesos was finally borrowed in Montevideo. Coe’s forces, meanwhile, went unpaid and often were on short rations. The situation on land was little better. The funds from the sale of confiscated hides provided only a trickle of gold and silver coin. Worthless paper promissory notes, occasionally printed but often only crudely sketched, began to make their appearance around the province of Buenos Aires; but this money had none of the acceptability of the paper pesos of the provincial bank.

On the basis of superior finances, porteño gold now began to make its appearance among the besiegers. The most dramatic blow fell on June 20 with the defection of Coe and his officers to the city in return for the payment of their back salaries and a handsome cash reward.³⁸ The chameleon-like loyalties of the rural caudillos were just as susceptible to bribery. In early June José María Flores suddenly returned from Montevideo, landed in the northern part of the province of Buenos Aires, and announced his support for the porteño government.³⁹ The great popularity of this caudillo in the northern districts encouraged a steady drain of deserters from the Lagos camp. The gaucho troops on whom Lagos relied were little disciplined for a long and fruitless siege. They tended to melt away from a cause which lacked excitement, drama, or the probability of enrichment. The tempo of desertions on an individual basis increased and was accentuated by the loss of entire units, such as that of Colonel Laureano Díaz at the end of June, and those of Generals Eugenio and Ramón Bustos in early July.⁴⁰ Urquiza’s subsequent report to Congress stated: “Meanwhile the army became rapidly demoralized as lack of confidence, disorder, and confusion grew by leaps and bounds, encouraged by some defections which were instigated and paid for by the porteño government; reaching such a point that on the evening of July 12, three aides of General Lagos himself deserted and took with them the mounts for the entire army.”⁴¹

A catalyst had been provided by the porteño gold, but the total collapse of discipline and confidence among the besiegers seemed to have been caused primarily by rumors which were spread by the Buenos Aires authorities.⁴² Urquiza and Lagos began to distrust their officers and men and saw gold glittering behind every movement of these forces. At the same time, the subordinate officers lost confidence in their leaders and expected to be betrayed.

The finale came with dramatic suddenness and was brought about with Machiavellian cleverness on the part of the porteño authorities. With mediation by the diplomatic representatives of France, England, and the United States, the Buenos Aires government concluded a draft treaty with the besieging forces on July 12. Hostilities were to be suspended, all troops were to be discharged, and the city would pay an indemnity of two million paper pesos to the besiegers. The officers in the Lagos army would retain their ranks, while Urquiza and his troops would be embarked on neutral warships in the harbor for their return trip to Entre Ríos. Pendleton’s report to Washington contained the outline of that climax:

In this state of affairs, Pendleton left immediately for Urquiza’s headquarters to inform him of the developments.

Thus ended the siege of Buenos Aires.

Urquiza’s victory at Caseros had brought to an end one type of porteño domination of the provinces. In the national role which had been thrust upon them, Urquiza and his followers attempted to define an organization in which the wealth and power of the porteño city would accrue to the nation and the province of Buenos Aires would assume an equal position alongside its sisters in an Argentine Confederation. The June debates, the September Revolution, the December counterrevolt, the Lagos-Urquiza debacle, demonstrated that this city was not willing to accept such a solution. The attitudes of porteño politicians and the personalities of caudillos cannot be discounted in reaching an understanding of this historical moment. The significance of the September Revolution, however, was far more than that of a military coup. The division between provinciano and porteño was a deep one. The wealth and predominance of the city of Buenos Aires was established and growing. Its economic self-interest had to be protected at all costs. Having removed Rosas, Urquiza found himself unable to remove the keystone of the Rosas regime. Likewise, although the moment for porteño domination of the nation had not arrived in 1852, it would inevitably come a decade later.

Author notes