Mexican Influence in Central America, 1821-1823

Posterity often fails to give adequate recognition to liberators who fail to be spectacular in their actions. Military rank or political power, or both, have served as usual prerequisites for the average liberator, whose subsequent fame has depended as much or more on a “good press” as upon his actual achievements.

One of the best proofs that can be offered to substantiate the need for a good press can be found in the history of Central America during the turbulence that preceded the final independence of that region from foreign rule. In the period from 1821 to 1823 two very remarkable captains-general were placed in charge of the onetime Captaincy-General of Guatemala. One was the last representative of Spanish control there, and the other was an appointed official of the Mexican Empire. Each in his turn brought independence to Central America. Captains-general, though, are not logical “liberator” material, and both received what might be considered a “bad press” after they had made their contributions to Central American independence. For if idealism and heroism (however selfishly motivated) enable public opinion to become panegyric in extolling the exploits of leaders responsible for much bloodshed, conversely it is difficult to expect intense journalistic or historical adulation for men who follow a course of least resistance, or act upon moral principles that reject the use of force where it is avoidable. At least such might be the most logical explanation for the relative slighting accorded Gabino Gaínza, Spain’s last captain-general of Guatemala, and Vicente Filísola, appointed captain-general of Guatemala by Iturbide shortly before he abdicated. Gaínza was responsible for Central America’s peaceful attainment of independence from Spain.¹ To Filísola Central America owed a carefully handled, equally peaceful liberation from Mexico.

When Central America declared herself independent from Spain on September 15, 1821, she left undecided the question of whether to remain independent or become a part of newly independent Mexico. She had achieved a provisional, and possibly only a temporary, state of independence. The main object had been to establish freedom from Spain. With the attainment of that goal, the future had been left to be decided by a more representative body than had been available in Guatemala City when independence was declared. This attitude was clearly shown by articles two and six of the Acta de la Independencia, which provided for the election of a congress representing all parts of Central America to meet in Guatemala City March 1, 1822, and decide the future of the country. Among the questions left for this congress to decide was the thorny one of whether to accept the Plan of Iguala and the Mexican control that was implicit in such an acceptance, or to choose a more independent course.² The interim government headed by Gabino Gaínza, the former acting captain-general and governor, was a purely provisional caretaking administration, designed to serve until the representative congress had made its decisions.

It was not long before the provisional government was faced with troubles that it had not anticipated. Guatemala, as the center of the colonial administration, had been the object of varying degrees of jealousy on the part of the provinces that had made up the old captaincy-general. This jealousy was not removed by the declaration of independence. If, earlier, jealousy had been an important factor in the separation of Chiapas from allegiance to the government centered in Guatemala City,³ it began to have a more disruptive effect after the declaration of independence. El Salvador experienced internal disturbances over the election of representatives to the March congress, but quieted down as the result of soothing diplomacy on the part of Guatemala.⁴ Honduras split into two factions, with the region around Comayagua adhering to the Plan of Iguala, and the Teguci-galpan and some smaller regions accepting the Guatemalan action of September 15.⁵ Nicaragua also divided her allegiance. Of the two main cities in the province, León and Granada, the former seceded from the provisional government early in October, and accepted the Plan of Iguala before the month was out. Granada remained loyal,⁶ and the difference in the attitudes of the two cities contributed to a rivalry between them that was to last for many years. Costa Rica adopted an attitude that was feasible only because of her relative isolation from the rest of the provinces. Although accepting neither the Guatemalan declaration of independence nor the Plan of Iguala, Costa Rica withdrew from the Spanish empire late in October, and refused to join the partisan activities common throughout the rest of the former Captaincy-General.⁷

Faced with separatist movements and irreconcilable ideas as to its future, Central America was rapidly losing political cohesion. To forestall the utter disintegration of regional unity, the provisional government advanced the scheduled meeting of the congress one month, to February 1, 1822.⁸ The move was one that would also make the decisions of the congress less subject to pressure from the proponents of the idea of union with Mexico, as the disorders probably strengthened the conservative arguments that security lay in accepting the Plan of Iguala. The sooner the congress met, the weaker would be the argument that Central America was unable to handle the problems of independence alone. Many considerations had taken on new meanings with the advent of Mexican and Central American independence from Spain. Mexico, as an independent country, might no longer have the technical claim to Central American allegiance that had existed when they were both colonies,⁹ but Mexico, larger and more populous, was better able to maintain her independence than was Central America. From the enthusiastic reports of the conservatives, it appeared that Mexico had established a sound, stable government, which contrasted most favorably with the relative weakness and uncertain future of the Central American government.

It was all too easy to compare the Mexican and Central American situations in such a way as to disparage the latter, and to bring genuine doubt as to the course she was pursuing. The future benefits to be gained by following an untried course of complete independence along republican lines were hard to evaluate in comparison to the benefits that could be expected from an early union with Mexico. Even the internal troubles besetting the old captaincy-general were ascribable to the moderate methods being used to choose her future— which might involve more regional autonomy. Since the weight of New Spain had been light in the past, there was no reason to believe that it would be heavier in the future. Moreover, the schismatic effects of the idea of joining Mexico had already curtailed or threatened the authority of Guatemala City in much of Central America, and it was doubtful whether some of the dissident regions could be persuaded to re-acknowledge Guatemala City’s political supremacy if Central America remained independent. Further secessions or defiance of the provisional government would go far toward eliminating what centralized authority and political unity was left. The only way to maintain the integrity of the former captaincy-general, and to keep Guatemala City as the capital, was by acting as promptly as possible, in accord with majority sentiment. The necessary inactivity that had existed under the provisional government was rapidly proving fatal to any hope that Central America could choose its own future freely, with a minimum of friction and pressure.

Iturbide, who was undoubtedly aware of some of the factors involved in the Central American situation, wrote Gaínza on October 1 suggesting the possibility of Central America’s joining the Mexican empire. At the time that he wrote he was unaware that independence had been declared in Guatemala City, but he probably knew about the recent events in Chiapas.¹⁰ After he had received Gaínza’s notification of Central American independence, which may have crossed his October 1 letter en route, he wrote again on October 19, renewing his invitation to Central America to join its destiny with Mexico’s.¹¹ These letters are perhaps the earliest documentary evidence, coming from the man himself, of Iturbide’s hope that Central America would be incorporated into the new Mexican state. Both letters point out the mutual benefits that would accrue from such a union, but exhibit no threats or tendency toward a forceful imperialism.

While letters were being exchanged between the two heads of state, journalists were stirring up the feelings of the people in the Central American capital. Pedro Molina, editorializing in El Genio de la Libertad, was eloquent in his defense of the republican theory of government.¹² His eloquence, however, served to injure the independence that he so earnestly desired. His writings helped to rouse feelings in Guatemala City to such a pitch that street fighting occurred between the liberals and the conservatives,¹³ and this in turn weakened further the prestige of the central government.

Late in October General Manuel Mier y Terán, who had been sent to investigate conditions in Chiapas and Guatemala, reported to the Mexican government that the sentiment in Guatemala was largely favorable to union with Mexico. He also said that plans for the future of Central America were very vague, and hazarded the opinion that a republican form of government would be contrary to the spirit of the country.¹⁴

The feeling in Mexico at this time is shown by a voluminous letter James S. Wilcocks wrote to United States Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, dated Mexico City, October 25, 1821.¹⁵ Although colored by an imperfect grasp of Spanish colonial politics and geography, Wilcocks seems to reflect the attitude of his associates —the literate classes¹⁶—when he writes:

Perhaps the most important reason for the belief in Mexico City that Central America was generally in favor of annexation to the empire can be found in the exertions of the Central American conservatives. Undoubtedly they did not wish to have their labors overlooked should their country be annexed to Mexico, and they did their best to attract attention to their efforts. The greatest indications of their activities were to be found in those regions that proclaimed the Plan of Iguala and adherence to the new Mexican state, such as Chiapas, Comayagua, and León. Where they were unable to achieve an outright declaration of annexation, as in Guatemala City, they continued nevertheless to promote the cause of union. In a letter from a Guatemalan conservative to the intendant of Chiapas, dated November 3, 1821, the author makes a laudatory allusion to Iturbide and states:

The biggest hindrance to the immediate fulfillment of the hopes which both Mexico and the Central American conservatives entertained was the refusal of Guatemalan authorities to declare for the union. Both the ayuntamiento of Guatemala City, whose example would have been an important one throughout the provinces, and the provisional government refused to regard themselves as empowered to take such a step.¹⁹

Such was the general situation in both countries on November 20, when Iturbide ordered a token force of 200 soldiers to enter Chiapas and take formal possession of that province.²⁰ Two weeks later Iturbide ordered the expedition, which had not yet started, to be increased to 500 men, and he further specified that men and officers alike should be the finest available.²¹ There were sound reasons for this increase, and for the emphasis placed upon the quality of the force. More men were not needed to take possession of Chiapas. Chiapas was so favorably disposed as to make any increase unnecessary, and could hardly support so large a force with ease.²² The purpose was to influence Central American opinion by a show of orderly, admirable troops.²³ This would tend to bolster those regions that had declared in favor of Mexico, and at the same time the demonstration could be taken as an indication of the order that Mexico could be counted upon to offer should Central America declare for the union.

Illness on the part of the officer originally designated to lead it delayed the start of the expedition, and finally, on December 27, 1821, Iturbide gave its command to Vicente Filísola.²⁴ Filísola’s instructions charged him with the task of:

Vicente Filísola, who was to play a major, if relatively unsung, role in Central American history, was a trusted friend of Iturbide’s. He had been born about 1789 in a small Neapolitan town in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, which was ruled at that time by a branch of the Spanish Bourbons. He had migrated to Spain in 1804, two years before the French took over his native land, and had entered the Spanish Army as an enlisted man. By 1810 he was a sublieutenant, and the succeeding year he came to New Spain, and received his captaincy in 1813. Serving against the Mexican revolutionists, his activities seem to have been unusual for the mercy that he showed in victory (especially if compared to Iturbide’s severity of action in the same fighting), and his high sense of duty. By 1815 he was a personal friend of Iturbide’s, a fact which may have contributed to his prompt acceptance of the Plan of Iguala after its proclamation. This action, and his subsequent military operations against the royalists, gained him a full Mexican colonel’s commission in 1821, the rank that he held when he was given charge of the Guatemalan expedition. Other events which had served to give Filísola prominence were his participation in the negotiations that led to the Treaty of Córdoba, and his being the first insurgent leader to enter Mexico City after its surrender to the revolution.

Soon after Filísola’s appointment to lead the army that was to occupy Central America, Iturbide raised him to the rank of a brigadier general and gave him a military decoration,²⁶ ostensibly in reward for past services but also, undoubtedly with the idea of dignifying Filísola and his mission as much as possible.

While Iturbide was arranging the expedition eventually headed by Filísola and enjoying himself as Mexico’s Liberator, Gaínza was trying to cope with increasing unrest in Central America. On November 30, 1821, he sent a circular to all the local authorities in Central America explaining the condition in which the government found the country, and informing them, by means of an attached copy, of Iturbide’s invitation to unite with Mexico.²⁷ The circular itself stated that the public declarations of adherence to Mexico made by Comayagua, León, Chiapas, and Quezaltenango had weakened the country seriously. The decisiveness of these actions had threatened the area’s unity, and seemed to preclude the possibility of having a genuinely representative congress in February that would have any choice in its actions. Gaínza pointed out with some bitterness that annexation to Mexico would be the only way to preserve unity; there seemed to be no choice left. Consequently, Gaínza asked that the situation be fully discussed in cabildos abiertos, and that he be advised of the desire of each locality by the end of December. The purpose of this request was, he explained, that Iturbide’s suggestion of union with Mexico might be answered according to the will of the people.

Although the circular was biased in favor of annexation, it could hardly have been otherwise without misrepresenting matters. Central America was weaker and smaller than Mexico, and seriously divided. It was in no condition to withstand a forcible Mexican annexation. If independence was the desire of the people, the immediate expression of such a desire, as a moral force, would be the best defense available.

Public opinion was examined by the provisional government at its meeting of January 5, 1822.²⁸ Of the replies requested by Gaínza that had arrived, one hundred and four ayuntamientos had voted for union with Mexico, with various reservations; thirty-two were willing to leave the decision to the government in Guatemala City; twenty-one wanted the anticipated February congress to decide, and two were against the idea of union. Popular sentiment for annexation was so overwhelming that it was extremely improbable that the seventy-seven replies not yet received would alter it, and they could not alter it if the provisional government exercised the authority offered it in favor of union with Mexico.²⁹

The attitude of the provinces paralleled the stand taken by Guatemala City herself. Various meetings throughout the city during the month of December had shown her citizens to be strongly pro-union in feeling. As the general trend of the replies from the provinces became evident, the city’s ayuntamiento reversed its earlier stand. Although it had previously claimed that it did not have the authority to do so, it declared Guatemala City united to the Mexican empire on December 29, without waiting for the official tabulation of the regional replies requested by Gaínza and the provisional government.³⁰

Also on December 29, Gaínza wrote Iturbide a long letter on the topic of the probable union of the two countries. In it he pointed out the instability of public opinion, and the need for any process of annexation to be as constitutionally binding as possible in order to be lasting. In addition, he stressed the desirability of achieving a union that would affect Central America as a whole, rather than the piecemeal annexation of only the favorably-disposed regions. Pending the opportunity to achieve such unanimity, he requested Iturbide to delay sending any troops to Central America, in order to prevent the expected declaration of self-annexation from being attributed to force, and to make it morally and legally stronger because of the absence of coercion.³¹

With the advent of the new year the pressure for annexation placed upon Gaínza and the provisional government became too strong to be withstood. Gaínza was the first to acknowledge the situation, and at the sessions of the provisional government held from January 2 to 5 he openly joined the advocates of union.³² It is difficult to see how he could have done otherwise and acted in the best interests of the country as a whole. Large sections of the country had either pledged allegiance to Mexico, as Chiapas had, or were ignoring the government in Guatemala City and were on the verge of secession, as in the case of Costa Rica. Attempts to reassert authority over those regions might be futile, might lead to conflict with Mexico, or might initiate a series of endless petty wars and increased hard feelings. Unity could be regained only by annexation to Mexico, a measure that had proved itself to be more popular than any other course of action. If union with Mexico was inevitable, as it seemed to be, the sooner it occurred the better it would be for Central America.

In accordance with this attitude, because of a miscalculation, and also to gain credit with the Mexican government and its representatives, Gaínza wrote Filísola on January 3, 1822, acknowledging the supremacy of Mexico before the provisional government had actually arrived at that decision.³³ Gaínza’s miscalculation was the primary cause of the letter: when he had written on December 29 requesting a delay in any entry of Mexican troops into Central America, he had asked that the delay should last until Iturbide received a letter that he would write on January 3. He had figured, incorrectly, that the weight of public feeling in favor of annexation would result in official action almost as soon as the government met on January 2. Evidently he felt that he could not defer mailing the promised letter past the promised date. He had anticipated his government’s decision, as things turned out, but not the amount of time necessary to reach the decision. Although it cannot be denied that selfish motives caused the haste with which Gaínza voluntarily accepted Mexican supremacy, it is difficult to see what significant change would have resulted if his actions had been less open to criticism. The outcome would have been the same, with more opportunity for the festering sores of particularism to spread. As it was, the impersonal weight of Mexican sovereignty, applied as soon as possible, provided a needed cheek for the forces that would, at a later date, tear Central America apart.

Whatever questionable activities may have preceded it, the formal decision made in the Acta de la Unión of January 5, 1822, reflected the opinion of the majority of the Central Americans. The Acta reviewed the expressed sentiment of the people, and made submission to the Mexican government as far as the authority of the provisional government was concerned.³⁴ This acceptance of limitations on its authority was an implicit recognition of the defections.

Gaínza showed genuine political astuteness following the declaration of union with Mexico. Having tried to obtain as much credit as he could with Iturbide through his letters and personal activities, he wrote the Mexican leader again, but this time not so much to gain credit as to avoid blame. Recognizing that the government he had been heading was more liberally-oriented than Iturbide’s, he respectfully disavowed any personal participation in the system of representative government that had been tentatively set up in Central America. Having thus cleared himself as far as possible from the politically dangerous implications of being regarded as too liberal, he recommended the retention of Central America’s governmental organization as being adapted to the geography of the country and the needs of the people.³⁵ Obviously the act of a “trimmer,” it was also statesmanlike in that his obsequiousness did not prevent Gaínza from showing a penetrating concern for Central America and its troubles. Understanding the divisive forces that threatened the country, he recognized the need for an adequate representational form of government if its basic unity was to be preserved.

While the provisional government in Guatemala City was awaiting formal absorption into the Mexican empire, Brigadier Don Vicente Filísola was readying his command, the Auxiliary Division of Guatemala, at Oaxaca. A letter that he wrote to Iturbide, dated January 18, 1822, reflects an optimistic outlook that was probably shared by the Mexican leaders of the time. Written at Oaxaca, it said in part:

Filísola himself states that by this time he had received news of the adherence to Mexico of all the Central American provinces, and that only the city of San Salvador and the region around it were against annexation.³⁷ Actually, Filísola was only beginning to encounter the difficulties that had beset Gaínza since September, as San Salvador was not the only region in which there was political trouble brewing. Various parts of the old captaincy-general saw in their new status under Mexico an opportunity to escape immediate Guatemalan control, and attempted to make their governments answerable only to Mexico. Had Filísola not been possessed of a fair degree of political adroitness, he might have been made a tool to implement these plans. An instance of these machinations can be found in a series of letters he exchanged with Gaínza and the ayuntamiento of Quezaltenango in late January and early February, 1822. Filísola was then in Chiapas, and his assistance against Guatemalan authority was urgently requested by Quezaltenango. At the same time, his aid was requested by Gaínza to help suppress Quezaltenango’s revolt against Guatemala. The general met this situation by writing Gaínza to suspend operations against the rebellious town, saying that he, Filísola, would restore order there. At the same time he wrote the ayuntamiento of Quezaltenango that he would come there with his 300 men by double marches, not to aid them in their separatist ambitions, but to restore peace and union with Guatemala, in conformity with his instructions.³⁸ In the same manner he tried to prevent the breach from widening between Guatemala City and some of the other rebellious regions which had owed that city allegiance, and tried to discourage the growth of additional schismatic local ambitions.

Because Filísola had not been aware of all the sectionalism and jealousies that suddenly confronted him in the former captaincy-general, he was at first inclined to distrust Gaínza. As the representative of Mexico, Filísola received the complaints of all those who were disaffected with the provisional government or the provisional governor. The charges that he heard against Gaínza were numerous and serious. As a result, he regarded Gaínza as insincere in his loyalty to Mexico, and reasoned that the disorders he found in Central America were probably due to the general incapacity of the provisional governor.³⁹ It is an interesting commentary on Gaínza that Filísola’s opinion of him changed after he had ascertained the truth, or lack of truth, behind these complaints. Filísola reported his opinion of Gaínza to Mexico, and backed it up by his refusal to use the authority that he had to remove Gaínza from office if he saw fit.⁴⁰

Soon after the Mexican general had, in effect, curbed the ambitions of Quezaltenango, Iturbide personally intervened in the political affiliations of the Central American provinces. By his intervention, “the provinces of Honduras and León de Nicaragua [sic] … were added for the time being to the captaincy-general of Puebla, for having been among the first of that kingdom [Guatemala] to join the empire.”⁴¹ Since Iturbide’s eventual plans for the political administration of Guatemala are not clear, it would be unwise to blame him for a poor knowledge of geography; rather it would seem that he wished to place these dissident regions temporarily under the control of a Mexican political unit close to his own central administration. Their final disposition was a matter left for future decision, after an evaluation of the situation. Iturbide justified his action by explaining that these provinces objected to Guatemala’s continued preeminence in Central America, and had refused to take orders from Guatemala City.⁴² On the same day that Iturbide issued this decree, February 16, 1822, the Council of Regency of the Mexican empire sent a general order to Gaínza and to all jefes of provinces under Guatemalan authority, enjoining them to observe the peace and to work harmoniously together.⁴³

Both orders, the one separating Honduras and León from the authority of Guatemala City, and the one telling most of the important leaders in Central America to squabble less and work together more, stemmed from Iturbide, as their authorizations show. But it is difficult to realize that they were both products of the same mind, and were promulgated at the same time. The effects of the two orders were mutually opposed to each other. If the one which ordered a cessation of internal conflict was designed to abate the disorders and disobedience that had plagued Central America, it was also designed to promote unity there, presumably under Guatemala City. Its purpose was laudable, but it cannot be regarded as basically compatible with the other, which rewarded Honduras and León for their anti-Guatemalan, pro-Mexican attitude by giving them much of what they wanted: freedom from Guatemalan control. Also gained by the two regions was a greater degree of autonomy that came with political control by a non-adjacent authority one thousand miles away, with no direct communications tying the regions together. Obviously this measure weakened Guatemalan prestige, and tended to lessen any control the old capital might have retained over Costa Rica, which was isolated from Guatemala City by regions no longer owing any allegiance to their former capital.

A later change showed that regardless of the intentions behind it, the system created by these orders was impracticable. In the political reorganization of Central America effected ten months later, in December, the imperial government re-divided Central America into three new administrative districts. Again Iturbide was the instigator of the change. The immediate cause, according to the Mexican government, was increased particularism. Quezaltenango was still complaining against being under Guatemala City, and Comayagua was by then objecting to its new local capital, León de Nicaragua.⁴⁴ The result of these protests was the establishment of three “commandancies-general,” with capitals at Ciudad Real de Chiapas, Guatemala City, and León de Nicaragua.⁴⁵ It was a more realistic appraisal of the political needs of the Central American provinces, but it seems to have had very little actual application because of Iturbide’s abdication a few months later. Both attempts by Mexico to accommodate a certain amount of the regionalism found in Central America failed to take into account the traditional pattern of government there. Seemingly, both were based more upon immediate rather than long-range considerations. Both gave added life to the divisive forces that afflicted Central America. In retrospect it is easy to see that a political reorganization that retained Guatemala City as the capital of Central America, and also conceded specified degrees of autonomy to the provinces, might have had far-reaching results.

Neither Gaínza nor Filísola was pleased by the February change that had placed part of Central America under the captaincy-general of Puebla. Gaínza saw in the move an unexpected decrease in Guatemalan authority, and Filísola, although discreet in condemning the action, showed his dislike of it in a long letter written to Gaínza in March. He disclaimed any responsibility for it, but indicated his intentions as a loyal soldier to abide by any Mexican instructions, however questionable, and advised Gaínza to do the same. In conformity with his orders, he repeated his previous admonition that Gaínza should avoid any hostile actions, and use tact to reconcile divergent interests.⁴⁶

At the end of April Filísola marched his men from Ciudad Real de Chiapas to Quezaltenango, completing the journey of about 300 miles by May 15.⁴⁷ The rapidity of the march is proof that the expedition had been well organized and was orderly, and by its very nature strongly refutes any charges of misconduct. Such speed allowed insufficient opportunity for the drunkenness or terroristic activities attributed to the expedition by some sources.⁴⁸ Filísola’s orders and personal reputation would also make such disorderly conduct highly improbable.

While Filísola was in Quezaltenango, Iturbide became Agustín I of Mexico.⁴⁹ The event had no significant effect on Mexico’s Central American policies, which had been largely Iturbide’s since their inception. As a friend and comrade-in-arms of the emperor, however, Filísola’s prestige was greater than before, a circumstance that tended to increase the respect that he was accorded by his associates,⁵⁰ and presumably by Central American officials. Shortly before the formal coronation, Iturbide showed his confidence in Filísola by ordering the general to assume control of Central America in place of Gaínza, who was summoned to Mexico City, where “the nation needed his services.”⁵¹ As suddenly as he had arrived, Gaínza departed from Central America. He had presided over a colony’s peaceful transition into the community of free nations, with the recognized right to stay free or to merge her future with Mexico’s. He helped her to choose the latter. Whatever his motives, he had served Central America well in the brief period (March, 1821-June, 1822) of his power.

On June 23, 1822, Filísola became the political and military head of “the Provinces of Guatemala.”⁵² He had arrived in the capital ten days before in response to an invitation sent him by the ayuntamiento of Guatemala City.⁵³ With commendable political insight, he recognized the value of arriving in the capital at its own request, rather than simply marching in to take possession.

Meanwhile, relations between Guatemala and El Salvador had deteriorated. Almost half of the ayuntamientos of El Salvador had voted to defer a decision on the future of Central America until the meeting of the congress in February. The action of the provisional government in declaring Central America annexed to Mexico had been protested by them, and their protests had been followed by refusals to obey the central government.⁵⁴ Bloodshed could have been avoided, as the Gaínza-Filísola policy had been one of caution and conciliation, but the disobedient districts were anything but cautious in their actions. A rebel junta in El Salvador attempted to take over by force the parts of that province loyal to Guatemala City, and Guatemala naturally felt obliged to help the loyal districts. By the time that Filísola had taken over as the chief executive of Central America, intermittent warfare was in progress between Salvadorean and Guatemalan forces.⁵⁵

Although at war with the provisional government in Guatemala City, the rebellious junta in El Salvador had maintained, in letters, an attitude of near-submission to Filísola and Mexico. The general was therefore reluctant to employ force in subjugating El Salvador, and tried, in an exchange of letters, to effect a reconciliation.⁵⁶ The effort failed. On orders from Iturbide, who had grown impatient with his lack of progress, Filísola finally had recourse to force, taking the field in the winter of 1822.⁵⁷ El Salvador attempted to stave off defeat by the expedient of declaring herself annexed to the United States,⁵⁸ but Filísola paid scant heed to such an unusual defense.⁵⁹ The leadership of Filísola and the discipline of his troops made the campaign a short one, although the Salvadoreans had equal numbers and equipment. Military operations began officially in November, and El Salvador was subjugated by the end of the following February.⁶⁰

El Salvador, however, was not the only part of Central America that wanted independence, although her pugnacity and closeness to Guatemala City had made her the most overtly troublesome. Because of the conciliatory methods employed by Filísola, peace and orderliness characterized much of his Central American activities, and where possible he tried to extend Mexican authority by diplomacy rather than force. But Chiapas, León de Nicaragua, and other regions which had submitted to Mexican authority to avoid Guatemalan control found themselves in an anomalous position which was impossible to maintain. Filísola, by his original mandate, was the Mexican representative in Central America, and had an ill-defined politico-military authority over the entire country. His assumption of the position of captain-general in Guatemala seemed in effect to place both the city and province of that name in their original position of predominance. This was also an unwelcome situation to any parts of Central America that still cherished desires of escaping the centralized control of Guatemala City.

Mexican cognizance of the general attitude throughout the annexed territory is shown in an order dated November 4, 1822.⁶¹ This re-divided the country into three commandancies-general for administrative purposes: Chiapas, including the Mexican province of Tabasco and parts of Guatemala which objected to control from Guatemala City, such as Quezaltenango, with Ciudad Real de Chiapas as its capital; Sacatepéquez, which included the southeastern half of present-day Guatemala, El Salvador, and the western third of Honduras, with Guatemala City as its capital; and Costa Rica, which included the modern states of Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and most of Honduras, with its capital at León de Nicaragua. Presumably León de Nicaragua owed this honor to its early pro-Mexican attitude.

Filísola showed his appreciation of the sectionalism of Central America by the manner in which he publicized the order, and the way in which he conducted his campaign to reduce the republican elements in El Salvador. Although the order had probably arrived from Mexico at about the end of November,⁶² he did not publish it until January 9, 1823.⁶³ This delay gave him ample time to evaluate the probable affect that it would have on the regions entrusted either directly or indirectly to his care, and it is an example of the way that he used the discretionary powers he possessed. There was need for thought on the subject rather than hasty action. Costa Rica and the Granada-dominated part of Honduras had not defied Mexico as openly as El Salvador had, but had withdrawn their allegiance from Guatemala City.⁶⁴ The designation of León de Nicaragua, already at odds with Granada, as the capital of that district, would undoubtedly offset much of the satisfaction there at attaining acknowledged freedom from Guatemala City. The timing of the issuance of the order must have concerned Filísola, although no record of his having discussed the matter is presently available.⁶⁵

To add to the problems that Filísola faced, he received word during the course of his campaign that the movement which was to unseat Iturbide was under way in Mexico.⁶⁶ For this reason he disobeyed orders and did not invade the non-submissive regions around Granada and Costa Rica, as he had been instructed to do, and returned from El Salvador to Guatemala City early in March.⁶⁷

The situation was a peculiar one for the Mexican general. His adherence to the Plan of Iguala seems to have been sincere, and the substitution of Iturbide for the desired Bourbon emperor had been acceptable to him, owing to his friendship for Iturbide, and because it was a fait accompli. But with the removal of the emperor, the Plan of Iguala was being rejected, at least in part.⁶⁸ Mexico was showing herself to be as politically unstable and capricious as Central America had been, and a basic part of the Plan seemed most unlikely of fulfillment. It is possible, although not probable, that his awareness of the growing instability of the Mexican government influenced his Salvadorean campaign, which was so humanely conducted as to elicit appreciative comment from at least one of his defeated opponents.⁶⁹ As both a professional soldier and politician, though, his humanity probably had a more sound origin. He must have seen that in the civil war in which he was engaged there was nothing to be gained by military excesses that could not be achieved better by firmness and mercy.

On March 10, 1823, Filísola wrote letters to Generals Eehávarri and Bravo, leaders in the revolt that was to overthrow Iturbide.⁷⁰ In reply to their request that he join the movement, he pointed out that such an action on his part would serve no good purpose either in Mexico or Central America, and might easily precipitate in the latter region the civil war that he feared would take place in Mexico. He added that his first allegiance was to Mexico, but that he also owed a certain duty to the provinces entrusted to his care. Two days later he issued a manifesto to the “pueblos de Guatemala” stressing the function of the army under his command as a guardian of the peace and the rights of society to establish its own law and government.⁷¹ The day after he had made this proclamation, he sent advice as to its contents and his position to the authorities in Chiapas, Nicaragua, and Comayagua,⁷² an action which implied that he had only a limited control over those regions at that time.

It was not until two weeks after his return to Guatemala City that Filísola sent his first official report from there to Mexico City. In a dispatch dated March 20, 1823, he informed the secretary of state that the province of El Salvador was pacified, that the “general system of the continent was made uniform,” and that he had reassumed complete control of Guatemala from the colonel to whom he had partially delegated authority in his absence. In addition, the general stated in a rather deliberately off-hand manner “y continúo sin novedad particular en ningún pueblo de los del territorio de mi mando …”⁷³ This was as discreet a wording as possible under the circumstances. It made clear that Guatemala, and probably most of the rest of Central America, were loyal to the imperial government, but by its delay and laconic quality, it did so in a way that would not injure its author should Iturbide have fallen by the time of its arrival. If Iturbide was still in power, it would serve the same purpose.

By the middle of March it was becoming increasingly evident even as far away as Central America that the Mexican empire of Iturbide was crumbling. Matters in Mexico progressed more slowly than they might have, as delay strengthened the revolt and weakened Iturbide’s position.⁷⁴ Consequently, although Iturbide did not abdicate until March 19, 1823, the success of the revolt seemed apparent by the beginning of that month. Filísola naturally received no advance word that the government was going to be overturned, but the information that he had on the state of affairs in Mexico could not have been reassuring. That such was the ease was shown by his decree of March 29, addressed to all the inhabitants of the old captaincy-general of Guatemala, calling for an assembly to decide the governmental organization of the regions entrusted to his care.⁷⁵

This act served several purposes. It gratified a local demand for a representative assembly,⁷⁶ and in so doing it minimized the possibility of Central American resentment crystallizing against Filísola as it had in Mexico against Iturbide. As a political measure, it was one that could be justified later to the Mexican government, whether it was a resurgent imperial administration or a republican junta. In addition, it temporarily ended most of the petty warfare that still existed in Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica,⁷⁷ by giving those regions grounds to hope for a peaceful solution to their problems and wishes.

Filísola explained his call for a congress to his Mexican troops in another proclamation published the same day. In it he said that their fellow soldiers in Mexico had risen against the imperial government and demanded a congress. He stated that the request for a congress was justified, and that the provinces of Central America were equal to and had the same rights as the Mexican provinces. It was only right, therefore, that Central America be allowed to have its congress, so that its members could decide whether or not they wanted to continue united to Mexico. He stressed the fact that he was not separating Mexico and Central America, but:

Showing that he was ready for separatist action in the congress, the proclamation closed with the statement that if Central America decided to separate from Mexico, his soldiers would live up to the high ideals of the Mexican army, and maintain standards of demeanor and conduct that would be irreproachable.

The wording of both of these documents was on such a plane as to inspire confidence in their author and his willingness to accept the decision of the congress. Filísola was exercising his authority in a manner that Iturbide had certainly not expected, but his actions and his attitude reflected nothing but credit on himself and the governments that he represented. Having carried out Iturbide’s orders in as reasonable and humane a way as possible, he was initiating a broad-minded policy that was anticipating the actions of the constituent congress of Mexico. Although the news could not have reached him, at the time that he issued the two proclamations Iturbide had already been dethroned, and Filísola actually represented the interim constituent congress of Mexico.

On April 1 the question of how the Central American provinces were to be treated was raised in the new Mexican Congress.⁷⁹ Although a motion to instruct Filísola to call a congress in Guatemala was not passed, he was ordered to cease any hostilities caused by resistance to Mexican absorption. The same orders were also sent to other pro-Mexican authorities throughout Central America.⁸⁰

On April 1, Filísola wrote the Mexican government explaining his course of conduct,⁸¹ following the first letter with a second one eight days later, in which he pointed out the possible eventualities that might emerge from the existing Mexican-Guatemalan-Central American circumstances.⁸² He underlined the inherent right of the Central Americans to choose their own destiny:

His position of liberalism, coming from a soldier, showed a greater humanity and understanding of the situation than might well have been expected. He was, in effect, returning the provinces of Central America to the status they had enjoyed after their declaration of independence from Spain on September 15, 1821.⁸⁴ He was not only allowing them to decide their future, but he was also acting as their guardian until they had made their decision. In addition to this he was arguing their right of self-determination to his own government, at a time when he might conceivably have been able to maintain the union with Mexico, and gain fresh laurels in his homeland by doing so.

Filísola had, by calling for a Central American congress, inaugurated a course of action that Mexico was slow to ratify. Yet the initiative shown by the general was so commendable in its concept that his government could not invalidate his action without denying the justice of its own successful revolt against Iturbide’s arbitrary regime. The Plan of Iguala had been subverted to a degree when Iturbide had taken the place of the desired but unavailable Bourbon ruler. The idea of monarchy might have lost its appeal for the government in Mexico, but it was nonetheless a basic part of the Plan of Iguala that had made union with Mexico desirable in the eyes of many Central Americans, and the same Plan of Iguala had been one of the constitutional bases for the Act of Union of January 5, 1822.⁸⁵ The failure of Mexico to comply with the provisions of the Plan would technically justify Central American action to nullify the Act of Union. The constitutional revolt that had overthrown Iturbide added an emotional element. Belief in Mexican power and stability, shared by Mexicans and Central Americans alike, was severely shaken. Filísola’s course of action was one that could be calculated to restore Mexican prestige at home and abroad by its unselfishness. Its generosity was at once an expression of national pride and a notice to Central America and the world that Mexico was not despotic.

It may have been politically and psychologically necessary to accept Filísola’s course of action, but the definite decision to do so was not an easy one to make. Deliberations on the Central American question began on April 1 and were not concluded until June 14.⁸⁶ On June 18 instructions were sent to Filísola that sanctioned his plans “with respect to the union or separation of this [captaincy-general of Guatemala] state …”⁸⁷ In keeping with the desire to revive Mexican prestige, and possibly with the hope of maintaining the union, Filísola was told to preserve the greatest possible degree of friendship between the two countries.

While Mexico had been debating the Central American question, Filísola had been solving it. In the absence of any definitive instructions from his home government, he had scheduled the meeting of the Congress for June 1, 1823,⁸⁸ an obviously independent action. The date of the opening of the Congress was unavoidably postponed until June 24, however, because of the difficulty in organizing the assemblage, and the actual sessions did not begin until June 29.⁸⁹ It had not been an easy achievement for the general. He had offered to resign his position on May l,⁹⁰ an offer that was apparently rejected by the Mexican government.⁹¹ This rejection of his resignation was to some extent a vote of confidence in him, as his offer to resign was closely followed by a letter from one of his Mexican officers protesting that his actions in Guatemala were prejudicial to Mexican interests.⁹² Faced with the need for immediate action in the Central American situation, resistance among some of his officers, and a Mexican government which was slow in making decisions, Filísola made the decisions and took what action he deemed best under the circumstances. He called the Congress that was to determine Central America’s future, and he accepted its decision. Subsequent Mexican approval of his procedure was required for the regularization of his acts, but it probably did not arrive until after the Congress had declared the provinces of Guatemala free.⁹³

The Congress opened on June 29, 1823, with the representatives of Honduras, Nicaragua, Chiapas, and Costa Rica absent.⁹⁴ Prior to the official opening, Filísola had made a frank address to the delegates on his position in Central America. In his speech he outlined the major facets of the policy that he had pursued since his arrival, and told the assemblage that the decision concerning Central America’s future was theirs to make. He made no apologies for his past actions, but pointed out that there were possible benefits which would result from continued union with Mexico.⁹⁵ If he had hoped to halt the movement toward separation, of which he must have been aware, he was soon disappointed.

On the first day of the sessions an inflammatory opinion was presented to the Congress by a commission that had been studying the nature of the connection between Central America and Mexico.⁹⁶ It recommended the dissolution of the ties between Central America and her northern neighbor, and blamed Iturbide and Gaínza for the union. All the civil wars that had taken place since the declaration of independence on September 15, 1821, were ascribed to the evil ambitions of pro-Mexican, self-seeking men, who wished to gain personal power through voluntary vassalage to Iturbide. All the economic evils that had beset the country since the union with Mexico were blamed on the taxes levied by the empire, the paper money that it had issued, and the “troops of the line, consuming much, and producing nothing…,”⁹⁷ the last being an oblique thrust at Filísola. In conclusion, the commission made three recommendations:

1. That by act and by law, our forced and tyrannical union with Mexico be annulled.

2. That the united provinces of Central America are a nation free and independent, from which this Supreme Congress is now called [the] NATIONAL CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED PROVINCES WHICH IT REPRESENTS. [sic]

3. That these states will never unite themselves to others, except by federation or alliance.⁹⁸

The whole presentation of the pro-independent point of view was masterly. Had there been any real doubt whether the Congress would vote for independence or union, the patriotic appeal of the commission’s report would probably have been enough to swing the majority in favor of separation from Mexico. Two days later, on July 1, 1823, the Congress declared the independence of the provinces of Central America.⁹⁹ The Provincias Unidas del Centro de América had come into being.

Filísola’s work in Central America, however, was not yet finished. Although on July 4 he requested the new Central American government to relieve him of his military duties, as it was incompatible with his Mexican nationality to serve another independent country, he was asked to continue his services until he could be replaced.¹⁰⁰ It was a compliment to the general that the new regime felt a continued need for his assistance. In spite of the difficulties attendant upon organizing an entirely new administrative machine, the fire of patriotic enthusiasm would have demanded the dismissal of any foreigner, particularly a Mexican, whose intentions, capabilities, or integrity were suspected of being prejudicial to the interests of Central America.

As far as possible, Filísola tried to avoid personal involvement in the peculiar position in which he found himself. As the main representative of Mexico, and consequently the easiest target for irresponsible attacks, he could serve both countries best by keeping aloof from activities that might lead to criticism. He consequently turned over the command of the Mexican Army in Guatemala to one of his officers, but did not dare give up his overall control of peace and the public security.¹⁰¹

The problems that faced the National Constituent Assembly were slow in being resolved. The sessions that had started in June, 1823, did not end until January, 1825.¹⁰² The desire for unity was a result of tradition and the belief that to justify independence and to be strong enough to maintain it, the provinces should be united. Yet it was hard to reconcile the delegates to a strong central government. Proof of this can be seen in the Bases de la Constitución Federal, adopted in late December, 1823, which provided for the federated form of government ultimately adopted.¹⁰³ The constitution itself was not completed until almost a year later, and was accepted as the organic statute in November, 1824.¹⁰⁴

Filísola was not destined to stay in Central America long enough to see the new government take its final shape. As early as July 1, 1823, the Mexican government had approved a motion that he and the Mexican forces under his command return to Mexico, in view of the decision to abide by the action taken by the congress meeting in Guatemala.¹⁰⁵ At best it would show that Mexico was not using coercion to affect a continued union; at worst, it would show Mexico’s intention to be a good neighbor. The presence of Filísola and his Mexican troops had helped to provide a fairly peaceful atmosphere for the congress to meet in, but continued clashes between the Mexican forces and the citizens of Guatemala were not productive of good feeling,¹⁰⁶ and presumably both Filísola and the congress were anxious to end the danger of serious conflict as soon as possible. By July 14 the Central American government had been able to find a substitute for the most important of the positions that Filísola had occupied,¹⁰⁷ and Filísola made ready to leave. He addressed the Mexican troops the same day, telling them that their mission was finished.¹⁰⁸ Two days later the government in Guatemala published a decree that called for a public subscription of funds to expedite the departure of the Mexican forces.¹⁰⁹ Finally, on July 17, Filísola’s resignation of his remaining official positions was accepted.¹¹⁰

A last touch was necessary, however, before Filísola was to depart. A few days before his departure the National Assembly sent him a handsome testimonial in appreciation of his conduct in Central America.¹¹¹ Appreciation was also expressed to the Mexican government for its role in Filísola’s actions,¹¹² and the ayuntamiento of Guatemala City added its thanks to the general for the services which he had rendered to the cause of Central American liberty.¹¹³

On August 3 Filísola and his forces left Guatemala City for Mexico.¹¹⁴ One cause of dissension marred his departure. Many Mexican soldiers and officers, for various reasons, preferred to remain in Central America. This caused an interchange of communications between Filísola and the Central American government that was perhaps the most acrimonious phase of the relationship between him and that administration.¹¹⁵

From some of his dispatches it was adduced by a contemporary authority that Filísola felt Central America to be unprepared for independence, and unfit to govern itself.¹¹⁶ It should be noted, however, that subsequent events justified his pessimism, and that his personal opinion, as expressed to his home government, did not prevent him from cooperating as fully as possible in the launching of the new nation. The end of the Mexican occupation of Central America left that country a prey to the forces that were to destroy it. Conservatism opposed liberalism, and sectionalism opposed unity. Caudillismo threaded a colorful and erratic pattern through every other attitude. Together, the divisive and destructive strife caused by the various forces let loose by independence racked the United Provinces until they split into separate, independent countries. Whether the partial and temporary annexation to Mexico gave impetus to, or slowed the separatism that overtook the country, is a matter that can be debated. It would seem that Central America did not disintegrate immediately after independence largely because of Mexican efforts, although the final result was not what Mexico had expected. Mexico, as a republic, provided an enemy to the conservatives who had favored Iturbide. To the liberals, the memory of Mexican imperialism made that country suspect under any government. On this one uneasy point of agreement, the people of Central America were able to remain together long enough to found the short-lived nation known as the Provincias Unidas del Centro de América.¹¹⁷

Author notes