This sequel to Castello Branco: The Making of a Brazilian President (1978) is another tour de force in the John W. F. Dulles mold. Drawing upon varied resources, including the Humberto de Castello Branco papers, the Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporanea do Brasil, collections of private papers, personal interviews, the United States National Security files in the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, earlier biographies, and other secondary sources, Dulles provides an extremely detailed account of the career of Castello Branco from April of 1964 until his death in 1967.
Dulles scrupulously covers the criticism as well as the praise directed at the essential issues and developments of the Castello Branco administration, even though it is evident that the overall treatment provided is essentially sympathetic, even laudatory. The general thrust of the book, of course, is concerned with Castello Branco as a reformer. In developing that thesis, Dulles has mustered plentiful evidence to support his portrayal of Castello Branco as the reformer stereotype (such as his somewhat moralistic approach to public office accompanied by a fairly coherent collection of reforms).
It is in the area of results achieved that one must judge Castello Branco’s success or failure as a reformer. Whereas in some areas, such as economics, it is clear that Castello Branco and his economic ministers set the stage for the “Brazilian miracle,” in other realms, especially the political, one can seriously question Castello Branco’s success. As is generally known, Castello Branco attempted to maintain a legalistic posture of guarding certain constitutional principles and political rights, but he was constantly pressured by a group of younger officers called the “hardliners.” The “hardliners” favored radical, revolutionary policies designed to end the careers of a large number of political leaders of the Vargas generation and to restructure the political system in general. Through the use of military police investigations, the “hardliners” were able to force the removal of the political rights of many of those politicos, and through their influence upon the National Security Council (which served as a pivotal governmental agency for a period of time), these “hardliners” also succeeded in asserting themselves in many other areas since virtually everything (industrial development, nuclear energy, education, labor unions, etc.) could be labeled matters of national security. This forcefully suggests that the “hardliners” were essentially victorious in their struggle against Castello Branco and his legalistic goals. In short, while the reformist plans of Castello Branco are clear and undeniable, the assertion that “modern Brazil owes its direction and basic concepts to the Castello Branco administration” (see dust cover) seems overdrawn in view of the record.
Nonetheless, this work is rich in interesting sidelights and insights into the course of national affairs during the Castello Branco regime. As such, it is useful as a reference tool and constitutes essential reading for all who seek greater understanding of Brazilian history during a difficult transitional period.
