On November 15, 1889, a small group from the upper echelons of the army overthrew the Brazilian Empire, proclaimed the Republic, and assumed control of the national government. A few pro-Republic civilians, who hoped to utilize the military as a means of attaining their aims, supported the revolution and participated in the new regime, only to discover that they could not exercise decisive influence. Officers who distrusted and disdained civilian politicians dominated the new order. They substantially increased the numerical strength and the budgets of the armed forces, established control of national and state administrations, and severely restricted civil liberties, especially freedom of the press. For five years they maintained their commanding position.
On March 1, 1894, with much of the country under a state of siege, the southern part of the nation in the hands of insurgents, and the naval revolt still a factor, although nearing its end, a civilian was elected president. On November 15 he was inaugurated without incident, and by 1898 civilian control was reestablished. The armed forces continued to influence political decisions, but civilians ruled the nation until 1930.
This monograph seeks to explain why and how civilian politicians were able to regain command of the government by a peaceful transfer of power. Investigations of the role of the military, particularly in emerging nations, have focused on the behavior of the armed forces while they were in power or on the means by which they achieved their ascendancy. Little has been done on the process by which the civilian elements have been able to ease the military from direct political control. June E. Hahner’s case study is of interest, therefore, not only to students of Brazilian history but also to specialists in other areas and to the general public.
The key to her argument is the Paulista oligarchy. By the 1890s the state of São Paulo had emerged as the leading economic unit of the nation. The large landowners of the region wanted political and social stability as an environment for continuing economic growth, and this, they felt, could not be attained as long as the armed forces dominated the government. The tactic which they eventually evolved stemmed from the factionalism which developed among the military. Within each branch of the armed forces prestigious leaders commanded rival groupings of fellow officers, and these hostile factions struggled for dominance. To oust the group in power by supporting one of the rival factions, a policy advocated by a number of civilians, would result only in an exchange of masters, as the coffee planters realized. The Paulista approach was to support the group in control of the government against opposing military factions with the view to effecting an orderly transfer of power to civilians. The support which they could give was substantial. Under the federal regime inaugurated by the Republic a larger portion of state revenues remained at home, and states exercised a greater degree of autonomy than under the Empire. This enabled the oligarchy to expand the militia into an effective state army and provided funds which could be lent to the hard-pressed central government. The military and economic support of the coffee planters made it possible for them to exact concessions from the Floriano Peixoto regime which led eventually to the restoration of civilian rule.
The monograph is based on manuscript collections in the archives of Rio de Janerio, São Paulo, and Petrópolis and on a wide range of contemporary printed sources. Secondary materials are comprehensive and pertinent. Organization is effective; the style is lucid; and the ideas are coherent. The result is a readable, authoritative treatment of a crucial period in Brazilian history.
