

The Spanish American Hacienda: A Survey of Recent Research and Debate

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THE AGRARIAN SECTOR of contemporary Latin America is undergoing a process of conflict and radical change; the traditional system of large estates or haciendas is now disappearing in country after country. Paradoxically, only when fading out has the hacienda finally succeeded in attracting real interest on the part of historians. Until very recently, Mexico was the only country whose agrarian history had been explored at least to some degree. The explanation is, of course, that agrarian unrest played such an important role in the origin and development of the great Mexican Revolution.

Twenty years ago, two very influential studies appeared, both dealing with the origins of the large Mexican estate. I refer to *New Spain's Century of Depression* by Woodrow Borah¹ and *La formation des grands domaines au Mexique. Terre et société aux XVI^e-XVIII^e siècles* by François Chevalier.² Both suggested that the rise of the large landed estate coincided with a moment of pronounced demographic and economic depression stretching from the late sixteenth century through the seventeenth. As Borah put it, at the end of the seventeenth century the Mexican economy was already "organized on the basis of latifundia and debt peonage, the twin aspects of Mexican life which . . . helped provoke the Revolution of 1910-1917."³

Ever since the appearance of these pioneering studies, historians have tended to take it for granted that the formation of the hacienda

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1. Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1951.

2. Paris, 1952. Spanish edition, México, 1956. The English edition unfortunately lacks scholarly apparatus.

3. Borah, *Century of Depression*, p. 44.

4. According to Frédéric Mauro, *L'expansion européenne (1600-1870)* (2d

all over Spanish America took place during the seventeenth century.⁴ In fact, we do not know whether our knowledge about Mexico can be generalized to all Spanish America or, if so, to what degree. Indeed, there is scattered evidence suggesting that in some areas the "typical, colonial hacienda" may have appeared only after Independence. Chevalier himself suggests, for example, that the predominance of the hacienda in the southern sierra of Peru is largely a phenomenon of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.⁵ The interpretations of Borah and Chevalier have now been challenged on various points by recent students of Mexican history. A study of mining in seventeenth century Zacatecas, for example, seriously questions the causal relationship that they assumed between Indian population decline and mining depression. In this particular district, the principal mining area of New Spain at that time, production reached its climax at the very same moment, the early seventeenth century, when Indian population in Mexico sank to its lowest level.⁶

An increasing number of scholars from various countries are now becoming engaged in the history of the large estates of Latin America. The Economic History Commission of the Latin American Council for Social Sciences (CLACSO) devoted a special session at the International Congress of Americanists in Rome in September 1972 to "latifundios, haciendas, estancias y plantaciones." Most of the seventeen papers prepared for this session were preliminary results of research which is now in progress.⁷ Another symposium on "Landlord and Peasant in Latin America and the Carribean" was held at Cambridge University in December 1972. The papers dealt with the large estates of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Because of this rapidly increasing interest, I think it is worth while, though far from easy, to try to sum up the state of research on the history of the Spanish American hacienda. The situation has become already quite different from that of the fifties. It is my purpose to

ed., Paris, 1967), p. 173, the characteristics of the Mexican hacienda as described by Chevalier "se retrouvent dans l'ensemble de l'Amérique espagnole, à quelques détails près."

5. "Témoignages littéraires et disparités de croissance: l'expansion de la grande propriété dans le Haut-Perou au XX^e siècle," *Annales E. S. C.*, 21:4 (Paris, 1966), 815-831.

6. P. J. Bakewell, *Silver Mining and Society in Colonial Mexico. Zacatecas 1546-1700* (Cambridge, Eng., 1971). See also James Lockhart, "The Social History of Colonial Spanish America: Evolution and Potential," *Latin American Research Review*, 7:2 (1972), 16-17, 26-27.

7. The organizers intend to publish the papers in Mexico shortly. The proceedings of the first meeting of the Commission, in Lima in 1970, appeared in time to be distributed at the Rome meeting, as *La historia económica en América Latina* (2 vols., México, 1972).

present the various aspects of hacienda history which have been discussed to date, as well as to pinpoint some key problems and possible avenues of research. The emphasis will be on the origins and early development of the hacienda, which so far have received the most attention.

Defining the Concept

Before proceeding further we must take up the question of how to define the concept of the hacienda, if it is not to be used merely as synonymous with "large landed estate." According to a well-known definition of social anthropologists Eric Wolf and Sidney Mintz, an hacienda is a rural property under a dominating owner, worked with dependent labor, employing little capital, and producing for a small-scale market. Under such a system the factors of production would not only serve for the accumulation of capital but also to underwrite the social ambitions of the owner. On the other hand, plantations would address themselves to a large-scale market with the assistance of abundant capital. Consequently, in the latter case, the factors of production only serve for the accumulation of capital.⁸

Obviously the models described are only two extremes on a continuum, variations of the same phenomenon. At the Rome meeting participants agreed on the essential unity of the plantation-hacienda-estancia complex. It is also clear that there are types which differ a great deal from the two Wolf-Mintz prototypes. As Solomon Miller points out, a great number of corporative holdings in Peru share the characteristics of the "hacienda" prototype in their social organization, but the rest are very commercialized.⁹ If the problem of categorization is so difficult for the contemporary period, it must, of course, be even more complicated when dealing with the past. Obviously the need for capital would be much less in the case of a seventeenth-century plantation than it is for a modern one. Thus, the contrast between plantation and hacienda in those days would also be much less pronounced.¹⁰ Also, the same unit of production could easily pass from one category to another in the course of time.

Furthermore, the social prestige aspect of the hacienda stressed by Wolf-Mintz is sometimes absent, as in the case of the numerous

8. E. Wolf and S. Mintz, "Haciendas and Plantations in Middle America and the Antilles," *Social and Economic Studies*, 6 (Kingston, Jamaica, 1957), 380-412.

9. In his article in J. H. Steward (ed.), *Contemporary Change in Traditional Societies*, III (Urbana, Ill., 1967), 136 ff.

10. Plantations producing for a domestic market also constitute a transitional category. See the excellent monograph of Ward Barrett, *The Sugar Hacienda of the Marqueses del Valle* (Minneapolis, Minn., 1970).

ecclesiastical holdings. In a well-written paper on colonial haciendas of the Sabana of Bogotá, Juan A. Villamarín also argues that these strongly market-tied units failed to raise the social status of the owners to any appreciable degree.¹¹

It is evident that we must test our definitions against historical evidence before using them as analytical tools.¹² In this article I am going to deal mainly with the mixed livestock and grain-producing hacienda of the Mexican and Andean highlands and not so much with the estates specialized in the production of sugar or other "plantation" crops.

Encomienda and Hacienda

Until the 1940s, historians more or less took for granted that the hacienda was the derivation and continuation of the encomienda.¹³ Silvio Zavala and Lesley B. Simpson then showed, however, that as an institution the encomienda did not imply any rights to the lands of the Indians. In principle, the encomienda implied the concession of Indian tributes by the Crown in favor of certain individuals in exchange for specific obligations, nothing else.¹⁴ This legal and administrative distinction was rigorously upheld by the succeeding generation of historians. It is now being challenged, however, as being excessively institutional and, in some cases, at least, not consonant with socio-economic realities. In his excellent pioneering study of the evolution of landed property in the Valley of Puangue near Santiago de Chile, Mario Góngora, while admitting the juridical validity of the thesis of Zavala, shows that in this area there existed a "factual connection" between encomienda and hacienda. The encomenderos asked for and often received land grants close to the villages of their Indians.¹⁵ Also

11. Juan A. Villamarín, "Haciendas en la Sabana de Bogotá, Colombia, en la época colonial" (Mimeograph, Rome, 1972).

12. To define a "rancho" is also hard. See Bazant in *La historia económica*, II, 113. In his paper on "Colonial Haciendas in the Valley of Oaxaca," prepared for the Rome meeting, William B. Taylor defines "hacienda" precisely as a "rural estate with a mixed economy of ranching and agriculture, permanent buildings and a resident labor force." The smaller units, "ranchos" and "labores," were specialized in cattle breeding and grain production respectively, but the labor system of the latter resembled that of the hacienda, Taylor admits.

13. According to George McCutchen McBride, *The Land Systems of Mexico* (New York, 1923), p. 45, the encomienda system "within a brief period lost its original character and became simply a method of land tenure."

14. See especially Silvio Zavala, *De encomiendas y propiedad territorial en algunas regiones de la América española* (México, 1940) and L. B. Simpson, *Studies in the Administration of the Indians of New Spain* (Berkeley, 1934-1940).

15. Jean Borde and Mario Góngora, *Evolución de la propiedad rural en el Valle del Puangue*, I (Santiago de Chile, 1956), 29. Góngora is the author of the first part of the book. He has continued and broadened his discussion of the

Charles Gibson, in his remarkable study of the Valley of Mexico, found that the holding of an encomienda did in fact facilitate the acquisition of landed property.¹⁶ Even Zavala himself, in a study on Guatemala, noticed the tendency of some encomenderos to carve out haciendas within the limits of their encomiendas.¹⁷ However, the frequency with which this phenomenon occurred remains unknown.

In 1969, James Lockhart, in a very interesting and provocative article in this journal, observed that after all there were many more haciendas than there ever were encomiendas. He also pointed out that *haciendas ganaderas* were unlikely to have encomienda antecedents as, more often than not, they were founded in areas where Indians were sparse. He emphasized that a continuity that only expressed itself in the family links of the owners would be of very limited interest. Instead, Lockhart found a functional or phenomenological comparison much more rewarding. According to him, the labor systems used by encomenderos and hacendados were basically the same. The hereditary and aristocratic character of the master group is another common feature. Both encomenderos and hacendados divided their activities and residence between town and land. The two systems served in fact as a bridge between the urban and the rural sectors of early Spanish American society, Lockhart claimed.¹⁸ Robert G. Keith, continuing the discussion in a recent article, stresses certain discontinuities between the two institutions. As he puts it, the encomienda "required the survival of the indigenous population without radical change, [whereas]

relationship in his recent book, *Encomenderos y estancieros. Estudios acerca de la constitución social aristocrática de Chile después de la Conquista, 1580-1660* (Santiago, 1970). Referring to a scrutiny of 164 Chilean encomenderos in 1655, Góngora concludes: "la encomienda ha terminado por ser una forma de obtención de mano de obra rural. Los encomenderos de todo tipo, de viejas o nuevas familias, son terratenientes" (p. 107).

16. Charles Gibson, *The Aztecs under Spanish Rule. A History of the Indians of the Valley of Mexico, 1519-1810* (Stanford, Calif., 1964), p. 275.

17. *Contribución a la historia de las instituciones coloniales en Guatemala* (México, 1945), p. 56.

18. James Lockhart, "Encomienda and Hacienda: the Evolution of the Great Estate in the Spanish Indies," *HAHR*, 49:3 (August 1969), 411-429. Pablo Macera, in his interesting article "Feudalismo colonial americano: el caso de las haciendas peruanas," *Acta Historica*, 35 (Szeged, Hungary, 1971), 5-7, gives several examples of "superposición encomendero-hacendado" but also observes how often these two groups had family links with the corregidores. For another statement of hacendado-encomendero linkages see also Juan Friede, "Proceso de formación de la propiedad territorial en la América intertropical," *Jahrbuch für Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas*, 2 (Cologne, 1965), 75-87. G. M. Riley's Ph.D. dissertation on "The Estate of Fernando Cortés in the Cuernavaca Area of Mexico, 1522-1547," University of New Mexico, 1965, does show similarities to the later hacienda. Cortés's estate appears to have been unique at this time, however.

the development of the hacienda system required that this society be largely destroyed and its members transformed into an agricultural proletariat."¹⁹

Both interpretations inevitably suffer from the fact that the concepts of *encomienda* and *hacienda* cover an infinitely varied reality. Keith, it is true, tries to resolve this difficulty by making use of "ideal types" rather than "typical institutions." This is a device of very restricted usefulness, however. Lockhart and Keith have also been criticized for explaining essentially economic systems mainly in terms of their formal and institutional expressions.²⁰ Yet it should be kept in mind that they have raised the level of the scholarly discussion considerably by showing how incongruous it is to compare the legal structure of the *encomienda* with the socio-economic function of the *hacienda*.

Origins of the Hacienda Scrutinized

Basing themselves on Borah's and Chevalier's interpretations of the Mexican experience, historians have agreed that there must have been some relationship between the tremendous demographic decline of the late sixteenth and the early seventeenth centuries, on the one hand, and the rise of the large landed estate on the other. But when one looks more closely at the presentations of this process, considerable discrepancies appear. Nevertheless, for some reason, these differences have not been adequately discussed.²¹

Let us begin with Woodrow Borah, who considers population decline to be the main cause of economic crisis. Among the results of this crisis, Borah underscores the diminished importance of the Indians as suppliers of food to the urban population. Thus Spanish producers gained entry to, as Borah puts it, the "large expanding markets of the Spanish cities." He thinks that it is possible to discern a *rise in demand* for the products of the haciendas, reflected in both prices and wages.²² It must be added that the demographic evolution of the non-Indian population of the cities, on which Borah bases this interpretation, is much more hypothetical and less well documented than the decline of Indian population. Charles Gibson supports Borah's view, however,

19. Robert G. Keith, "Encomienda, Hacienda and Corregimiento in Spanish America: A Structural Analysis," *HAHR*, 51:3 (August 1971), 431-446.

20. According to Enrique Florescano, "nos llevan otra vez a explicar instituciones que tenían un sentido económico preciso, por sus expresiones formales é institucionales." *La historia económica*, II, 72.

21. After having written this I noticed that D. A. Brading makes the same observation in *La historia económica*, II, 101.

22. Borah, *Century of Depression*, pp. 24-25, 32-33.

showing that the hacendados of the Valley of Mexico did replace the Indians as suppliers of not only wheat but also maize for the market of Mexico City.²³ Relying on Borah, André Gunder Frank in his unorthodox Marxist interpretation of Latin American economic history also claims that the growth of the hacienda in the seventeenth century, as always, was "due to the increase of demand for and price of agricultural products."²⁴

On the other side we have François Chevalier, who fixes his attention on the "demonetizing" impact of the crisis in mining, caused in turn by the decline in Indian population. Contrary to Borah, the French historian observes that apart from some years of acute shortage Mexican food prices during the seventeenth century were stable or even tended *to fall*. Thus, conditions favored the rise of self-sufficient economic units, that is, haciendas. It is obvious that Chevalier often has in mind the process of formation of large estates in Western Europe during the early Middle Ages.²⁵ Eric Wolf in his excellent synthesis, *Sons of the Shaking Earth*, also claims a drop in demand. "A glut quickly lowered the prices to the point where commercial agriculture met its ruin," he says. "Thus the hacienda played safe by always producing below capacity."²⁶

The disagreement of the authors mentioned with respect to the trend and impact of prices could not be more striking. As a matter of fact, none of them had at his disposal more than scattered data on prices to support his views. Consequently, only a future investigation of prices in Mexico during the seventeenth century will make it possible to judge which of the opposing ideas is more justified.

The pioneering study of Enrique Florescano on Mexican maize prices is restricted to the period from 1708 to 1810. Following the example of French historians, Florescano tries to discern seasonal and cyclical movements as well as the secular trend. He underscores the socio-economic effects of the cyclical movements especially, demonstrating that the times of profits for the hacendados were those when the masses were suffering from hunger and misery. He also emphasizes the enormous regional differences in price levels and the series of obstacles the haciendas faced in reaching beyond their immediate regional markets. These observations are relevant also for the seven-

23. Gibson, *Aztecs*, pp. 323-326. "Maize progressively increased in price, most notably in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries when the Indian population was in sharp decline and cultivation was decreasing." *Ibid.*, pp. 311-312.

24. André Gunder Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America. Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil* (New York and London, 1969), pp. 131-132.

25. Chevalier, *Formation*, p. 382 and *passim*.

26. Eric Wolf, *Sons of the Shaking Earth* (Chicago, 1962), p. 205.

teenth century situation.²⁷ It is also well to keep in mind what Ruggiero Romano says about the difficulty or even impossibility of using a reconstruction of prices during the colonial period "as a measure of *general* socio-economic situations . . . for the very simple reason that prices did not touch or reach the masses."²⁸ For the River Plate, Ceferino Garzón Maceda has claimed that a natural and a monetary economy coexisted there as late as during the eighteenth century and that most local payments were actually effected in kind.²⁹ Even if the situation was different in the nuclear areas of the Empire, agricultural products often served as payments there too. Consequently, a drop in agricultural prices might reflect an extension of natural economy rather than a decline in demand.

There is another interesting disagreement between the authors discussed. For Chevalier, the hacienda, under the impact of the crisis in mining, withdrew from the larger economy, henceforth to pursue the ideal of self-sufficiency. Stanley and Barbara Stein follow the same line when claiming that miners and merchants shifted investment to land, accelerating the formation of the hacienda. Later, without the stimulus of the mines as a source of specie and as a market, the hacienda tended to become, as they put it, "relatively self-sufficient."³⁰ On the other hand, for Borah, Frank, and even Wolf, the estates of the seventeenth century merely adapted themselves to a new commercial situation.

Recently, the self-sufficiency theory of Chevalier has been challenged on two points. David Brading has observed that while the cattle hacienda of northern Mexico would have possessed the motivation and flexibility required for such a withdrawal, the sugar- and grain-producing estates of the South would not.³¹ Brading's English

27. Enrique Florescano, *Precios del maíz y crisis agrícolas en México (1708-1810)* (México, 1969), p. 196 and *passim*.

28. Romano's article in *Temas de historia económica hispanoamericana* (Paris and The Hague, 1965), pp. 17-19. See also the interesting discussion in his *Les mécanismes de la conquête coloniale: les conquistadores* (Paris, 1972), pp. 152-157.

29. Ceferino Garzón Maceda, *Economía del Tucumán: economía natural y economía monetaria. Siglos XVI-XVII-XVIII* (Córdoba, Arg., 1968), p. 29. This study draws its inspiration from Alfons Dopsch.

30. Stanley J. and Barbara Stein, *The Colonial Heritage of Latin America. Essays on Economic Dependence in Perspective* (New York, 1970), p. 38. A relevant concept here might be the early phase of *indirect agricultural consumption* when the majority of the population are still occupied within agriculture. B. H. Slicher van Bath, *The Agrarian History of Western Europe, A. D. 500-1850* (London, 1963), p. 24.

31. D. A. Brading, *Miners and Merchants in Bourbon Mexico, 1763-1810* (Cambridge, Eng., 1971), p. 13.

colleague, Peter Bakewell, in his study of Zacatecas mining society, shows that instead of withdrawing to their "self-sufficient" haciendas, ruined miners indeed used to lose these estates entirely.³²

Actually the contrast between "self-sufficiency" and market orientation should not be overemphasized. Wolf rightly underlines the great capacity of the hacienda to reduce production when market conditions were adverse, as well as to increase the output when they became favorable.³³ We also have to keep in mind that while haciendas, as Arnold Bauer puts it, were "essentially . . . set up to provide European food—mainly wheat and beef—for the white population," the Indian workers were usually supposed to grow maize and beans on subsistence plots.³⁴ In his comparison of *encomienda* and hacienda, James Lockhart makes another interesting point. He thinks that the *encomienda* already exhibits the same features of self-sufficiency or, rather, economic diversification and social integration as the later hacienda. If so, how could the upward economic trend of the early sixteenth century that witnessed the formation of the *encomienda* produce the same result as the seventeenth-century depression? Furthermore, he points out that in terms of the prevailing ideas of mercantilism, the seventeenth-century hacienda did make good economic sense. Rather than aspiring to increased production, the aim was to "monopolize, drive out competition and sell at high prices to a severely limited market." Land hoarding would serve to eliminate local competitors.³⁵

In the light of all these observations, it does seem rather sterile to discuss whether the hacienda arose as a closed economy, aiming at self-sufficiency, as Chevalier claimed, or whether, on the contrary, it was always dependent on the market, as Frank feels. I think it is clear that henceforth a major task for research will be to determine the *relative* importance of the links of the haciendas to their markets through time. The changes in the relation between production for

32. Bakewell, *Zacatecas*, pp. 117-118. In *Zacatecas*, according to this thorough study, the seventeenth century, "far from being a period of formation or even static consolidation of estates, was for many of them a period of dissolution." Ruined miners saw their estates confiscated and sold by auction. Enrique Florescano makes the somewhat paradoxical claim that both boom and decline in mining favored the north Mexican haciendas. First, because profits were then used to expand the landed property; second, because in that situation people preferred to invest money outside mining. On the other hand, the recurrent agrarian subsistence crisis would hurt both mines and haciendas. In Alvaro Jara (ed.), *Tierras nuevas* (México, 1969), pp. 68-69.

33. Wolf, *Sons of the Shaking Earth*, p. 210.

34. Arnold Bauer, "The Church and Spanish American Agrarian Structure: 1765-1865," *The Americas*, 28:1 (1971), 79.

35. Lockhart, "Encomienda and Hacienda," 424-425.

domestic consumption and for sale will indicate the chronological trends that really matter.

Landownership a Question of Prestige?

The question of non-economic motivations behind the formation of the hacienda was first raised by Chevalier. According to the French scholar, the hacendado with his peculiar, archaic mentality, "acquired land not to increase his earnings, but to eliminate rivals and hold sway over an entire region." Thus Chevalier easily discerned a parallel between the Mexican hacendados and the "ricos homes" of Medieval Castile.³⁶

This interpretation can be challenged on several points. We have already referred to Lockhart's observation that land hoarding in order to drive out competitors made perfect sense in terms of the economic ideas of the time. Indeed, Chevalier himself better than anybody else described how the expansion of the haciendas deprived many Indians and mestizo peasants of their lands, forcing them to join the labor force of the estates. As Florescano observes, haciendas often had to reduce their production due to the limitations of the market and the drastic fall of prices when harvests were plentiful. Why then did they bother to expand? Because by depriving their neighbors of their lands, the hacendados wiped out competing production or forced hitherto self-sufficient small producers to become consumers of hacienda products, instead.³⁷ It is also important to keep in mind that in the beginning of Spanish colonization land was practically a free utility, of no value without labor. Even as late as the eighteenth century when land values were rising, the monopoly of agricultural accessories such as cattle, seed, and water for irrigation remained more valuable than land possession itself.³⁸ In long-term perspective, investment in land could be economically justified also in terms of rising land values, as Robert Keith has pointed out.³⁹ One must be aware, of course, that

36. Chevalier, *Formation*, p. 406.

37. Florescano, *Estructuras y problemas agrarios de México, 1500-1821* (México, 1971), pp. 140-141.

38. Mellahe in *Temas de historia económica*, pp. 25-26; Florescano, *Precios del maíz*, p. 188. On the other hand, Tovar, speaking about the Jesuit haciendas of eighteenth-century Mexico in his Rome paper, points out that "el valor de la tierra alcanza un porcentaje superior al de cualquier otro valor" of these estates. He also makes an important point when underlining the risk of using general averages of the acreage of an estate without considering the different categories of land.

39. Keith, "Origen del sistema de hacienda: el caso de Chancay," in *La hacienda, la comunidad y el campesino en el Perú* (Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, Lima, 1970), p. 42.

other alternatives for investment were usually few and not overly attractive.⁴⁰

Still, the point made by Chevalier cannot simply be disregarded. The question of non-economic motivations actually seems to become even more intriguing in the case of a later generation of hacendados, those of the late eighteenth century. This is the phenomenon described by David Brading: "The fortunes created in mining and commerce were invested in land, there to be slowly dissipated or to be gradually transferred into the coffers of the Church." The process was related to the aristocratic ambitions of the new wealthy class, who bought titles and founded entailed estates or *mayorazgos*.⁴¹ In his dissertation on the Coahuilan latifundio of the Sánchez Navarros, Charles H. Harris contradicts the notion that such motivation was universal by showing that that particular family was clearly moved by purely economic considerations and that it also succeeded in amassing an impressive fortune in the short time span of 1765–1821. However, it should be noted that the Sánchez Navarros retained the commercial enterprise that had financed their very first acquisition of land. Thus, Harris concludes that it was precisely "because the Sánchez Navarros were not entirely dependent on their latifundio that they made such a notable success of it."⁴²

The example of the Sánchez Navarros also convincingly shows how in their case landownership paved the way for the acquisition of local political power. *Caciquismo* and *gamonalismo* are often mentioned in general terms. So far we know very little, however, about how this local strongmanship was established and how it functioned. Was the ownership of a large tract of land or family control of lands a prerequisite for such a position? Or was the acquisition of local power instead more often a result of military or mercantile success, promptly confirmed by purchases of land, the traditional way of obtaining prestige?⁴³

40. Woodrow Borah, "Colonial Institutions and Contemporary Latin America: Political and Economic Life," *HAHR*, 43:3 (August 1963), 377.

41. Brading, *Miners and Merchants*, p. 219 and passim. According to Edith Boorstein Couturier, "Hacienda of Hueyapan: The History of a Mexican Social and Economic Institution, 1550-1940," Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1965, pp. 82-84, the famous eighteenth-century miner, Pedro Romero de Terreros, first Count of Regla, was very wise in acting "to secure his family position through land ownership" precisely at the moment when the mining boom began to subside.

42. Charles Houston Harris III, "A Mexican Latifundio: The Economic Empire of the Sánchez Navarro Family, 1765-1821," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas, 1968, p. 295 and passim.

43. In his paper "The Hacienda 'El Huique' in the Agrarian Structure of Nineteenth-Century Chile" (Mimeograph, Rome, 1972), Arnold Bauer states that in 1874, 28 of the 96 Congressional Deputies and 17 of the 30 Senators of Chile

Evolution of Land Tenure

Our knowledge about the process of concentration or fragmentation of landed ownership is reduced to the few areas that have been studied so far. In the Valley of Puangue in Chile, Borde and Góngora show that the period 1680-1880 witnessed a notable stability in the distribution of land holdings, but then fragmentation set in.⁴⁴ In the Valley of Chancay, Peru, on the other hand, the division of land as of the late eighteenth century suffered no further changes of importance until present times.⁴⁵ In Colombia, many large estates came into being in the eighteenth century. W. P. McGreevey suggests, however, that "excessive" concentration of land only "arose in the redistribution of political power and income in the decades after Independence."⁴⁶ Since the appearance of Chevalier's work, the concentration of land in Mexico has been thought to date from the seventeenth century, reaching its climax during the Porfiriato. William B. Taylor's recent investigation of colonial land tenure in Oaxaca has shown, however, that in that particular district, the hacienda's share of the land remained relatively modest, perhaps one third of the total at the end of the colonial era.⁴⁷ The hacienda of San Juan Hueyapan near the mines of Pachuca in Hidalgo presents still another pattern. As shown by Edith B. Couturier, the rhythm of consolidation and fragmentation there was interwoven with the fortunes of mining. In the early and in the very late eighteenth century, as well as around 1900, the hacienda was consolidated by "dynasties" of rich miners. In the intervals fragmentation set in.⁴⁸ In the southern sierra of Peru the process of land concentration, as suggested by Jean Piel and François Chevalier, would

were large estate owners. By 1900, the percentage had increased: 58 out of 94 Deputies and 21 of 33 Senators.

44. Borde and Góngora, *Evolución de la propiedad rural*, I, 58. Similarly, in Boyacá, Colombia, according to Orlando Fals Borda, *El hombre y la tierra en Boyacá* (Bogotá, 1957), pp. 139, 142, there were latifundia during the colonial period, but today small and middle-sized properties prevail.

45. José Matos Mar, "Las haciendas en el Valle de Chancay," in *Les problèmes agraires des Amériques Latines* (Paris, 1967), pp. 317-353. See also Keith, "Origen," and Louis C. Faron, "A History of Agricultural Production and Local Organization in the Chancay Valley, Peru," in Steward, *Contemporary Change*, III, 229 ff.

46. William Paul McGreevey, *An Economic History of Colombia, 1845-1930* (Cambridge, Eng., 1971), p. 130.

47. On the evolution during and after the Porfiriato see Moisés González Navarro, "Tenencia de la tierra y población agrícola, 1877-1960," *Historia Mexicana*, 19:1 (1969), 62-86, and his account in D. Cosío Villegas (ed.), *Historia moderna de México. El Porfiriato. La vida social*. (México and Buenos Aires, 1957), pp. 212-216. William Berley Taylor, *Landlord and Peasant in Colonial Oaxaca* (Stanford, Calif., 1972); see also his Rome paper already cited.

48. Couturier, "Hacienda of Hueyapan."

reach its culmination as late as the 1920s in connection with the increased demand for wool.⁴⁹

In the case of the department of Caupolicán, Chile, Arnold Bauer makes an important observation which might apply to other areas as well. As he says, tax survey (*catastro*) data on acreage have often been used to prove the expansion of latifundism. When checking them against the land titles of the haciendas he found, however, that the legal domains were much larger, and that the nineteenth-century expansion of the cultivated area took place within legal boundaries established a long time before.⁵⁰

It has never been doubted that the Church and the religious orders became great land holders in the course of the colonial era. Exactly how extensive church holdings were we do not know, however. Thanks to Pablo Macera of Peru and Germán Colmenares of Colombia, among others, our information, though far from exhaustive, is especially good with reference to the holdings of the Jesuits.⁵¹ After the confiscation of the Jesuit estates in 1767, these properties, known as *Temporalidades*, sooner or later were acquired by private individuals. Arnold Bauer suggests that the lands of the Jesuits "passed, almost always in the huge original units, into the hands of private owners at a fraction of their value."⁵² The whole question of the destiny of the *Temporalidades* remains to be investigated systematically, however. In his exceptional study of the confiscation of Jesuit properties in Mendoza in present Argentina, Esteban Fontana shows that there, for some reason,

49. Chevalier, "Temoignages" and "Official Indigenismo in Peru in 1920: Origins, Significance and Socioeconomic Scope," in Magnus Mömer (ed.), *Race and Class in Latin America* (New York and London), pp. 184-196; Jean Piel, "Le problème de la terre dans la région du Cuzco à l'époque contemporaine (fin 19^e-début 20^e siècle)," *Recherche cooperative*, No. 147. *Villes et régions en Amérique Latine*, Cahier no. 1 (Institut des Hautes Etudes de l'Amérique Latine, Paris, 1970), pp. 5-16.

50. Bauer, "El Huique."

51. Macera, "Feudalismo," and *Instrucciones para el manejo de las haciendas jesuitas del Perú* (ss. XVII-XVIII), (Lima, 1966: Nueva Crónica, II:2) and *Mapas coloniales de haciendas cuzqueñas*, I-II (Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, Seminario de historia rural andina, Lima, 1968, mimeograph); Colmenares, *Haciendas de los jesuitas en el Nuevo Reino de Granada, Siglo XVIII* (Bogotá, 1969). See also Horacio Aranguiz Donoso, "Notas para el estudio de la Hacienda de la Calera de Tango, 1685-1783," *Historia*, 6 (Santiago de Chile, 1967), 221-262. At the Rome meeting, Hermes Tovar Pinzón presented an important communication called "Elementos constitutivos de la empresa agraria jesuita en la segunda mitad del siglo XVIII en México." J. D. Riley had prepared a paper on "Santa Lucía: The Development and Management of a Jesuit Hacienda in the Eighteenth Century," related to his 1971 Ph.D. dissertation at Tulane University on the estates of the *Colegio Máximo* of Mexico City.

52. Bauer, "The Church," p. 84.

the buyers were apparently young and relatively modest people, not the existing wealthy elite.⁵³

In the course of the nineteenth century, the transfer of land from the Church to individuals continued, reaching large proportions in many places but especially so in Mexico. Thanks to the recent monograph of Jan Bazant we know that the landholdings of the Mexican church, forfeited as a result of the *Reforma*, passed undivided to a rather small group of people. "The dream of the liberals of creating a rural middle class by the division and sale in parts of the clerical haciendas was not realized."⁵⁴

The linkage between the anticlerical policy of the later Bourbons and the efforts of the nineteenth-century Liberal governments to eliminate ecclesiastical landholding is very obvious, indeed. On the other hand, the pious wishes of late eighteenth-century authorities to curtail secular latifundismo have only recently attracted scholarly attention. Ursula Ewald describes how various groups of peons in Puebla tried to settle in villages, purchasing or renting lands from the hacendados, and how the authorities sympathized with these efforts. They failed. At that time no free land was left in central Mexico. In the much less densely populated North and East, however, large state domains remained so that the problem on the whole should have been easier to solve. Yet, as other authors have shown, similar efforts towards establishing a free peasantry failed there, too. These episodes are interesting nevertheless, revealing how haciendas were criticized by reformers and high officials on both socioeconomic and political grounds, an antecedent of the twentieth-century debate.⁵⁵

There have, no doubt, been many examples of landownership by

53. Fontana, "La expulsión de los jesuitas de Mendoza y sus repercusiones económicas," *Revista Chilena de Historia y Geografía*, no. 130 (Santiago de Chile, 1962), pp. 70-74.

54. Bazant, *Alienation of Church Wealth in Mexico. Social and Economic Aspects of the Liberal Revolution, 1856-1875* (Cambridge, Eng., 1971), p. 289. See also Robert J. Knowlton, "Expropriation of Church Property in Nineteenth-Century Mexico and Colombia: A Comparison," *The Americas*, 25:4 (1969), 400; McGreevey, *Economic History*, p. 128.

55. Ursula Ewald, "Versuche zur Änderung der Besitzverhältnisse in den letzten Jahrzehnten der Kolonialzeit. Bestrebungen im Hochbecken von Puebla/Tlaxcala und seiner Umgebung zur Rückführung von *hacienda*-Land an Gutsarbeiter und indianische Dorfgemeinschaften," *Jahrbuch für Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas*, 7 (Cologne, 1970), 238-251. See also Enrique Florescano, "El problema agrario en los últimos años del virreinato, 1800-21," *Historia Mexicana*, 20:4 (1971), 477-510; Brian R. Hamnett, "Obstáculo a la política agraria del despotismo ilustrado," *Historia Mexicana*, 20:1 (1970), 55-75; François Chevalier, "The North Mexican Hacienda: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries," in Archibald R. Lewis and Thomas F. McGann (eds.), *The New World Looks at its History* (Austin, Texas, 1963), pp. 95-107.

the same family during extended periods of time. In the Valley of Putaendo, Chile, the largest hacienda passed intact from one generation to another between 1670 and 1880.⁵⁶ To ensure such a stability of ownership, there was the device of *mayorazgo*, but it does not seem to have been very extensively used.⁵⁷ As Mario Góngora points out, there were many other legal forms and family agreements that could serve the same purpose.⁵⁸ In the case of the hacienda of Guachalá in the Valley of Cayambe in Northern Ecuador, all transfers were through inheritance from the mid-seventeenth century through 1819. From then until 1892, four transfers were made through purchase, and only one through inheritance.⁵⁹ However, ownership continuity and transfer of property mainly through inheritance cannot be considered universal during the colonial period either. In colonial Oaxaca, according to William Taylor, there was a striking lack of such stability. Estates changed hands frequently, and through purchase more often than not.⁶⁰ Referring to Huancavelica, Peru, Henri Favre states that purchase rather than inheritance was already the rule in colonial times.⁶¹ In Chancay, José Matos Mar observes, 72.2 per cent of the existing haciendas were acquired by new owners between 1901 and 1926, and only 11.1 per cent belonged to the same family as prior to 1800.⁶² Speaking about eighteenth-century Mexico, Brading confirms an old saying when asserting that haciendas seldom remained within the same family for more than three generations. Thus, "a continuous replacement in the hacendado class occurred."⁶³ McGreevey observes that in nineteenth-century Colombia there was not only a "rapid turnover in land ownership, but the social composition of landowners changed as well."⁶⁴

56. Rafael Baraona, Ximena Aranda and Roberto Santana, *Valle de Putaendo. Estudio de estructura agraria* (Santiago de Chile, 1969), pp. 145-149.

57. One of my students at the University of Texas in 1972, Carmen Ramos Escandón, wrote an interesting term paper on the *mayorazgo* in Mexico and Chile which conveyed this general impression. On the local level, the *mayorazgo* might still have been important, as shown by Taylor in his Rome paper on the colonial haciendas of Oaxaca. In the Sabana of Bogotá, Villamarín, in "Haciendas en la Sabana," found only one *mayorazgo*.

58. Borde and Góngora, *Evolución*, I, 54-55.

59. Emilio Bonifaz, "Origen y evolución de una hacienda histórica: Guachalá," *Boletín de la Academia Nacional de Historia*, 53:115-116 (Quito, 1970), 115-122, 338-350. I am obliged to Professor Michael T. Hamerley of the University of Northern Colorado for having kindly placed a copy at my disposal.

60. Taylor, "Oaxaca," p. 263.

61. Henri Favre, Claude Collin Delavaud and José Matos Mar, *La hacienda en el Perú* (Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, Lima, 1967), p. 239.

62. Matos Mar, "Haciendas en el Valle de Chancay," p. 332.

63. Brading, *Miners and Merchants*, p. 219.

64. McGreevey, *Economic History*, p. 132.

It is a general notion that haciendas were often heavily burdened with encumbrances and debts. An exceptionally interesting published document from the early eighteenth century proves that this was, indeed, true for the province of Tlaxcala in New Spain. Another document, on the neighboring district of Cholula in 1790, shows that the haciendas there, valued at 788,000 pesos, had to pay a total of 550,000 pesos in obligations.⁶⁵ This may have been an exceptional case, but the level of indebtedness of the haciendas was probably often high. This helps to explain why they changed hands so often. Taylor's table on "Mortgages as a percentage of the market value of haciendas in the Valley of Oaxaca, 1750-1810" is particularly enlightening in this regard.⁶⁶ At the same time, by assuming the payment of the obligations, buyers often only had to pay a small sum in cash. It then became more easy for an hacienda to change hands as a unit. Due to the encumbrances, the division of property would also prove both costly and complicated.⁶⁷

As is well known, these obligations were, as a rule, imposed by the owners themselves in response to religious needs. The 1671 will of a Venezuelan lady, owner of the estate of Chuao, offers a particularly eloquent example of the variety and extent of such *censos*, *obras pías* and *capellanías*.⁶⁸ In 1804 the Spanish government tried to enforce the redemption of the obligations of the hacendados to the *Obras Pías* by having them pay the capital value to the Crown. This revolutionary measure, the *Consolidación de Vales Reales*, was long almost untouched by research. Now, however, it has finally received the attention it deserves. According to Romeo Flores Caballero, in Mexico the *Consolidación* caused a great number of landowners, mostly criollos, to lose their properties.⁶⁹

65. Isabel González Sánchez (ed.), *Haciendas y ranchos de Tlaxcala en 1712* (México, 1969); Banco Nacional de Crédito Agrícola y Ganadero, S. A., *El crédito agrícola en el Partido de Cholula de la Intendencia de Puebla en 1790 por D. Manuel de Flon*. Con una breve advertencia de L. Chávez Orozco (México, 1955).

66. Taylor, "Oaxaca," p. 310. Regarding the causes of the *remates por deudas de censos* compare Borde and Góngora, *Evolución de la propiedad rural*, pp. 61-62, and Baraona, *Putando*, p. 174.

67. M. P. Costeloe, *Church Wealth in Mexico. A Study of the "Juzgado de Capellanías" in the Archbishopric of Mexico, 1800-1856* (Cambridge, Eng., 1967), p. 27.

68. *La Obra Pía de Chuao, 1568-1825* (Caracas, 1968; Comisión de Historia de la Propiedad Territorial Agraria en Venezuela, No. 1), pp. 194-213.

69. Flores Caballero, "La consolidación de Vales Reales en la economía, la sociedad y política novohispanas," *Historia Mexicana* 18:1 (January-March 1969), 334-378. See also Brian R. Hamnett, "The Appropriation of Mexican Church Wealth by the Spanish Bourbon Government: the 'Consolidación de Vales Reales' 1805-1809," *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 1:2 (1969), 85-113, and his book *Politics and Trade in Southern Mexico, 1750-1821* (Cambridge, Eng., 1971). The

The problem of land tenure is not limited to the question of ownership. How much do we know about the extent and usage of tenancy arrangements? Very little, as it appears. How large were the parcels to be kept in usufruct by tenant labor (*colonos* or *yanaconas*)?⁷⁰ Some information is available for contemporary conditions, but historical data on this question seem to be very hard to find.⁷¹ Yet, the problem is an important one. For Cristóbal Kay, in his theoretical analysis of the hacienda, it is the ratio between the "demesne" of the landlord and the lands of peasant families within the borders of an hacienda that mainly determines the nature of the enterprise. Under the *Grundherrschaft* type, peasants retain the major part of the land. If, on the contrary, most lands are included with the "demesne," then we have to do, instead, with *Gutsherrschaft*.⁷²

Hacienda Labor

Zavala, Borah and Chevalier all agree that debt peonage played a key role in tying Indians from the villages—*gañanes*, *conciertos* or whatever they were called—to the estates.⁷³ But Charles Gibson, in his work on the Valley of Mexico, concludes that this was not so in this central area prior to Independence. For Gibson the reason was simple enough. The hacienda of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries offered the Indians a better livelihood than either life in the independent villages or in the *obrajes*, mines and urban slums.⁷⁴ How-

topic is also dealt with in Asunción Lavrín, "Problems and Policies in the Administration of Nunneries in Mexico, 1800-1835," *The Americas*, 28 (1971), 57-77 and Asunción Lavrín, "The Execution of the Law of Consolidación in New Spain: Economic Gains and Results," *HAHR*, 53:1 (February 1973).

70. On the *colonos* see my booklet *Tenant Labour in Andean South America Since the Eighteenth Century. A Preliminary Report* (Moscow, 1970: XIII. International Congress of Historical Sciences).

71. See H. Gustavo Palacio Pimentel, "Relaciones de trabajo entre el patrón y los colonos en los fundos de la Provincia de Paucartambo," Part 4, *Revista Universitaria*, XLXI, no. 120 (Cuzco, 1962).

72. Kay, "Comparative Development of the European Manorial System and the Latin American Hacienda System: An Approach to a Theory of Agrarian Change for Chile," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Sussex, 1971. Professor Arnold Bauer, University of California, Davis, kindly enabled me to consult this study.

73. Chevalier, *Formation*, pp. 368-373; Borah, *Century of Depression*, p. 39; Silvio Zavala, "Orígenes históricos del peonaje en México," *Trimestre Económico*, 10 (México, 1944), 711-748.

74. Gibson, *Aztecs*, pp. 249, 252-256. Referring to Hueyapan, Couturier in her dissertation also rejects the traditional view of peonage. She observes that the *tienda de raya* was rented and that, therefore, "the hacienda did not participate directly in the profits from the peons' debt" (pp. 265-266). In his excellent little monograph, "Biografía de la hacienda de San Nicolás de Ulapa," *Ibero-Americana Pragensia*, 4 (Prague, 1970), Bohumil Badura shows that the liquidation of

ever, Harris's study of the late eighteenth-century Sánchez Navarro estates in Northern Mexico makes clear that in that time and place debt peonage was, in fact, a systematic device to tie scarce manpower to the land. Harris also shows how deserters were assiduously persecuted, even after they had left the region far behind.⁷⁵ As far as late colonial Oaxaca is concerned, William Taylor also claims that debt bondage was part of the general pattern of the hacienda system. The average debt was 35.5 pesos for a sample of 475 peons on 14 estates, that is, the equivalent of some 11 months' work.⁷⁶ In his study on eighteenth-century haciendas of the Jesuits in Peru, Pablo Macera is able to document in detail how debt peonage worked. The money spent on credits to the workers was considered to be a necessary investment to secure manpower.⁷⁷ On the other hand, according to Hermes Tovar's thorough study on the mid-eighteenth-century Jesuit haciendas of Mexico, workers there were not tied to the estates by their own debts. Instead, the retention of part of their salaries by the hacienda might have produced the same effect.⁷⁸

Obviously, the question of debt peonage ought to be studied in time perspective. So far, information gathered on the hacienda of Guachalá in Ecuador is unique in this regard. Emilio Bonifaz provides the following figures on the credits or debts of the workers:

accounts that took place in 1792 in that particular hacienda left a balance against the administration. 147 workers demanded a total of 1,420 pesos, 1½ reales, as compared with 125 who owed 889 pesos, 5 reales (p. 106).

75. Harris, "Mexican Latifundio," ch. V. He underscores the role of the low wage level and the high level of the ecclesiastical fees in making indebtedness unavoidable. The hacendado paid the fees to a priest, often a member of his family, after which they were credited to the workers. See also Isabel González Sánchez, "La retención por deudas y los traslados de trabajadores tlaquehuales o alquilados en las haciendas como sustitución de los repartimientos de indios durante el siglo XVIII," *Anales del Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia*, 19:48 (México, 1966), 241-250.

76. Taylor, "Colonial Haciendas." When hacendados attempted to make debts hereditary, however, this was opposed by the Audiencia.

77. Macera, "Feudalismo," pp. 34-36. Speaking about the Indians on an estate in early nineteenth-century Southern Colombia, J. León Helguera asserts that "el hecho de deber dinero en vez de servicios personales, [fué] un aparente avance en su posición." "Coconuco: Datos y documentos para la historia de una gran hacienda caucana, 1823, 1842 y 1876," *Anuario Colombiano de Historia Social y de la Cultura*, 5 (1970), 192.

78. Tovar, "Elementos constitutivos." Brading ("The Structure") refers to "what was in effect a reverse form of debt peonage . . . in New Spain." J. D. Riley in his paper on the Jesuit hacienda of Santa Lucía states that workers' debts were small and labor mobility high. He even declares that the hacienda administration "set artificially low prices on goods," a striking contrast to the system as described by Macera.

Year	Total number of workers	Workers in debt	Workers in credit
1763	174	60	114
1783	234	93	141
1819	259	183	76
1892	439	280	159

Unfortunately he does not state the amounts. The trend he shows should be seen against the backdrop of falling real wages and the decline of an originally flourishing sheep-breeding economy.⁷⁹

To summarize, it is clear that the traditional view of a necessary connection between hacienda and debt peonage must be rejected. On the other hand, it is as yet too early to venture any other generalizations about the role of labor indebtedness. The examples known to us present a great variety.⁸⁰

As is well known, different categories of tenant labor have formed a major part of the resident labor force of the haciendas in recent times. The historical development of this kind of labor is very little known, however. Góngora's perceptive study of the origins of the Chilean *inquilino* remains almost unique. According to the traditional view, the *inquilinos* derived from a group of Indian workers formed in the wake of the abolition of the *encomienda*. But Góngora shows that, instead, the *inquilinato* gradually developed from a form of non-Indian tenancy. Whereas seventeenth-century *estancieros* let out land in exchange for almost symbolic rents (*préstamos de tierras*), in the eighteenth century, when growing wheat exports to Peru raised land values, rents were considerably augmented. Towards the end of the century, many tenants found themselves obliged to pay their rent by day labor. Their social status sank and their lots of land grew smaller. But, as Góngora sees it, the real transformation of the *inquilinos* into a proletariat took place only during the nineteenth century. The change is mainly explained by their increasing numbers.⁸¹ The nineteenth-

79. Bonifaz, "Origen," pp. 346, 349 and *passim*. In 1783, the inventory value of a cow corresponded to 20 days of work, in 1819 to 28, in 1891 to 60.

80. The relation to the degree of density of population seems obvious, however. During the Porfiriato, debt bondage was more widespread in the North and Southeast of Mexico, where population was scarce, than in the central parts, with the possible exception of Morelos, according to M. González Navarro in Cosío Villegas, *Historia moderna . . . Porfiriato. Vida social*, pp. 214-223.

81. Mario Góngora, *Origen de los "inquilinos" de Chile Central* (Santiago de Chile, 1960). It is interesting to compare this with the trend observed by Brading, in his Rome paper on the Bajío towards the end of the eighteenth century, to "raise rents, and to replace customary obligations and privileges by cash payments." In both cases a more abundant supply of workers and an expanding market led to greater pressure on the lower rural strata, but in different directions.

century history of the *inquilinos* has been studied by Bauer, who maintains that they were still better off than ordinary peons. He suggests that rural wages in Chile fell 50 per cent between 1830 and 1880, for him a much more crucial period in the expansion of wheat exports than the eighteenth century.⁸²

In the case of Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador, there seems to exist an institutional linkage between the *yanaconas* of the sixteenth century and the *colonos* of recent times. The problem ought to be studied, however, within the context of the whole development of agrarian structure.⁸³ According to Karen Spalding, the economic contraction of the Peruvian viceroyalty in the eighteenth century forced many Indians to sell themselves to the hacendados. These would then take care of the debts the Indians had incurred to the *corregidores* when unable to pay for the *repartimiento de mercancías*.⁸⁴ In the case of Quito, Udo Oberem has outlined how the *yanaconas*, around 1600, were transformed into *conciertos*, in more recent times known as *huasipungueros*. His study highlights the abusive treatment they experienced.⁸⁵

The whole study of hacienda labor is extraordinarily difficult as a result of the usually oral character of labor contracts and because wages more often than not were paid in kind. Macera has made an acute attempt to analyze rural wages on the basis of Jesuit records, but he fails to take into account the value of the usufruct of the parcels that the workers probably also enjoyed.⁸⁶ Apart from the rich documentation concerning the expropriated Jesuit haciendas, accounts

82. Bauer, "Chilean Rural Society of the Nineteenth Century," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1969. In part published as "Expansión económica en una sociedad tradicional: Chile central en el siglo XIX," *Historia*, 9 (Santiago de Chile, 1970), 137-235. Bauer also published "Chilean Rural Labor in the Nineteenth Century," *The American Historical Review*, 76:4 (October 1971), 1059-1083. See also Horacio Aranguiz Donoso, "La situación de los trabajadores agrícolas en el siglo XIX," *Estudios de historia de las instituciones políticas y sociales*, 2 (Santiago, 1967), 5-31; Gonzalo Izquierdo, "Memoria sobre Hacienda Las Condes en 1895," *Boletín de la Academia Chilena de la Historia*, 35:2, no. 79 (Santiago, 1968), 121-205, and his book *Un estudio de las ideologías chilenas. La sociedad de agricultura en el siglo XIX* (Santiago, 1968), pp. 185-194.

83. It is the intention of the present writer to do so, with particular regard to the Cuzco region and from the eighteenth century onwards. The support received for this research project from a Swedish foundation has recently been discontinued, however.

84. Spalding, "Tratos mercantiles del corregidor de indios y la formación de la hacienda serrana en el Perú," *América Indígena*, 30:3 (México, 1970), 595-608.

85. Oberem, "Zur Geschichte des lateinamerikanischen Landarbeiters: Concier-tos und Huasipungueros in Ecuador," *Anthropos*, 62 (St. Augustin, 1967), 759-788.

86. Macera, "Feudalismo," pp. 36-37.

are very difficult to find. This is what makes Jan Bazant's recent study of the labor force of the large hacienda of Bocas in San Luis Potosí, Mexico, especially noteworthy. After a meticulous analysis of numerous records dealing with the hundreds of peons, tenants and sharecroppers living on this estate around 1850, Bazant concludes that resident peons were better off than most of the tenants and, less surprising, than the temporary workers. Tenants are also shown to have been especially active in a riot on the hacienda.⁸⁷

Today, the unequal distribution of material benefits among the workers of contemporary haciendas and the stratification of these communities are easy to observe. But it is very difficult to find out if these features are old or relatively new. The demographic factor, that is, the slowly increasing supply of labor in the Andean areas, in any case had a profound impact on hacienda labor relations.

Markets, Profitability and Credit

Contemporary studies underscore the low productivity of traditional haciendas. Only a minor part of the cultivable area is utilized. Due to the low level of their technology, capitalization and management, production is mainly determined by the quantity of labor used. Still, a "seigneurial" pattern of income distribution assures large landowners considerable income, a great part of which is absorbed by sumptuary consumption.⁸⁸ Even contemporary students find it difficult, however, to distinguish the role of the haciendas from the many other enterprises in which the large landowners are often engaged. Do the haciendas help to finance these other activities or is the opposite more often the case?⁸⁹

If economic analysis is imperfect concerning the present, our knowledge about the profitability of haciendas in the past is very poor indeed. David Brading takes a gloomy view of the eighteenth-

87. Bazant, "Peones, arrendatarios y medieros en México. La hacienda de Bocas hasta 1867" (Mimeograph, Rome, 1972). Another case of abundant records for a nineteenth-century hacienda is that of "El Melón," Chile. An Italian student, Paola Moltoni of Torino, is using them for a study.

88. Solon L. Barraclough and Arthur L. Domike, "Agrarian Structure in Seven Latin American Countries," *Land Economics*, 43:4 (1966), 401-406. In the Ecuadorian sierra "the average hacienda earns 33 per cent gross profit (excluding amortization) on its sales receipt," according to Keith Griffin, *Underdevelopment in Spanish America. An Interpretation* (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), p. 73. "The reason why the returns are so high is that most factor inputs are provided gratis or nearly so."

89. According to Matos Mar, "Haciendas del Valle de Chancay," p. 337, "desde 1942 las haciendas del valle comienzan a proveer de capitales a otras actividades económicas que controlan y desarrollan fuera del valle el grupo de hacendados."

century haciendas of Mexico. Except for the Valley of Mexico and the Bajío, markets were simply too small for landowners to make real profits. The average return on capital in agriculture in the eighteenth as well as the nineteenth century would not exceed 6 per cent. Individually owned estates were worse off than those held by the Church. They had to pay tithes and excise taxes, and they also had to support a double load, absentee landlords as well as managers. Thus, "the Mexican hacienda was a sink through which drained without stop the surplus capital accumulated in the export economy."⁹⁰ To this, Hermes Tovar objects that 5 per cent was after all considered a normal return in the eighteenth century. He also shows that, rather surprisingly, some of the former Jesuit haciendas of Mexico increased their profitability after the expropriation of 1767, at times considerably beyond 6 per cent.⁹¹ On his part, Pablo Macera finds the Jesuit haciendas of eighteenth-century Peru to have been very profitable indeed. It should be noticed, however, that most haciendas studied by Macera specialized in growing wine and sugar, easily marketed products. This helps to explain their high degree of commercialization.⁹² The stock-breeding latifundio of the Sánchez Navarros in Coahuila also was apparently very profitable. It is interesting to observe its close links with merchant houses as far away as Mexico City. "Through their annual sales [they] amassed credits with the commercial houses, drawing against these accounts by means of *libranzas* or drafts."⁹³ But this latifundio seems to have been a rather exceptional case.

For a nineteenth-century Chilean hacienda, Arnold Bauer estimates an annual yield of 4.5 per cent. To maintain their living standard, the owners had to borrow considerable amounts of capital at a rate twice as high. Why did they keep their money in the estate at all? Quite apart from non-economic motivations, there were sound economic reasons, Bauer claims. They obtained cash through mortgages on their estates. Later on, they were able to repay these loans with a rapidly devaluating currency.⁹⁴

For Rolando Mellafe, the existence of a diversified market for agricultural products was simply a *sine qua non* condition for the formation of the latifundio.⁹⁵ There can be no doubt that for most haciendas

90. Brading, *Miners and Merchants*, pp. 215-219.

91. Tovar, "Elementos constitutivos."

92. Macera, "Feudalismo," pp. 13-14.

93. Harris, "Mexican Latifundio," ch. VI.

94. Bauer, "El Huique."

95. Mellafe's account of sixteenth-century Peru in Alvaro Jara (ed.), *Tierras nuevas* (México, 1969), pp. 19-29. He bases his analysis on notarial records. "En la medida en que los mercados agrarios se formaban, el interés por la posesión de la tierra también se amplió."

distance and the quality of communications to the market and the size of the market crucially affected production. Germán Colmenares quotes a report from 1692 on some Jesuit haciendas in New Granada: "era inútil cultivarlas pues no había mercados para sus productos."⁹⁶ Florescano underscores how distances, bad roads and high freights prevented Mexican grain-producing haciendas from developing their productive capacity beyond what the local market required.⁹⁷ Speaking of central Chile, Arnold Bauer claims that the income of the large estates in this fertile region remained negligible until the middle of the nineteenth century, due to the lack of markets. Only exceptionally did trans-Atlantic wheat exports during the period 1865-1880 make Chilean agriculture really profitable. Expanded production, when necessary, was achieved merely by extending cultivation and by using additional manpower. Incentives to raise productivity by intensive methods were lacking.⁹⁸

To obtain at least some idea of the evolution of the hacienda as an economic enterprise through time, we need a great number of well-distributed monographical studies. As it happens, the few that we have all deal with areas situated close to important markets: the Valley of Puangue in Chile, that of Chancay in Peru and, of course, the Valley of Mexico.⁹⁹ We also have to try to reconstruct the movements of agricultural prices. The prices of those cash crops which would provide haciendas with their main income, whether wheat or pulque or wool, are of course especially important. In the case of those estates for which records are indeed available, we have to attempt to calculate the development of their productivity, as well as that of their profitability, which was often a different matter.¹⁰⁰ As José Carlos Mariátegui once put it, "the hacendado does not concern himself with the productivity of the soil. He is only concerned with its profitability," that is, he tries to exploit "Indian labor boundlessly."¹⁰¹

Profits, in fact, cannot be separated from the patterns of consumption and investment of the landowning class. Juan Villamarín makes a

96. Colmenares, *Haciendas*, p. 41.

97. Florescano, *Precios del maíz*, p. 184.

98. Bauer, "Expansion," pp. 172-173. In "El Huique," Bauer emphasizes that the low degree of technology and the abundance of land and labor made Chilean hacienda agriculture remarkably flexible in the face of a very uncertain market.

99. No hacienda could be closer to an important market than Hueyapan. Unfortunately Couturier, in her dissertation, reports (p. 95) that she was unable to find any records on the marketing relationship with Pachuca.

100. As Bauer ("El Huique") points out, production costs and efficiency are very difficult to get at, due to the lack of data on acreage, types of land, and labor input for each crop.

101. Mariátegui, *Siete ensayos de la realidad peruana* (Santiago de Chile, 1955), p. 69.

distinction between funds for “ceremonial” (mainly religious), “social,” and actually economic purposes, which seems quite enlightening.¹⁰² “Ceremonial” investments were, of course, also very important in the case of ecclesiastical holdings.

Thus, even in the case of prosperous haciendas, the question of credit would sooner or later arise, due to consumption and investment patterns as well as to the hazards of weather and adverse market conditions. The Church’s role as a source of credit was important from the beginning. Michael Costeloe’s work on the *Juzgado de Capellanías* in Mexico during the first half of the nineteenth century gives an excellent account of this kind of operation.¹⁰³ The Jesuits were also important lenders. However, it appears from recent research that the extent of ecclesiastical credit has often been exaggerated. As Bauer put it, merchants were prepared to extend “higher-yield/high-risk” credit. Thus, they would lend money to landowners, who were not solvent enough to receive church credit, at higher interest rates.¹⁰⁴ According to Robson Tyrer, who investigated the rural credit of León, Mexico, 33 large estates obtained a total of 175,000 pesos in loans between 1780 and 1790. Miners and merchants supplied 68 per cent, the Church the remainder.¹⁰⁵ Nor should another rather unlikely lender to the landowners be forgotten, the *cajas de comunidades* of the Indian villages. Luis Chávez Orozco has published some revealing documentation on this topic from the early years of the nineteenth century.¹⁰⁶ In the course of the latter part of the nineteenth century banks and other credit institutions extending mortgage loans began to appear.¹⁰⁷ It has often been observed that the large landowners have practically monopolized these increasingly abundant sources of credit.¹⁰⁸

102. Villamarín, “Haciendas en la Sabana.”

103. Costeloe, *Church Wealth*. In the eighteenth century “all legal disguises for the interest-bearing loan were put aside. Members of the Church became openly engaged in the business of lending money.” Asunción Lavrin, “The Role of the Nunneries in the Economy of New Spain in the Eighteenth Century,” *HAHR*, 46:4 (November 1966), 378.

104. Bauer, “Church,” pp. 93-95.

105. As quoted by Bauer, *ibid.*, p. 95.

106. Banco Nacional de Crédito Agrícola y Ganadero, S. A., *Los fondos de comunidades indígenas como fuentes de crédito agrícola en la Nueva España. Siglo XIX* (México, 1955).

107. Bauer, “Expansion,” p. 177 ff. He refers to an unpublished study by Eugenia Horwitz, “Ensayo sobre el crédito colonial.”

108. Griffin, *Underdevelopment*, pp. 77-79, claims that the *Caja agraria* in Colombia in fact transfers the savings of the “poor” to better-off farmers. On the other hand, it is clear that even large landowners may find it hard to get credit. According to C.I.D.A., *Tenencia de la tierra y desarrollo socio-económico del sector agrícola: Perú* (Washington, 1966), p. 116, most of the traditional haciendas in the sierra do not dispose of any credit in commercial or state banks.

Towards 1900 some modernizing hacendados make their appearance. Did they obtain the capital they invested through loans or through reinvestment of profits?¹⁰⁹ In her study of the hacienda of San Juan Hueyapan in Mexico, Couturier points out that the hacendado obtained credit from the Banco Comercial in 1902 which allowed him rapidly to construct a new mansion, to irrigate part of the terrain, and to buy machinery. But there was a purpose of ostentation in all this rather than an intent to obtain returns on the capital invested, the author claims. Also, the landowners did not really distinguish between their personal expenditures and the costs of production.¹¹⁰

When modernization was more advanced, as in the case of the sugar estates of Morelos, industrialized from the 1880s onwards, the social equilibrium was lost. As François Chevalier and John Womack, Jr., have pointed out, the aggressive territorial expansion of these estates to acquire new land as well as dependent labor, provided the special preconditions for the revolt of Emiliano Zapata.¹¹¹

The Hacienda as a Social Unit

The hacienda, in recent times, has been characterized by having its own social hierarchy, provision for internal supply of goods and services and, to some extent, its own administration. Because haciendas differ greatly in size and type of production, their role as centers of population will also vary. Sometimes, the peons and their families are grouped closely together in *villorios* or *caseríos* in the shadow of the mansion and the chapel. In other cases, the people of the hacienda live scattered on the marginal lands where their usufruct parcels are also located.¹¹²

The origins of these patterns have so far received little attention from historians. In a recent work I tried to outline in very broad terms how the sixteenth-century dualist pattern of Spanish towns and Indian villages gradually became blurred or vanished. Eighteenth-century sources suggest that, in many areas, the majority of the rural inhabitants had already formed new clusters of population around the

109. Jan Bazant, in *La historia económica*, II, 114.

110. Edith Boorstein Couturier, "Modernización y tradición en una hacienda (San Juan Hueyapan, 1902-1911)," *Historia mexicana*, 18:1 (1968), 35-85.

111. Chevalier, "Un factor decisivo de la revolución agraria de México: el levantamiento de Zapata (1911-19)," *Cuadernos americanos*, 113:6 (México, 1960), 165-187; Womack, *Zapata and the Mexican Revolution* (New York, 1969), pp. 42-51.

112. Marshall Wolfe, "Rural Settlement Patterns and Social Change in Latin America," *Latin American Research Review*, 1:2 (1966), 10. At the Rome meeting, geographer Ward Barrett proposed that it would be a more rewarding approach to consider the plantations-haciendas *settlements* rather than *enterprises*.

haciendas.¹¹³ It is not so easy to follow this change in our ordinary demographic sources. It would seem, however, that the fiscal category of *indios forasteros sin tierra* often refers precisely to those Indians who had settled down on the haciendas for good.¹¹⁴ An indicator of the fundamental social change taking place can be found in the sphere of ecclesiastical organization. The establishment of a special *oratorio* or chapel for the hacienda population would prove that it was already functioning as a full-blown "community."¹¹⁵ Another important element in the hacienda milieu was the store. In Bauer's words, the "pulpería reinforced the hacienda's position at the economic and social center of the rural society."¹¹⁶

The scope and character of the mansion (*casco*) ought to provide a clue to what degree the hacendado valued his property and was linked to it. Lockhart observes that, as distinct from the encomiendas, "the typical hacienda had an impressive country house as one of its outstanding features." Yet he emphasizes that hacendados, like encomenderos, preferred to live in the city and that their social ties were urban.¹¹⁷ This may be true of the most important hacendados. But would it also apply to the many smaller and middle-sized ones? We need regional biographical samples to find out if this generalization about hacendados as a group is really valid. In any case, the grouping of the buildings and the architecture of the *corps de logis* permit us to distinguish different types. For Manuel Romero de Terreros, the three principal ones are the haciendas of the religious orders, those of the sugar *ingenios*, and those of other private owners (including *cabeceras de mayorazgos*).¹¹⁸

Theoretical Aspects

In contemporary political debate about development problems, the traditional hacienda has become the symbol of the obstacles to prog-

113. Mörner, *La corona española y los foráneos en los pueblos de indios de América* (Stockholm, 1970).

114. Spalding, "Tratos mercantiles del corregidor," p. 607, says that she did not find population records indicating the division into pueblos and haciendas prior to 1792. At the Archivo Arquidiocesano, Cuzco, I came across a *padrón* of this type dating from 1729 (Fundos 34-298-3). In a dossier on "Tributos de Calca . . . 1784" at the Archivo Histórico de la Universidad Nacional del Cuzco I found correspondence indicating that Indian tenant labor would be classified as *forasteros*.

115. Macera, "Feudalismo," pp. 7-8, and my own observations in sources related to eighteenth-century Cuzco.

116. Bauer, "El Huique."

117. Lockhart, "Encomienda and Hacienda," p. 420.

118. Romero de Terreros, *Antiguas haciendas de México* (México, 1956), pp. 16-17.

ress. Therefore, it is not surprising that attempts have been made to analyze it in theoretical and ideological terms. Is the traditional hacienda a "feudal" institution, whether "feudal" be used in a Marxist sense or according to one of the various non-Marxist definitions?¹¹⁹

Among those who think it is, the non-Marxist French political scientist Jacques Lambert sees Latin America as an essentially dual society, divided into one capitalist, dynamic, mostly urban sector and a "feudal," traditional, agrarian one. When "capitalism" was introduced into Latin America a hundred years ago or less, "it clashed with a still young and strong feudal society," Lambert wants us to believe. Owing to their capacity to resist change, haciendas would be a major factor in preserving the tragic division of society discerned by the dualist school.¹²⁰ Basically the same view is held by such Marxist writers as José Carlos Mariátegui, who strongly emphasized the "organic and fundamental difference" between the feudal or semifeudal economy of the Peruvian sierra and the capitalist economy of the coast.¹²¹

However, more than twenty years ago, Jan Bazant presented a contrary interpretation of the hacienda. Different from the *encomienda*, with its "feudal" mode of production, the hacienda was characterized by its capitalist mode of production, Bazant asserted.¹²² It is curious to observe that Robert Keith's recent article provides a very similar interpretation, though not formulated in Marxist terms. As Keith sees it, the *encomienda* was "essentially a pre-capitalistic institution," though modified by capitalistic features, whereas the hacienda would be a basically capitalistic institution, "corrupted" by "feudal" features.¹²³ Those who have read José Miranda's excellent but little-known study of the entrepreneurial activities of sixteenth-century *encomenderos* would surely hesitate in making such a distinction.¹²⁴ The most emphatically anti-dualist view, in any case, has been expressed by André Gunder Frank. For him the so-called "archaic" or "feudal" sector of society is a complete illusion, produced by "the internal contradictions" of the capitalist system. In Frank's opinion, ex-

119. Definitions closely tied to the West European medieval prototype will not be very suitable in this connection. For a thoughtful, modified Marxist definition see Witold Kula, *Théorie économique du système féodal: pour un modèle de l'économie polonaise, 16^e-18^e siècles* (Paris and The Hague, 1970), p. xl.

120. Jacques Lambert, *Amérique Latine. Structures sociales et institutions politiques* (Paris, 1963).

121. Mariátegui, *Siete ensayos*, p. 75.

122. Bazant, "Feudalismo y capitalismo en la historia de México," *Trimestre económico*, 17 (México, 1944), 89-98.

123. Keith, "Encomienda, Hacienda, and Corregimiento," p. 438.

124. Miranda, *La función económica del encomendero en los orígenes del régimen colonial (Nueva España, 1525-1531)* (México, 1965).

ternal dependence and capitalism have dictated Latin American history ever since 1492. When confronted with the presence of nonmonetary relations in agriculture Frank explains that terms like "feudal" or "capitalist" must be reserved for the entire socio-economic system instead of being applied to all sorts of "associated features." He believes that historical research will show that the so-called feudal haciendas which are relatively isolated and self-sufficient today "were usually not organized" in this way. They were the result of an earlier commercial development which declined.¹²⁵ I think historians had better take this last suggestion seriously. It seems likely, for instance, that the haciendas of the Cuzco region were commercialized to a considerably higher degree in the eighteenth century than they were during the nineteenth.

Frank's interpretation has been much criticized, however, from both Marxist and non-Marxist quarters, for being simplistic and excessively static and rigid. Ruggiero Romano, among other things, objects to Frank's refusal to accept the existence of "surplus" in a "feudal" society. This is in harmony with Marcello Carmagnani's analysis of colonial Chile: "a seigniorial and dependent economy may experience sustained growth . . . of production, as long as there is an external or induced demand that provides the stimulus." Frank can also be criticized for having simplified the concept of "dualism" in order to refute it. Romano points to the possible co-existence of "feudal" and "capitalist" elements in the same environment, even within the same enterprise.¹²⁶

The easiest way out of the dilemma is, of course, simply to call the hacienda "semi-feudal" or "half-feudal, half-capitalist" as some authors have been content to do.¹²⁷ The Peruvian historian Pablo Macera has attempted a more ambitious analysis. He points out that

125. Frank, *Capitalism*, p. 239 and passim; and his *Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution?* (New York, 1969), p. 238 ff. See also Rodolfo Stavenhagen's succinct rejection of the dualist thesis in James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin (eds.), *Latin America. Reform or Revolution? A Reader* (Greenwich, Conn., 1968), pp. 14-18.

126. Romano, "Sous-développement économique et sous-développement culturel," *Cahiers Vilfredo Pareto. Revue Européenne des Sciences Sociales*, no. 24 (Geneva, 1971), pp. 271-279; Carmagnani, "La producción agropecuaria chilena. Aspectos cuantitativos (1680-1830)," *Cahiers des Amériques Latines*, no. 3 (Paris, 1969), p. 21.

127. Chevalier, "La gran propiedad en México desde el siglo XVI hasta comienzos del siglo XIX," *Desarrollo económico*, 3 (Buenos Aires, 1963), 46; Wolf, *Sons of the Shaking Earth*, p. 204. Pierre Vilar, "Mouvements paysans en Amérique Latine," *Enquête sur les mouvements paysans dans le monde contemporain . . . Rapport général* (Moscow, 1970: Congrès International des Sciences Historiques), p. 79, admits that "le terme 'semi-féodal' irrite par son imprecision" but can find no better alternative.

whereas the internal economy of the hacienda was non-monetary, externally it was a part of the money economy of its time. The "feudal" character of the agrarian sector was simply a consequence of the colonial status of Spanish America. Thus, the Spanish American "mode of production could well be defined as a dependent sub-capitalism which in order to be precisely that, needed an agrarian feudalism of a colonial type." For Macera the appearance of outmoded, "archaic" social forms in the New World in the wake of the Conquest was the price that Europe made the colonies pay for its own modernization.¹²⁸

The idea that the expansion of the capitalist world market at certain stages produces or rather reproduces archaic socio-economic phenomena on the frontier of development is also supported by Eric Hobsbawm. In his study of the haciendas and labor of twentieth-century La Convención, Peru, he argues that "serfdom" in this area was not so much "the child of feudal tradition as the response by powerful landlords to an economic condition." This would refer to increasing external demand for the products of the district, where labor, free, forced or enslaved, was scarce. The tenant labor system, here called *arriendo*, would then necessarily follow from the decision of the landowners "to undertake demesne cultivation under conditions of labor shortage and inadequate communications."¹²⁹

In his recent dissertation Cristóbal Kay, as already mentioned, makes the relationship between demesne and peasant cultivation the criterion for his analysis of hacienda. With increased demand, an estate is likely to pass from the *Grundherrschaft* type to that of *Gutsherrschaft*, where manpower is mainly occupied on the demesne of the landlord. Kay thinks, for example, that haciendas in central Chile underwent this transformation during the latter part of the nineteenth century.¹³⁰ His interpretation is not wholly convincing, but it has the advantage of drawing attention to the parallels between the

128. Macera, "Feudalismo." In his Marxist analysis, "Feudalismus und Kapitalismus in der Kolonialgeschichte Lateinamerikas" (Rome, 1972), Manfred Kossok accepts Macera's analysis of the double nature of the hacienda but rejects his notion of "sub-capitalism." He also cautiously points out that there being no hacienda "*an sich*" (that is, in the abstract), the approach must be an empirical one.

129. Hobsbawm, "A Case of Neo-Feudalism: La Convención, Peru," *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 1:1 (1969), 39, 48-49 and passim. In "Un edificio capitalista con una fachada feudal? El latifundio en Andalucía y en América Latina," *Cuadernos de ruedo Ibérico*, no. 15 (Paris, 1967), p. 49, Juan Martínez Alier presents an analysis of labor relations of the *colonato* type which harmonizes with Frank. When the motives of the landowners in introducing such arrangements are to reduce labor costs, and the workers continue to consider themselves as such, then these labor relations "son más bien un síntoma de que las relaciones de producción son realmente capitalistas."

130. Kay, "Development," pp. 96-106.

large estates in Latin America and those in Eastern Europe, the other frontier of the Atlantic World during the same period. The two areas look strikingly similar in both their commercialization and their extreme exploitation of labor.¹³¹ Students interested in analyzing the nature and functioning of the hacienda would also have much to learn from such a sophisticated scholar as the Pole Witold Kula. His definitions and models of the various stages of agrarian evolution in Poland between the sixteenth and the eighteenth century are intelligent and closely based on factual knowledge.¹³²

As it is, to date the theoretical discussion of the hacienda and of Latin American economic history in general is far from impressive. Non-Marxists have been strikingly superficial and vague, while Marxists, more often than not, seem merely confused when confronted with a complex historical reality.¹³³

Sources

There are two main categories of source material available for hacienda history: records kept by the landowners themselves, and public or publicly registered documents referring to their estates. These two categories complement each other. It is obvious, however, that it is mainly the former which provides insight into the inner workings of the hacienda.

Hacienda papers can be broken down into several categories—property titles; correspondence, for instance between an absent owner and his administrator; inventories; and last but not least, accounts. Most “hacienda archives” merely contain a batch of *títulos*, though some comprise more. In the case of Mexican haciendas, the vast collection of Sánchez Navarro papers at the University of Texas and that of Regla papers at Washington State University are well known.¹³⁴ There is also, for instance, the collection of the Ipiña-Verástegui family of San Luis

131. It is my impression that the usual insistence on comparing the medieval manor and the hacienda has been unfortunate. The time difference makes such comparisons especially difficult and risky. On the other hand, I had long been wondering why nobody seemed to notice the striking similarities between the agrarian structures of Latin America and those of Eastern Europe, when I found that Mario Góngora, in his *Encomenderos y estancieros*, pp. 121-122, makes precisely this point.

132. Kula, *Théorie économique*.

133. The discussion makes obvious that controversial and vague terms like “feudal” and “capitalist” absolutely should not be used as analytical tools unless the author first clearly defines his use of them. An example of Marxist confusion is D. F. Maza Zavala’s introduction to *La obra Pia de Chuao*, pp. 51-94.

134. See Jacqueline M. Gaines, *Three Centuries of Mexican Documents. Partial Calendar of the Regla Papers* (Pullman, Wash., 1963).

Potosí, said to contain no less than 40 volumes of correspondence dealing with the hacienda of Bledos (1870-1913). To find out about the motivations and attitudes of landowners, correspondence is necessarily the principal source.¹³⁵ Unfortunately, accounts have usually been lost, if, indeed, it was ever the practice to keep them in any but the most rudimentary form.¹³⁶ If preserved, accounts may yield a surprising mass of data on production, wages, debts and rural prices.¹³⁷ Twentieth-century expropriations of landed properties in countries like Mexico, Bolivia and Peru have at times included hacienda archives. It seems, however, that much of this material has sooner or later been lost. At the present time, a small group of scholars in Peru—Juan Martínez-Alier of Oxford, Heraclio Bonilla of the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos and Pablo Macera of the University of San Marcos—is trying to rescue and inventory such documents. They would be kept at a Centro de Documentación Agraria in Lima to be freely accessible for research. The efforts of the group have met with the approval of the Peruvian authorities, but so far the resources at their disposal have been utterly inadequate for this important and urgent task.

The expropriation of all the properties of the Society of Jesus in 1767 resulted in the preservation of an unsurpassed wealth of documentation on a considerable number of properties, scattered throughout Spanish America. These collections are widely distributed. The one at the National Archives of Santiago de Chile is especially rich. Referring to the holdings there on Mexico, Hermes Tovar says that they not only give us a complete view of the situation of each property in 1767, but also of its state five, ten or fifteen years later, when it was auctioned or sold. At times, serial data on costs and production comprise two or three decades, beginning some five years before the expulsion.¹³⁸ During recent years Pablo Macera, Germán Colmenares, and others have explored Jesuit documentation on colonial landholding. However, to generalize on the basis of Jesuit material alone is

135. Jan Bazant, in *La historia económica*, II, 112-113.

136. For the Peruvian sierra, Francisco Ponce de León, *Al servicio de los aborígenes peruanos* (Cuzco, 1946), p. 36, reports that "lo más que hacen los hacendados es llevar una cuenta de lo que debe dar cada arrendatario por las tierras que ocupa y de los días en que ha ocurrido a los trabajos de la hacienda." These "accounts" are settled once a year.

137. See, for instance, Luis Chávez Orozco's presentation of the accounts of a small Mexican hacienda from 1802 in Banco Nacional de Crédito Agrícola y Ganadero, S. A., *Contabilidad de una hacienda novo-hispana* (México, 1956).

138. Hermes Tovar Pinzón, "Las haciendas jesuitas de México. Índice de documentos existentes en el Archivo Nacional de Chile," *Historia mexicana*, 20:4 (1971), 563-617; 21:1 (1971), 135-189. The Jesuit collection in Santiago totals 429 volumes, 83 of which deal with Mexico.

very risky. On the whole, their estates seem to have been more efficiently organized than those of other landholders.¹³⁹

Apart from the Jesuits, religious archives probably harbor much other hacienda documentation that still remains unknown. A short time ago, for example, a research seminar at the Departamento de Investigaciones Históricas of the Mexican Instituto de Antropología e Historia uncovered records on some 28 haciendas in the archives of the Basílica of Guadalupe.¹⁴⁰

It would take too long to discuss here all the different kinds of public sources which might be relevant for the study of the hacienda. Tithe receipts necessarily provide a basic source for any effort to calculate the growth or decline of agricultural production prior to the mid-nineteenth century. But the task raises difficult methodological problems. Apart from fiscal sources, we should also stress the importance of notarial and judicial archives. Lawsuits provide a very heterogeneous wealth of information about the haciendas, at times even on their internal organization.¹⁴¹

Demographic sources are invaluable in that they allow a distinction to be made between the population of the free villages and that of the haciendas. At times, there are also sources that give us an excellent overview of the existing agrarian structure. In 1712-19, a census was taken of all the landholders of the province of Tlaxcala in connection with a *donativo gracioso* being imposed on them by the Crown. This document, well edited by Isabel González Sánchez, lets us know the names of each owner and property, the extent, quality and value of the land, the number of cattle and various kinds of encumbrances attached to the estate.¹⁴²

139. Apart from the works listed in note 51, the Rome papers of Tovar and J. D. Riley, and Chevalier's *Instrucciones a los hermanos jesuitas administradores de haciendas* (México, 1950) can be mentioned. Riley admits that Jesuits were "more concerned with efficiency" than lay landowners, but argues that their "handling of labor and crop technology" were those of the time and place.

140. The paper given at Rome by Enrique Semo and Gloria Pedrero, "La vida en una hacienda-aserradero mexicana a principios del siglo XIX," was based on these records.

141. See Brading, in *La historia económica*, II, 105. At the Rome meeting M. P. Brungardt presented an ambitious paper on "Tithe Production and Economic Change in Colombia, 1761-1833." Carmagnani, "Producción," presents a method for calculating agricultural production on the basis of the receipts of tithes. His method of eliminating the impact of price trends raises serious doubts, however. In *Estadísticas económicas del Porfiriato. Fuerza de trabajo y actividades económicas por sectores* (México, n. d.), F. Rosenzweig presents a methodology for the construction of agricultural price indexes in Mexico, 1877-1911, on the basis of heterogeneous material.

Future Research

This survey intends to make clear that our knowledge about the hacienda and the rural history of Latin America in general is now considerably more extensive than it was twenty years ago. However, it is still strikingly uneven in both geographical and chronological terms. Mexico is still far better known than the rest of the region. Absurdly, most of the serious investigations suddenly stop at 1810, a date which is almost meaningless in economic and social history. Also, we know considerably more about the territorial expansion of the great estates and their conflicts with Indian communities and other neighbors than about the internal functioning of the haciendas and their links to the market.¹⁴³

The heart of our problem is of another kind, however. Even with a rapidly increasing, more evenly distributed set of monographs, the relation between the particular case and general conditions will still prove frustratingly difficult to establish.¹⁴⁴ Thus at the end of the Rome meeting Arnold Bauer somewhat gloomily concluded that the session had, indeed, contributed to our knowledge, but perhaps not so much to our understanding. What should we then attempt to do?

James Lockhart has admonished students of the great estates to "take into account the institution's multiple dimensions and not limit themselves to 'hacienda studies' or to the study of 'land and labor systems,' or most especially to 'rural history.'" ¹⁴⁵ To some extent I can agree. The market aspect and, as we already discussed, the non-rural activities of the landowners cannot be left out. But the limitations of a scholar's capacity being what they are, the overview might be bought only at the price of superficiality. To understand the role and development of the haciendas, it seems even more important to place them, or the entire agrarian structure in a certain district, in an ecological context and to determine the cartographical dimensions through time.¹⁴⁶ The most natural approach would then be to use the relatively abundant sources which exist on contemporary conditions as the point of departure for historical reconstruction. There is no doubt that quantification will prove difficult in other than exceptional cases, but efforts

142. González Sánchez, *Haciendas*.

143. See Florescano's remarks in *La historia económica*, I, 200-201.

144. See Brading in *La historia económica*, II, 110.

145. Lockhart, "Encomienda and Hacienda," 429.

146. Mellafe, in *Temas*, p. 24. See also J. P. Berthe, "Production et productivité agricoles au Mexique du XVI^e au XVIII^e siècle," *Third International Conference of Economic History* (The Hague, 1965), pp. 105-109.

in this direction must be made.¹⁴⁷ Available sources may permit a demographic reconstruction through time. They would hopefully allow for an approximation, at least, of the historical trends of land values, production, rural prices and trade.

If so, some very timely and basic questions could be approached. How large a part of the haciendas' output found its way to regional or more distant markets? Can the links of the haciendas with the outer world be identified as "chains" within a pattern of internal and external dependence? The task will be extremely complicated and time-consuming. It would seem that interdisciplinary teamwork between historians and geographers, rural sociologists or other social scientists would often be the rational solution. In any case, historians should feel stimulated and challenged in this difficult work by the fact that the historical development of the hacienda is exceptionally relevant to Latin America's contemporary problems.¹⁴⁸

147. See John J. TePaske's cautious remark in "Quantification in Latin American Colonial History" in V. R. Lorwin and J. M. Price, *The Dimensions of the Past* (New Haven and London, 1972), p. 441. Soviet scholars have gathered especially great experience in the quantification of agrarian history. A good example is J. Kähk, *Die Krise der Feudalen Landwirtschaft in Estland (Das zweite Viertel des 19. Jahrhunderts)* (Tallinn, 1969).

148. As Griffin, *Underdevelopment*, p. 48, puts it, "it is only from an examination of the forces of history—i. e. of the political uses of power, both political and economic—that one may obtain an insight into the origins of underdevelopment."