

sion of the public sector which triggered a struggle over “big government” and Seaga’s privatization campaign; changing labor relations; the evolving nature of public opinion, which features a subset of undecided voters who are the key to elections; and the political polarization which has dominated Jamaican politics since 1972 when Michael Manley and the People’s National Party assumed power.

While quick to recognize weaknesses, Carl Stone is optimistic about the prospects for democracy in Jamaica. Among the factors to which he attributes its vitality are the country’s multiple-class party system, a firmly democratic political culture, and effective political institutions. One is troubled by the author’s heavy dependence on his own work in arriving at these conclusions, but his analysis is rich with insights into Jamaican politics. As such it is required reading for Latin Americanists seeking to understand Jamaica and for United States foreign policy makers.

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Trinidad and Tobago: Democracy and Development in the Caribbean. By SCOTT B. MACDONALD. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1986. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. 230. Cloth. \$31.95.

Scott MacDonald begins this case study with a strident methodological assertion: the theoretical literature on the Caribbean, he maintains, is dated and “flawed” (p. 6). Since there is no discussion of any of this literature, one has to take the author’s word that what he replaces it with is indeed an improvement. The replacement is a retooled version of the John J. Johnson thesis on the developmental and democratizing role of the “middle sectors.” “In making revisions on the Johnson thesis,” says the author, “a solid framework of analysis has been created for a case study on Trinidad and Tobago” (p. 7). Alas, the promise proves to be more bark than bite. First, the framework is never consistently used in the analysis but rather serves the function of summarizing thoughts in a post facto fashion. The concepts middle sectors, middle class, groups, bourgeoisie, and class/caste are all used interchangeably. One consequence of this theoretical confusion is a major tautology which runs through the study: the notion that democratic capitalism is made possible because of the existence of a “democratic-minded middle class.”

But conceptual confusion is not the most serious weakness of the case study, factual errors are. They are so numerous and blatant that no list of them is possible. How, for instance, can one cite the *West Indies Year Book* of 1941 for 1941–44 figures (p. 64)? How can the author cite Eric Williams as saying that qualifications for candidacy to the Legislative Council in the early 1920s were to own real estate worth \$24,000 “from which they derived an annual income of \$19,000” (p. 53) when on the page cited Williams clearly says that the qualifications were any income of \$100 per month or capital worth at least \$2,400? How is it possible to

claim to have read Ivar Oxaal's and Selwyn Ryan's classic studies of the rise of Trinidad's black bourgeoisie and in a chapter on "interlocking directorates" cite the following cases of the "white economic elite": "In particular, a number of whites close to the prime minister, Bruce Procope, Eldon Warner, Ellis Clarke, Joffre Eli Serrette and Kenneth Julien . . ." (p. 69). If the author does not know that these gentlemen are not only not white and not of the economic elite, but indeed the very core of the new black bourgeoisie which the ruling party created, and that Clarke was the governor-general, Serrette the commander of the defense force, and Julien the government-appointed chairman of the major industrial complex at Point Lisas, what *does* he know about the middle sectors he purports to explain? The sad answer is evident and need not be belabored.

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Revolution and Intervention in Grenada: The New Jewel Movement, the United States, and the Caribbean. By KAI P. SCHOENHALS and RICHARD A. MELANSON. Boulder: Westview Press, 1985. Notes. Index. Pp. xii, 211. Cloth. \$22.00.

Schoenhals and Melanson provide an excellent summary of the short-lived Grenada Revolution and its forcible suppression by the United States. Schoenhals describes this tiny island state, summarizes its earlier history, and records the rural workers' upheaval led by Eric Gairy and his degeneration into a personal tyrant. Having laid this foundation, he gives a skillfully condensed account of the revolution which began on March 13, 1979, lasted for four and a half years, and was terminated by a U.S. invasion and occupation.

Schoenhals spent several months in Grenada gathering information about the revolution and meeting the people engaged in its development. His contribution, coming after the publication of so many ill-informed or deliberately distorted versions of the events leading up to the killing of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and the assumption of control by the Revolutionary Military Council, is like a breath of fresh air. He shows clearly that, even on the basis of the selective issue of captured documents released by the U.S. government, the only disagreement of importance within the New Jewel Movement (the ruling Marxist-Leninist party) was the question of what would be the most effective structure of party leadership. He disposes of the allegation that there was an internal power struggle between "hard-liners" and pragmatists, and discounts completely the suggestion that Coard, Bishop's deputy, conspired to replace Bishop for personal ambitions or any reason at all.

In assessing the blame for the escalation of the internal party dispute to the point of the fatal armed confrontation at Fort Rupert on October 19, 1983, Schoenhals is even handed as between Bishop and Coard. But, unable to resist a desire to identify a villain in the piece, he speculates as to the responsibility of certain