Much of the literature on the Chilean military government (1973–90) emphasizes the highly personalist nature of the regime constructed after the 1973 coup that ousted Salvador Allende. Robert Barros challenges this characterization, arguing that the division of power among the branches of the armed forces, and between the Junta (acting as legislature) and the president, made General Augusto Pinochet’s dominance much less complete than other scholars have suggested. Instead, Barros insists that cohesion and stability of the military regime rested on “a collegial organization of power that was institutionalized through rules and procedures which protected and reinforced the original plural foundation of military rule” (p. 4).
He grounds this conclusion in careful and extensive review of internal documents of the military regime. Archival research is supplemented by interviews with key civilian officials in the military government, retired and active-duty military officers, lawyers, judges, constitutional theorists, and opposition politicians and activists....
