TWO. SEEKING AUDIENCE

Refusals to Listen, "Style," and the Politics of Recognition

If there is someone you do not wish to recognize as a political being, you begin by not seeing them as the bearers of politicalness, by not understanding what they say, by not hearing that it is an utterance coming out of their mouths. . . . In order to refuse the title of political subjects to a category—workers, women, etc . . . it has traditionally been sufficient to assert that they belong . . . to a space separated from public life. . . . And the politics of these categories has always consisted in re-qualifying these places . . . in making what was unseen visible; in getting what was only audible as noise to be heard as speech. —JACQUES RANCIÈRE, "Ten Theses on Politics," 2001

Podile asked us to come back the next day. He had staff, wardens and security personnel when we came back. Podile told us, "I do not need to answer you, I have full powers given by the VC [vice chancellor]." He then asked the security guards to throw us out. A scuffle broke out and some glass got shattered. Podile then said we assaulted him and got ten of us rusticated [suspended] on January 10. —Student suspended from the University of Hyderabad in 2002 after repeated efforts to present a memorandum to the chief warden of hostels, quoted by Sandhya Ravishankar, "No University for Dalits," 2016

On January 10, 2002, ten students from the University of Hyderabad—a Government of India centrally administered university—were suspended after repeated efforts by a group of more than one hundred students to collectively present a list of concerns to the university's chief warden of hostels.[1] The students were members of the Ambedkar Students' Association (ASA), an organization founded in 1993 by a small group of Dalits studying at the University of Hyderabad.[2] Established to respond to various

forms of discrimination and to advocate for the rights of Dalit students, the ASA has subsequently expanded to other university campuses, including Hyderabad's Osmania University, the Tata Institute of Social Sciences in Mumbai, Pondicherry University, University of Mumbai, Central University of Gujarat, Central University of Kerala, and Panjab University in Chandigarh.

Although a propensity for violence was the reason cited by university officials for suspending the ten students, the members of the ASA were attempting to raise several issues with the chief warden during the encounter that precipitated their expulsions.[3] Their chief concern was the dramatic increase in hostel mess fees by nearly 60 percent over the previous six months, brought on by the chief warden's decision to centralize purchasing.[4] The move toward centralization, widely seen as a step toward privatization, increased the financial strain on those students who were dependent on university fellowships and whose stipends were insufficient to cover the raised catering fees. Many interpreted the fee increase as an attempt to push such students out of the university and as "a slur on the integrity of mess secretaries," many of whom were Dalits who lacked familial financial support and sought to defray expenses by working in the hostel mess in exchange for reduced meal fees.[5] An additional concern was the recent demotion of a Dalit warden—who had opposed the centralization of the mess catering service and acted as an advocate for many Dalit students—from his overall administrative and financial responsibility for the hostel to taking care of "sanitation and gardening." This was seen as a deeply demeaning move by members of the communities that had historically been relegated to such tasks. Together, this fee increase and the demotion must be read within a context in which many upper-caste Hindus—both students and faculty— have felt resentment at the increased numbers of students from historically marginalized backgrounds, both those admitted via government-mandated affirmative action policies and through general quotas.

This was not the first time the students had attempted to voice their concerns to university authorities. Their collective efforts to speak with the chief warden in January 2002 followed a series of attempts to communicate with university authorities, including participating in meetings in the hostel and a general student body meeting, sending a petition to the vice chancellor, and attempting to meet with and present a memorandum to the chief warden. They had also submitted a formal written complaint to university authorities in November 2001 in response to posters that were hung in the hostel calling Dalit students "pigs and uncivilised, violent brutes," and

describing them as "corrupt" and "shameless."[6] No action was taken in response to their repeated efforts to raise these concerns or in response to the offensive posters. Nor did university officials ever acknowledge their formal complaint or their petition to the vice chancellor, and their memorandum to the chief warden and efforts to meet with him were refused. Yet, in the wake of the students' suspensions, rather than addressing how university administrators had failed to acknowledge the escalating series of concerns raised by the Dalit students, *The Hindu* newspaper quoted the vice chancellor as asking, "What makes the Dalit students so angry?"[7]

The discursive representation of emotion has been used to include and incorporate others into a social body, but it can also exclude, mark out as different, silence, and prevent active participation. In an earlier book, I explored ways of representing emotion to incorporate and suggest inclusion in a social body, focusing on new recognitions of emotion in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.[8] In this chapter, I argue that emotion and emotionally charged violence have been portrayed as reflecting a particular "style" of political communication and that this attribution of political style can be used to silence marginalized voices, mark difference, and prevent and counteract formal inclusion. I illustrate this argument by identifying the representation of emotion in refusals to recognize and give audience to speaking subjects.

Seeking Audience in South Asia

The formal role of holding audiences has a long history in India. Ethical rulers or leaders are expected to offer their constituents, followers, or subjects regular opportunities for communication. The classical Indian text on the science of statecraft and politics, the *Arthaśāstra*, is perhaps the earliest work to capture this ideal.[9] A section on administrative organization recommends that rulers divide each of their days and nights into eight equal (ninety-minute) portions. The second ninety-minute portion of the day is explicitly designated for public audiences; it is a time to hear and consider "the prayers and petitions of the subjects."[10] Regardless of whether rulers actually followed the *Arthaśāstra*'s template, the fact that giving audience to subjects was considered important enough to occupy daily attention suggests its centrality in theory. The Telugu language similarly offers glimpses into an understanding of a concept of audience that does not easily translate into English. The Telugu noun *koluvu*, for example, has a complex meaning that

encompasses references to both the physical *space* in which an audience takes place ("a hall of audience" or "court") and to a *relationship* ("service" or "employment").[11] The English term *service* itself is widely used in India to refer to government or public sector employment, thus the "government servant." The combination of both meanings in the same word suggests a conceptual history that points to the importance of the government job in Indian history, as discussed in the introduction. Government employment has long been seen as one of the most effective routes to social mobility in South Asia, distinct from agriculture or mercantile occupations, and continues to be privileged in the context of the affirmative action reservations that are expanding in India today. Koluvu evokes some of this history while also placing the giving of an audience within a privileged position.

Although the form and organization of power have obviously changed in an era of electoral politics, many politicians and elected officials today still hold public audience sessions with their constituents on a regular basis, often in the form of regular reception hours or a weekly "Grievance Day," *vijñaptula dinam* or *darakhāstula dinam* in Telugu (see figures 2.1 and 2.2).[12] Jennifer Bussell, for example, found that between two-thirds and three-quarters of the visitors received by elected officials in India are constituents seeking services or assistance and that elected officials spend between one-quarter and one-third of their time receiving constituents and addressing their petitions and needs.[13] The architectural and spatial arrangements of the offices of elected officials and higher-level bureaucrats in India reflect the expectation that they will spend time entertaining petitioners, with a reception area or audience hall integrated into the design. When meeting a senior official or elected representative, it is not uncommon to be ushered into a room in which rows of seats are arranged facing the official's desk, enabling multiple petitioners to be present simultaneously. Officials skillfully manage their various appeals while also performing their power by hearing and settling cases in front of an audience of other petitioners (see figure 2.3). When the Mahbubnagar district collector T. K. Sreedevi discontinued the Collectorate's traditional weekly Grievance Day in February 2015 after launching a website for receiving online petitions, the move was met with great protest. Feeling excluded from direct access to the collector, many requested that the weekly audiences at the Revenue Bhavan be reinstated.[14]

Anastasia Piliavsky describes another example of the spatial arrangements that enable face-to-face communication with those in power in the context of the north Indian state of Rajasthan:

FIGURE 2.1. People waiting to meet with the collector on Grievance Day, Thoothukudi Collectorate, July 24, 2006 (photo: N. Rajesh/*The Hindu*).

FIGURE 2.2. Farmers attending a Grievance Day meeting with Revenue Divisional Officer P. Murugesh, Tirupur, December 12, 2008 (photo: M. Balaji/*The Hindu*).

FIGURE 2.3. Superintendent of Police Labhu Ram listening to grievances raised by members of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe groups in Mangalore, November 6, 2011 (photo: R. Eswarraj/*The Hindu*).

In the *darbar*, or the royal assembly, the king receives his visitors in two separate halls: the commoners in the *diwaan-e-aam* (the common assembly) and special visitors in the *diwaan-e-khaas* (the special assembly). The *diwaan-e-aam* occupies a green, spacious courtyard, which fills every morning with petitioners seeking an audience with the king. The courtyard leads, through a screened door, into the inner chamber where the king receives envoys, aristocrats and notable visitors from abroad. The commoners come separately or in groups and the king, when he does appear, dispenses various "gifts" and he adjudicates.[15]

Yet, the king in question, she goes on to tell us, "is not an erstwhile Rajput, Mughal or Maratha sovereign, but a current Member of the Rajasthan Legislative Assembly."[16] Her contemporary portrait, based on fieldwork conducted in the first two decades of the twenty-first century, emphasizes the ongoing relevance in India of seeking audience with a government official (see figure 2.4). Even when arrangements for audiences are not formally instituted by government administrators themselves, citizen groups or intermediaries like journalists often stage them. The Hindi-language newspaper *Hindustan* in conjunction with its English-language counterpart *Hindustan Times*, for example, organizes a

FIGURE 2.4. Cartoon illustrating the desire of citizens to be heard by government officials (here Prime Minister Narendra Modi), published in the wake of the Pegasus spy scandal revelations that dozens of Indian politicians, activists, journalists, and government critics were potential targets of snooping by Israeli-made spyware, July 21, 2021 (courtesy of cartoonist Satish Acharya).

biannual program, "At Your Doorstep," to facilitate opportunities for "resource-poor" people to gain audiences with administrators.[17] Such events not only offer opportunities to share grievances and suggestions but also position members of the press as key brokers between the state and its citizens.

But what happens when an elected or appointed official, such as the chief warden of hostels at a central government-administered university, refuses to give an audience and hear a petitioner? In this chapter I argue that throughout Indian history there has been a direct relationship between the refusal on the part of officials to entertain petitioners and the subsequent emergence of collective action. Indeed, one way of approaching the history of collective action in India is to view it as the holding of an audience in reverse. Instead of a leader extending an audience to petitioners to enable grievances or concerns to be heard and addressed, forms of collective assembly are frequently used in India to compel an audience with

someone in power under conditions in which recognition may not otherwise be forthcoming. Many collective assemblies—in both designated assembly spaces and other public spaces—are staged specifically with the aim of gaining an audience with someone in the government.

The 2020–21 farmers' agitation discussed in the introduction is a case in point. An explicit goal of the farmers' occupation of public spaces at various entry points into Delhi was to gain an audience with government officials, reflecting their frustration that they had been given no opportunity to provide input about the new agricultural policies. Komal Mohite's ethnography of the 2017 Tamil Nadu farmers' dharna in Delhi's designated assembly space at Jantar Mantar similarly illustrates this desire for an audience. One farmer explained to her that their "spectacular protests are done with the precise aim of getting the attention of the Prime Minister Narendra Modi and that the farmers want Modi to come and meet with them and accept their demands."[18] Although the Tamil Nadu farmers did not succeed in meeting with the prime minister, their media-savvy strategies to gain attention—which included shaving half their beards and hair, displaying skulls and femur bones purported to be from farmers who had committed suicide, eating rats and snakes, marching in the nude to the prime minister's office, and vowing to drink their own urine and eat their own feces—did motivate the Madras High Court to direct the Tamil Nadu government to waive the cooperative bank loans of *all* farmers on the twenty-second day of their action, temporarily halting their protests.[19] The decision was later stayed by the Supreme Court, however, and the farmers returned to Jantar Mantar.[20] As we saw in chapter 1, such collective assemblies—in full public view—are seen by marginalized actors as particularly effective in mobilizing public opinion in ways that encourage a leader to give a hearing to, and enter into discussion or negotiations with, those in structurally less powerful positions, particularly after earlier efforts to seek audience were refused or ignored. Yet this is not always how such actions are understood or portrayed, especially by those in more dominant positions. Instead, those in positions of authority use a range of strategies to avoid hearing the voices of those in marginalized positions.

Emotion and Collective Action

The question of why Dalits are so angry is one that has been voiced repeatedly by non-Dalits in India in recent years, particularly as Dalit political mobilization has become more visible since the 1980s and 1990s.[21] Newspaper

headlines and academic paper titles alike suggest that we are witnessing, in the words of Nicolas Jaoul, a shift from "meek Harijans" (Gandhi's somewhat patronizing term for Dalits) to "angry Dalits."[22] But rather than endeavoring to explain "why Dalits are so angry," I argue in this chapter that we instead need to ask how and why efforts to make voices heard are so often framed as something *other* than acts of communication or constructive participation in the public sphere. Particularly for members of already marginalized groups, the reduction of their political articulations to emotional outbursts, or their representations as noise, violence, or excess, can silence the *illocutionary* dimensions of their communicative acts. Making only the form or rhetorical style of a communicative act visible and audible, such representations elide the specific intended meaning that an intersubjective performative act seeks to make understood. The intended meanings often remain unheard and unacknowledged.[23] An exclusive focus on form or style of communication allows potential listeners—in this case, authorities at a government-administered university—to convince themselves and others that they need not recognize an act as communicative and therefore can avoid hearing or acknowledging it. In these acts of communication that are specifically addressed to authorities, I analyze the complicity of social theory and historiography within the conceptualization of communicative acts in ways that license a refusal to hear. In doing so, I argue that, by situating each collective act of mobilization within a longer temporal frame, we can identify the role that earlier refusals of recognition have played in shaping the forms or "styles" of later actions. Paying attention to emotions in the absence of such larger contextualization can further disempower those already on the margins.

Participatory and Adversarial Politics: Beyond European Historical Genealogies

Daniel Cefaï defines mobilization as "any collective action oriented by a concern for promoting a public good or for repealing a public evil, that gives itself adversaries to fight against."[24] He is not alone in associating collective actions with an adversarial stance. Scholars of the political in South Asia have inherited analytical tools from European and colonial political projects, making it more challenging to move beyond an understanding of collective mobilization as contention, resistance, insurgency, or opposition to or rejection of the state. As the introduction argues, social theorists

are quick to assume that people mobilizing in the streets are resisting and questioning the legitimacy of the state or seeking to subvert and negate its authority.[25] Attending to the histories of those who engage in collective action and to the official reactions to their communicative efforts allows us to contextualize their desires for recognition from the existing state, for interpellation within its networks, and for inclusion within its ongoing processes of decision making.

Ideas of negation and adversarial opposition loom large in discussions of collective forms of state-directed assembly in both European and South Asian scholarship. Ranajit Guha's *Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency*, for example, does much to reclaim peasants as political actors, particularly in his critique of Eric Hobsbawm's notion of the "pre-political."[26] However, by focusing only on the stages of protest in which actors had already become what he identifies as "rebels" and by framing his analysis as an examination of peasant *insurgencies*, Guha elides the earlier nonviolent actions that peasants took to appeal to the state. This has had the effect of inscribing a deep separation between the actions and ideologies of the peasant actors who form the object of his analysis and the forms of practice engaged in by elites. This bifurcation lives on, for example, in Partha Chatterjee's more contemporary distinction between *political society*—those who act collectively as objects of governmentality—and *civil society*, or the bourgeois minority who function as individual "rights-bearing citizens in the sense imagined by the constitution" and who interact with "organs of the state" either "in their individual capacities or as members of associations."[27] The intention of these analytic interventions has been to develop tools that take "subaltern" forms of claim-making seriously. Yet the acceptance of categorizations such as insurgency, rebellion, riot, and revolt—even for the many nonviolent actions and efforts to communicate with state officials that preceded uprisings—has had the effect of collapsing both violent and nonviolent forms of collective assembly under the sign of opposition, inscribing a sharp contrast between collective forms of action and individual forms.

The specific attention to the emotional states of peasant and other "subaltern" actors has played a significant role in constructing this binary. James Scott's foreword to the 1999 edition of Ranajit Guha's classic text makes this clear: "What Guha does is to restore the passion, anger, and indignation to popular movements. . . . The presumed cultural, economic, and social inferiority of the tribal, the peasant, the outcast(e) in a complex indigenous and colonial order—their subaltern status—is precisely the relationship that forms the basis for all acts of insubordination, resistance, refusal, and self-

assertion."[28] In this way, the emotions of subaltern actors are frequently made central within the analyses of collective action. It is far less common for this same attention to be devoted to the emotions of those in positions of authority, even when there is archival evidence of their anxiety, anger, or fear.

What is crucial to recognize, then, is not a distinction between elite and nonelite cultural *forms* or *ideologies*, as Ranajit Guha implies in his use of terms like *rebel consciousness*, his understanding of society as shaped by "class antagonisms," and his adoption of the Gramscian perspective that the peasant "learnt to recognize himself not by the properties and attributes of his own social being but by a diminution, if not negation, of those of his superiors."[29] Instead, I argue for attending to distinctions in the level of responsiveness by authorities to various individuals and groups. Rapid and positive responses have empowered some voices to be easily heard politically *as* individuals, whereas others who find themselves repeatedly silenced or ignored have no hope of being heard unless they come together to act collectively—and even then they still may not be heard. Nonviolent efforts to communicate with the colonial state—using conventionally recognizable civil society tactics like letters, petitions, and delegations, as well as other nonviolent forms of what we today recognize as civil disobedience or noncooperation—often grew violent only after being repeatedly ignored or in response to violent efforts of the British to quell them.[30] Guha acknowledges the widespread use of civil society and nonviolent civil disobedience tactics by subaltern groups in a single sentence in passing when he writes, "In many instances [peasants] tried at first to obtain justice from the authorities by deputation (e.g., Titu's bidroha, 1831), petition (e.g., Khandesh riots, 1852), and peaceful demonstration (e.g., Indigo rebellion, 1860) and took up arms only as a last resort when all other means had failed."[31] With the exception of this single sentence, however, these various deputations, petitions, strikes, peaceful assemblies, and other nonviolent efforts in which Guha's various "rebels" engaged before resorting to violence disappear from the text, turning a continuum of practices shaped by the responsiveness of authorities into a binary between elite and subaltern "cultural" worlds. Nor are we offered insights into the emotions of the district collectors, police superintendents, army officers, and other colonial administrators or authority figures who issued orders to fire on collective assemblies or advocated the use of force to disperse the gathered crowds.

Similarly, the appeals made by members of the Ambedkar Students' Association also turned violent only after repeated unsuccessful efforts to gain

an audience with authorities and be heard by them. Although it is unclear exactly how the encounter turned violent, we do know that the chief warden refused to meet with a smaller group of students the first time they sought an audience with him and that when they returned the next day at the appointed time, they found that he was not alone but had gathered reinforcements—including security personnel. One student suspected that the warden's derogatory attitude toward the Dalit students might have reflected "a deliberate campaign" to get them expelled: "Podile asked us to come back the next day. . . . He had staff, wardens and security personnel when we came back. Podile told us, 'I do not need to answer you; I have full powers given by the vc." He then asked the security guards to throw us out. A scuffle broke out and some glass got shattered. Podile then said we assaulted him and got ten of us rusticated."[32] It was clear to the students not only that the chief warden was not interested in hearing their concerns but also that he found them out of line for even daring to raise them, regarding their desire to be heard as itself insubordinate.

Anger, Violence, and the Representation of Rational Speech Action

Mary Holmes has written of "the threat that anger poses for political order," suggesting that it has given rise to "strong cultural and political norms that seek to suppress the expression of anger."[33] Although she acknowledges that "anger bears no 'natural' allegiance to the downtrodden," any anger that challenges the status quo appears more marked and visible to those in power who enjoy the benefits of the current situation. Holmes therefore advocates for the importance of analyzing "anger as embedded within situated power relations."[34] She draws on the work of Elizabeth Spelman, who shows that the expression of anger by subordinate groups is not well tolerated by those in dominant positions. It is therefore much more likely to provoke both comment and retaliation than anger expressed by members of dominant groups.[35] As in the case of the university authorities' reaction to the members of the ASA, the expression of anger on the part of those in historically marginalized positions is often interpreted by those in power as itself "an act of insubordination."[36] All this suggests that, when it comes to the expression of anger, what matters is who is doing the expressing. Laura Ring's study of everyday life in a Karachi apartment building in Pakistan demonstrates how anger can be cultivated as "a hallmark . . . of masculine efficacy

and power." It is not only permitted but also encouraged in boys—but not in girls—from a very young age, functioning as "a powerful lexicon of difference" that is "deeply imbricated in the specific symbolic content of ethnic enmity."[37] Ring's deep ethnography supports the argument that anger expressed by anyone in a historically subordinate position is much more likely to encounter negative comments and censure than anger expressed by those in dominant positions.

Thus, when Peter Lyman identifies anger as "an indispensable political emotion," writing that "without angry speech the body politic would lack the voice of the powerless questioning the justice of the dominant order," he is careful to demonstrate that "the expression of anger is [also] a resource for the dominant."[38] Why, then, is it the anger of the powerless that so often becomes the focus of attention? And why do we not interrogate the feelings experienced by those like Podile who appear to resent the presence within the university of members of historically marginalized groups? Daniel Cefaï argues, "There is no collective action without perceiving, communicating, dramatizing and legitimizing an experience of indignation."[39] Amelie Blom and Nicolas Jaoul, building on Cefaï, argue that "public responses to illegitimate orders and perceived injustices are rarely devoid of anger."[40] Yet how much of our understanding of the role of anger within collective mobilizations of the powerless is shaped by existing social theory? And what of the anger or other emotions experienced by those in historically privileged positions when they feel their privilege to be in jeopardy? Lyman, for example, reminds us that the dominant representation within social theory of anger as a "subordination injury" emerges out of a very particular European historical genealogy shaped by European class and status anxieties.[41]

Drawing on Max Weber's analysis of Protestant asceticism and the rise of professional knowledge workers and bureaucratic knowledge techniques, as well as Svend Ranulf's study of middle-class indignation at the arbitrary power of the European aristocracy, Lyman demonstrates how the claim that "reason should be in control of the emotions" functioned as a form of ideology specifically intended "to silence angry speech" and prevent the lower orders from sharing in the new redistributions of power within modern liberal societies.[42] In short, he locates "the social construction of order as the *opposite* of anger" as one of the most fundamental contradictions of European liberalism.[43]

The context of opposition to an entrenched and arbitrary European aristocracy by a newly emerging and status-anxious European mercantile middle

class was quite different from that experienced by various populations in South Asia as they engaged with this very same European middle class of professionals—a class that eventually came to rule them. European commodity traders and administrators brought with them a version of the new impersonal legal and bureaucratic structures that were emerging in Europe and that helped secure their own political authority. However, the receptions and meanings attributed locally to these new legal and bureaucratic techniques by those who had little ideological investment in them meant that law and bureaucracy were understood much differently by residents of South Asia. Many simply took the legal and bureaucratic realms as yet another domain for playing out local competitions for power, status, and economic gain.[44] European discourses of liberalism—with their constructions of the autonomous individual as the ideal political subject, as well as the oppositions between rationality and emotion and between order and anger used to keep the lower orders at bay—spread through colonial encounters, but they never entered into a vacuum. Instead, these new discourses intersected with preexisting practices, ideas, and representations wherever they were introduced, leading to very different histories of the relationship between emotion and politics in, for example, South Asia or Latin America, when compared with Europe.[45] These historical differences must be taken into account as we approach the representation of emotion within politics, recognizing that practices that appear similar may not mean the same thing in different parts of the world. Indeed, the history of collective action in South Asia demonstrates that collective forms of mobilization and communication need not necessarily be premised on anger.

Take, for example, the contrast offered by Ramachandra Guha in his analysis of the reactions of the native rulers of the hill province of Tehri Garhwal versus those of the British colonial administrators who controlled the adjacent territory of Kumaun in response to nearly identical forms of practice. Analyzing a series of collective appeals in both locations during the early twentieth century, he demonstrates a marked difference in understandings of what he calls "rebellion as custom" and "rebellion as confrontation."[46] Although his use of the term *rebellion* here already reflects the dominant ideology that assumes all collective action to be rebellious rather than participatory, his close readings of concrete examples suggest something else. Guha focuses on the nonviolent form of collective communication known locally as *dhandak*, writing that "there existed in the moral order of society mechanisms whereby the peasantry could draw the attention of the monarch to the wrongdoings of officials."[47] He explains,

In the dhandak the absence of physical violence, barring isolated attacks on officials, was marked. The moral and cultural idiom of the dhandak was predicated firstly on the traditional relationship between raja [king] and praja [people], and secondly on the democratic character of these peasant communities. The rebels did not mean any harm to the king, whom they regarded as the embodiment of Badrinath [a manifestation of the deity Vishnu]. *In fact they actually believed they were helping the king restore justice.*[48]

Guha contrasts this understanding with that of British officials, "particularly those deputed from British India, who were often the targets of such revolts." He argues that the British officials "were unable to comprehend the social context of the dhandak" and therefore "invariably took *any* large demonstration to be an act of hostile rebellion."[49] Guha's description suggests that the dhandak was a communicative act rather than an act of rebellion or anger.

As K. M. Panikkar and Upendra Nath Ghoshal show, such actions were sanctioned by Hindu scripture in circumstances where the king had failed to protect his people.[50] Dhandak—along with *dum* or *dujam*, describing very similar forms of protest practiced in nearby Simla—sought to "draw the king's attention to some specific grievance" by "abandon[ing] work in the fields and march[ing] to the capital or to other prominent places."[51] Given that revenue collection would decrease when agricultural labor was suspended, Guha tells us that "the king would usually concede the demands of the striking farmers."[52] Guha interprets the marked "absence of physical violence" in such actions as evidence that local rulers were usually quite responsive in promising redress to such appeals, at which point "the crowd would disperse" and return to work.[53] In contrast, the British had much different understandings of the meanings of such collective appeals to authority, perceiving the massing of bodies in public space as itself a potential crime and typically responding with immediate punitive action rather than entertaining collective requests for audience.[54] Guha's extended analysis of a mass dhandak that emerged in 1930 in Tehri Garhwal reveals that there was no violence at all until the army was brought in to disperse the *dhandakis*.[55]

Although British officials clearly interpreted large demonstrations as angry and aggressive, it is not clear that either anger or rebelliousness defined such events. Instead, Guha portrays the dhandak as a socially condoned mechanism for communicating with authority and securing recognition as members of a larger social body. This example opens new possibilities for better conceptualizing how people in India have understood their relationships

with state officials—not always in adversarial terms but also in relation to historical forms that enabled recognition, inclusion, and ongoing relationships between sovereign and subjects.

Violence and Collective Action

As with the representation of anger in contexts where efforts to be recognized and heard had failed or were repeatedly ignored, violence is most obvious in the historical record in cases where the state sought to silence or disband an assembled group. Guha writes that, although the peasants of Kumaun offered a direct challenge to state authority, "physical violence was very rarely resorted to."[56] Archival evidence shows that, despite their frustrations with what they saw as insubordination and disorder, even British administrators recognized the absence of violence during collective actions in India. In response to the large collective action in Banaras in 1810–11, in which much of the population vacated the city to protest the imposition of a house tax, the collector himself acknowledged the peaceful nature of their action. Writing to the Revenue Department secretary at Fort William, he remarked, "Open violence does not seem their aim, they seem rather to vaunt their security in being unarmed in that a military force would not use deadly weapons against such inoffensive foes. And in this confidence they collect and increase, knowing that the civil power cannot disperse them, and thinking that the military will not."[57]

When collective actions did become violent, it was often in response to authorities firing on crowds to silence and disperse them.[58] The Indian historian Dharampal reinforces this view when he writes, "On the occasions when the people actually resorted to violence it was mostly a reaction to governmental terror, as in the cases of the various 'Bunds' in Maharashtra during the 1820–40s," a point that he connects with Tilly's observation of a similar phenomenon in the context of Europe.[59] Writes Tilly, "A large proportion of the European disturbances we have been surveying turned violent at exactly the moment when the authorities intervened to stop an illegal but nonviolent action. This is typical of violent strikes and demonstrations. Furthermore, the great bulk of the killing and wounding in those same disturbances was done by troops or police rather than by insurgents or demonstrators."[60] David Hardiman similarly recognizes a relationship between a nonresponsive state and the likelihood of violence, writing that "in situations in which the ruling classes were closed to any dialogue with the people and in which they

enforced their will by brute force, action by insurgents was likely to involve counter-violence."[61] But, he continues, "in situations in which channels were kept open for dialogue, protests might be almost entirely non-violent."[62]

The completely nonviolent 1810–11 Banarās collective action, which culminated in the British revocation of their proposed house tax, stands in sharp contrast with a very similar collective action in Bareilly just six years later in 1816, when the East India Company (EIC) revived efforts to implement a house tax. Unlike the Banarās protest, however, British authorities responded to the Bareilly "disturbances" by slaughtering some three to four hundred protesters, and no concessions were ultimately made to protesters' concerns. Although the Bareilly events have been widely historicized as an uprising of communal violence, with the EIC justifying its violent actions as a necessary response to the threat of Muslim radicalism, Waleed Ziad argues that the protest was "a coordinated cross-class mode of collective action aimed at repealing the tax, rather than a pre-meditated revolt to overthrow the local political structure."[63] As in Banarās, the Bareilly events began with nonviolent efforts to raise concerns about assessment of the tax, which was intended to support the establishment of a centralized municipal police force. Opposition came from a wide range of communities within Bareilly—Hindus and Muslims, landed gentry, religious leaders, "Buneyahs [traders], cloth merchants, and brokers," as well as "weavers, shoemakers, bricklayers and all lower orders," led by a "popularly chosen" local religious leader, Mufti Mohammad 'Iwāz.[64] When the mufti submitted a petition to the British magistrate asking that the tax be repealed, the magistrate not only disregarded it but also reportedly had stocks and fetters prepared for the tax evaders.[65] The magistrate of Bareilly noted that "two proclamations were put up inviting people to resistance," "combinations were formed," and "on the 28th [of March] the shops in the town were shut, and an immense multitude of [unclear] and shopkeepers of every description assembled in a tumultuous manner near my Cutcherry [government office]" in a strike that continued for several weeks.[66] Following a skirmish with company soldiers after the second week, the strikers moved to a Sufi shrine on the outskirts of town, where they were joined by "considerable numbers" of supporters from neighboring towns in the region.[67] Company troops followed them there and finally ended the strike on April 21 by firing directly on the crowd, killing between three and four hundred protesters.[68]

In analyzing the events at Bareilly, Ziad observes that colonial commentators attributed the violence to the "natural temperament" of local residents, thereby identifying violence as an attribute of a particular type or class of

individual.[69] British colonial officials described the initially peaceful protest as a "clash with an unruly mob" and as an "act of aggression upon 'the whole small European population, cooped up in the cantonment with only a handful of sepoys to protect them.'"[70] Ziad observes that even otherwise careful historians like Chris Bayly and Azra Alavi characterize these events as "premeditated uprisings promoted mainly by displaced Afghan nobility and an antagonistic religious official" and suggest that they typified "Muslim 'oppositional' attitudes" of the time.[71] Bayly, for example, calls the event a "savage urban riot that centered on a Muslim holy man" and "one of the most spectacular armed outbreaks against British rule."[72] What he fails to point out, however, is that the majority of the fatalities were among those opposed to the house tax. Strikers were killed at a rate more than ten times that of British soldiers, and it was the British who initiated the violence.[73]

Collective Assembly: A Matter of "Style" and "Subculture"?

Because of the increased British documentation of any event that became violent, mass claim-making efforts before Gandhi's entrance into the nationalist movement in India were frequently historicized only under the sign of violence. Nonviolent collective actions that were resolved peaceably were less often documented. Nonviolent efforts to communicate with authorities that later turned violent, usually in response to British attacks, therefore typically entered historical archives as violent confrontations. One of the earliest objectives of the Subaltern Studies project, for example, was to make sense of the "logic and consistency" of "peasant violence," about which colonial counterinsurgency operations had amassed such rich archives.[74] In *Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency*, for example, violence was the criterion that determined which events were chosen for analysis, lending the impression that subaltern actors were more prone to violence than elites. Yet as Charles Tilly reminds us, "Instead of constituting a sharp break from 'normal' political life, violent protests tend to accompany, complement, and extend organized, peaceful attempts by the same people to accomplish their objectives."[75]

Even more importantly, as Parthasarathi Muthukkaruppan argues, the violence perpetuated against marginalized groups—not only by the state but also by dominant groups fearful of losing their privileged positions—too often remains ignored.[76] He shows that violence is at the heart of persistent unequal social relationships like caste. Offering a close analysis not only

of "visible and large-scale mass killings and mundane forms of corporeal violence meted out to Dalits" in India today but also structural and symbolic forms of violence, he points to the complicity of social science and other scholarship in actively eliding the central role of violence perpetuated against socially marginalized groups in constructing and maintaining discriminatory social structures.[77] "As long as the hierarchy is in place in all spheres of life for men and women," writes Muthukkaruppan, "it is misleading to characterise the relationship as though it is based on 'cultural' difference and not on inequality or hierarchy."[78]

Similarly, the examples cited in the previous section suggest that it is when authorities take steps to actively *silence* grievances that violence is most likely to occur. This observation should prompt us, as Muthukkaruppan suggests, to pay closer attention to the practices and violence of those in structural positions of power. Being wary of binary oppositions that represent marginalized subcultural groups as more prone to engage in violent or excessively emotional "styles" of political engagement can help us recognize the broader structural effects of repeatedly not being heard.

Subculturalist approaches have characterized not only violence but also collective assembly itself as a "style" of politics associated with certain groups. In critiquing these approaches, I demonstrate that collective assembly is a communicative medium available to all but typically used only when more cost-effective (in terms of time, labor, and energy) methods of communication like petitions, letter writing, deputation, and individual face-to-face forms of communication have proven ineffective. Framing forms of collective assembly along a continuum, rather than as a distinct "style," allows us to better see the ways in which "impolite," aggressive, or violent encounters may themselves be produced by authorities seeking to silence competing opinions rather than being an intentional style of political intervention of members of an underclass or marginalized group. However, once a political encounter has turned violent, regardless of who initiated it, it becomes substantially easier for those in positions of power or authority to dismiss the content of what a group was attempting to communicate and make heard.

The historical construction of a dichotomy between order and anger and between civility and violence has been so successful that social theorists and authorities alike frequently assume that anger and potential violence play a constitutive role in virtually *any* large collective effort to approach or meet with those in positions of power.[79] This assumption is not made in response to individual efforts to meet with authorities, even when the motivating concern is the same. A sharp distinction between rationality and

emotion also continues to inform both theories of the political and theories of communication in ways that aspire to be universal. Jürgen Habermas's *Theory of Communicative Action* is one of the more influential examples of how this dichotomy continues to pervade social theory, and it is to this theory and its influences as a representative example that I now turn.[80]

Civility, Speech Action, and Collective Assembly

Representations of civil society—and indeed, of civility more generally—have privileged a form of restrained and unemotional speech action as an essential feature of the public sphere, often portraying such speech as offering protection and enabling more equal access for all. Consider, for example, the role that forms of speech action associated with the English coffeehouses, French *salons*, and German *Tischgesellschaften* (table societies) of eighteenth-century bourgeois social life played in the development of Jürgen Habermas's theory of communicative action. Despite variations "in the size and composition of their publics," writes Habermas, these various spaces "had a number of institutional criteria in common." First and foremost, "they preserved a kind of social intercourse that, far from presupposing the equality of status, disregarded status altogether. The tendency replaced the celebration of rank with a tact befitting equals. The parity on whose basis alone the authority of the better argument could assert itself against that of social hierarchy and in the end can carry the day meant, in the thought of the day, the parity of 'common humanity.'"[81]

Although the extent of the recognition and inclusiveness of a "common humanity" was likely quite limited in the early eighteenth century, Habermas suggests that

> the same process that converted culture into a commodity . . . established the public as in principle inclusive. However exclusive the public might be in any given instance, it could never close itself off entirely and become consolidated as a clique; for it always understood and found itself immersed within a more inclusive public of all private people, persons who—insofar as they were propertied and educated—as readers, listeners, and spectators could avail themselves via the market of the objects that were subject to discussion. The issues discussed became "general" not merely in their significance, but also in their accessibility: everyone had to *be able* to participate.[82]

This, then, was seen by Habermas to constitute "a sphere in which state authority was publicly monitored through informed and critical discourse *by* the people."[83] As a result, "control over the public sphere by public authority was contested and finally wrested away by the critical reasoning of private persons on political issues."[84]

In his examination of why Habermas's concept of the public sphere has had such widespread and lasting appeal, the historian of England's coffee-houses, Brian Cowan, suggests, "For Habermas, the eighteenth-century public sphere was important in world-historical terms because it seems to offer the closest thing to an actually-existing example of what he would later develop into the notion of an 'ideal speech situation,' that is, the conditions in which *individuals* may freely engage in rational and critical debate about the political and ethical issues of the day and come to a universally agreed-upon conclusion."[85] A broadsheet of 1674 offered the following "Rules and Orders of the Coffee House" that, even if written as a parody as some suggest, mark the representation of the newly emerging set of values:

> *Enter sirs freely, But first if you please, Peruse our Civil-Orders, which are these.*

> First, Gentry, Tradesmen, all are welcome hither, and may without affront sit down together: Pre-eminence of place; none here should mind, But take the next fit seat that he can find: Nor need any, if Finer Persons come, Rise up to assigne to them his room.

> He that shall any Quarrel here begin, Shall give each man a Dish t'atone the sin; And so shall he, whose Complements extend So far to drink in COFFEE to his friend; Let Noise of loud disputes be quite forborn, No Maudlin Lovers here in Corners mourn, But all be brisk, and talk, but not too much.[86]

By privileging restrained speech action, limiting loud and angry voices, and curtailing sentimentality and other strong emotions within an idealized public sphere as the keys to maintaining civility, attention has been directed away from the other end of the communicative process: the act of hearing or listening. Analytic attention to speech action perpetuates the hegemony of this idea of civility and frames the reception of speech acts and the act of recognition as playing no role in the maintenance of civility or, indeed, in the smooth workings of the public sphere.

A number of scholars, however, have challenged the presence of the ideal of formal universal equality that dominates theories of the public sphere

and of democracy. Nancy Fraser, for example, questions the Habermasian claim that differences can be bracketed to enable interlocutors "to deliberate 'as if' they were social equals."[87] In critiquing the contributions of Habermas's foundational account of an idealized and exclusively *bourgeois* public sphere to the formation of normative discourses of the public sphere, she seeks to challenge the hegemonic representations of the public sphere that support liberal understandings of acceptable forms of participatory democratic practice. Fraser argues instead that competing publics have always contested the norms of the bourgeois public sphere. "Subaltern counterpublics," she writes, "function as bases and training grounds for agitational activities directed toward wider publics."[88] As discussed in the introduction, rather than seeing the public sphere as a space defined by the norms of masculine bourgeois society and reading the entrance of new and conflicting groups and interests as causing its decline, Fraser's argument suggests that we may be better served by attending to the sites where interactions occur not only of competing interests but also of competing *styles* of political participation. She writes, "Virtually from the beginning, counterpublics contested the exclusionary norms of the bourgeois public, elaborating alternative *styles* of political behavior and alternative norms of public speech."[89] Michael Warner similarly suggests that the competing styles of counterpublics, particularly those that employ the body in a "creative-expressive function," may help us imagine public agency—including agency in relation to the state—in new ways:

> It might be that embodied sociability is too important to them; they might not be organized by the hierarchy of faculties that elevates rational-critical reflection as the self-image of humanity; they might depend more heavily on performance spaces than on print. . . . To take such attributions of public agency seriously, however, we would need to inhabit *a culture with a different language ideology, a different social imaginary*. It is difficult to say what such a world would be like. It might need to be one with a different role for state-based thinking.[90]

In drawing attention to bodily challenges to hegemonic norms, Warner advocates broadening our understanding of what constitutes communicative acts beyond the speech actions of a masculine, heteronormative public sphere.

Despite the importance of these interventions, these approaches share with the critics of the asa's actions a preoccupation with the styles and forms of communication rather than with their content and reception. Popular

views mirror these academic approaches in associating particular styles of intervention with specific countercultures that seek to challenge bourgeois norms. Although it is certainly important to broaden the recognition of specific forms of communication, such arguments contribute to and exacerbate two persistent problems. First, tying particular *political* behaviors to specific groups through the attribution of culturally (or subculturally) framed political "styles" implies the existence of substantively unique cultures that in turn produce distinct styles of communication. And second, this ignores the ways that structural inequalities and repeated refusals of recognition push individuals toward the adoption of collective communicative methods that are both more labor intensive and better able to be heard.

In Britain, for example, unrest erupted across England in the wake of the August 2011 shooting death by white police of Mark Duggan, a twenty-nine-year-old man of mixed British and West Indian descent. In Tottenham, the London neighborhood where Duggan was shot and where the rioting began, a young Black man explained the need for escalation in public spaces in order to be heard. "Two months ago we marched to Scotland Yard," he told reporters, "more than 2,000 of us, all blacks, and it was peaceful and calm, and you know what? Not a word in the press. Last night a bit of rioting and looting and look around you." The reporter in turn reflects, "Eavesdropping from among the onlookers, I looked around. A dozen TV crews and newspaper reporters interviewing the young men everywhere."[91]

Yet most commentators portrayed the unrest as resulting from a cultural style of behavior that encourages rioting, reflecting a "street code of vengeance,"[92] a "culture of violence" and a "pernicious culture of hatred,"[93] or a "particular sort of violent, destructive, nihilistic gangster culture,"[94] rather than recognizing the events as the escalation of increasingly frustrated efforts to be heard.[95] In 2014, during collective assemblies in the United States protesting police brutality against Black Americans in the wake of the wrongful death of Eric Garner, protesters took pains to communicate that their demonstrations were not riots but rather attempts to communicate with police, policy makers, and members of the judiciary.[96] Daniel J. Watt, in a political performance outside Manhattan's Times Square police station on July 29, 2014, made clear that he and his collaborators aspired "to provoke, not riots, but conversation."[97] Watt's song lyrics illustrate that concerns over racial disparities in policing in the United States have been both misunderstood and gone unheard, and that when repeated efforts to engage in conversation go unheard, there is little choice but to find ways to amplify one's communicative efforts. At the same time, these examples also illustrate

the structural disparities that exist in policing, with members of groups marginalized along racial and caste lines far more likely to be the victims of violence than the perpetrators, despite being more quickly associated with "cultures" of violence.

Labeling collective assemblies—both nonviolent ones and those that for whatever reason do turn violent—as political "styles" or as reflecting a unique political "culture" obscures the repeated efforts to be heard made by members of marginalized groups that are often identical to the forms of political communication used by members of dominant groups. These include (but are not limited to) writing letters, signing and circulating petitions, investing in efforts to hold face-to-face meetings with political leaders and representatives of the state, and engaging in restrained, rational, and polite speech actions. As the efforts made by members of the ASA at the University of Hyderabad demonstrate, even when forms of political communication used by members of marginalized groups do conform to what are seen as mainstream norms of civility, they may still continue to go unheard, unrecognized, and ignored. And, as argued in the introduction, the goal of these communicative acts is often simply to ensure equal and uniform enforcement of existing laws and constitutional provisions or to hold state representatives and officials accountable to their promises.[98]

Speech Acts, Validity Claims, and Recognition

Let us return to the situation with which this chapter opened. Members of the ASA repeatedly raised what Habermas would call a validity claim: "The speech act of one person succeeds only if the other accepts the offer contained in it by taking (however implicitly) a 'yes' or 'no' position on a validity claim that is in principle criticizable. Both ego, who raises a validity claim with his utterance, and alter, who recognizes or rejects it, base their decisions on potential grounds or reasons."[99]

Yet rather than receiving either a "yes" or a "no"—agreement or rejection of the specific validity claim in question based on "potential grounds or reasons"—members of the ASA instead received silence (from the authorities whom they addressed), retribution (in the removal of the Dalit hostel warden who had supported them), and scorn and degradation (from others in the hostel dining room who objected to their very presence and participation in the university public sphere and who expressed this by hanging up hostile posters). What the members of the ASA did *not* receive were

arguments countering their claims. By Habermas's definition, theirs was a failed speech act. But why did it fail? To answer this, we must look beyond the purely linguistic features of the communicative acts engaged in by members of the ASA to examine the conditions of recognition.

Expressing frustration with Habermas's efforts to "theorize modes of rational discourse purified of rhetoric," Iris Young argues that he builds on "a strain of Western philosophy" that claims that "allegedly purely rational discourse abstracts from or transcends the situatedness of desire, interest, or historical specificity, and can be uttered and criticized solely in terms of its claims to truth."[100] She advocates instead for "an expanded conception of political communication" by drawing on Emmanuel Levinas's conception of the "Saying" (the aspect of communication that involves "subject-to-subject recognition") as a supplement to Habermas's attention to what Levinas calls the "Said" (the "aspect of expressing content between the subjects").[101] Young extends Levinas's focus on the role played by forms of public recognition within political interactions by identifying greetings as a fundamental part of inclusive communication.[102] This "public acknowledgement," she writes, "names communicative political gestures through which those who have conflicts . . . *recognize* others as included in the discussion, especially those with whom they differ in opinion, interest, or social location."[103] Unlike Charles Taylor's attention to a politics of recognition as a political end, however, Young sees recognition "as a condition rather than a goal of political communication that aims to solve problems justly."[104] Locating her intervention within "a theory of democratic inclusion" that, she argues, "requires an expanded conception of political communication," she suggests that "the political functions of such moments of greeting are to assert discursive equality and establish or re-establish the trust necessary for discussion to proceed in good faith."[105] As such, Young argues that they represent a moment "prior to and a condition for making assertions and giving reasons for them."[106] As a precondition, they are as essential to inclusive political communication as the actual assertions and reasons.

Such an analysis prioritizes attention to efforts that expand or reduce opportunities for recognition and face-to-face communication. In India, earlier ideals of socially embedded relationships with those in authority now intersect in complex ways with discourses of ideal speech action drawn from liberal frameworks that celebrate individual autonomy, disinterestedness, and impersonal technique. As we have seen, practices such as holding regular audiences to which constituents may bring concerns, formally acknowledging collective appeals, and permitting spaces in front of government

offices to be used for assembly are still regarded by many as essential parts of how democracy works in South Asia. At the same time, however, these features of democracy have been threatened not only by a history of efforts to limit political access to public spaces but also by attempts to reduce or restrict opportunities for recognition and face-to-face communication. New innovations that have sought to individualize and depersonalize administrative processes, including moves toward "e-governance" and personal identity numbers, have similarly made processes of collective recognition more challenging.[107]

In the case of the ASA, rather than branding their "style" of communication as more emotional or violent than that of other students, such an expanded conception of political communication would focus not simply on its members' communicative acts but also on the conditions that have enabled or prevented them from being heard. It also would encourage attention to the very conditions of presence, noticing, for example, that efforts to raise the cost of the hostel mess fees well above the level of university fellowships have challenged the very presence of economically marginalized students within the space of the university.

Analyzing Communicative "Style," Emotion, and Politics

When writing about the "style" of political engagement, therefore, it is important to ask at every stage (1) whose "style" we are attending to; (2) where these individuals are located socially and politically; (3) at what point in a longer progression of efforts to communicate is "style" (including emotional states, anger, or violence) first marked; (4) who first marks communicative "styles"; and (5) what their relationship is with those whose "style" is marked. By recognizing the conditions that enable those already empowered to expect that their voices will be heard and acknowledged even when they speak softly, in moderate tones or as individuals, we can approach the history of the autonomous speaking subject from an alternate perspective. Those who stake exclusive claims to rationality and civility are too often those with existing access to established networks of power. Their attempts to frame their audibility simply as the product of the reasonableness of their arguments stem from the same conditions of privilege that also enable them to ignore, refuse to acknowledge, and silence communicative efforts with which they do not wish to engage. This suggests that we must be particularly attentive to all such markings of difference and must ask what work is being accomplished

when collective actions are labeled as angry, emotional, disruptive, uncivil, or irrational.

In addition, we must not attend only to the anger, emotion, or emotional styles of those in structurally less powerful positions, effectively treating the communicative actions of those with access to networks of power as though they do not also experience emotion. In the case of the expulsion of the ten Dalit students from the University of Hyderabad in 2002, we should be equally interested in the emotions of the chief warden and of the students from dominant caste communities responsible for the derogatory posters. Asking about the role that anger and resentment play among caste Hindus who fear their own loss of privilege in the face of the expanded inclusion of historically marginalized groups can help redistribute our attention to emotion. As Iris Young observes, "The only remedy for the dismissiveness with which some political expressions are treated on grounds that they are too dramatic, emotional, or figurative is to notice that any discursive content and argument is embodied in situated style and rhetoric. . . . No discourse lacks emotional tone; 'dispassionate' discourses carry an emotional tone of calm and distance."[108] Attending to the ways that proximity to institutional authority shapes the freedom to play with various styles of communication can help avoid reinforcing the idea that rationality is the absence of emotion.

Rather than strengthening existing hierarchies by assuming that anger is the standard *choice* of the marginalized and that calm speech is the *choice* of those in positions of power, we can work to recognize the work that goes into *not* hearing, as well as the ways in which depersonalized bureaucratic structures can function to relieve those in authority from the obligation to listen or to recognize collective communicative acts as political participation.[109] Tracking historically, ethnographically, and textually the construction and maintenance of powerful distinctions in the representation and marking of different political and communicative styles; interrogating the "styles" and emotions of structurally empowered speakers as often as we do the styles of those already marginalized; and asking what those in power stand to gain from dissecting the communicative styles of those on the margins can go a long way toward these goals. In the next chapter, I explore the longer history of representations of the autonomous individual speaking subject and collective forms of communication in the wake of the deliberative turn in the study of democracy.