

The Micropolitics of Borders

The Issue of Greater Nagaland (or Nagalim)

As an Indian national, every time I go to Nagaland I have to make a mandatory visit to Nagaland House in Aurangzeb Road, situated at the heart of Lutyens' New Delhi to obtain an Inner Line Permit, known in common parlance as an ILP, to enter the State.¹ Once inside Nagaland State, I am also required to go to the district commissioner's office within a seven-day period to get the permit extended for a period of three months. Each time I have to supply my photograph and the name of my local guarantor and host. The very fact that as an Indian citizen I need an ILP to enter a border area in my own country speaks volumes about the nature of the northeastern border and how the colonial legacy has continued to keep the area inaccessible and under state control.

This chapter delineates how the situation of Nagaland on the borders of Indian territory has had a determining influence on its people, its politics, and the development of ethnicity, which at its extreme is expressed in the desire for sovereignty. The development of such political sentiment can be traced throughout the postcolonial history of the past seventy years. The internal competitiveness for hegemony along 'tribal' lines within the Naga nationalist movement in conjunction with the obsession of the different sides—the government of India; the Indian Federal States of Assam, Manipur, and Arunachal Pradesh; and the Naga nationalist groups—with where the borders of Nagaland/Nagalim should be, and the modern demand and assumption that there should be clearly marked and unambiguous borders, are what keeps the conflict so intractable.

The Inner Line

The Inner Line and excluded territories were administrative measures deployed by the British to keep a check on the usurpation of land by entrepreneurs during the nineteenth-century ‘tea rush’ in Assam in the area bordering a loosely demarcated territory known as the Naga Hills district (Baruah 2005: 92–93). The Inner Line regulation also distinguished the administered territory from the fuzzily defined unadministered area which lay beyond British control (Yonuo 1974: 94). The Inner Line was a constantly shifting ‘boundary’; as the ‘frontier’ moved, so did the Inner Line.

In the 1830s the British East India Company began to explore the eastern borders of Assam for possible tea plantation.² They secured the region by restricting entry to what was declared in official terms ‘wasteland’ (Baruah 2005: 91–95; Guha 1991; Gangopadhyay 1990). The communities living in the ‘wasteland’ beyond the ‘frontier,’ including the ancestors of the present-day Naga, did not have any say in this expansion. After the 1850s the presumed ‘empty tracts’ were also used for settling migrants from other parts of India who worked as seasonal labor in the tea plantations as well as to settle migratory groups such as the Kuki people from the neighboring Manipur Kingdom.³

The administered part, known as the Naga Hills district in the colonial period, along with the unadministered territory, is mountainous and covered with thick tropical forest and lies between the plains of the Brahmaputra River in Assam and the Chindwin River in Myanmar (Burma).⁴ This region has been home to many different communities, which formed a buffer between Burmese, Assamese, and Manipuri kingdoms (Roy Burman 1968). James Scott (2008; see also Scott 2009) describes the upland northeastern region of India as part of a nonstate space, which is one way of contrasting village republics with larger kingdoms. Based on the historical literature and colonial archives it would seem that this buffer zone was not specifically under any one kingdom’s control; rather it was at the margins, with some villages having reciprocal relationships with the kingdoms (Barpujari 1992).

The historical records, or *Buranji*, of the twelfth-century Ahom rulers, a Tai people who had conquered parts of Assam, mention land deals with the neighboring hill communities identified by the name of their villages (Barpujari 1992; Baruah 1999). In the eighteenth century the Burmese defeated the Ahom kingdom and then were themselves defeated by the British in the first quarter of the nineteenth century. The Anglo-Burmese Treaty of Yandabo

in 1826 also included transfer of the hill region between Assam and Burma to British India. With a view to finding a direct land route to Burma from Assam, British exploratory expeditions were sent into what later came to be known as the Naga Hills. When British interests conflicted with the villages, several punitive expeditions were sent into the hills to coerce the communities to enter into a settlement with the British.

Franke (2009) reiterates the point that annexation of the northeastern region by the British was not a reluctant act but was part of the imperialist strategy of expansion and search for new resources to increase revenue (see also Baruah 2005; Yonuo 1974: 95; Hilaly 2007). The nineteenth century was the time of exploration and survey. The discovery of oil reserves in 1889 at Digboi in Assam and coal in the surrounding region resulted in the building of the railways in the northeast (Hilaly 2007).

That the railway network in this part of India, Northeast Railways, was renamed Northeast Frontier Railways in 1958 raises the question of whether the northeast is a frontier only for the railway network or remains a frontier region, preserving the old sense of a moving border between a known territory beyond which lies as yet unknown land. Certainly since precolonial times this geographical area has been a 'frontier' region in sharing borders, but also cross-cutting trading networks, with what we now know as China, Myanmar, and Bangladesh (see Baruah 2005, 2009; Van Schendel 2005a; Robb 1997; Mishra, this volume). In other words, when and how do such regions become regarded as borders at one time and as part of a nation-state at another?

Nagaland, one of the seven northeastern States of India, shares its border with Myanmar and, for the government of India, is strategically located as part of a buffer against neighboring China and Myanmar. Since the Sino-Indian War of 1962, China has laid claim to the Indian State of Arunachal Pradesh, which lies to the north of Nagaland and borders Tibet, China, and Myanmar. It ignores the McMahon line, about 885 kilometers long, drawn in 1914 during the British colonial period as an outer line and international border along the northeastern Himalayan crest, which brought the trade center of Tawang (now in Arunachal Pradesh) into British Indian territory. The various 'frontier tracts,' identified as Balipara, Sadiya, Mishmi, and Tirap by the British colonial administrators, were renamed North East Frontier Agency by independent India in 1954 and now form the State of Arunachal Pradesh.

Unlike the formation of West Pakistan and East Pakistan (Bangladesh since 1971), where the 'known' land was divided between two countries, causing

tremendous upheaval, leading to mass movement as well as large-scale massacres of people, the formation of India's northeastern border is said to have been more speculative. In the popular imagination an arbitrary line was drawn over the Patkai ranges when Jawaharlal Nehru, prime minister of India, and U Nu, the prime minister of Burma, flew over the area to determine the international boundary, thus unwittingly dividing villages perched on the mountaintops between the two nations. On both sides the area is envisaged as remote, with freedom of movement by local communities for sixteen kilometers on either side of the border. In recent years the Myanmar junta has helped the government of India by destroying the camps of two Naga nationalist groups on their side of the border. This tacit understanding between India and Myanmar is perhaps the basis for the government of India's diplomatic silence on issues of democracy in Myanmar.

Compared to India's northwestern border with Pakistan, which has been in national and international focus since 1947, the northeastern border with Myanmar has received only intermittent attention. The formation of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) took away a large tract, leaving only a thin corridor strip about twenty kilometers in breadth that connects the rest of India to the seven northeastern States. At a conference on Asian borderlands held in Guwahati in 2008 an Assam government minister claimed that the northeast is equidistant to Hong Kong and Delhi and questioned the very term 'northeast,' asking, "'Northeast' of what?"⁵ Of course, in nationalist narratives distance is measured from the capital city of the country. But 'the northeast' has always evoked the idea of a very distant place. As Baruah (2005) rightly points out, a posting to the northeast still carries a stigma of 'punishment' imposed on central government employees, despite the fact that they enjoy a hardship allowance and an income tax break.⁶

The seven northeastern States (earlier constituting most of undivided Assam) now have an equal status with other States in India. On the one hand, some of these northeastern States (e.g., Nagaland, Mizoram, Arunachal Pradesh) can be regarded as nonstate spaces according to Scott's (2008, 2009) argument in that they were not previously part of any kingdom. On the other hand, the large number of rebel movements in the northeast seeking autonomy or sovereignty demonstrates that they no longer wish to remain nonstate systems and that the days of viable nonstate space are gone. The demand for a 'greater' Nagaland (or Nagalim) is intended as a move toward formation of a nation-state of their own.



FIGURE 7.1. On 18 November 2006 a special reconciliation ceremony was held in Nagaland between the clans of A. Z. Phizo and T. Sakhrie. T. Sakhrie, the first general secretary of the Naga National Council and Phizo's trusted lieutenant, was murdered in 1956 after he rejected violent rebellion (see chapter 7, note 7). Photograph courtesy of V. Joshi.

Riots and Reconciliation

On 22 February 2009 a mass convention for reconciliation was held in Kohima, the capital of Nagaland.⁷ This was a part of the ongoing attempt by Naga civil society organizations, comprising the Naga Baptist Church Council, Naga Mothers' Association, Naga Students' Federation, Naga Ho Ho, and Naga People's Movement for Human Rights (NPMHR), to bring together the different rival factions of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland/Nagalim—NSCN(IM), NSCN(κ), NSCN(Unification)—and Naga National Council (NNC-Accordist and NNC-Non-Accordist).⁸ As one unit they would then be able to negotiate with the Indian government. Among those present were also international representatives of the Quaker group and Baptist World Alliance. However, factional killings and attacks have continued between NSCN(IM) and NSCN(κ), indicating the arduous process of reconciliation and the difficulties that the sharing of power poses for nationalist groups, especially the two main NSCN factions (see figure 7.1).

In 2010 the Indian government was engaged in negotiations with only one group, the NSCN(IM), concerning sovereignty and the unification of the Naga area, although it had cease-fire agreements with both NSCN groups. In 1997 a cease-fire was announced with NSCN(IM) and ground rules were laid. In 2001 a cease-fire was also agreed between the Indian government and the NSCN(K) group. There is a Ceasefire Supervisory Group, led by a chairman (the first chairman until 2008 was Lt. Gen. [Ret.] R. V. Kulkarni) from the government of India, personnel from the Assam Rifles and Indian Army that are stationed in Nagaland, Nagaland State home commissioner, Nagaland State police chief, and the representatives of the two NSCN factions. Cease-fire talks are also held separately with each faction.⁹

These were followed in the same year, 2001, by revised ground rules for the cease-fire agreed with both NSCN factions:

- NSCN will notify list of all its camps to the [Cease Fire Monitoring Committee] who after due consultation would declare them as the designated camps. In the interest of promoting peace process, there would be no parading (either in groups or individually) of NSCN cadres in uniform and/or with arms. For the present, this would cover all populated areas, public transport and Highways.
- The concern that forcible collection of money on essential supplies and intimidation of individuals including Government officials were taking place was denied by the NSCN. However, in the interest of promoting the peace process, the NSCN representatives agreed that the above activities would be prevented.¹⁰

The cease-fire with both factions was limited to the territorial boundaries of the present State of Nagaland. The attempt by the NSCN(IM) group to extend it to “all the Naga inhabited area” was rejected by the government of India on the following grounds:

In a federal structure, the Union Government is required to consult the State Governments, and at the time of the first agreement with the NSCN(I/M), such consultation has taken place only with the Government of Nagaland. . . . The term ‘Naga areas’ is vague and has not even been defined. NSCN’s repeated references to the Naga areas have given a feeling of unrest and apprehension in the minds of the other State Governments, as indicative of your claim for Greater Nagaland directly or indirectly. While

agreeing with the cease-fire between the Govt. of India and the NSCN as two entities, it has never been the intention of the Govt. of India that it should be interpreted by NSCN(I/M) as a step directly or indirectly towards recognition of any claim to Greater Nagaland. The intention was only to maintain peace with the NSCN as an Organisation, and to extend the area of peace in the North East.

Yet, the Govt. of India stands by its commitment to the cease-fire agreement with the NSCN(I/M) as an entity with a view to furthering the cause of peace. The Govt. of India would consider extension of cease-fire with the NSCN(I/M) to other areas in the North East subject to the condition that NSCN(I/M) accepts and agrees to issue a statement that extension of cease-fire to other areas will not be interpreted by them as a step towards recognition of their claim to Greater Nagaland.

As mentioned above, extension of cease-fire to other areas would require consultation with the concerned State Governments. The Govt. of India agrees to hold this consultation process in an agreed time-frame.¹¹

Then, also in 2001, the government of India issued a statement to the effect that the cease-fire would be extended to all Naga-inhabited areas in the north-east. This was received with trepidation by the Manipur State government and was interpreted as the central Indian government's agreeing to the NSCN demands for a 'Greater Nagaland.' A series of violent riots in Manipur resulted in the hasty removal of the offending phrase.¹² The Cease Fire Monitoring Committee's jurisdiction is limited only to Nagaland State. There are designated camps for the NSCN(IM) and NSCN(K), but the factions have nevertheless allegedly extended their camps in Naga areas in Manipur,¹³ Arunachal Pradesh, and North Cachar Hills district of Assam. Extortion, violent clashes between the two NSCN factions, and the killing of civilians have continued in these areas as well as within Nagaland.¹⁴

By 2010 Nagaland had a putatively democratically elected State government, which was a coalition between regional and national parties and separate parallel governments that are run by three Naga factions. Both the NSCN factions call their parallel governments the People's Republic of Nagalim, while the NNC's body calls itself the Federal Government of Nagaland, or FGN. English-language newspapers in Nagaland provide daily reports on the intra-factional fighting, as well as publishing rejoinders issued by factions and appeals by civilians to stop the extortion and killings.

The power structures of the elected government have been weak from the very inception of the State of Nagaland. As Baud and Van Schendel (1997: 228) note, “The position of the regional elite weakens because it is exposed as an agent of the state rather than a protector of local rights and concerns.” Nagaland State before its inauguration was governed by an interim body of ‘tribal representatives’ comprising councilors from the dominant Ao, Angami, and Sema (now Sumi) communities who were members of the Naga People’s Convention and were not supportive of sovereignty. The first government was formed by these representatives. The first Legislative Assembly elections in 1964 were contested by two parties but won by the party considered closer to the central government of India. However, internal divisions among the Naga, that is, between the nationalists (who were known as the ‘undergrounds’), and those who were ‘overground’ and trying to run the Nagaland State, over the issue of sovereignty were also augmented by suspicion that the former had been ‘bought’ by the government of India. The increase in armed ‘insurgency’ during the mid-1960s to the late 1970s resulted in the imposition of President’s Rule in Nagaland, that is, the suspension of the State Legislative Assembly. In the past thirty years the national political parties, such as the Indian Congress, have found a foothold in the State. Most Naga politicians (including the chief minister of the State in 2011) have at one point or another been members of the Nagaland Congress Party. The State politicians have made alliances even with the so-called Hindu national parties, such as the Bharatiya Janata Party, when it was the ruling party in India.

The Quest for Sovereignty

How the Naga national movement has reached this juncture has been a long, winding process. Sifting through the literature on Naga politics written by both Naga and non-Naga writers is like opening a Pandora’s box—or perhaps a can of worms. The literature is full of details of various rounds of negotiations, the signing of accords, and programs.¹⁵ Most such accords have succeeded only in dividing the Naga, creating suspicion, and causing the assassination of moderate Naga by their radical comrades. Since the early years of Indian Independence in 1947, alleged Indian high-handedness in political negotiations and the forceful suppression of the Naga movement have simply fueled Naga demands for sovereignty. There is some truth in the claim that the alienation of the Naga peoples is directly related to blunders committed

first by the India Committee and then by brutal army action by the Indian government to quell the Naga armed uprising.¹⁶

At present, and despite some autonomy secured in 1963 through the creation of the State of Nagaland within India, many Naga are divided over the issue of full independence and sovereignty. My impression is that most Naga believe that full sovereignty (i.e., independence) is ultimately the only answer. But for many also the long decades of factional strife, intimidation, and extortion by the Naga ‘nationalists,’ all of which have continued despite the cease-fire agreement, does not portend a bright future for an independent Nagaland. The present atmosphere is such that very few are able to express critical opinions openly. Those who do are immediately threatened for having put themselves before the greater Naga cause.

As an indication of this, the NNC/FGN’s Yehzabo (constitution) declares that “a Naga who undertook oath of allegiance to the Indian Constitution clearly betray[s] Naga nation” and “cannot serve the interest of Nagaland.” It asserts that it is the Naga people who occupy Nagaland and that India cannot resolve the conflict through the creation of an administrative entity with no basis in history. It further cautions that whoever attempts “to subvert the authority of the FGN and NNC shall be judged according to the National Resolution passed on 27 April, 1955 at Lakhuti.”¹⁷

By contrast, in 2000 a pamphlet appeared entitled “Bedrock of Naga Society,” produced by the Nagaland Pradesh Congress Committee and written by S. C. Jamir (2000), a former chief minister of Nagaland. The pamphlet criticized the demand for Naga sovereignty and challenged the assumption that Naga existed as an independent nation before the British annexed parts of their territory. It began with the following statement: “The 16-Point Agreement of 1960 came about when the Naga were going through the worst of times. But it was also one of the best things to have happened to the Naga people because it led to the birth of Statehood—on whose firm foundation our society is built. In a larger form of things, due to the Agreement, for the first time, the world recognised the territory of the Naga as Nagaland.” The pamphlet was vehemently denounced in Nagaland by the political parties and the nationalist factions for distorting historical facts and as an attempt to divide the Naga (Baruah 2005: 111–12). The protestors staged public burnings of the pamphlet. The Naga Students Federation office in Kohima displays a framed burned copy of the pamphlet to denounce the “divisive politics” of Jamir (Lotha 2008: 55). One of the bureaucrats who allegedly coauthored the

document has been threatened by the NSCN(IM) group. The publication came at a time when peace negotiations between NSCN(IM) and the Indian government were taking place. It is alleged that, in 2004, Jamir was sent out of the State to become governor of Goa in order to allow for smoother peace talks.

Such was the controversy that by the time of the 2008 general elections in Nagaland the pamphlet had been withdrawn by the Congress Committee. However, the pamphlet touched on two sensitive issues at the heart of the present Naga movement: sovereignty and the unification of all Naga-inhabited areas—that is to say, an independent Greater Nagaland. The precise area covered by greater Nagaland, or Nagalim, as it is now called by NSCN(IM), is quite vague. Contradicting their earlier position in the pamphlet, the Nagaland Congress Party included the demand for Greater Nagaland in its 2008 election manifesto. The present coalition government of the State of Nagaland, known as the Democratic Alliance of Nagaland, has also taken on the agenda of Greater Nagaland.¹⁸

The present quest in the Naga movement for sovereignty and the formation of Nagalim or Greater Nagaland clearly invokes a narrative not only of an imagined community but one based on continual reconstructions of history. Van Schendel (2005a: 4) notes that “dominant historical narratives may sacralize borderlands and make them pawns in the ‘performance’ of sovereignty. Borderlanders may develop counter-narratives (e.g. irredentist ones) in which the historical significance of the border that separates them is minimized. In other words, borderlands are often battlefields of historiography, of the politics of selective remembering and forgetting.” Despite the many internal differences, there is broad agreement among the various strands of Naga nationalism that Naga sovereignty and unification should be based on the following points:

1. The Naga were always independent and were a nation before the British annexed part of their territory.
2. The Naga are one people but divided into many groups that have similar cultural traits. Naga have common ancestors and arrived at their present habitat after migrating from the north and/or from the east (Burma). Ptolemy is quoted as the oldest source mentioning hill tribes living on the northeastern fringes of Assam.
3. The Naga are Christian and speakers of Tibeto-Burman languages.

4. As far back as 1929 Naga had submitted a memorandum to the Simon Commission declaring their intention to be independent. This was signed by educated Christian Naga, mostly from the Angami community, who worked for the British administration as clerks and interpreters.

Invoking an ‘Ethnie’

These claims are far from uncontroversial. The argument that Naga are one people, a nation, and were always independent before the British annexed part of their territory may be regarded as part of the process of constructing an ‘ethnie’ (Smith 1984, [1994] 1998: 709). As is often the case in such situations, the term ‘Naga’ has no known or agreed origin.¹⁹ Conjectural suggestions abound: that the name was derived from the Sanskrit *nāg* meaning ‘mountain,’ or *nanḡā*, the Hindi/Sanskrit for ‘naked,’ or from the Kachari *nok*, meaning ‘a warrior,’ or from Burmese *nā kā* meaning ‘those with pierced ears.’²⁰ The Naga themselves never had a common term for the different communities that occupied the hilly tracts. Some of these communities had different terms for themselves from those used by their neighbors. The term ‘Naga’ itself was used by outsiders, especially the British, when they came in contact with hill communities during the surveys for tea plantations in Assam from the 1830s onward. The Naga were divided into *pakka* (real) and *kachcha* (raw, half-baked) by the British during their first contact with the hill communities. The *pakka* Naga resided in the northern areas and “went naked,” whereas the *kachcha* lived in the southern areas and wore a “short black hobbled kilt” (Hutton 1965: 16). The oldest documents that mention contact with the hill communities living on the east of Assam are the twelfth-century chronicles, or *Burunjia*, of the Ahom rulers (Barpujari 1992). The hill communities were named after their villages or the dominant village in the cluster and further divided into *Bori* (tame) and *Abori* (untamed), depending on the distance from the Assam plains and their relationship with the Assamese.²¹ The Ahoms were Tai people who moved westward, passing areas inhabited by the hill communities now known as Konyak, Tangsa, and Nocte. The legends and folklore of these hill communities also provide an oral account of such contact. Ptolemy’s mention of hill tribes in the area (150 CE) is taken as further confirmation of early Naga presence (Shimray 2005; Sanyü 1996; Iralu 2000).

Currently the name Naga is used as a suffix after the individual name of the group, for example, Ao Naga, Phom Naga, Konyak Naga, which asserts both the individual identity of the group and their collective ethnic identity. What constitutes the collective identity of the entity Naga is based on certain institutional similarities and on material culture (Lotha 2008). But some groups sharing similar cultural traits do not identify with the Naga nationalist movement. Depending on the benefits of exclusion and inclusion and the coercive tactics used by the Naga nationalist groups, some groups identify themselves as Naga and others do not (see also Longkumer 2010).

The legends reinforce this sense of diversity counterbalanced by common identity. Some of the central and southern Naga, for example, the Angami, Lotha, Sema, Chakesang, and Rengma, share a common legend of origin; their ancestor, Koza, is said to have come from the south, settling at Kezakenoma, with the community then dispersing in various directions from Chiteba, where an old pear tree is said to mark the site of dispersal (Joshi 2012; Lotha 2008). On the other hand, the Ao, Sangtam, Yimchungrü, Phom, Chang, and Khiamniungan of north and northwest Nagaland believe that they migrated from the east. The Ao and Sangtam, in addition, also have the same myth of origin, which claims that their ancestors emerged from the six sacred stones at Longtrok. Recent excavations at the place have indeed revealed ancient settlement patterns and artifacts belonging probably to the Neolithic period.²² A common theme in the various tales of migration is of emergence from the mouth of a cave or an opening in the earth. Here it is interesting to note that we have oral genealogical evidence from the recent past of people having a common origin but within a few generations developing some linguistic, ritual, and material cultural diversity. If such diversity could arise from a common origin so swiftly within living memory, it certainly could have happened less recently, as indicated in the older legends of origin of certain Naga groups.

A common feature in some legends is that ancestors of Naga peoples as well as those of the plains people were brothers. A number of folktales illustrate the cunning of the plains people. The Tangkhul of Manipur trace the origins of the Meitei and Tangkhul as well as other Naga groups (in Nagaland) to a pair of brothers who migrated from the east (Myanmar). The younger brother settled on the fertile plains, while the elder brother went to the hills to avoid heat and mosquitoes. The descendants of the elder brother thus spread northward, becoming the ancestors of all the Naga communities, and those of

the younger brother became ancestors of the plains-dwelling Meitei people (Horam 1975: 25–26). This view of all the varied Naga communities coming from a single direction suits the nation-building aspirations of the NSCN(IM) group and is quoted frequently in the writings on Naga nationalism by Tangkhul scholars (see Horam 1975, 1988; Vashum 2000; Shimray 2005). This is in contrast to the early colonial writings. Hodson (1911: 8–9) mentions that there are three different legends of migration among the Tangkhul, and one of them points to Naga, Kuki, and Meitei having a common ancestor who had three sons. Other myths of origin and migration that have become popular in recent Naga writings point toward a possible migration of some groups from the north (i.e., from China). Thus the website of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation (UNPO) claims that “the Naga are [a] racially and ethnically distinct people. Today there are 16 major and 20 minor tribes with a total population of a little over 3 million. About 95% of the Naga are Christian. The Naga people originally came from Mongolia, migrating to Nagalim in the 10th century B.C.”²³

Any scholarly writing that is seen as a challenge to the rhetoric of unity based on an oral history of migration is rejected by most Naga decision makers. For example, a book by Purotongzuk Longchar (2002), an Ao historian, which deviated from the Ao Naga myth of origin and dispersal from the Longtrok site near Chungliyimti village, was not accepted by the Ao council even though the writer had based his conclusions on oral narratives collected from different Ao villages. Longchar was eventually forced by the Ao Council to apologize publicly and withdraw his book.

Diversity is further evident in the plethora of languages and dialects in use among Naga. The official language of the proposed Nagalim is English, as is already the case in the present Nagaland State, in recognition of the many Tibeto-Burman languages and dialects spoken by Naga. The other, more extensive lingua franca spoken by Naga in Nagaland is Nagamese, derived from Assamese, an Indo-Aryan rather than Tibeto-Burman language, whereas in Manipur the Naga lingua franca is Meitei or Meiteilon, the Tibeto-Burman language of the Vaishnav Manipuri/Meitei population. In the past few years concerns have been voiced by public intellectuals regarding the preference for Nagamese over English as the language of conversation among people belonging to different tribes, and of Nagamese over Naga languages in urban families. The objection is essentially political because Nagamese is seen as an

extension of Indian hegemony by virtue of its basis in Assamese and Hindi. On the other hand, T. Muivah of NSCN(IM), recognizing the popularity of Nagamese in Nagaland, has begun to address his meetings in Nagaland in both English and Nagamese.

Naga see themselves as distinct from the rest of India, while recognizing the internal complexity of their identity as a people. Some Naga scholars (Sanyü 1996; Lotha 2008) identify unifying traits, such as the erstwhile practice of cloistering or *genna*,²⁴ status-gaining ‘feasts of merit,’ an egalitarian social system based on age sets, clans, and the past tradition of headhunting. Some of these features are in fact common not only to Naga groups but also to a number of neighboring communities within northeast India as well as those farther afield in Southeast Asia (Kirsch 1973; Woodward 1989; Lehman 1989; Blackburn 2007). At a micro level some Naga communities have dissociated themselves from their earlier colonial classification, in some instances coalescing different groups into one unit. The group classified by the colonialists as Eastern Angami thus declared themselves a separate tribe from other Angami in the 1960s. They took on the name Chakesang, comprising Chakro, Kheza, and Sangtam. (Sangtams have since left the union, but the group name of Chakesang continues to be used by the other two.) Three groups, Zeme, Liangmei, and Rongmei, came together in the 1970s to form the Zeliangrong ‘tribe’ under the influence of Gaidinliu, the charismatic Heraka leader. The group labeled as the ‘naked’ Rengma in colonial writings are now a separate group called Pochuri, distinct from the rest of the Rengma grouping. The Tikhirs, who are claimed as one of their clans by the Yimchungrü, have been striving for separate group status since the 1990s.²⁵

The difficulty in discerning the boundaries of Naga groups extends to overlaps in material culture and language. Moreover it is difficult to demarcate physically Naga territory from that of the neighboring groups who live in mixed villages at the boundaries of the Naga nation or Nagalim as proposed by the NSCN(IM). The situation regarding the proposed Assam-Nagalim borderlands is no different from that of the Indo-Myanmar border (Goswami 2007, 2008). Where the Naga area ends and non-Naga area begins is a question that cannot be easily answered. There are overlaps between neighboring communities. We can agree with Van Schendel (2005a: 9) that “borders not only join what is different but also divide what is similar.” Naga nationalists claim


that Naga communities are spread over an area of 120,000 square kilometers (map 7.1). The UNPO website describes Nagalim as

situated between China, India and Burma. Nagalim occupies a compact area of 120,000 km² of the Patakai range between the longitude 93° east and 97° east, and in between the latitude 22.5° north and 28° north which lies at the trijunction of China, India and Burma. The part of Nagaland ruled by India consists of territory which today is administered by four different administrative units, the states of Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur and Nagalim.

The eastern part of Nagalim, ruled by Myanmar (roughly 100,000 km²) has been placed under two administrative units, those of the Kachin state and of Sagaing [Sagaing] division.²⁶

Religious Reinforcement

A key part of the rhetoric of contemporary pan-Naga identity focuses on the dominant religion of (mainly Baptist) Christianity.²⁷ Christianity is seen as the unifying force that has brought together Naga from different groups in an evangelistic mission. The Christian character of independent Nagaland was first put forward by the NNC, although the Constitution of the Naga Federal Government gave equal rights to the animist Naga. The present NSCN(IM) leadership emphasizes Christianity in their motto “Nagaland for Christ.” When Nagalim was inducted as a member of UNPO, the leaders presented the president of the organization with a cloth inscribed with this motto. Thuingaleng Muivah, the leader of NSCN(IM), has been quoted as saying that his is an evangelistic mission,²⁸ a statement that has been criticized by some church leaders as having a ‘jihadi’ connotation. Though almost 90 percent of Naga are Christian, not all of them follow Baptist Christianity. Since the 1950s other denominations have made their way into Nagaland; Catholics and various Revival churches, such as Pentecostals, Seventh Day Adventists, and Jehovah’s Witnesses, have churches in several towns and villages, especially in the southern Naga area.²⁹ The 10 percent of the non-Christian Naga follow animism. A large percentage of Zeme Naga who live in Peren district of Nagaland and the North Cachar Hills district of Assam are followers of Heraka, a charismatic cult begun by Gaidinliu in the 1930s.³⁰ This has brought the Zeme into confrontation with the NSCN(IM), who are keen for them to convert to Baptist



MAP 7.1. Nagaland and area claimed by Naga nationalists as part of Nagalim or Greater Nagaland and based on a map available at www.nagalim.nl (accessed 12 September 2012).

Christianity.³¹ Across the border in Myanmar, NSCN has been instrumental in the Christian conversions among Myanmarese Naga (Jacobs et al. 1990). The Christian discourse is such that Vashum (2000: 99–100), writing on the Naga national movement, states that NSCN's split into two factions in 1993 was linked to the inability of the then vice chairman of NSCN, Sagwan Sankai Khaplang, to follow the strict discipline of the Christian life and give up the use of alcohol and narcotics.

Much earlier the issue of religious differences became a feature, though not the only one, in Naga attempts to gain recognition and of colonial responses to such claims. In 1927 the Conservative government in Britain appointed an Indian Statutory Commission, popularly known as the Simon Commission after its chairman, to decide the political future of India. The Simon Commission was boycotted by the Indian National Congress, the Muslim League, and other organizations as no Indians were included. However, the Naga, who were not a part of the mainland Indian freedom movement, sent a letter to the Simon Commission in 1929 expressing their wish to be recognized as separate from the rest of India and sought an independent status at the end of the British rule. The argument they put forward was similar to that expressed separately by Robert Reid, who was the governor of Assam, and also by J. H. Hutton, an anthropologist and former district commissioner of the Naga Hills, that the Naga peoples were different in their customs, religion, and governance from the mainland and plains Indians (see Elwin 1961).

The 1929 memorandum by the Naga to the Simon Commission declaring their intention to be independent is put forward as an argument in support of the claim that the decision to be independent had been made by Naga even before India itself became independent in 1947. The memorandum cited fear of Hindu hegemony and 'forcible' conversion, singling out their concern that they would be discriminated against both by Hindus and by Muslims over their diet of pork and beef. The memorandum was signed by a group of educated Christian Naga, mostly from the Angami community, who worked for the British administration as clerks and interpreters. Among them were two pastors. At that point in Naga history only some 13 percent of Naga were Christian (Baptist).³² About two thousand Naga men had already experienced World War I when they were sent as part of the French Labor Corps in 1917 (see Balfour in Hutton 1921: xvi–vii). A group of Naga who returned from France, together with those who were employed as government officers and interpreters (Dobashi), formed a society called the Naga Club in 1919. Major

conversions to Christianity took place after the 1944 Battle of Kohima in which Allied forces, with the help of the Naga, halted the Japanese incursion. Many Naga also converted to Christianity in the mid-1970s, when a massive Christian revival wave swept through Nagaland coinciding with brutal Indian army action against Naga nationalists and civilians (Luen 2009).

The Origins of the Nationalist Movement

After the battle of Kohima in 1945, Charles Pawsey, then deputy commissioner for the Naga Hills, formed the Naga Hills District Tribal Council to bring the Naga together for the postwar reconstruction program (Ghosh 1982; Singh [1972] 1995; Hutton 1945). Within a year it acquired political overtones and in January 1946 changed its name to the Naga National Council (NNC; Singh [1972] 1995: 89). Allegations and counterallegations have been made against each other by the Naga since the inception of the NNC. The diaries of Mildred Archer, who accompanied her husband, W. G. Archer (posted as additional deputy commissioner), for six months to the Naga Hills in 1947, reveal the developments that led to the demands for independence by the Naga National Club.³³ The Ao and Lotha members of the NNC were initially not in favor of independence as proposed by the Angami, fearing Angami hegemony in an independent nation. In 1947 the NNC members agreed to autonomous status within Assam with a ten-year interim government at the behest of the Ao members, who stated their apprehension regarding the viability of an independent Naga nation with no source of revenue and no armed forces to control the unadministered territories, where 'headhunting' raids were the norm.³⁴ Finally, in this stalemate, and at the suggestion of the deputy commissioner for Naga Hills that the Naga should present a united front to the All India Constituent Assembly, the NNC then turned in support of the Angami demand for independence to take effect after ten years of being an interim part of Assam. "This interim government was to have full powers in respect of taxation, legislation, the executive and the judiciary, while a guardian power was to give it a financial subvention, and to place some armed force at the Nagas' disposal."³⁵ However, the subcommittee on the constitution of Naga Hills of the All India Constituent Assembly (which included only one Naga among its seven members), rejected this proposal of a Naga interim government.

After much deliberation between the NNC leadership and the last British-appointed governor of Assam, Sir Akbar Hydari, a nine-point accord for an interim government for ten years was signed in June 1947. The Naga communities

represented by the signatories were the Western Angami, Eastern Angami, Kuki, Kacha Naga (Zeme), Rengma, Sema, Lotha, Ao, Sangtam, and Chang. These communities were within the British administrative boundaries. The sixth point of the accord on boundaries stated, “Boundaries—That present administrative divisions should be modified so as (1) to bring back into the Naga Hills District all the forests transferred to the Sibsagar and Nowgong Districts in the past, and (2) to bring under one unified administrative unit as far as possible all Naga. All the areas so included would be within the scope of the present proposed agreement. No areas should be transferred out of the Naga Hills without the consent of the Naga Council” (Yonuo 1974: 174). The ninth point of the accord regarding the future of Naga at the end of the ten-year period was, however, disputed by the members of the Naga Council. It was seen as ambiguous and was interpreted by some members as equal to their gaining independence from India at the end of the ten-year arrangement. The ninth point stated, “Period of Agreement—The Governor of Assam as the Agent of the Government of the Indian Union will have a special responsibility for a period of 10 years to ensure the observance of the agreement, at the end of this period the Naga Council will be asked whether they require the above agreement to be extended for a further period or a new agreement regarding the future of Naga people arrived at” (174–75).

Angami opinion was divided on this. The Kohima group of Angami agreed to go with the accord, whereas the Khonoma group demanded full independence at the end of ten years and rejected it. A delegation led by Zapu Phizo, an Angami from Khonoma village, went to Delhi to put forward their case to Gandhi as well as talk to Jinnah. However, within a few days of signing the accord the Delhi Committee visiting Assam allegedly brushed aside the agreement, suggesting that Naga should send a delegation to Delhi. The Naga were then left with no clear idea as to the future of Naga Hills. In the meeting of the NNC that followed just before Indian Independence, the Naga once again disagreed over the issue of their own independence. On 14 August 1947 Zapu Phizo, leading the breakaway section, declared Naga independence. However, the telegrams he sent to the newspapers, the United Nations, and the Indian government were intercepted at the Kohima post office, and thus never reached their destination.³⁶ The Naga declaration of independence therefore went unnoticed by the press. Meanwhile in Kohima, the non-Naga (Mizo) wife of the British government employee Kevichusa (who was then assistant to the deputy commissioner as well as a leading Angami from Khonoma village) hoisted a black Angami Lohe cloth as the independent Naga national

flag in the compound of their house, situated below Kohima village, near Mission Compound. This angered the Kohima Angami, who did not support independence and who also interpreted the hoisting of a Khonoma cloth as an extension of Khonoma village's hegemony over Kohima territory. Charles Pawsey, then district commissioner for Naga Hills, had the cloth taken down to disperse the angry mob.³⁷

In 1950 Zapu Phizo was made the leader of the NNC. In 1951 the NNC conducted a plebiscite on the issue of Naga independence. It is alleged that 99 percent of Naga supported the ballot with their thumbprint. However, the plebiscite did not include eastern Naga (currently Tuensang, Longleng, and Mon districts). The issue of the colonial division of Naga into administered and unadministered has continued to be relevant to the present political divisions. The Eastern Naga Peoples Organization and Eastern Naga Students Organization strive to gain an equal footing in decisions regarding the political future of Naga by emphasizing that they have always been independent, even of British colonial rule. During the army action by the Indian government in the 1950s, the eastern groups of Naga along the Indo-Burma border had also joined the fight against the Indian army, and this is put forward as a counterargument to those who question the inclusion of all Naga in the plebiscite by NNC (Iralu 2000: 78). Naga training camps were also established among the eastern Naga villages.³⁸

By the mid-1950s there was once again a division between moderates and radicals among the NNC, which eventually resulted in the resignation of high-profile members such as T. Sakhrie and Dr. Imkongliba, who were against the use of violence for gaining independence. Both were assassinated by Phizo loyalists for their moderate views in support of autonomy within the Indian Union. In 1960, after protracted army action,³⁹ a peace accord was signed between the Naga People's Council and the Indian government which became the basis for the formation of Nagaland State in 1963. The State comprises the erstwhile Naga Hills and Tuensang Area, which includes parts of unadministered territory that lay between the Naga Hills district and Burma during British rule.

The Thirteenth Amendment Act of the Constitution of India (1962) gives more autonomy to the Naga through special safeguards, which cannot be withdrawn unless the Legislative Assembly of Nagaland decides to pass a resolution against them. Thus the Nagaland State Assembly retains authority over (1) religious and social practices of the Naga; (2) Naga customary law and

procedure; (3) the administration of civil and criminal justice involving decisions according to Naga customary law; and (4) the ownership and transfer of land and its natural resources (Singh [1972] 1995: 101). With these constitutional safeguards, the Naga are in a privileged position, as they have private ownership of the land, forest, and water resources, unlike in the rest of India, where water and forest resources are owned by the government.

However, the formation of the State yet again divided the Naga into those who supported the State and those who wanted independence and unification of all Naga areas.⁴⁰ By then the Tangkhul, Mao, and the non-Naga Kuki of Manipur had joined the Naga national movement.⁴¹ The Nagaland State boundaries did not include these areas. The new State also did not get the land that had been transferred to Assam during colonial rule. Thus two kinds of government came into existence in Nagaland: the elected State government and the parallel 'underground' government, called the Federal Government of Nagaland, with their leader, Phizo, living in exile in London. The protracted conflict continued. Two more accords were signed: first, the Peace Accord in 1964, and then the Shillong Accord in 1975, which was formulated during the Emergency Rule in India. Both these accords created further divisions. Phizo's silence on the Shillong Accord, in which Naga signatories had agreed to abide by the Indian Constitution, resulted in the formation of a breakaway group in 1980 called the National Socialist Council of Nagaland, which was led by Thuingaleng Muivah, Isak Chishi Swu, and Sagwan Sangkai Khaplang. In 1993 NSCN itself split into two groups following an allegation by Khaplang that Thuingaleng Muivah and Isak Chishi Swu were making a deal with the Indian government. (As noted earlier, Khaplang's personal commitment, or lack of it, to Christian standards of behavior was also said to be an issue.)

Differences in ideology as well as 'tribal' group identities have played a part in these fissiparous nationalist politics. The NNC at its inception was dominated by the Angami and Ao members. The first split in Zapu Phizo's NNC saw the separation of the Sema group, which eventually surrendered in the 1964 Peace Accord. In the 1980s the formation of NSCN passed on the leadership of the nationalist movement to Naga who mainly hailed from communities that live outside the boundaries of the present State of Nagaland.

At present Naga are divided along party lines, with each party adhering to different aims with regard to the political status of Nagaland. The moderates believe in more autonomy within the Union of India, which the present State of Nagaland currently enjoys, while the extremists favor secession and



FIGURE 7.2. Memorial to A. Z. (Zapu) Phizo (1904–90), Kohima, Nagaland, 2011. It reads, “Father of the Nation, here rests the man who gave his all for the nation.” On the plinth is a quotation in Tenyidie and English: “Our land is our heritage, to none shall it be surrendered: as whetstone our opponents sharpen us.” Photograph courtesy of V. Joshi.

independence. At present there are at least five different State-level political parties (some of which are linked to the national parties of India, such as the Indian National Congress, Bharatiya Janata Party, and Rashtriya Janata Dal) and three main underground organizations. It is common local knowledge that during State elections the NSCN factions back candidates from rival groups. NSCN(κ) is said to side with the Congress Party, whereas NSCN(IM) has its sympathy with the present State government of Nagaland formed by the coalition Democratic Alliance of Nagaland.

The Demand for Redrawing Borders

In recent years the demand for redrawing the borders of Nagaland has become a key issue for Naga nationalists with differing views on where the borders should be. As mentioned earlier, at the inception of the Naga movement in the 1940s the demand for the unification of Naga areas did not specifically include the hill districts of Manipur and the villages across the border in Burma (Myanmar). However, over the past two decades the inclusion of these areas has become central to the demands for an independent Greater

Nagaland or Nagalim. In the internal politics of the nationalist movement this demand for a Greater Nagaland has further consequences that go beyond independence claims and fuel the regional politics of leadership, 'tribal' hegemony, and the continued political stalemate with the government of India. Paradoxically this nonresolution of the conflict prolongs and so benefits the fundraising efforts of insurgent groups and delays the intractable problem of which of the rival groups would assume power in an independent Nagaland.

The divisions are evident in the visualization of Nagalim or Greater Nagaland by each of these groups. The NSCN(IM) in its negotiations with the Indian government is demanding the consolidation and unification of all Naga areas within the Indian union. These comprise two districts of Arunachal Pradesh (Tirap and Changlang), three districts of Assam (North Cachar Hills, Karbi Anglong, and parts of Sibsagar, Jorhat, Tinsukhia, and Dibrugarh, including the oil fields), and four districts of Manipur (Ukhrul, Senapati, Chandel, Tamenlong—almost two-thirds of the present State). The northern Naga areas in Myanmar are not part of the demand made to the Indian government but are shown on the Nagalim map of NSCN(IM). The Naga villages in the northern Myanmar portion are controlled by the NSCN(K) faction, but the southern Naga regions in Myanmar include some Tangkhul villages. The inclusion of the Assam oil fields, especially the region explored by the Indian Oil and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC) and found to have substantial reserves, is aimed at capturing the revenues from their exploitation. In the popular imagination in Nagaland it is claimed that Nagalim has immense natural resources of crude oil, natural gas, coal, and semiprecious stones. No evidence has yet been offered to support these claims. However, crude oil exploration by ONGC in the Champang region of the Lotha Naga-dominated district of Wokha was stalled after NSCN(IM) cadres threatened ONGC employees in 1994.

The Khaplang-led NSCN, on the other hand, demands a Greater Nagaland that does not include Manipur, especially the Tangkhul-dominated Ukhrul district, Tangkhul being rejected for fear that they might take control of an independent Nagaland. Naga within the State of Nagaland support integration with the areas in Assam, but in what can only be called 'kitchen talk' or private views, they are not in favor of integration with other Naga areas, especially Tangkhul. Most are now weary of the constant demands made by the two NSCN groups. They complain that the leaders are both from outside Nagaland State: Muivah is a Tangkhul, and Khaplang is a Heimi from Myanmar.⁴² Since Zapu Phizo's death in 1990, the NNC has dwindled in scope,

overshadowed by the larger and better organized NSCN groups. As mentioned earlier, in Nagaland State-level politics the demand for Greater Nagaland has been included in the manifesto of both the Nagaland Congress Party and the present coalition government, the Democratic Alliance of Nagaland.

The three major factions have parallel governments, each with its own constitution and departments of finance, publicity and information, foreign affairs, and defense. So far negotiations have taken place only between the Indian government and the NSCN(IM) group. The latter wants all negotiations to be unconditional and outside the scope of the Indian Constitution. To this effect it has proposed a 'federal' system in which Nagalim will have its own way of governance (apparently not based on democratically elected government), with a separate flag, its own army to maintain law and order, but using the Indian currency and allowing the Indian government to be responsible for foreign affairs and defense.⁴³ However, the Indian government insists on reaching a solution within the framework of the Indian national constitution. The result is a persisting stalemate. The Indian Constitution has provisions for changing the boundaries of constituent States of the federation, allowing decrease or increase of a State's area as long as both houses of Parliament agree on the issue and India's overall territorial integrity is maintained, as stated in the Preamble to the Indian Constitution.

The NSCN(IM) maintains that it is the sole representative of the Naga peoples. On this basis it had previously rejected any demands for reconciliation with other factions. It has publicly denounced the Khaplang-led group as being antistate and accepting funds from the Indian Intelligence Agency. Similar allegations have been made against the NSCN(IM) leadership by the Khaplang group.

In 1992 NSCN expelled the Kuki of Manipur from the Naga nationalist movement, simultaneously issuing a notice to all Kuki residing in southern Nagaland to leave. Prominent Kuki civilians were killed. In 2006 the NSCN(K) group issued a quit notice to the Tangkhul Naga living in Nagaland. Such quit notices inadvertently ignore the social realities of the present State of Nagaland. For while there are divisions along tribal lines, in urban centers there are intertribal marriages between Kuki and Naga and between Naga of Nagaland and Manipur. Some Nagaland State bureaucrats hail from other northeastern States as well from 'mainland' India.

Since the cease-fire agreement of 1997 the NSCN(IM) has increased its support base in Nagaland and, against the cease-fire rules, has continued to recruit

cadres and collect taxes from all households, businesses, and government departments. About 25 percent of the salary of a government employee is claimed in taxes by the factions. Taxes are also collected from people living in the areas claimed as part of Nagalim. Ransom demands from both Naga and non-Naga (in common parlance, 'nonlocals') have continued. There have been claims that countries sympathetic to the Naga nationalists have supplied them with funds as well as arms, even from across the Indian Ocean (Shimray 2005). The flow of money from the center to the northeastern States provides a constant supply and inadvertently finances the insurgency (Nag 2008). Ramesh (2005) illustrates the total dependence of the northeastern state economy on the central funds (see also Mishra, this volume). Eighty percent of the Nagaland State budget is financed by the central government. On top of that, funds for development are constantly given to the States. If not claimed, these funds do not lapse but go back to the corpus, unlike the yearly funds available to other Indian States. The present 'Look East' policy of the Indian government has meant that northeastern States are now in an even better position to demand funds for infrastructural development, which may indirectly go into funding the insurgency (compare Farrelly, chapter 8, this volume). This is in contrast to the beginnings of the nationalist movement, which was based on what Elwin (1961: 75) saw as the "simplistic" claim by Naga that they could sustain themselves through hard work by tilling their land, depending on a subsistence economy.

WHAT SUSTAINS the Naga nationalist movement is the colonial experience, conversion to Christianity, and education of a people projected as a Christian population distinct from their Hindu, Muslim, and Buddhist neighbors. This is combined with the living memory and memorialization of sustained brutal army action by India during the 1950s and 1970s and the deployment of the controversial Armed Forces Special Powers Act since the 1960s, which has not been repealed.⁴⁴ In addition the geographical advantage of the mountainous landscape, forest cover, proximity to the international border, and guerrilla war tactics have helped the nationalist movement in the past to evade the Indian armed forces after the ambushing of army convoys and during the army's 'combing' operations against the insurgents.

The Naga secessionist movement has continually raised issues of ethnicity and identity. Paradoxically, while seeking overall Naga autonomy, the movement has experienced rivalry and competition among its members, which

have been expressed through, and so have reinforced, internal boundaries and distinctions of ‘tribe.’

Underlying the fragmented quest for sovereignty is the relationship between the plains and valley dwellers and the hill dwellers. The legends relate the separation of brothers and the cunning of the plains people, which is reflected in the demand for independence by a section of Naga. Coexisting with this is what Van Schendel calls selective remembering and forgetting, a distortion of history into modern time. As Van Schendel (2002a) has emphasized, the northeastern borderlands of India sit at the confluence of three world areas: South Asia, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. The communities that live in this ‘Zomia’ region all fall in the margins of their main area.

On the one hand, as Van Schendel (2005a: 12) points out, states presume that “the borderland is considered to be ‘known.’” At the same time, “state elites of the region have displayed a pervasive concern with sovereignty, security and territorial control. They have kept the borderland fairly inaccessible and this also has dissuaded academics from studying it” (12), thus creating “geographies of ignorance” (Van Schendel 2002a). This view is clearly applicable to the Naga area. The Inner Line Permit that was introduced in 1853 by the British colonial administration was retained, initially, at the behest of the Naga leaders (Yonuo 1974: 174). Its continued use in the northeastern States, especially Nagaland, is a direct consequence of the political situation. It dissuades Indian academics from entering an area out of fear for their security. It creates suspicion of ‘Indian’ researchers as being covertly engaged in intelligence gathering.⁴⁵ Any research on the politics of the Naga movement that is not explicitly in favor of nationalist demands may also be viewed with suspicion by the vigilantes of the movement (such as the Naga Students Federation).

Thus alongside the paradox that borders are at the center of state definition and reality, there is a second paradox that applies to situations such as that of Nagaland. In the struggle over borders between competing secessionists on one hand and the federal state on the other, prolonged nonresolution of the conflict may benefit both sets of combatants. Thus the regional factions can defer the seemingly impossible task of converting severe political division into a unity government, and the Nagaland State government can continue to reap economic benefits in the form of subsidies from the central government (a considerable percentage of which is siphoned off to the rebel movements as a

‘tax’). At the same time the federal state of India exploits this political uncertainty by continuing to deploy armed forces along its national borders, and so preserves a buffer zone between itself and other nation-states.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 7

1. An Inner Line Permit is needed by Indians to enter some of the northeast Indian States. Foreigners require a Restricted Area Permit (RAP), which is obtained through the Indian Consulates. Beginning in January 2011 the RAP requirement for foreigners (except from Afghanistan, China, Bangladesh, and Pakistan) for Nagaland was lifted provisionally for one year to improve tourism in the State. However, ILP regulations for Indian citizens continued. Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, FAQs on Protected Area Permit and RAP, accessed 19 October 2011, mha.nic.in.

2. After the Indian Sepoy Mutiny of 1857–58, the East India Company was dissolved and the administration of India passed to the British government. The capital of British India was moved from Calcutta to Delhi.

3. Land was given to tea plantations under the Waste Land Grant Rule of 1838. The conditions were liberal, and revenue rates were very low (Gangopadhyay 1990: 134; compare Baruah 2005: 92). Guha writes that by 1901 tea gardens occupied nearly one fourth of the total settled area in Assam (Guha 1991: 191; cf. Baruah 2005: 93). Carving out tea plantations restricted the movement of the local population to forest paths. See also Joshi (Patel) (1994).

4. In 1989 Burma was renamed Myanmar by the new military regime.

5. “Northeast India and Its Transnational Neighbourhood,” Asian Borderlands Research Networks Conference, Indian Institute of Technology, Guwahati, January 2008.

6. It has to be remarked that even today non-Naga do genuinely find conditions difficult in Nagaland.

7. Reconciliation among warring factions and between the families of victims of underground violence and the underground is now seen as essential for any meaningful unity among the Naga. In October 2008 a football match was organized by the Naga Baptist Church Council between a united team of Naga nationalists and Naga civil society members. In November 2006 a large gathering of all the clans from Merhema ward (*khel*) of Khonoma village and the representatives of civil society organizations was held to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of T. Sakhrie’s death. The occasion also highlighted the reconciliation between the clans of Sakhrie and Phizo (Dolie). An elder of Dolie clan apologized to the Sakhrie clan for the assassination. Sakhrie was the right-hand man of Phizo until his fallout and was brutally tortured and killed (Nibedon [1978] 1983: 70–72). He was labeled a traitor on account of his moderate views supporting autonomy within the Indian Union. See also the website of Unrepresented

Nations and Peoples Organization, www.unpo.org; Sanjoy Hazarika, “Let the Bloodshed End,” www.hardnewsmedia.com, accessed 10 November 2008.

8. NSCN(IM) is the National Socialist Council of Nagaland/Nagalim—Isak Chishi Swu and Thuingaleng Muiwah (at Camp Hebron, Diphupar, Dimapur); NSCN(K) is National Socialist Council of Nagaland–Sagwan Sankai Khaplang; NSCN(Unification) comprises members of the IM and K factions who came together to form a united National Socialist Council of Nagaland (at Camp Khehoi, Dimapur).

9. I happened to be at the venue of two such meetings in January 2008, a government guesthouse in Kohima, where I stayed with a colleague. On our arrival we were stopped by the armed guards outside the gates of the guesthouse to allow the “important meeting” to finish and to wait until after the “parties” had left. Later we were told in hushed tones that the meeting was between the representative of the NSCN(K) group and the Ceasefire Monitoring Committee’s chairperson. A couple of days later we chanced upon a large gathering for another “important” meeting. On this occasion the semicircular space in front of the guesthouse building was surrounded by vehicles with red lights on top, pilot jeeps, and several men sporting AK-47 assault rifles. It turned out to be the Ceasefire Monitoring Committee’s High Command meeting with the NSCN(IM) group representative, ‘Brigadier’ Phunthing, and some of his comrades. The High Command comprised the army chief of staff, the director general of Nagaland Police, the Nagaland home commissioner, the Assam Rifles chief, and the chairperson of Ceasefire Monitoring Committee. These meetings had urgency as President’s Rule (the suspension of the State Legislative Assembly) had been declared in Nagaland on 4 January 2008, after a no-confidence motion was passed in the Nagaland Legislative Assembly against the ruling coalition just months before the Assembly elections were due to be held. Meetings were to assure that no untoward activity should take place in the run-up to the elections. The Nagaland public was visibly relieved at the imposition of President’s Rule as there had been rampant extortion of money in the preceding months by the ‘national workers’ (as the insurgent outfits call themselves).

10. From *Fault Lines: Writings on Conflict and Resolution*, South Asia Intelligence Review, South Asia Terrorism Portal, retrieved 20 January 2009, www.satp.org.

11. *Fault Lines*, South Asia Intelligence Review. See K. Padmabhaiah, “Territorial Cease Fire with NSCN IM,” South Asia Terrorism Portal, accessed 19 January 2009, www.satp.org.

12. R. Kojiam, “Naga Ceasefire and Manipur,” *The Hindu*, 13 July 2001, accessed 19 January 2009, www.hinduonnet.com.

13. See news report on NSCN(IM) camp in Shirui, Ukhrul district, Manipur and the clash in January 2009 with Assam Rifles: “AR-/NSCN-IM Gun Battle in Ukhrul,” *Morung Express News*, 12.08.2009, accessed 23 May 2013, www.tangkhuul.tangkhuul.com.

14. In February 2009 the subdivisional officer and his two staff members from Kasom Khullum in Ukhrul district were abducted and then killed by the NSCN(IM)

cadres. After public protest at these “senseless brutal” killings, the NSCN(IM) from Camp Hebron in Nagaland issued a statement that they had set up a “fact-finding committee and exemplary punishment will be meted out to the cadres who have committed the crime.” See “A New Definition of Barbaric Killing Invites 48 hrs Gen Strike” and “NSCN(IM), Naga Organisations, Others Decry Slaying of SDO and Two Employees,” *The Sangai Express*, 17.02.2009, e-pao.net/GP.asp?src=1.180209.feb09; “Finally, IM Hands over Hopeson Ningshen to CBI, Remanded to 15 days,” *The Sangai Express*, 29.05.2009, e-pao.net; “Naga Army not to Spare any Cadre Involved in SDO Killing,” *Hueiyen News Service*, 21.02.2009, e-pao.net/GP.asp?src=20.220209.feb09; “Manipur Protests Continue,” *Assam Tribune*, 26.02.2006, www.assamtribune.com; ‘SDO Murder: People Want NSCN (I-M) Cadres to be Taken to Task,’ *Times of India News*, articles.timesofindia.timesofindia.com; all accessed 23 May 2013.

15. For examples, see Nuh and Lasuh 2002; Vashum 2000; Horam 1975, 1988; Shimray 2005; Iralu 2000; Rammuny 1988; Nibedon (1978) 1983, 1981; Luithui and Haskar 1984; Rustomji 1983; Sema 1986; Singh (1972) 1995; Maxwell 1979; IWGIA 1986; Yonuo 1974; West 1999.

16. See Luithui and Haksar 1984; Iralu 2000; Chasie 1999. The brutality of the Indian army is also the subject of Naga literature, for example, *These Hills Called Home: Stories from a War Zone* by Temsula Ao (2000). She was awarded the Padam Shri, a civilian honor, in 2007 by the government of India.

17. Shevohü Keyho, “Let Our People be Aware,” *Morungexpres*, accessed 23 May 2013, www.nagalim.nl/news/00001139.htm. See also Nuh and Lasuh 2002.

18. In early 2010 the Democratic Alliance of Nagaland government again addressed the demand for a return to Nagaland of the areas in Assam that had been transferred during the colonial period. However, when the central government asked for submission of the original maps, these could not be found, so the issue remains unresolved.

19. I have sometimes been asked in Nagaland whether I knew the first usage and origin of the term ‘Naga’ as I am a researcher. Such queries are not unusual: Burling (2007) writes that he was often asked about the origin of the Garo by the Garo themselves.

20. See Hutton 1921; Elwin 1961; Ao 1970.

21. See also Hutton 1965: 16. The labels for objects collected for European museums from these hill communities in the nineteenth century show a similar trend. While some objects are identified as Ao, Angami, or Rengma, others bear Assamese village names for hill communities such as Bordoria or Namsangia. See Joshi 2008a.

22. Excavations were carried out around Longtrok in 2006–8 by a team of Naga archaeologists led by Tiatoshi Jamir (Jamir and Vasa 2008).

23. See ‘Nagalim’ www.unpo.org (retrieved 10 December 2008). See also Burling (2007) for similar views on the migration of the Garo peoples of Meghalaya.

24. The term *genna* derives from the Angami word *kenyü*, denoting prohibition on movement and cloistering. It has now become part of the Naga lingua franca.

25. This insistence on a separate identity is also related to positive discrimination in

terms of reservation in government jobs for backward tribes that Nagaland State follows as part of national policy in India for the integration of the ‘backward’ communities into the mainstream. The Naga themselves are part of the Scheduled Tribe classification and benefit from reservations in government jobs and educational institutions.

26. See “Nagalim,” accessed 10 November 2008, www.unpo.org. Nagalim became a member of UNPO in 1993 after concerted efforts by NSCN(IM).

27. For a comparable case from Myanmar, see Gravers 2007; Sakhong 2007.

28. See also Shimray 2005: 158–60.

29. See Joshi (2007, 2008b, 2012) on Christianity among the Angami Naga.

30. See Kabui 2004; Yonuo 1974; Longkumer 2007.

31. A similar line of argument is dominant among the Mizo, who have marginalized the non-Christian communities in Mizoram since the signing of the Mizo Accord with the Indian government and the subsequent formation of Mizoram state in 1987 (Das 2007: 40–42).

32. Eaton (1997: 246) provides comparative statistics from the census of India for the percentage of Naga that were Christian in 1881–1990.

33. See Mildred Archer, “Journey to Nagaland, An account of six months spent in the Naga Hills in 1947,” typescript, Pitt Rivers Museum Archives, University of Oxford. They are also available online in the Naga database at www.alanmacfarlane.com. Of course, such writings are selective, subjective, and open to debate for the accuracy of their historical content.

34. See M. Archer diaries, 1947, and W. G. Archer papers and tour diaries, 1946–48, Naga database, www.alanmacfarlane.com.

35. Mildred Archer, “Journey to Nagaland.”

36. The postmaster passed the telegrams to Charles Pawsey, the last British district commissioner of Naga Hills, who in turn decided not to send them. W. G. Archer diaries 1946–48, Naga database, www.alanmacfarlane.com.

37. W. G. Archer manuscript notes and diaries 1946–48, Naga database; Sentsi 2004. Anungla Aier and Easterine Iralu helped me confirm that the Angami cloth that was hoisted was in fact black-colored *Lohe*, which is common to both Kohima and Khonoma Angami villages.

38. See Lintner (1990) for his account of travel through these camps to reach the Kachin Independence Army in Burma.

39. According to reports by human rights groups (IWGIA and NPMHR), in the 1950s and 1960s ruthless actions, including the burning of villages, were undertaken by the Indian army. Monuments to those who died fighting the army are prominent among the Angami. In Jotsoma village the martyrs’ graveyard overlooks the village. In the same village, in a *thehuba* (public meeting place), is a lasting inscription on a flat rock that informs readers that Jotsoma village was burned by the Indian army in 1956. Such monuments are a constant reminder to the younger generation of the ongoing war

for Naga freedom. The brutality of the Indian army is also the subject of recent Naga literature (see Ao 2000).

40. Sema 1986: 59–72; Singh (1972) 1995: 98; Rustomji 1983: 69; West 1999: 38–39; Gundevia 1975; Horam 1975, 1988. Elwin (1961: 670) writes that when demand for Nagaland State was accepted by the Indian government, the pastors in the radical NNC group used the biblical text of Exodus 32 to denounce the move and draw parallels between those who accepted the creation of Nagaland State and the worshipping of the Golden Calf by the Israelites while Moses was away in the mountains.

41. The Tangkhul considered themselves exploited and marginalized by the Meitei of Manipur. However, Baruah (2005: 115), writes that this claim is contentious, as Manipuri kings have had Tangkhul generals and since the formation of Manipur State there have been two Tangkhul chief ministers.

42. Khaplang has sometimes been erroneously identified as a Konyak, a group that is similar to the Heimi.

43. See “India’s Hidden Wars in the North East Nagas Float Federal Model,” UNPO, 06.10.2006, accessed 2 February 2009, www.unpo.org.

44. See Figures 7.1 and 7.2. Names of nationalist martyrs on public memorial stones and epitaphs are a constant reminder of the nationalist movement.

45. A Naga researcher working in the Northeast in a community different from his own was under suspicion by both the Indian army and the Naga nationalists (Longkumer 2009).