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Richard Nixon deepened US-Soviet cooperation and began US-Soviet strategic arms negotiations, but his détente policies ultimately failed, because of Soviet behavior and the secretive operating style of Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger. The chapter draws on declassified reports of backchannel negotiations between Kissinger and Soviet ambassador Dobrynin. It discusses the US-Soviet summit held in 1972, SALT accords and Soviet leadership maneuvering. An important element is Nixon’s failed efforts to use Moscow to moderate North Vietnamese behavior, his decision to escalate bombing and block Soviet supplies despite the risk to the summit, and Moscow’s recognition, based on Kissinger’s comments at the summit, that the US sought only a “decent interval” between withdrawal and Hanoi’s takeover of the south, which may have contributed to Soviet pressure on Hanoi to accept the 1973 agreement ending US involvement in Vietnam.

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